3, Field's L. B., §§ 87, 88; Fraud, vol. 3, Field's L. B., §§ 558, 575; Tracy v. Sackett, 1 Ohio St. 42; 59 Am. Dec. 610.

§ 49. Liability for torts.

A lunatic, or other person non compos mentis, is liable in damages in a civil action for any tort which he may commit, although he is not punishable criminally therefor: Morse v. Crawford, 17 Vt. 449; 44 Am. Dec. 349; Williams v. Cameron, 26 Barb. 172; Behrons v. McKinze, 23 Ia. 343; Contracts, vol. 2, Field's L. B., § 81.

§ 50. Unsoundness of mind as a defense to a criminal charge.

An idiot, lunatic, or permanently insane person, or one who is otherwise unsound in mind, to the extent that he does not know whether he is doing right or wrong, is not punishable for any act he may do while in that state: See vol. 2, Field's L. B., §§ 270, 271; Reg. v. Law, 2 F. & F. (Eng.) 836; Rex v. Offord, 5 C. & P. (Eng.) 168; Vance v. Com., 2 Va. Cas. 132; State v. Spencer, 21 N. J. L. 196; McAlister v. State, 17 Ala. 434. A person cannot be responsible for a crime unless he possesses sufficient mental capacity and intel

ligence to have a criminal intent, and if his mental powers are so deficient that he has no will, conscience, or controlling mental power, or if through the overwhelming violence of mental disease his intellectual power is for the time obliterated, he is not a responsible moral agent, and is not responsible criminally for his acts: Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7 Met. (Mass.) 500; 41 Am. Dec. 458; see also McAlister v. State, 17 Ala. 434; 52 Am. Dec. 180; Freeman v. People, 4 Denio (N. Y.), 1; 46 Am. Dec. 216; Criminal Law, vol. 2, § 271; Shelf. on Lunacy, 458; Wills v. People, 32 N. Y. 715; State v. Lawrence, 57 Me. 574; State v. Hunting, 21 Mo. 464; People v. Coffman, 24 Cal. 230; People v. Sprague, 2 Park. C. R. (N. Y.) 43; Commonwealth v. Heath, 11 Gray (Mass.), 303.

The broad doctrine on this subject may be stated as follows: No act done by a person in a state of insanity can be regarded as an offense, and no insane person can be tried, sentenced to any punishment, or punished for any act or offense which he commits in that state. On this subject Blackstone says: "If a man in his sound memory commits a capital offense, and before

arraignment for it he becomes mad, he shall not be tried; if after he be tried and found guilty he loses his senses, before judgment, judgment shall not be pronounced; and if after judgment he becomes of non-sane memory, execution shall be stayed. If there be any doubt whether the person be compos or not, this shall be tried by a jury. And if he be so found, a total idiocy or absolute insanity excuses from the guilt, and of course from the punishment of any criminal action committed under such deprivation of the senses; but if a lunatic hath lucid intervals of understanding, he shall answer for what he does in those intervals, as if he had no deficiency:" 4 Bl. Com. 24; Shelf. on Lunacy, 467; Freeman v. People, 4 Denio (N. Y.), 10; 47 Am. Dec. 216; Commonwealth v. Meriam, 7 Mass. 168; 1 Whart. Cr. L., § 53; see also Criminal Law, vol. 2, Field's Lawyers' Briefs, § 277.

§ 51. Insane delusions and irresistible impulses.

We have before referred to the answers of the English judges to questions propounded by the House of Lords on the subject of insane delu

sion in its relations to the criminal law: See Criminal Law, vol. 2, Field's Lawyers' Briefs, § 272; Reg. v. McNaughten, 10 C. & F. (Eng.) 210. The questions were suggested by the case of McNaughten, who shot Mr. Drummond in London in 1843, and was tried therefor and acquitted on the ground of insane delusion. The questions propounded were as follows:

"1. What is the law respecting alleged crimes committed by persons affected with insane delusion in respect to one or more particular persons, as, for instance, where, at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, the accused knew he was acting contrary to law, but did the act complained of with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of redressing or revenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of produc. ing some public benefit?

"2. If a person, under insane delusion as to existing facts commits an offense in consequence thereof, is he thereby excused?"

To these questions fifteen English judges responded as follows:

"1. The jury ought to be told in all cases that every man is presumed to be sane, and to possess

a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and that to establish a defense on the ground of insanity it must be clearly proved that at the time of committing the act the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature or quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.

"2. Assuming that your lordships' inquiries are confined to those persons who labor under such partial delusions only, and are not in other respects insane, we are of opinion that, notwith. standing the party did the act complained of with a view, under the influence of the delusion, of redressing or revenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing some public benefit, he is nevertheless punishable according to the nature of the crime committed, if he knew at the time of committing such crime that he was acting contrary to law, by which expressions we understand your lordships to mean the law of the land.

3. The answer to this (the 2d) question must