is thereby enabled to perform manual operations as well, frequently, as in his waking state. The farmer goes to his barn and threshes his grain ; the house servant lights a fire and prepares the breakfast for the family; and the scholar goes to his desk and writes or reads. Usually, however, the action of the senses is more or less imperfect, many of the impressions being incorrectly or not at all perceived. The person walks against a wall, or stumbles over an object in his path; he mistakes some projection for a horse, strides across it, and imagines himself to be riding; he hears the faintest sound connected with what he is doing, while the voices of persons near him, and even the blast of a trumpet, are entirely unnoticed. Occasionally the power of the senses is increased to a degree unknown in the waking state. Jane Rider, whose remarkable history was published some thirty years ago, could read almost obliterated dates of coins in a dark room, and was able to read and write while her eyes were covered with several folds of handkerchief. For the most part, however, the operations of the somnambulist consist in getting up while asleep, groping about in the dark, endeavoring to make

his way out of the house through doors and windows, making some inarticulate sounds, perhaps, and all the while unconscious of the persons and things around him. The power of the perceptive faculties, as well as that of the senses, is sometimes increased in a wonderful degree. It is related of the girl just mentioned that in the fit she would sing correctly, and play at backgammon with considerable skill, though she had never done either when awake: Guy & Fer. on For. Med. 178; Ray's Med. Jur.

§ 62. The legal relations of somnambulism.

The legal relations of somnambulism should be precisely those of insanity. The party should be held exempt from criminal liability for acts done in that condition, but liable in damages for his torts. Criminal acts have been committed in a state of somnambulism by persons of irreproachable character: Whart. & S. Med. Jur., § 472; Gray & F. on Forensic Med. 265; Rush on the Mind, 302.

§ 63. Statutory provisions relating to the responsibility of persons mentally unsound.

In various states there are statutory provisions relating to the responsibility of persons of un

sound mind, although they generally only declare the common law on the subject: See ante, §§ 22, 23; 2 Field's L. B., §§ 270–279. Thus the Penal Code of New York provides as follows:

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"§ 20. An act done by a person who is an idiot, imbecile, lunatic or insane is not a crime. A person cannot be tried, sentenced to any punishment or punished for any crime while he is in a state of idiocy, imbecility, lunacy or insanity, so as to be incapable of understanding the proceeding or making his defense.

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"§ 21. A person is not excused from criminal liability as an idiot, imbecile, lunatic or insane person, except upon proof that, at the time of committing the alleged criminal act, he was laboring under such a defect of reason as either,

"1. Not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or

"2. Not to know that the act was wrong.

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"§ 22. No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his having been in such a condition. But whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive or intent is a necessary element to constitute a particular species

or degree of crime, the jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time in determining the purpose, motive or intent with which he committed the act.

"§ 23. A morbid propensity to commit prohibited acts, existing in the mind of a person who is not shown to have been incapable of knowing the wrongfulness of such acts, forms no defense to a prosecution therefor."

§ 64. Construction of statutes and the common law on the subject.

Insanity occasioned by previous habits of intemperance, and not resulting directly from the immediate use of intoxicating liquors, as in case of delirium tremens, exempts the victim from criminal responsibility for his acts: Ante, §§ 56, 57; O'Brien v. People, 48 Barb. (N. Y.) 274; see also 2 Field's L. B., §§ 270-279; Kenny v. Peo., 31 N. Y. 330; Lonergan v. People, 50 Barb. 266; 6 Park. 209; Freery v. People, 54 Barb. 319; Com. v. Hawkins, 5 Gray (Mass.), 463.

A person may be insane at the time of the commission of the criminal act, or he may be insane at the time he is called to make a defense

thereto. In the former case he would not be responsible; but if sane at the time he is called to make a defense he must interpose the insanity as a defense. In case he is insane at the time of trial, he cannot be required to make a defense. The common law, if not the statutes, requires, in case of a suggestion or plea of insanity, or, in case such a mental condition is manifest, the court to appoint a commission or impanel a jury to inquire, in a preliminary way, into the mental condition of the accused, and to determine whether the accused be sane or insane,whether compos mentis or non compos mentis,—and if they find for the accused the trial will be suspended Arch. C. L. (Watt. Notes, 7th ed.) 27; 1 Whart. C. L., § 53; 2 Field's L. B., § 277.

And a finding upon such a preliminary issue that the prisoner is sane and capable of making a defense, has no bearing upon the question of his responsibility for the crime with which he is charged: Freeman v. People, 4 Denio (N. Y.), 9. A lunatic is responsible for a crime committed during a lucid interval; but mere weakness of intellect, not amounting to insanity, will not exempt from criminal responsibility in the