ishable for criminal acts. But these are extremes easily distinguished and not to be mistaken. The difficulty lies between these extremes and cases of partial insanity, where the mind may be clouded and weakened, but not incapable of remembering, reasoning and judging, or so perverted by insane delusion as to act under false impressions and influence. In these cases the rule of law, as we understand it, is this: A man is not to be excused from responsibility if he has capacity and reason sufficient to enable him to distinguish between right and wrong as to the particular act he is then doing,—a knowledge and consciousness that the act he is doing is wrong and criminal, and will subject him to punishment. In order to be responsible he must have sufficient power of memory to recollect the relation in which he stands to others, and in which others stand to him, and that the act he is doing is contrary to the plain dictates of justice and right, injurious to others, and a violation of the dictates of duty. On the contrary, although he may be laboring under partial insanity, if he still understands the nature and character of the act and its consequences, if he has a knowledge that it is wrong

and criminal, and a mental power sufficient to apply that knowledge to his own case, and to know that if he does the act he will do wrong and receive punishment, such partial insanity is not sufficient to exempt him from responsibility for criminal acts:" See also Quain's Dic. Med. (Am. ed.), topic, Legal Insanity, p. 726 et seq.

$ 54. Impulsive mania, or uncontrollable impulse.

Of this form of mania Messrs. Guy & Ferrer observe: "The acts committed under its influence have most all of the following characters : They are without discoverable motive, or in opposition to all known motives. A man kills his wife, to whom he is tenderly attached, a brother his sister, a mother her infant, or the victim is one whom he never saw before, and against whom it is impossible that he can bear malice. Nay, the victim of this blind passion may be a horse or other animal incapable of offense. After the commission of the act he does not seek to escape; he often publishes what he has done; does not conceal the body, but openly exposes it; delivers himself up to justice; describes the state of mind which led to the act, and either

remains stupid and indifferent or is overwhelmed with remorse. He has no accomplices, has made no preparations, and takes nothing from his victim. Sometimes he has previously spoken of his strong temptation and begged to be prevented from doing mischief. These homicidal acts are generally preceded by a striking change of conduct and character, and, on inquiry, the accused is often found to have an hereditary tendency to insanity, to be subject to fits, to have attempted suicide, to have expressed a wish for death, or to be executed as a criminal. Imbeciles are peculiarly liable, as we should suppose they would be, to these wild impulses, and it is easy to understand how the instinct of destruction is sometimes associated with delusions, the criminal act itself being the result of strong excitement of the homicidal passion, while the delusion suggests the motive. To this class probably belong those cases of wholesale murder in which the father of a family destroys his wife and children to prevent them falling the victims of starvation, and then puts an end to his own life; the idea that such an evil threatens them being insane, no less than the impulse which prompts such a mode

of escape. Some imbeciles, who are addicted to petty theft, rob their victims; but they make so childish a use of that which they have stolen as to afford fresh proof of their inherent weakness of mind. Violent homicidal impulses are also very common in the epileptic sometimes preceding, sometimes following the fits, and sometimes taking their place: " Guy & Farrer on For. Med. (5th ed.) 228, 229; Whart. & S. Med. Jur. 159, n.

§ 55. Defense on the ground of.

To constitute a defense on the ground of impulsive mania or irresistible impulse, it must exist to such an extent and with such violence, as to render it impossible for the party to do otherwise than to submit to it; and a mere temporary and violent passion will not exempt the person from responsibility nor constitute a defense for wrongful acts: Reg. v. Barton, 2 F. & F. (Eng.) 762; Reg. v. Townley, 3 F. & F. 839; Scott v. Com. 4 Met. (Ky.) 227; Smith v. Com. 1 Duval (Ky.), 224; Com. v. Mosler, 4 Pa. St. 266; Hopps v. State, 31 Ill. 385; State v. Felter, 25 Ia. 67; Stevens v. State, 31 Ind. 486;

Sanchez v. People, 22 N. Y. 147; Whart. & S. Med. Jur., §§ 144, 162, 531, 537; Reg. v. MeNaughten, 10 Cl. & Fin. (Eng.) 130; Willis v. People, 5 Park. C. R. (N. Y.) 620; State v. Spencer, 21 N. J. L. 196; see also 2 Field's L. B., § 273.

§ 56. In case of drunkenness; legal responsibility.

Alcoholic drinks will produce intoxication and drunkenness of various degrees, the extreme of mental unsoundness in such cases reaching a condition of incoherent utterances and unconsciousness. In this condition the contracts of the victims would be void or voidable, and this would apply to all gifts by will or otherwise : See ante, § 43. And on general principles they should be held irresponsible criminally for their acts. But it seems, in consideration of public policy, the law, as it is now recognized and administered by the courts, is otherwise, and drunkenness, voluntary or involuntary, is not an excuse for au act of a general criminal nature, done under its influence: People v. Robinson, 2 Park. C. R. (N. Y.) 649; Hester v. State, 17 Ga. 146; State v. Harlowe, 21 Miss. 446.