of course depend upon the nature of the delusion; but making the same assumption as we did before, that he labors under such partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane, we think he must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real. For example, if, under the influence of his delusion, he supposes another man to be in the act of attempting to take his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes in self-defense, he would be exempt from punishment. If his delusion was that the deceased had inflicted serious injury to his character or fortune, and he killed him in revenge for such supposed injury, he would be liable to punishment."

These conclusions of the fifteen judges have received some criticism, and in the light of more recent observation and experience their soundness in various respects has been questioned, if not destroyed. They, it has been said, take no note of irresistible impulses of the insane to do wrongful acts, and hold a partially insane person as responsible as a sane one.

Of the principles thus laid down it has been

observed that they are open to the following objections:

"1. To make delusion the sole test of insanity in criminal cases, and especially in cases of homicide, is at complete variance with the well ascertained facts of impulsive insanity, in which the existence of delusion can be distinctively nega tived, as well as in many forms of emotional insanity, in which delusions form no necessary feature of the disease.

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2. On the other hand, the test of a knowledge of right and wrong is condemned by the notorious fact that a great many insane patients, and even imbeciles, have a clear conception of the two ideas. Indeed, the whole management of asylums presupposes a knowledge of right and wrong on the part of inmates.

"3. Nothing is more illogical than the statement of the law in reference to the partially insane. It amounts to nothing less than an absolute denial of the significance of a state of things universally acknowledged to constitute a valid test of insanity. The error has arisen from confounding single and harmless delusions, such as occur in most cases of hypochondriasis, with

those that affect the insane, commonly so called. Such single delusions are doubtless more compatible with self-restraint; but they are of rare occurrence, and do not often figure in courts of law, and harmless as they may seem to be,

we cannot safely assume that they may not take a dangerous turn. That a man should believe that he is the Crystal Palace, may seem a very harmless fancy; but if he grew angry with the government for removing it, to assassinate some member of the government, would be far less illogical than the fancy itself. The partial delusions of the insane are much more common, but when they are closely examined, they are found to be the offspring and natural expression of some one excited feeling or passion, which, having had force enough to create illusions of the senses and delusions of the mind, may be expected to give rise to insane impulses of great power; to which we may add that a multitude of delusions implies mental confusion and excitement in proportion, and that in many instances these conditions are heightened by the co-existence with these delusions of the mind, of illusions of the senses, and illusive transformations

of real objects and persons. The excited feelings or passions which, having first destroyed the integrity of the senses and mental faculties, proceed to instigate acts of violence and cruelty, are religious excitement or despondency, jealousy, domestic anxieties exaggerated into fear of starvation, and discontent transformed into an insane belief in persecution. Now the acts of violence which ultimately flow from these excited feelings or passions, the true source of delusion, ought to be judged by the same rules that apply to the delusions themselves. It is reasonable and logical to infer that the acts are as little subject to restraint as the delusions to correction. What right have we to assume that the man who cannot control his thoughts is master of his actions?" Guy & F. on Forensic

Med. 220.

§ 52. Common sources and manifestations of insane de

lusions.

These distinguished authors refer to four sources of homicidal acts by those of unsound mind, as follows: "1. Maniacs under the influence of religious excitement or despondency are subject to illusions and delusions of a very sin

gular kind. They transform the persons with whom they are associated into supernatural beings, endowed with authority or power not to be questioned or resisted, and they convert common and familiar sounds into the articulate language of temptation or command. One religious maniac, therefore, kills a relative or a keeper, imagining him to be a fiend; another thinks that he has a direct commission from the Deity to fulfill some mission of wrath or extirpation. In case of religious mania, then, we can never safely affirm that the homicidal act was not the consequence of a command which the maniac would deem it impious to resist, or a delusion which places him in his own sincere conviction beyond and above the operation of human laws. The maniac who believes himself to be God, Christ or the Holy Ghost, would from the very nature of the case deem himself irresponsible.

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2. Of homicidal acts instigated by jealousy, shaping itself into a distinct delusion, it will suffice to observe that they are such acts as, if committed by sane men, on the evidence of their senses, would be punished as manslaughter, and not as murder.