The common law seldom excuses or relieves the drunkard from responsibility for his acts, either in civil or criminal cases. A person non compos mentis, or permanently or temporarily of unsound mind, cannot make a valid contract or perform a valid civil act. A temporary insanity or intoxication, "produced by the excessive and voluntary use of alcoholic liquors, may be a good ground for avoiding a contract entered into while in that state; and, generally, when one enters into a contract while deprived of his reason, he may repudiate it when he recovers his reason:" See Contracts, vol. 2, Field's L. B., § 80; Gore v. Gibson, 13 M. & W. (Eng.) 623; Cook v. Clay worth, 18 Ves. (Eng.) 15; Mitchell v. Kingman, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 431; Arnold v. Richmond Iron Works, 1 Gray (Mass.), 434; Gant v. Thompson, 4 Conn. 303; Lang v. Whidden, 2 N. H. 435; see also Shelf. on Lunacy, 274, 304. But this rule is not universal, as where one makes a note in that condition, it would be valid in the hands of an innocent holder; and the contract of a drunken man is not void, but voidable State Bank v. McCoy, 69 Pa. St. 201; 8 Am. Rep. 246; 1 Ames' Cas. on B. & N. 558. But in criminal cases a more rigorous rule prevails, and drunkenness, whatever the degree, will not excuse a criminal act. The doctrine of the common law was stated by Blackstone, as follows: "As to artificial and contracted madness or intoxication, which, depriving men of their reason, puts them in a temporary frenzy, our law looks upon this as an aggravation of the offense, rather than an excuse for any criminal misbehavior. The law, considering how easy it is to counterfeit this excuse, and how weak an excuse it is, though real, will not suffer any man thus to privilege one crime with another :" 4 Bl. Com. 26; see also R. v. Meakin, 7 C. & P. (Eng.) 297; R. v. Thomas, 7 C. & P. 820 ; Swan v. People, 4 Park. C. R. (N. Y.) 649; Kenny v. People, 31 N. Y. 330; Boswell v. Com., 20 Grat. (Va.) 860; Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424; Flanigan v. People, 86 N. Y. 554; Criminal Law, vol. 2, § 274; Ray's Med. Jur. 514; 3 Par. & Fonbl. Med. Jur. 39. The soundness of this old doctrine may well be questioned, and the reasons for it might as well be applied in other cases; for it is a matter of common understanding among the enlightened members of the medical profession that other habits and practices, as well as the intemperate use of spirituous liquors, may produce mania or unsoundness of mind, and the person may pursue these habits well knowing this probable result, and would be exempt from criminal responsibility for acts done while in such unsound condition of mind: Allis. Princ. C. L. (Scot.) 654; 22 Am. Jur. 290; ante, § 44. § 57. Drunkenness as a mitigation of criminal acts. Notwithstanding drunkenness will not excuse criminal acts, still in case of the trial of a person for murder the present doctrine seems to be that the intoxicated condition of the defendant at the time of the taking of the life may be proved to show either a want of intent to murder or of premeditation, and to reduce the offense from murder to some inferior degree of homicide: Reg. v. Cruise, 8 C. & P. (Eng.) 546; R. v. Meakin, 7 C. & P. (Eng.) 297; R. v. Thomas, supra; People v. Robinson, 1 Park. C. R. (N. Y.) 619; Pecple v. Hammill, 2 Park. C. R. 223; Lonergan v. People, 6 Park. C. R. 209; 50 Barb. 266; People v. Rogers, 18 N. Y. 9; Kenny v. People, 31 N. Y. 330; Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424; Humphreys v. State, 45 Ga. 190; Rafferty v. People, 66 Ill. 118; McIntyre v. People, 38 Ill. 515; Keenan v. Com., 44 Pa. St. 55; Shannahan v. Com., 8 Bush (Ky.), 463; Dawson v. State, 16 Ind. 428; State v. Harlow, 21 Mo. 446. But want of intent or premeditation will not be conclusively presumed from any degree of intoxication at the time of the killing, as this may have existed before the intoxication, and the latter may have been induced as a part of a plan or purpose to accomplish the felonious act with impunity: Id.; see also O'Brien v. People, 48 Barb. (N. Y.) 274. Intoxication in such cases is a mere circumstance to be considered for the purpose of mitigation Whart. on Hom. 371; Com. v. Hawkins, 3 Gray (Mass.), 463; Com. v. French, Thatcher's Cr. Cas. (Mass.) 163; Pirtie v. State, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 663; Swan v. State, 4 id. 136; State v. Bullock, 13 Ala. 413; Pigman v. State, 14 Ohio, 555. : The old and modern doctrine on this subject is well stated in the opinion of the court in the case last cited, where it is said: "Drunkenness is no excuse for crime; yet in that class of crimes and offenses which depend upon guilty knowledge, or the coolness and deliberation with which they are perpetrated, to consummate their commission or fix the degree of guilt, it should be admitted to the consideration of the jury. If the act is of that nature that the law requires it should be done with guilty knowledge, or the degree of guilt depends upon the calm and deliberate state of mind at the time of the commission of the act, it is proper to show any state or condition of the person that is adverse to the proper exercise of the mind and the undisturbed condition of the faculties. The older writers regard drunkenness as an aggravation of the offense, and excluded it for any purpose. It is a high crime against one's self and offensive to society and good morals; yet every man knows that acts may be committed in a fit of intoxication which would be abhorred in sober moments. And it seems strange that any one should ever have imagined that a person who committed an act from the effect of drink, which he would not have done if sober, is worse than the man who commits it from sober and de |