professional character in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of such denomination:" 2 Rev. Stat. N. Y. 403, 572. In Ohio, Missouri and other states they have a similar statute. § 69. The privilege may be waived. The patient may, it seems, waive the privilege thus secured to him by the statute, and permit his medical adviser or attendant to disclose the communication: Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 637. And if a party makes himself a witness he, it seems, cannot refuse on cross-examination to testify as to communications made to his legal or medical adviser, on the ground of privilege See Inhabitants, etc., v. Henshaw, supra. In this respect the law is the same, whether the privilege be in favor of a patient or client See 1 Field's Lawyers' Briefs, sub. Attorney and Client, § 473. : § 70. Construction of the statutes on the subject. The full scope and effect of a statute is not always known with certainty until it has been interpreted and construed by the courts. Then the statute, with the interpretation of it, becomes the law of the state, as a general rule. In construing the statute of New York, prohibiting a physician or surgeon from disclosing any information which he acquired in attending a patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, it has been held that the provision includes not only information obtained from the statements of the patient, but such as may be conveyed by others present at the time, or obtained from his own observations of the patient's symptoms and appearance; and that it will be presumed that information so imparted or acquired was given or obtained for the purpose of enabling the physician to prescribe for the patient, and that it was material. And it has been further held that the right of objecting to the disclosure of such privileged communications is not limited to the patient and his personal representatives, but that a third party may avail himself of it, such as an assignee of the party, where his rights may be affected by the communication: Edington v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 67 N. Y. 185; see also Dilleber v. Home Life Ins. Co., 69 N. Y. 256; Westover v. Etna Life Ins. Co., 99 N. Y. 56. In the case last cited, EARLE, J., after referring to the statutes of New York restraining clergymen, attorneys and counselors at law, and physicians and surgeons, from disclosing confidential communications made to them in their professional character, observes as follows: "It is thus seen that clergymen, physicians and attorneys are not only absolutely prohibited from making the disclosures mentioned, but that by an entirely new section it is provided that the seal placed upon such disclosures can be removed only by the express waiver of the persons mentioned. Thus, there does not seem to be left any room for construction. The sections are absolute and unqualified. These provisions of the law are founded upon public policy, and in all cases where they apply, the seal of the law must forever remain until it is removed by the person confessing, or the patient or the client :" See also Grattan v. Life Ins. Co., 80 N. Y. 281. § 71. The general rule applicable to other professions. Under statutes in various states, as we have noticed, the general principles of the law protecting confidential and professional communica tions between attorney and "client, have been extended to similar communications between a clergyman or priest and the confessor or penitent, and between the physician or surgeon and his patient. § 72. Illustration of the rule in case of surgeons. Upon the trial of an indictment in New York, in 1865, for abortion, the evidence on the part of the prosecution tended to show, that the defendant, arranged with one Dr. S. to perform an operation to procure an abortion, and took the female to the office of said doctor, where the operation was performed; that the defendant then took her to a boarding-house and arranged for her board and care until she recovered from her sickness, and paid the bill. After the discovery of the circumstances of the case, the district-attorney sent a physician to attend upon the girl, and he called upon her and made an examination of her person and prescribed for her. Upon the trial the said physician was called as a witness for the prosecution, and was permitted to give his opinion, under objection and exception, that an abortion had been performed, founded upon personal examination so made by him, and upon what the girl told him in regard to the matter. It appeared that the girl was alive at the time of the trial. On appeal, the admission of this testimony was held to be error; that the fact that the physician was selected and sent by the public prosecutor to attend upon the female did not affect the question, as she accepted his services in his professional character, and the relation of physician and patient was established between them: Peo. v. Murphy, 101 N. Y. 126; Grattan v. Life Ins. Co., 80 N. Y. 281; 15 Hun, 74. On this subject see also 1 Beck's Med. Juris. 288-331; 2 Whart. & S. Med. Jur., § 84; 2 Whart. C. L., § 1220; Ros. C. Ev. 190; Dilliber v. Home Ins. Co., 69 N. Y. 258; Westover v. Etna Life Ins. Co., 99 N. Y. 56. As to the common law see 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 248; 1 Whart. Crim. L. 774 ; Duchess of Kingston, 20 How. St. Tr. (Eng.) 613; Phil. Ev. (7th ed.) 147. As to expert testimony see 1 Whart. Crim. L., §§ 45, 49, 821a, 821g. In reference to such communications between attorney and client it is observed by Mr. Greenleaf: "The protection given by the law to such commu |