liberate intent. The law regards an act done in sudden heat, in a moment of frenzy, when passion has dethroned reason, as less criminal than the same act when performed in cool and undisturbed possession of all the faculties.

"There is nothing the law so much abhors as the cool, deliberate and settled purpose to do mischief. That is the quality of the demon; whilst that which is done on great excitement, as when the mind is broken up by poison or intoxication, though to be punished, may, to some extent, be softened and set down to the infirmities of human nature. Hence, not regarding it as an aggravation, drunkenness, as anything else, showing the state of mind or degree of knowledge, should go to the jury. Upon this principle, in modern cases, it has been permitted to be shown that the accused was drunk when he perpetrated the crime of killing, to rebut the idea that it was done in a cool and deliberate state of mind necessary to constitute murder in the first degree."

§ 58. Delirium tremens as an excuse in criminal cases. We have already referred to the legal relations of delirium tremens: See ante, § 42. But a fur

ther consideration of the subject in criminal cases

may be appropriate.

Whether a sound reason exists for a distinction between that direct and immediate insanity, delirium or frenzy, frequently produced by the intemperate use of alcoholic drinks, inducing the condition of drunkenness, and that mania or delirium which sometimes follows an excessive use of such drinks, and known as delirium tremens, our criminal law recognizes a distinction. The law in the latter case does not look to the remote causes of the mental disturbance, and if the act is not committed under the immediate influence of intoxicating drinks, the plea of insanity is not invalidated by the fact that it is the result of drinking at some previous time: Whart. C. L., § 48; State v. Birdsall, 1 Beck's Med. Jur. (10th ed.) 808; State v. Wilson, Ray's Med. Jur. 520; R. v. Watson, 2 Taylor's Med. Jur. 599; United States v. Drew, 5 Mason (C. C.), 28; R. v. Meakin, 7 C. & P. (Eng.) 297; R. v. Runie, 1 Lew. C. C. (Eng.) 76; Maconahay v. State, 5 Ohio St. 77; Bales v. State, 3 W. Va. 685; Carter v. State, 12 Tex. 500; Smith v. Com., 1 Duval (Ky.), 224; United States v. Drew, 5 Mason (C. C.), 28.

We have already stated the general doctrine on this subject as follows: "If a person is entirely incapacitated by delirium tremens, so as not to be conscious of the nature or moral turpitude of the act, he is not punishable therefor, even though such delirium tremens is produced by the voluntary use of intoxicating liquor:" See vol. 2, Field's Lawyers' Briefs, § 276; also cases cited in the last paragraph; also United States v. Clark, 2 Cranch (U. S.), 158; United States v. McClue, 1 Curt. (C. C.) 1; Bailey v. State, 26 Ind. 422; 40 Ind. 263; 64 Ind. 435; O'Brien v. People, 48 Barb. 274; Real v. People, 55 Barb. 551; 42 N. Y. 270; Lonergan v. People, 6 Parker's C. R. (N. Y.) 209; 50 Barb. 266.

§ 59. Dreaming; illusions and delusions common to.

It has been observed that "the phenomena of dreaming have a striking analogy to those of some forms of unsoundness of mind. The external world being shut out, and the higher faculties inactive, illusions and delusions have the vivid impress of reality, and follow each other according to associations over which we have no

control. Many dreams are directly traceable to states of body which, when we are awake, produce pain and uneasiness, such as fullness of stomach, distension of bladder, or irritation of skin. The sleeper is conscious of this uneasy sensation, and seems seeking relief in unlikely ways and places, or he associates it with imaginary events. Thus a fit of indigestion is converted into a nightmare, and the ruffled dressing of a blister on the head suggests a dream of being scalped by savages. In other instances the uneasy sensation gives rise to a dream which has no other relation to the sensation itself than that of being painful or disagreeable; or to induce a state of mind in which disconnected occurrences, recent or remote, having nothing in common but the feeling of annoyance or discomfort, are blended together. We hear of a distressing accident; we receive bad news from an absent friend; we have been concerned in some anxious business; a dream combines these scattered elements; we are ourselves connected with the accident; the absent friend is in our company; and the person with whom the business is transacted appears upon the scene:" Guy & Ferrer on Forensic Medicine, 177.

§ 60. Legal relations of dreaming.

It sometimes occurs that a person suddenly aroused from sleep kills another, under the influence of his dream and the impression of necessity for self-defense. Thus two men, being out at night in a place infested with robbers, engaged that one should watch while the other slept; but the former falling asleep, and dreaming that he was pursued, shot his companion through the heart, on being aroused from his slumber. So in another case, a person being suddenly awakened from sleep at midnight, thought he saw a frightful phantom, which, though twice challenged, gave no answer and seemed to advance upon him. He attacked it with a hatchet, and killed his wife. These and like acts could not reasonably be regarded as criminal: Guy & F. on Forensic Med. 178:

§ 61. Somnambulism; common manifestations of.

Somnambulism or sleep-walking differs from simple dreaming in this, that although a degree of mental activity is common to both conditions, the somnambulist enjoys the use of his senses in some degree, and the power of locomotion.

He