is exceedingly weak. Occasionally it occurs in an acute form in young subjects, and then only is it curable. In old men, in whom it often occurs, it is called senile dementia, and it indicates the breaking down of the mental powers in advance of the bodily decay. It is this form of dementia which usually gives rise to litigation; for in others the incompetency is generally too patent to admit of controversy. It cannot be described by any positive characters, because it differs in the different stages of progress, varying from the simple lapse of memory to complete inability to recognize persons or things. It sometimes manifests itself in breaches of decorum, when the mental infirmity is not so serious as might at first sight be supposed, as frequently in such cases, if the attention be aroused to a matter in which the person is deeply interested, he will show no lack of wonted vigor or acuteness. In other words, the mind may be damaged superficially, to use a figure, when it may be sound at the core; so that, although he may be quite oblivious of names and dates, he may comprehend perfectly well his relations to others and and the interests in which he is concerned.

In

case of senile dementia, the impression made upon the minds of those who have been long and most intimately acquainted with the subject, as to his mental condition and status, would be better than the impression made upon casual observation: Id.; see also Judge Redfield in 3 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 449; 2 Phil. Eccl. L. 449 ; Harrison v. Rowan, 3 Wash. (C. C.) 580; 1 Red. on Wills.

§ 21. Legal relations of dementia-in case of wills.

Questions frequently raised respecting persons suffering from this form of mental unsoundness, relate to the validity of wills made or altered by them; and especially in case of senile dementia. The question of mental capacity for such purposes is frequently a difficult one to determine, for such persons vary greatly from day to day, and present themselves in different lights to different observers. Hence we have conflicting testimony and wide divergences of opinion, both among skilled and unskilled witnesses. The only general rule of much practical value in such cases is, that competency must be always measured, not by any fancied stand

ard of intellect, but solely by the requirements of the act in question: See Ray on Insanity (5th ed.), 133; Taylor's Med. Jur. 629; Gilm. Med. Jur. 20; also Wills, vol. 5, Field's L. B., § 729. A small and familiar matter would require less mental power than one complicated in its details and somewhat new to the testator's experience. Less capacity would be necessary to distribute • an estate between a wife and child than between a multitude of relatives with unequal claims upon the bounty of the testator.

It has been observed that the legal principles by which courts are governed are not essentially different, whether the mental incapacity proceed from dementia or mania. In case the question of competency arises upon the contest of a will, if the will coincides with the previously expressed wishes of the testator,—that is, his wishes as expressed before any question as to his competence had arisen,—and if it recognizes the claims of those who stood in near relation to him, and shows no indication of undue influence,in short, if it is a rational act, rationally done, it will very properly be established, although there may have existed considerable impairment of

mind: Id.; Jarm. on Wills (5th Am. ed.), 94; Swinb. on Wills, pt. 2, § 5; Bird v. Bird, 2 Hagg. Eccl. (Eng.) 142; Creely v. Ostrander, 3 Bradf. (N. Y.) 107; Crolires v. Stark, 64 Barb. (N. Y.) 112; Clark v. Fisher, 1 Paige (N. Y.), 171; Van Alstyne v. Hunter, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 148; Daniel v. Daniel, 39 Pa. St. 191; Higgins v. Higgins, 28 Md. 115; Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 240; 50 Am. Dec. 329; Yoe v. McCord, 74 Ill. 33; Carpenter v. Calvert, 83 Ill. 62; Lowder v. Lowder, 38 Ind. 638; Thomas v. Stump, 62 Mo. 275; Rutherford v. Morris, 77 Ill. 397; Thomas v. Kyner, 65 Pa. St. 368; Terry v. Buffington, 11 Ga. 337; 56 Am. Dec. 432; Couch v. Couch, 7 Ala. 519; 42 Am. Dec. 602; Rigg v. Wilton, 13 Ill. 15; 54 Am. Dec. 419; 5 Field's Lawyers' Briefs, §§

727-730.

We shall hereafter notice the principles of the law, in criminal cases, relating to unsoundness of mind generally.

§ 22. Mania defined.

One of the most common forms of insanity or mental unsoundness is mania, and consists of in

tellectual aberration, or morbid obliquity, or both of these conditions: Bouv. L. D., Mania. The term includes all forms of mental unsoundness that are characterized by undue excitement. Mania has been classified into three kinds, namely: General, intellectual, and moral; the latter has also been divided into general and partial mania: Guy & Fer. on For. Med. (5th ed.)

197.

The term also embraces monomania; that is, mania confined to a certain point, or partial mania, the understanding being sound in every other respect. The subject of mania involves the consideration of delusions and hallucinations, which will be treated of further on : 6 Field's L. B., § 419.

§ 23. General mania; character of.

General mania affects the intellect, the emotions, and the passions, and throws the whole mind into a state of mingled excitement and confusion. It has been designated as raging incoherence. The maniac either misapprehends the true relations between persons and things, in consequence of which he adopts notions mani