t;

S. Now, M'liss, may be it war a jackass-rabbit you wouldn't say it warn't a jackass-rabbit if it war a jackass-rabbit, would ye, M'liss?

M. It war a jackass-rabbit.

S. You wouldn't say a jackass-rabbit war some other kind of a rabbit-you know I seed it; now, if I war to ask you, for instance, if it wore a green hat and a yaller ribbou, you wouldn't fool me and say it did if it didn't?

M. And a red rosette.

S. I didn't quite ketch on to the rosette; but I say, M'liss, do you think it altogether the square thing for a rabbit to war a rosette?

M. Shouldn't war a rosette.

S. That's so, M'liss, that's

M. I didn't say anything.

eh ?

S. Who said you said anything? What makes you think you said anything, and yer wouldn't think yer said anything, if yer didn't say anything, would yer, gal?

It may be observed that the subject of an attack of delirium tremens is frequently, after he has recovered, misled by the impressions made upon his mind while in the state of delirium, and will

sometimes refer to these impressions as though they were among his ordinary experiences. And it is only after expressions of wonder and incredulity by his associates that he learns to be cautious and reticent in reference to them. To the victim the delusions and hallucinations are actual and objective, although arising from his own diseased brain; and especially is this the case where these phenomena are not so extravagant as to carry on the face of them, even to the recovered victim, manifest evidence that they were delusions and hallucinations, and subjective rather than objective impressions. And it may be further observed that these phenomena may continue for some time after convalescence, and when the victim is apparently restored to his normal mental condition; and especially is this the case in respect to the impression of hearing voices near him, or in an adjoining room, or outside in the open air. And not unfrequently such delusions afford much amusement to the convalescent, who comprehends the source of them as his own unrestored brain. When it occurs, as it frequently does, that the thoughts and sentiments uttered by the unsubstantial visitors are entirely at vari

ance with his own, which is frequently the case, the phenomena become inexplicable.

Some knowledge of these matters may be important in cases where the mental soundness of a person may be a question under investigation, whether it arises on a question of his credibility as a witness, or on the validity of his will, or on his liability on contract, or even on his responsi bility for some apparently criminal act.

§ 41. Legal relations of delirium tremens.

Delirium tremens is a recognized disease, with mental unsoundness a symptom; wherefore the person thus diseased cannot be held responsible for his acts, and he will not be responsible for acts that would otherwise be criminal: Guy's For. Med. (5th ed.) 182; see also Criminal Law, vol. 2, 276; United States v. Clark, 2 Cranch (U. S.), 158; United States v. McGlue, 1 Curt. (C. C.) 1; United States v. Drew, 5 Mason (C. C.), 28; Reunie's Case, 1 Lew. C. C. (Eng.) 76; Rex v. Meaken, 7 C. & P. (Eng.) 297; O'Brien v. People, 48 Barb. 274; Real v. People, 55 Barb. 551; 42 N. Y. 270; Lonergan v. People, 6 Park. C. R. (N. Y.) 209; Bailey v. State, 26

WFORD UN

Ind. 551; Bales v. State, 3 W. Va. 685; Carter v. State, 12 Tex. 500; Com. v. Rogers, 7 Met. (Mass.) 500; 41 Am. Dec. 458; Ray's Med. Jur. 520; post, § 57.

§ 42. Civil acts of persons of unsound mind.

An idiot, lunatic, maniac, or other person non compos mentis, cannot make a valid contract or will; and this rule applies whether the person be permanently or temporarily of unsound mind. If at the time he is mentally disabled from understanding the purpose and effect of the act, it avoids it See Contracts, vol. 2, Field's L. B., § 80. Such persons are incompetent in law to enter into a contract or to make a valid will: Hovey v. Hovey, 55 Me. 256; Dennett v. Dennett, 44 N. H. 531; Bond v. Bond, 7 Allen (Mass.), 1; Sowers v. Pumphrey, 24 Ind. 231; Ham. on Ins. 10; Wills, vol. 5; Field's L. B., § 727; ante, §§ 18, 22, 26.

§ 43. In case of wills.

Blackstone observes: "Madmen, or otherwise non compotes, idiots or natural fools; persons grown childish by reason of old age or distemper, such as have their senses besotted by drunk

enness

all these are incapable by reason of mental disability to make any will, so long as such disability lasts:" 2 Bl. Com. 497; see also 1 Jar. on Wills (5th Am. ed.), 63; Ray's Med. Jur., § 54; Brannatyne v. Brannatyne, 14 Eng. L. & Eq. 581.

The law, however, makes a distinction between the subjects of total mania, or unsoundness of mind, and those of partial insanity, monomania, or unsoundness of mind, so far as it relates to testamentary capacity. In the latter cases the authorities distinctly sustain the doctrine that the person may make a will, unless he at the time is laboring under a delusion which would materially influence the testamentary disposition of his property: Guy & F. For. Med. (5th ed.) 216.

A person may have an insane belief or delusion as to one or more subjects and not as to others; and if the delusion has no relation to his testamentary disposition, it would not be af fected by it; and this may be inferred from the reasonable provisions of the will, and its entire accord with the wishes of the testator as expressed on former occasions, when there was no