In most of such cases it has been observed that there has been some derangement of health, or some deviation from the ordinary physiological condition, such as delivery, suppression of menstruation, and the like; but occasionally no incident of this kind can be detected — the patient has been, apparently, in ordinary condition, both bodily and mentally. This mental condition may sometimes be the result of great religious excitement, and a deluded belief that some great calamity or danger is impending over a child or wife who becomes the victim, and the act is done from a belief that it is necessary to avoid a worse result.

The legal relations of this unsound condition of mind we have before stated, as follows: To constitute a defense [to a criminal charge] on the ground of irresistible impulse, it must exist to such an extent and with such violence as to render it impossible for the party to do otherwise than to submit to it: See 2 Field's Lawyers' Briefs, § 273; Scott v. Com. 4 Met. (Ky.) 227; Hoppes v. State, 31 Ill. 385; Stevens v. State, 31 Ind. 486; State v. Felter, 25 Ia. 67; Com. v. Mosler, 4 Pa. St. 266; Board v. State, 30 Miss. 600.

In the case last cited it was observed: “In order to constitute a crime, a person must have intelligence and capacity enough to have a criminal intent and purpose; and if his reason and mental powers are either so deficient that he has no will, no conscience or controlling mental power; or if, through overwhelming violence or mental disease, his intellectual power is, for a time, obliterated, he is not a responsible moral agent, and is not responsible for criminal acts."

To constitute a complete defense, insanity, if partial, as in case of monomania, must be of such a degree as to wholly deprive the accused of the guide of reason in regard to the act with which he is charged, and of the knowledge that he is doing wrong in committing it: State v. Spencer, 21 N. J. Law, 196; 1 Whart. & S. Med. Jur., §§ 144, 162, 531, 537; R. v. Barton, 3 Cox C. C. (Eng.) 275; R. v. Goode, 7 Ad. & El. (Eng.) 536; R. v. Oxford, 9 C. & P. 553; Willis v. People, 32 N. Y. 715; Flanagan v. People, 52 N. Y. 467. And mere "moral insanity," where the person is intellectually sane, will not exempt from responsibility: State v. Lawrence, 57 Me. 574; Com. v. Heath, 11

Gray (Mass.), 303; Freeman v. People, 4 Denio (N. Y.), 10; Shater v. People, 2 N. Y. 199; Farrer v. State, 2 Ohio St. 54; Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424; People v. Coffman, 24 Cal. 230; United States v. Schultz, 6 McLean, 121; United States v. Holmes, 1 Cliff. (U. S. C. C.) 198; 1 Whart. & S. Med. Jur., § 186 et seq.; Whart. on Ment. Unsound. 43; State v. Spencer, 21 N. J. L. 196; Reg. v. Barton, 3 Cox C. Cas. (Eng.) 275.

§ 29. Kleptomania, or propensity to steal.

The tendency or irresistible propensity to steal is among the recognized forms of mental derangement. It is frequently manifested in persons of irreproachable life, and who are in easy and even in opulent circumstances, and by habit and education above all petty dishonesty. The articles stolen are frequently, and perhaps usually, of trifling value, and are put away out of sight as soon as stolen. This intellectual disease, or obliquity, is said to generally occur in connection with some pathological or other abnormal condition, as a sequel of fever or blows on the head, of pregnancy or disordered men

struation, and the precursor of mania and organic disease of the brain: See Whart. on Ment. Unsoundness, 44.

§ 30. Disinclination to regard it as a defense.

There has been much disinclination of the courts to recognize kleptomania as a defense to an act of theft. The spirit of this feeling was expressed by Baron Alderson, who observed: "A man might say he picked a pocket from some uncontrollable impulse; and in that case the law would have an uncontrollable impulse to punish him" Reg. v. Pate, Lond. Times, July 12, 1850. Neither theoretically nor practically is this form of insanity recognized as a defense for theft. But when the law comes to reflect more clearly the light of science, such a defense will not perhaps be regarded as a "dangerous innovation," as expressed by Baron Parke: See Reg. v. Barton, 3 Cox C. Cas. 275; Chit. Med. Jur. 352.

§ 31. Pyromania, or a propensity to burn; and aidoimania, sexual propensity.

These indications of unsound mind are recognized by medical authors. The latter is said

always to occur in young subjects, and is supposed to be connected with disordered menstruation, or that physical evolution which attends the transition from youth to manhood. Of both, the same remarks would be applicable which were made in the last section relating to kleptomania. Doubts have been expressed as to the maniacal character of these singular impulses, which have generally been attributed to depravity of character rather than disease. Nothing, however, seems better established by abundance of cases related by distinguished observers. In. spite of all metaphysical cavils, there are the cases on record; and there they will remain, to be increased in number by every year's observation.

§ 32. These have not received much favor as a defense. Kleptomania, pyromania and idoimania, in what may be called their milder forms, have not received much favor as a defense for the acts which they suggest. But juries have been loath to convict a man for a petty theft who, toward the close of an exemplary life, has been detected in stealing things of insignificant value, or a