and even cast into jail by reason of her acts. He is obliged to pay her bills, but she does not have to pay his, although abundantly able to do so. The husband may be arrested and prosecuted criminally if he fails to support his wife, but no matter how wealthy she is or how ill or poor he is she is not so liable. He may reside at the poor farm while my lady speeds by in her limousine.

If the husband owns real estate he cannot sell or dispose of it by will in such a way as to affect the wife's dower without her consent; but she can sell or dispose of her realty by will without his consent. She may be worth a million and cut the husband off without a penny by her will or conveyance, but he cannot cut her off by either without her consent. If he dies leaving children, a widow, and an estate, no matter how large, consisting of personal property, she not only gets her widow's allowance, but comes in equally with the children for a share of the personal estate, while he, under the same circumstances, no matter how wealthy she may be, gets nothing. She is favored by exemption and homestead laws, and in conveying her property is protected from fraud and imposition by the statutory provisions relating to acknowledgments. In some places the personal property of the wife is assessed against the husband, and by the income tax law he must report and pay the tax on her income.

If the wife commits a crime while in her husband's presence it is presumed that he coerced her to do so, and he will be presumed guilty and she not guilty. If she slanders her neighbor he must pay the damages, but it he defames another he must stand the consequences himself. And the civil damage act enables her to dash from her hubby's lips the cup that cheers.

We omit an extended reference to the numerous provisions of law that have been adopted for the protection of women because they are females. These are suggested by such titles of the law as Abduction, Abortion, Bastardy, Rape, Seduction, et cetera.

From anything approaching a practical standpoint who can say that the pithless ballot is worth these many substantial advantages that "man made law" has secured to woman?

MARRIAGE AND FALSE PRETENSES.

TH HAT portion of the marriage ceremony which binds the contracting parties to take each other for "better or worse" is taken at its face value by most men, and by most courts as we shall see, and however prone a man may be to bring suit in the event that he comes off the worse in a horse swap, or a land deal, he usually considers that in marriage the doctrine of assumption of risk applies with full force and in such a case is quite likely to say "caveat emptor," if that phrase is in his vocabulary. To a large extent the courts have carried out this idea and have held, in the language of Chief Justice Bigelow in Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen (Mass.) 605, that "no misconception as to the character, fortune, health or temper, however brought about, will support an allegation of fraud on which a dissolution of the marriage contract, when once executed, can be obtained in a court of justice. court of justice. Probably the harshest statement of this doctrine is to be found in

Beckley v. Beckley, 115 Ill. App. 27, an action by the husband to annul a marriage on the ground of fraud, wherein the court, denying an annulment, said that "he got possession of the same flesh and bones he bargained for." As the husband procured his wife through a broker, the ground of that decision would appear to be contributory negligence, and the court's harsh words were excusable. The most interesting cases passing upon misrepresentations as to character, social standing, etc., are those brought by the wife to annul the marriage, or procure a divorce, for the fraud of her husband in procuring consent to the marriage. In practically every jurisdiction except New York the courts have been very positive in refusing annulments or divorces in these cases. Illustrative of the refusal of a divorce on this ground is Wier v. Still, 31 Ia. 107, wherein it appeared that the future husband came to the house of the future wife (who was a widow) and represented to her that "he was a man of good standing and good character" and that she had been recommended as a suitable wife, and after some coaxing, within a week from the first meeting, the parties were married. Afterward the wife learned that her husband was a convict, having served three terms in the penitentiary. While the court apparently desired to relieve the wife from the marriage, it was held that relief must be denied, the court saying: "Mere false representations by one of the parties as to his fortune, character or social standing will not avoid the marriage. If they should be so held, where would courts fix the limits of invalid marriages? It would open a field for judicial investigation at once extensive and most detrimental to society. A man consents to a marriage because the woman induces him to believe she has an ample fortune; a woman consents to become a wife because the man falsely represents that he is of respectable social standing. If these representations prove false, shall the marriages induced by them be declared void? If so, to what extent must they be proved false? If the woman represents she has a fortune of $100,000, upon the faith of which the man consents to the marriage, when, in fact, it is but $10,000, or if the man represents that he is of good social character and thereby wins the hand of the woman, when, in truth, he is not admitted into good society, will the courts in either case dissolve the marriage? These thoughts suggest the dangerous tendencies of the doctrines advocated by plaintiff's counsel, and the impossibility of their recognition by the courts." Another case of this class is Meyer v. Meyer, 7 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 627, in which it appeared that the husband posed under a false name and represented that he was connected with a wealthy and respectable family in Germany of whom the wife had heard, which was not the fact. In that case the court said: "The present case is simply one in which the defendant had undertaken to represent that he occupied a station, a position in society, and was related to a family of respectability and wealth, which representations were all untrue. Where one personates another, and the marriage takes place under this false personation, the contract of marriage is void for fraud, because the person marrying him never consented to marry him, but simply to marry another, and there was a false substitution of one person for another. That is not this case. There is no statement that there was a Herman Meyer from Westphalia, whom his defendant personated. On the contrary, the consent of the

plaintiff was to marry the person she did marry, under the false representations that he bore relationship to another that he did not bear. All this was very gross falsehood, assuming the facts stated in the petition to be correct; and yet, under the decisions as reported it does not constitute a case of fraud for which the marriage relation will be dissolved." The New York courts were at first slow in granting a divorce for fraud. In the early case of Clarke v. Clarke, 11 Abb. Pr. 228, the complaint alleged that the plaintiff-wife had a great repugnance to marrying a divorced man and had once refused to marry a man on that ground, and that the defendant, knowing of this fact, falsely represented that his former wife was dead, whereas she was in fact divorced from him. In holding that this did not constitute fraud warranting the dissolution of the marriage Judge Sutherland said: "It was not a fraud in or as to a material matter or thing, within the ordinary or legitimate purposes of marriage, and the supposed intention or purposes of parties in contracting marriage. The plaintiff had a fancy that she would never marry a man who had been divorced from his wife. She had a right to indulge this fancy, but it does not follow because she was deceived and induced unknowingly to marry a divorced man, that she should be indulged in such fancy afterwards to the extent of having her marriage judicially declared void. I find neither precedent nor principle for declaring a marriage void for fraud as to or in such a matter or thing." A dissolution of the marriage contract was also refused in Klein v. Wolfson, 1 Abb. N. C. 134, wherein the fraud charged was that the defendant falsely represented himself to be a man of good character, and represented that he was worth fifteen thousand dollars when in fact he was good for nothing and had no means. Said the court: "The fraud, for which a court of equity would be justified in decreeing a dissolution, is clearly not of the character indicated by the complaint. And if judicial favor was given to this application, it would open the door to a class of cases not heretofore entertained, and disturb the sanctity with which the marriage bond should be regarded." And where a husband represented that he was twenty-one years of age, when in fact he was but twenty years and some months of age, an annulment was of course refused. Williams v. Williams, 71 Misc. 590. The later cases in New York, however, seem to have opened the door for wholesale application for annulments on the ground of fraud. Thus in Keyes v. Keyes, 6 Misc. 355, the court said that if the misrepresentations had been as to the defendant's social position, rank, fortune, manners or the like, they would have furnished no ground for declaring the marriage void; this was followed by an annulment decree on the ground that the defendant represented himself to his future wife as "an honest, industrious man" when in fact his picture had a place in the rogues' gallery and he was subsequently sentenced to prison for a crime, apparently committed after marriage. More liberal still is the decision in King v. Brewer, 8 Misc. 587, where a marriage was annulled where it appeared that the husband was supposed by persons who knew him, including the wife, to be a law-abiding citizen of good character, when in fact he was at the time running a "pool room," indictable offense, of which he kept his intended wife in ignorance, the fraud consisting, apparently, in silence. "A court of equity," said the court, "does not go too far

when it gives this young plaintiff, who has been grievously wronged while doing no wrong herself, the opportunity to commence life again free and untrammeled." Along the same line is a recent unreported case wherein the wife of an absconder was released from the marriage contract on the ground of fraud consisting in a representation that he was a man of good reputation, whereas he had committed forgery before his marriage. While, strictly speaking, the case of Kraus v. Kraus, 9 Ohio Dec. 515, is not to the point, the humor of the opinion excuses a short reference to the case. It, was there alleged, as stated by the court, "that the plaintiff represented that she was bodily and physically a sound woman, that she was perfect in her eyesight; that she wore glasses and was thereby enabled to disguise her true condition, and that instead of being in a sound physical condition, she wore and used a glass eye, and that she skillfully concealed that fact from the defendant for more than one year after their marriage. And by reason of said alleged fraud and deceit he prays that a divorce be granted him." In denying relief the court said: "It is not necessary for a woman, during courtship, to inform her intended husband of any device or attachment used to improve the work of nature in the construction of her face, form or figure. If a glass eye, purposely concealed before marriage, be fraudulent representation and a ground for divorce, why are not false teeth, false hair or any other false articles peculiar to the fair sex also a ground for divorce?" That decision seems to remove women from the precarious position in which men position in which men are placed by the New York courts. The view followed by the majority of courts, or rather the practical application of the law, is certainly more calculated to suppress fictitious applications for relief from the marriage contract on the ground of fraud than the prevailing practice in New York. Such a course of procedure, carried out to its logical conclusion, places the marital status of most husbands in jeopardy, for the delicate nature of an engagement to marry results in much deception pro and con.

WHEN EXECUTORS BECOME TRUSTEES.

THE Common practice of testators appointing the same persons to be both the executors and the trustees of their wills possibly explains the comparative infrequency of the question whether an act done by a personal representative is performed in the capacity of executor or in that of trustee. But that this question may become of first-rate importance is shown by such a case as Attenborough v. Solomon (107 L. T. Rep. 833; (1913) A. C. 76) recently before the House of Lords. It is often very difficult to distinguish in the administration of the deceased's estate the point of time at which the functions of the one office cease and those of the other commence; although it is generally fully appreciated that the acts done immediately after the death are acts done in the capacity of executor, whereas those done in the later stages of the administration are usually done in the capacity of trustee.

Although an executor may readily become a trustee, even though he has not been appointed to the latter office, a person clothed with the powers of duties of an executor stands on a very different footing to a trustee. The office of an

executor is essentially a legal one. It has always been so, although the ecclesiastical courts and the courts of equity have had much to do in defining his obligations. The office of a trustee is essentially the creature of the courts of equity. But it is not proposed to go into the historical aspect of these offices. It is proposed only to discuss the main rules by the aid of which the point may be ascertained where the functions of the one office cease and those of the other commence.

As pointed out by Mr. Justice North in Re Smith; HendersonRoe v. Hitchins (61 L. T. Rep. 363; 42 Ch. Div. 302, at p. 304), the duty of the executor is to clear the estate-to pay the debts, the funeral and testamentary expenses and the pecuniary legacies, and to hand over the assets specifically bequeathed to the specific legatees. But there are some duties imposed upon him over and above those mentioned by his Lordship, for he must provide for the burial of the testator, and take steps to procure probate of the will. He must also collect the testator's effects. The law has always secured to the executor a priority for the expenses incurred in burying the deceased. There are several authorities dealing with the amount which ought to be allowed to the executor for this purpose. The importance of setting a limit to this amount is obvious, especially in cases of insolvent estates. At one time only 40s. was allowed by law. This limit was increased to £5 and then to £10, and Lord Hardwicke in Stag v. Punter (1744, 3 Atk. 119) allowed as much as £60 in the case of a solvent testator. But there is no hard-and-fast limit at the present day.

To pass to the more congenial functions of an executor, his next duty is to prove the will. Then follows the collection of the effects and the ascertainment of the testator's debts. The most important office which the executor has to perform is the payment of debts. This is essentially an executorial function. The clearance of the estate by payment of the debts and funeral and testamentary expenses is, as it were, a condition precedent to the termination of the executorship: (Re Willey, W. N. 1890, 1). But it does not follow that the executorship ends forthwith on the clearance of the estate. Distribution of the estate, in so far as it is immediately distributable, is part of an executor's duty: (Re Smith; Henderson-Roe v. Hitchins, 42 Ch. Div., at p. 304). Where the specific and pecuniary legacies are transferred and paid over to the legatees forthwith, there can be no question but that such transfer and payment is made quâ executor.

The property retained by the executor after the estate has been cleared may be said to fall into three categories-first, property not immediately distributable, as e.g., where life interests are given with gifts over; secondly, property immediately distributable so far as the terms of the will are concerned, but which cannot be paid over because of some incapacity on the part of the legatee to give a good discharge, as e.g., in the case of an infant legatee; and, thirdly, property which is immediately distributable but which is not in fact distributed. Each of these categories requires to be considered separately.

First, as to property in the hands of the executor and not immediately distributable, the test whether it is in his hands as executor or as trustee depends on the question whether he has assented to the bequest. On his assent the property retained notionally ceases to be assets in the hands of the executor and becomes trust property, and by his assent the executor constitutes himself a trustee for the beneficiaries holding the property on the trusts of the will: (see Dix v. Burford, 1854, 19 Beav. 409). The same rules apply where a legacy is given to a legatee on attaining a certain age. On the executor's assent to the bequest the legacy ceases to bear the character of a legacy and becomes

a trust fund, and the quondam executor holds the fund for the legatee; although, except for the mention of the age when the legatee is to receive the legacy, there are no trusts declared in the will with regard to the legacy: (Phillipo v. Munnings, 1837, 2 M. & C. 309, at p. 315).

As to the second category-viz., property immediately distributable to a legatee incapable of giving a valid dischargethe question whether the executor retains the legacy quâ executor or quâ trustee is a difficult one. On the one hand it may be said that when he has assented to the bequest he, according to the authorities mentioned above, thereby constitutes himself a trustee, and on the other-and this appears to be the better view-that he merely defers payment for want of a valid discharge, and in the meantime his retention of the legacy is done solely in his capacity as executor.

In passing, we may observe that the executor may relieve himself of the inconvenience of awaiting the legatee's majority. Formerly the executor could obtain a discharge by paying the legacy into the Bank of England with the privity of the Accountant-General of the Court of Chancery (an office since abolished) under the statute 36 Geo. III, c. 52. Now, by sect. 42 of the Trustee Act 1893, trustees having money belonging to a trust can obtain a discharge by payment into the High Court. The terms "trust" and "trustees" are defined by sect. 50 as including the duties incident to the office of a personal representative of a deceased person.

It is chiefly on cases concerning property falling under the third category that the recent case (Attenborough v. Solomon, sup.) throws light. We have included in this category property immediately distributable but which is not in fact actually distributed. Speaking of chattels which were immediately transferable after the estate had been cleared, Lord Haldane, L.C., said (107 L. T. Rep., at p. 835; (1913) A. C., at p. 83): "The office of executor remains, with its powers attached, but the property which he had originally in the chattels that devolved upon him, and over which these powers extended, does not necessarily remain. So soon as he has assented, the dispositions of the will become operative, and then the beneficiaries have vested in them the property in those chattels." His Lordship also pointed out that the assent might be informal and merely inferred from the executor's conduct, and added that the transfer is made not by mere force of the assent, but by virtue of the dispositions in the will which became operative because of the assent.

The question whether a person acts as an executor or as a trustee becomes important where it is desired to substitute another person for the person filling the office. The court has no jurisdiction to remove an executor; nor did the Trustee Act 1893 give the court power to appoint an executor. Indeed, it was expressly provided that sect. 25-the section which enables the court to appoint new trustees-was not to be construed as giving any such power: (see sect. 25, sub-sect. 3). Where, therefore, a legacy is not immediately payable-as e.g., where it is payable after the death of a beneficiary, and it is desired to appoint some new party a trustee the question arises whether the executor is functus officii. If he is, a new trustee may be appointed in his place; if not, the court can do nothing: (see Re Willey, sup.; Eaton v. Daines (1894) W. N. 32). Thus, where a testator appointed two persons to be his executors and trustees and gave certain life interests with gifts over, and one executor and trustee became a lunatic, and a petition was presented for the appointment of another person in his place, the court directed the petition to stand over until evidence had been furnished that all the debts and funeral and testamentary expenses had been

paid. In other words, evidence was required that the executorship functions had been discharged: (Re Willey, sup.).

That there are other occasions when the question whether an executor had become a trustee may become of the utmost importance is shown by such a case as Attenborough v. Solomon (sup.). There a testator appointed two persons to be his executors and trustees and bequeathed his residuary estate to them on trust for sale and after payment of expenses on trust to divide the residue into four equal shares. One fourth share was given to each executor, and the two remaining shares were settled on trusts for the testator's daughters. The testator died in 1878. All the debts and legacies, etc., were paid within a year of his death. Certain articles of plate forming part of the residuary estate was retained by one executor pending the ultimate division. In 1892 this executor pledged the plate in his own name to secure an advance. The pawnbrokers had no notice that the plate formed part of the testator's estate. The executor applied the sum so raised in satisfying a personal debt. After his death a new trustee was appointed, and in 1908 it was discovered for the first time that the plate had been pledged. The pawnbrokers refused to hand it over unless it was redeemed; so the trustees commenced an action for its recovery.

An executor has by law a title to the personal property of his testator. He may sell or pledge the chattels for payment of debts and the getting in of the money value of the estate, and his act will bind his co-executor. Where, however, chattels are held by trustees they are the joint property of the trustees, and one trustee cannot give a title to chattels without the concurrence of the other. If, therefore, the executor pledged this plate as executor, the pawnbroker might have insisted on redemption. But the House of Lords, affirming the decision of the Court of Appeal (106 L. T. Rep. 87; (1912) 1 Ch. 451) reversing the judgment of Mr. Justice Joyce (105 L. T. Rep. 11; (1911) 2 Ch. 159), held that the executor had by his conduct assented to the bequest previously to the pledge, and thereupon the property in the chattels had vested in him jointly with his co-trustee; consequently the pledgor had no property in the plate to pass to the pawnbrokers, who had no contractual rights which could prevail against the trustees.-Law Times.

SOCIOLOGY OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.*

THE work of the courts and the operation of the law seem to be a bitter source of attack from all sides. I am of the opinion that most of the people are laboring under a serious misconception in criticising the administration of the courts, its officers and the benefits which come to the injured. The courts for all these years have served the people well, and have been the bulwark of our liberties; and when we by our continued criticism seek to debase them, it is traducing a forum to which all must go, and have gone, in every stable government. The lack of knowledge of the relation of many other elements of the government and a consideration of the constant changing mechanical development of this country, and listening to much of newspaper misconstructions of courts' rulings, and to editorials whose sentiments are directed by outside influences, has developed a prejudice of the most unjust character. Instead of berating the courts for adhering to the law and the constitutions of the

* From the Address by Robert C. Ferguson, of the Chicago Bar, before the National Paint, Oil and Varnish Association, October, 1912.

states, be sure something has gone wrong besides the effects it has on the objector. Every man should take an active interest in the non-partisan, political and governmental necessities and requirements of our country, before going too far in his complaint. That we must introduce reforms in the procedure all are agreed, but this takes time and requires constitutional construction, and we must be patient and work for a wise end.

If the employers feel that they are going to be relieved of the duties of the courts to look after this branch of business, they are very much mistaken. In a recent report from England, it is stated that of nine cases before the House of Lords, reported in the Appeal Cases of 1911, not less than five involved the interpretation of the English Act on this subject, passed in 1906.

The statistics show claims for damages have greatly increased under the Compensation Acts, lawsuits have increased, and while many small cases are easily disposed of, anything of importance is carried into court. Some of the comments I made from the Law Times are equally applicable here.

I desire to quote from an article recently published in a French journal, and copied in the Market World and Chronicle, which will give most of you a new thought.

The article says: "Taking up the insurance against accidents and sickness directed by the German State, Professor Bernhard recalls the criticisms which certain authorized physicians have given expression to, as against the practical carrying out of this insurance, and asserts that the scheme of working-class insurance has given rise in Germany to the vicious art of simulation and of aggravation of sickness and accidents. The physicians do not cease calling attention to the extraordinary energy which workmen, affected with an unheard-of enfeeblement of their physical powers, are capable of displaying, in order to demonstrate this enfeeblement. In Upper Silesia the Polish workingmen are predisposed to follow the instruction which is given them by pensioners expert in the art of simulating traumatic neurosis. Worst of all, according to Professor Bernhard, is the state of mind which prevails among the workingmen, the relation which has been established between every sickness and the right to the annual payment, or pension. Their attention becomes concentrated upon the phenomena, the symptoms; and that obsession is engendered which the German physicians have called 'pension-hysteria' (Rentenhysterie). The physicians note that this hysteria of workingmen's pensions has become a veritable epidemic. Nervous derangement and simulation progress side by side; sick persons, apparently exhausted both mentally and physically, are capable of calculating with wonderful precision the exact amount of pension to which they are entitled." I think, therefore, with this last statement, you will conclude that with the peculiar cases cited, that there is no room in the agitation of this question for sentimentality. If this is the experience of Germany, after thirty years, then each man has got to have woven into the doormat of his factory, just as Glaucus did in his house in Pompeii, "Beware of the dog."

My belief is, that every one of these cases which cannot be settled by quick and fair adjustment between the employee and the employer, shall be disposed of by a court which shall have all the experience and all the knowledge which comes from that cumulative work in the trial of human rights in the courts of our country, and if it takes a judge for each block in the city, I would have enough of them so that there would be no complaint of unreasonable delay; and I would adopt the simplicity of the disposition of the claims of the injured very much in the manner in which the more recent laws have undertaken to create a plan. I would eliminate court

appeals except in rare cases. But for the present other resourceful methods must be adopted, and you as well as other organizations must find within yourself a power such as the law gives, in the arbitration of many of these cases, whenever it is possible, and by the development of a reasonable cordiality between yourself and your employees many dollars can be saved for both.

In this connection, the law as made in this country must, necessarily, be amended, because the question of industrial diseases is going to enter into the matter so far that it is likely to produce a chaotic state and a disagreeable situation with our progressive Americanism, unless we do as they have done in England-define industrial diseases and the conditions under which a liability is incurred, and determine more absolutely what sort of infirmity or physical derangement is going to be put into the classification of diseases and injuries.

We must take into consideration what the professional risk is in any employment. I am opposed to the broad proposition that every man that suffers a derangement of any sort while in your employ is entitled to compensation. There is a certain risk which he must take in his employment, and for which he must be held strictly accountable, the same as the risk which the capital takes in its efforts, and the inevitable losses which come to it for which nobody can be held responsible.

What is an accident or recoverable injury cannot be solved by any formula, but must always depend upon the circumstances of each case.

In the case of Haley v. United Colonies, 44 Scotch Law Reports, 193; and in an article in the Harvard Law Review, by Francis Bowen, he following a line of decisions, deducts this principle: "If the risk is one common to all humanity, it is not enough that his employment subjects him in common with all humanity to it. Yet, it is impossible to distinguish broadly between danger of a sort to which only workmen in a particular employment are subjected, and the dangers of the sort to which all men are exposed."

"In a case of Pearce v. Provident Clothing Company, 1 K. B. 997, Buckley, L. J., does draw this distinction: 'An accident,' he says, 'arises out of the employment when it results from a risk incidental to the employment, as distinguished from a risk common to all men. The employee must be exposed by the nature of his employment to some peculiar danger.'

Yes, you may well ask who is to decide what is peculiar about each risk and employment, especially when, as the court has said in Craske v. Wygand, 2 K. B. 635, "the peculiarity need not be in the nature of the work itself; it may lie in the conditions under which it is carried on."

The Pearce case was where the employee, as a canvasser for subscriptions, which took him constantly about the streets of London, chose, with his employer's knowledge, to use a bicycle as a means of getting about. While riding about he was killed. It was held that the risk of injury from traffic was one incidental to his employment.

If this is the law, under the language of the English Act (injuries arising out of and in the course of employment), it needs no argument to see where you stand when this form is used in our laws, and the uncertainties with which you must deal. It is for you to help solve this question, because you must render to those who are seeking to direct the law, the aid of practical experience and advice, which should be the moving spirit in rendering justice wherever it is due, and framing laws which will enable justice to be adequately administered. We cannot expect to right all our wrongs by the law; we must right some of them by righting the people.

The constant cry in America for laws to regulate competitive conditions of business and labor, and to ameliorate the domestic conditions of labor and living, is a phobia which must be checked. Many who are asking for Federal laws, and others who want radical State laws, and who are ready to break down the strong barriers by rabid amendments to the constitutions, will find our State and National Constitutions are still the fort of intelligence from which we must find relief. They must stand like a time-lock against every secret power which menaces life, liberty, and property.

It was well said in the Minority Report of a Committee of the Bar Association of the City of New York, upon a proposed amendment to the Constitution so as to permit the enactment of the Workmen's Compensation Act: "We must begin by ourselves understanding that the constitutional provisions which are contained in our bill of rights in the State and Federal Constitutions are moral principles, as standard in moral authority, and as vital to the safety of society as any that have been promulgated, not even excepting the 'Golden Rule.' After that, we much teach the people. We must make them understand that constitutional rights are moral rights, and that whatever experience they may try in modes of social organization, they must never try any experience which will imperil those moral rights. We must make them understand that once they tamper with the security of those moral rights, they will, like Samson, wreck the social structure, and be themselves crushed in the ruins."

The German Social Democracy is said by John William Perrin, in the North American Review, "to be without doubt, not only the largest, but the most thoroughly revolutionary body that the world has ever seen. It is a constant menace, not only to Germany, but to the entire world."

Are we not facing a social democracy in this country? And if Germany, to whom all eyes are looking regarding the Compensation Act, has met with this criticism, we who are installing compensation in this country must "look and listen" before we cross dangerous places, and "look and listen" before we go too far with compensation, insurance, pensions, etc., and all other more or less fads, which lead to the government control of all our people, and our industries, and destroy the individuality of our population, and destroy the ambitions of men and make them, as it were, the wards of a government which will then be a disorganized body.

In conclusion, gentlemen, when we take into consideration that the American people are apt to go to extremes, it is well to consider that you must qualify yourselves to determine in your business, when a man should receive compensation for a defect in his working condition, where it grows out of the occupational relation between your business and himself; and you must take into consideration that machinery which has been developed has more certainty, and gets better care than the laborer. It has no excessive habits, no nerves to become depleted by the anxieties other than the labor to be performed. The machine has no sick wife, no dying children, and can perform its functions day by day; but the human existence has surrounding it hundreds of conditions which in a more or less degree change or modify the ability to perform the duties which must either provide for daily bread, or provide for other exigencies of life. A workman may be living under the distress of a disease carried down by generations; he may be living under conditions of labor which may at times snap the most vital nerve of his existence. The automatic action of the daily toil subjects him to much danger; the lack of education leaves him in a position so that