referring to the wonder which he had heard expressed as to the readiness and ease with which the Bar had adapted itself to that method of trying important cases, said:

"I saw the pleadings only a day or two ago, in a matter involving two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, where, on two half sheets of paper, the pleadings on both sides were written, and it was an exceedingly important matter which involved many, many involved and intricate questions of law, and yet the whole story was told on those two half sheets of legal cap."

The Chief Justice of the Municipal Court of Chicago is with us and we hope to hear from him to-night something of the efficiency of that court, unhappily unique between the Canadian and the Mexican border.

In the first American address to lawyers, made by Cotton Mather in 1710, he closed his admonition with these words:

"You may, gentlemen, if you please, be a vast Accession to the Felicity of your Countreys. Perhaps you may discover many things yet wanting in the law; mischiefs in the execution and application of the laws, which ought to be better provided against; mischiefs annoying of mankind against which no laws are yet provided. The reformation of the law, and more law for the reformation of the world is what is mightily called for."

After the lapse of 200 years, may I not say the same with equal truth to-day?

True, the task before us is endless. The law never can keep pace with human development, because it is, itself, a generalization from what has been developed. There must be many instances before the rule applicable to future instances can be deduced.

Yet we of the Bar, from which the Bench is drawn, can— and must-do our part toward making real the promise of King John: "To none will we sell, to none will we deny or delay, right or justice;" consoling ourselves where we fail with the nunc dimittis of Thomas Jefferson: 'Our children will prove as wise as we are, and will establish in the fullness of time those things not yet ripe for establishment.'

APPAREL LOST AT RESTAURANTS OR ENTERTAINMENTS.

WHEN seeking to ascertain the incidence of the damage to, or loss of, any apparel at a restaurant or other place of entertainment, it is very interesting, and quite as important, to note incidents which a layman may consider quite immaterial; in other words, to discover whether the customary liability of an innkeeper for the safe custody of a guest's goods, or a contract of bailment (gratuitous or for reward), or any other contract inter vivos is, in truth, at issue. It is scarcely necessary to remind the reader, says the Law Times, that one of the few positive duties known to English law is that, arising by the custom of the realm quite independently of any contract between the parties, whereby an innkeeper insures the safety of his guest's chattels left within his inn (even against injury or theft by a burglar, by his servant, or by another guest), in the absence of any act of God or of the King's enemies, or of any negligence of the owner (Robins v. Gray, 73 L. T. Rep. 252; (1895) 2 Q. B. 501). And for our present purpose it is material to remember that this duty, onerous and extraordinary as it is, attaches notwithstanding there has been no delivery of the chattels to the innkeeper or his servants, and no food or lodging having been supplied or found at the time of the loss (Wright v. Anderton, 100 L. T. Rep. 123; (1909) 1 K. B. 209), and notwith

standing the true owner of the chattels does not pay for the food or lodging supplied (Gordon v. Silber, 63 L. T. Rep. 283, 25 Q. B. Div. 491; Wright v. Anderton, ubi sup.). And the innkeeper's pecuniary liability is only limited by the Innkeepers' Liability Act 1863 (26 & 27 Vict. c. 41), which legislation, as it affects the present inquiry, amounts to this, that where the innkeeper can prove that a complete (Spice v. Bacon, 36 L. T. Rep. 896; 2 Ex. Div. 463) print in plain type of the exempting section of the Act was exhibited "in a conspicuous part of the hall or the entrance of the inn," and neither the innkeeper nor the guest proves that the injury or loss was due to negligence for which the other is responsible, then, although the value of the article or articles of apparel lost be more than £30, the guest can recover no more than that sum (Medawar v. Grand Hotel Company, 64 L. T. Rep. 851; (1891) 2 Q. B. 11).

It is, we think, so extremely important in the case of a damage or loss to discern, in the very first place, whether the remedy arises from the owner being a guest at an inn, or from a liability as bailee either gratuitous or for reward, or for some other relationship existing between the owner and another person, and then, having done so, to keep the fact ever in mind, that we will select four suggestive and typical illustrations which may further elucidate the problem, and exhibit its many undecided difficulties.

1. Suppose that a wayfarer or traveler goes to an hotel to get a meal, and on entering the dining room hangs an overcoat on a peg, and that when he finished his repast the coat is missing. Here there is sufficient evidence to establish the relation of innkeeper and guest, so as to make the hotel proprietor liable for the loss subject, of course, to the limitation imposed by the Innkeepers' Liability Act-without proof of negligence on his or his servant's part, unless he can prove the loss arose from the negligence of the guest (Orchard v. Bush & Co., 78 L. T. Rep. 557; (1898) 2 Q. B. 285). And if, instead of being missing, the coat were found to have been injured, the innkeeper would be liable for the injury, subject to the like limitation, as it seems clear that no just distinction as regards responsibility can be established between injury and loss (Day v. Bather, 2 H. & N. 14).

2. Again, take the case of a man, whether a traveler or not, entering a restaurant, not attached to or part of an hotel, who finds a waiter in the vestibule or at the door of the dining room taking the customers' coats, sticks, etc. The mere fact that this waiter took the man's chattels, and disposed of them where he (the waiter) chose, would be evidence upon which a jury might properly find that the restaurant-keeper was a bailee of the chattels, and, accordingly, liable as a bailee should injury or loss occur; and this because such a practice does, or even might, add to the popularity and distinction of the establishment, and was probably adopted by the proprietor or manager with that very object in view (per Mr. Justice Charles in Ultzen v. Nicols, 70 L. T. Rep. 140; (1894) 1 Q. B. 92).

3. Thirdly, suppose that a man (traveler or not) enter a restaurant, or a "tea shop," and a waiter, without being asked, takes his hat and hangs it upon a hook behind him, and suppose that, while he is enjoying his meal, the hat disappears. Now, a person cannot be made liable as a bailee without his consent; and it has to be confessed that these assumptions present a vexatious and troublesome question whether they show a bailment of the hat, or merely a taking of the hat as an act of good nature, or an act of service, and without any intention of taking charge of it. Still, on the whole, they present evidence upon which a jury might find a bailment, and, if so, more assuredly, that the restaurant-keeper was guilty of negligence

vile the hit was in his custody, owing to want of reasonable cat on his part. Sizes v. Nicvis, ubi sup.; and cf., as to the merligare. Friggs v. New Claridge Hotel, 22 Times L. Rep. 49; First. Spa 23 Times L Rep. 258; Giblin v. M'Mullen, 1 Lg. I P. C. 317.

4 LAST, E a subscription dance or concert held in a country strane te assembly room, a subscriber leaves his overcoat in de cand rum and it is afterwards found missing. The en mat segave a bailment with the entertainment comAnd as y breach of an implied contract by the comme Le proper care of any chattels so deposited, it DIT de DHELITed by the low price of the tickets (Baker v. Cain, Ima. Did Nov. 1:12 p. 3).

I endent, therefore, that if the place visited be not an inn, The customer must show some express or implied contractual migne de a bailment. And the reader may have concluded, aut we think sorrectly, that the traveler in the first case would sare und so siffer the loss if the place he had gone to had not best at ease Le did not deliver his overcoat to the inndenger or oce of the servants, and, as every lawyer knows, and Sue Ser12100 of the word "bailment" suggests, delivery of the tis essential to a bailment of it. In the second case 2 +0 2m Poel-room charge might have been demanded and paid; and therefore, it will be useful to recall that a bailment may be etter for reward or gratuitous, and that this distinction affects, and very reasonably so, the degree of diligence which is expected of the tune. And whenever the place is not an inn, it may be B considering whether the responsibilities of a boardingtrouve keeper, or at least some of them, which were a few years ago clarussed and enunciated in a case in the Court of Appeal Vacantorough v. Cosgrave, 93 L. T. Rep. 530; (1905) 2 K. B. bido Lot also attach to the proprietor of the establishment in queson; and further to bear in mind that if liability for injury or los exist, it would not be limited to £30.

It appears, then, that in a case of customary liability, a just has to, if it be possible, prove he visited an inn (see compron v. Lacy, 3 B. & Ald. 286), and that the relationsp of innkeeper and guest, in the legal sense of these terms,

In this connection we would point out that when Mr. Justice Wills stated (Orchard v. Bush & Co., ubi sup.) that, from the point of authority, he did not think that there *as much to be said for the proposition that the term "wet" is to be limited to a wayfarer, and that the liability

* innkeeper arises whenever he receives a person causâ Bertandi or hospitü, it was obiter, as the plaintiff in the case as held to be, and clearly was, a traveler; and, with great et for that learned judge, we must add that this dictum wowars to be inconsistent with other cases (e.g., Burgess v. Comente, 4 M. & S. 306; Reg. v. Rymer, 35 L. T. Rep. 774; 2 4. v. 136; Lamond v. Richards, 76 L. T. Rep. 141; (1897) B. 541). We should be glad if the meaning of the term sama vytis shortly for consideration and judgment; as we are vana w thick it is still arguable that a person who dines at As town, and then returns home, or goes on to the Who is not a "guest," and must, accordingly, frame

4 8142Laive of the fact that the place he visited was an

things. For elasticity enables those who have to administer a law to adapt it the more readily to the modern requirements of the age.

Observations Here and There.

In a dissenting opinion in Sparf v. U. S., 156 Fed. Rep. 51, 114, Mr. Justice Gray contended, with characteristic energy, that a jury upon the general issue of guilty or not guilty in a criminal case, have the right, as well as the power, to decide questions of law as well as of fact involved in that issue.

"It is well known that, where a gleam of light falls from a moving train upon a perfectly smooth exterior surface, the train itself frequently appears to be stationary. The stream of light naturally moves forward with the train, and gives to it a stationary effect." Hence it may be inferred that a passenger was free from fault in alighting from such a moving train under the belief that it had come to a full stop, especially when there was an entire absence of jar and no upright objects in the neighborhood which as the train glided past them would have indicated motion. Mearns v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, 23 N. Y. App. Div. 298, 48 N. Y. Supp. 366, 368, reversed in 163 N. Y. 108, apparently, however, on the sole ground that no negligence of the railroad company or its servants was shown.

In McKee v. Nelson, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 555, 557, a breach of promise case, the court said "there are a thousand nameless things indicating the existence and degree of the tender passion which language cannot specify." But Rosalind named eight or ten, and summed up with "everything about you demonstrating a careless desolation," in "As You Like It," Act III, sc. 2.

"Instruction" would be a misnomer for the following direction by a trial judge to the jury; in slang phrase it was "dope," and the appellate court so regarded it: "First, The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to satisfy you by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the bargain was as he says, and that the goods bargained for were delivered. Second, The burden of proof is upon the defendant to satisfy you by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the goods as delivered were not the goods bargained for, in quality or quantity." New trial granted. Ordonez v. Manda, 79 N. J. L. 236, 75 Atl. Rep. 740.

Cases of Interest.

RIGHT OF PURCHASER OF MAP PROPERTY BOUNDED BY STREET TO EASEMENT OF ACCESS.-In Weeks v. New York, etc. R. Co., (N. Y.) 100 N. E. 719, the court reaffirmed the rule of law laid down in Lord v. Atkins, 138 N. Y. 184, that where the owner of land lays it out into distinct lots, with intersecting streets or avenues, and sells the lots with reference to such streets, his grantees or successors cannot afterwards be deprived of the benefit of having such streets kept open, and when, in such a case, a lot is sold bounded by a street, the purchaser and his grantees have an easement in the street for the purposes of

access, which is a property right, similar to the right of an abutter upon a public street or highway.

CONVICTION BASED ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE AS NOT OBTAINED BY DUE PROCESS OF LAW.-In McRae v. State, (Okla. Crim. App.) 129 Pac. 71, it was held that a conviction obtained against the defendant for having possession of intoxicating liquors for the purpose of unlawfully disposing of them should be reversed because hearsay evidence had been admitted at the trial over the objections of the defendant's attorney which reasonably contributed to the verdict of guilty and that the conviction therefore was not obtained by due process of law. The court said: "It is true that the admission of illegal testimony does not necessarily deprive a defendant of due process of law, because the other testimony in a case might show that it did not affect the results; but where illegal evidence is admitted which is material in its character and which goes directly to the question at issue, and where the record shows that such evidence reasonably contributed to a verdict of guilty, then such a conviction cannot be said to have been obtained by due process of law. This is the condition of the record now before us."

VALIDITY OF STATUTE PROTECTING PROPAGATION OF FISH BY PROHIBITING POLLUTION OF STREAM.-In State v. Southern Coal & Transportation Co., (W. Va.) 76 S. E. 970, it was held that a statute was valid as within the proper exercise by the state of its police power, which made it an offense to put into a stream sawdust or any matter deleterious to the propagation of fish, and that a coal mine operator was liable under the statute for draining sulphur or mine water from his mine into a stream, deleterious to the propagation of fish, though such stream was the natural receptacle of such drainage, or it was impracticable to drain the mine otherwise. The court said: "The case of People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 116 Cal. 397, 48 Pac. 374, 39 L. R. A. 581, 58 Am. St. Rep. 183, holds that fish within the waters of a state constitute the most important part of that species of property commonly designated as 'wild game,' the general right and ownership of which is in the people of the state. The right to protect such property for the common use and benefit is one of the recognized prerogatives of the sovereign. It also holds that the right of the state to protect fish is not confined to navigable or public waters, but extends to all waters within the state, public or private, where the animals are accustomed to resort for spawning or other purposes, and of which they have freedom of passage to or from the fishing grounds of the state. The state owns the fish in its streams and has ample power to preserve and protect them from destruction under its police power, and private right and convenience must yield to it."

RIGHT OF PERSONS IMPLICATED IN SAME MURDER AND SEPARATELY TRIED AND CONVICTED TO SAME PUNISHMENT.-In Allen v. Com., (Va.) 77 S. E. 66, wherein Claude S. Allen and Floyd Allen, convicted of murder in the first degree, sought to have the conviction set aside and a new trial granted, one of the grounds on which a new trial was claimed was that upon the trial of others implicated in the same murder and equally guilty as they, a charge of conspiracy like the charge made against them and on which they were convicted was abandoned and verdict rendered for murder in the second degree. It was held that the ground stated did not warrant a new trial. The court said: "The guilt or innocence of the petitioners must be determined in the record before us. The records upon the other trials are not here, and we are unable to say what they do or do not contain; but if it be granted that the statement of counsel for the petitioners is accurate in the respect mentioned it could not produce the result contended for. The commonwealth was not bound down to

pursue the same line of prosecution in all the cases, though the same transaction was under investigation. With respect to the verdicts of the juries being more lenient in subsequent cases, that is a matter beyond the control of the courts. The question before us is: Were the accused guilty of the offense with which they were charged, were they tried in accordance with the law of the land, and does the evidence support the verdict of the jury? It does not concern us that in other cases other juries inflicted a milder punishment upon substantially the same state of facts."

or

AUTHORITY OF BRAKEMAN OF FREIGHT TRAIN TO REMOVE TRESPASSERS.-In Harrington v. Boston, etc., R. Co., (Mass.) 100 N. E. 606, it was held that a brakeman upon a freight train was not by virtue of his position as such vested with authority to remove trespassers. The court said: "It never has been decided that such is the law in this commonwealth, although some allusion has been made to this question. When we look to the decisions in other jurisdictions we find a conflict of authority. We do not deem it necessary to go over them in detail. Those which favor the general proposition seem to rest upon the doctrine adopted by them that 'whenever a railway servant is put in charge of any property of the railway, as a station master in charge of a station, or a conductor in charge of a train, or an engine driver fireman in charge of an engine, or a brakeman in charge of a car, that servant is necessarily charged with the duty of protecting that authority to remove trespassers therefrom.' See for example Brevig v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry., 64 Minn. 168, 66 N. W. 401. Those opposed to the proposition maintain in substance that this doctrine is not applicable in the case of a freight train where there is a conductor, that this business has no reference to passengers or the payment of fare, that the conductor is the person presumably in charge of the train and there is no reason for the presumption in such a case that any of the subordinates like brakemen are. See for example Farber v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 116 Mo. 81, 22 S. W. 631, 20 L. R. A. 350, and also Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. v. Brackman, 78 Ill. App. 141, where there is a good review of the authorities on each side. On the whole we think that on principle and the weight of authority the proposition that in a case like the present there is a presumption that the brakeman as such is vested with the authority to remove trespassers is not sound."

DUTY OF TRIAL JUDGE WITH RESPECT TO PRESENTING THE EVIDENCE TO JURY.-In People v. Poulin, (N. Y.) 100 N. E. 593, wherein it appeared that the defendant was convicted of murder and appealed, his counsel on the appeal complained of the failure of the trial court "to marshal, analyze, discuss and present the evidence to the jury fairly and comprehensively," and argued that the failure was so prejudicial to the defendant as to constitute a ground for reversal notwithstanding that he neglected to call the attention of the trial judge to any omission in this respect and made no request whatever indicating a desire on his part for any further discussion or presentation of the facts. But the contention was not upheld by the Court of Appeals, which said: "When a trial closes under circumstances like these which show that counsel representing the defendant are satisfied with the charge, it would be going further than any appellate court has ever gone to reverse the resulting judgment simply because in a calm consideration of the case it may seem that the charge could have been improved by a fuller or different review of the evidence. The language of Judge Peckham in People v. Fanning, 131 N. Y. 659, 30 N. E. 569, 570, is quoted, where he said: 'In a criminal case we think the judge has the right,

and indeed it is his duty, to present the evidence to the jury in such light and with such comments that the jury may see its relevancy and pertinency to the particular issue upon which it was admitted, and thus be better qualified to appreciate its character and weight and to determine its credibility.' This was said in justification of the action of the trial judge in assisting the jury to deal with the facts intelligently and was by no means intended to imply that a charge would be fatally defective, as counsel seems to suppose, because the judge did not marshal the evidence more fully, when no dissatisfaction with the charge in that regard was manifested at the time."

SUIT TO ENJOIN STATE MILITIA AS "ACTION AGAINST STATE.” -In Joos v. Illinois Nat. Guard, (Ill.) 100 N. E. 505, which was a suit against the Illinois National Guard and certain officers of such guard to enjoin them from using a certain rifle range adjacent to the complainant's premises for target practice in such manner as to cause ricochet bullets or other dangerous missiles being sent across or upon his premises, one of the questions in dispute was whether the court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit, it being contended by the defendants that the National Guard was a part of the state government of Illinois, that a suit against it was in effect a suit against the state and that both state and its administrative officers were exempt from suit under a constitutional provision providing that "the state of Illinois shall never be made defendant in any court of law or equity." But the court said: "We do not think this can properly be considered a suit against the state. The officers of the National Guard are charged with unlawful acts infringing the rights of appellee in the lawful use of his property. If it be conceded that the National Guard and its officers, while in the lawful discharge of their military duties, are exempt by the Constitution from being sued, where they unlawfully deprive a citizen of his property, or prevent his free enjoyment of it, they cannot be considered as representing the state. The establishment of a rifle range and the practice of target shooting is a lawful exercise of power; but when it is so conducted as to be a menace to the life of a citizen upon his own premises and to deprive him of the rightful use of said premises, the officers of the National Guard become trespassers, and are not representatives of the state. We would not like to say that the officers of the National Guard could take property without compensation to the owner, by making it so dangerous to the life and safety of the owner as to prevent his use of it, and that he would have no remedy in the courts. When the officers of the National Guard exceed their authority and by wrongful act injure another, they should be, and are, answerable to the injured party in the courts."

USE OF TRADE NAME OF ANOTHER TO DISTINGUISH NONCOMPETITIVE GOODS AS "UNFAIR COMPETITION." In Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 Fed. 510, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals reversed an order of the district court in the circuit granting a preliminary injunction restraining the appellant "Borden's Ice Cream Company" from the use of the name "Borden" in the manufacture or sale of ice cream without advising purchasers and the public in an unmistakable manner that their product was not that of the appellee the "Borden's Condensed Milk Company." The reason for the reversal of the order was that the appellee was not engaged in the manufacture or sale of ice cream. The court said: "The only theory upon which the injunction in this case can be sustained is upon that known as unfair competition. Relief against unfair competition is granted solely upon the ground that one has built up a good will and reputation for his goods or business is entitled to all the resultant benefits. Good will or business

popularity is property, and, like other property, will be protected against fraudulent invasion. . . . It has been said that the universal test question in cases of this class is whether the public is likely to be deceived as to the maker or seller of the goods. This, in our opinion, is not the fundamental question. The deception of the public naturally tends to injure the proprietor of a business by diverting his customers and depriving him of sales which otherwise he might have made. This, rather than the protection of the public against imposition, is the sound and true basis for the private remedy. That the public is deceived may be evidence of the fact that the original proprietor's rights are being invaded. If, however, the rights of the original proprietor are in no wise interfered with, the deception of the public is no concern of a court of chancery. Doubtless it is morally wrong for a person to proclaim, or even intimate, that his goods are manufactured by some other and well-known concern; but this does not give rise to a private right of action, unless the property rights of that concern are interfered with. The use by the new company of the name 'Borden' may have been with fraudulent intent; and, even assuming that it was, the trial court had no right to interfere, unless the property rights of the old company were jeopardized. Nothing else being shown, a court of equity cannot punish an unorthodox or immoral, or even dishonest, trader; it cannot enforce as such the police power of the state. In the case now under our consideration the old company (the appellee) never manufactured what is known as commercial ice cream. The new company (the appellant) was incorporated for the sole purpose of manufacturing and putting on the market such an article."

CONSTRUCTION OF BURGLARY INSURANCE POLICY CONTAINING EXEMPTION FROM LOSS IN ABSENCE OF VISIBLE MARKS UPON PREMISES.-In Rosenthal v. American Bonding Co., (N. Y.) 100 N. E. 716, the court had under consideration the question whether a certain burglary was covered by a burglary insurance policy providing that the indemnity was granted for direct loss by burglary "by any person or persons who have made forcible and violent entrance upon the premises, or exit therefrom, of which force and violence there shall be visible evidence" and that "the company shall not be liable unless there are visible marks upon the premises of the actual force and violence used in making entry into the said premises or exit therefrom." The facts leading up to and constituting the alleged burglary were as follows: At about 7:30 in the morning, two of plaintiff's employees went to plaintiffs' warehouse or loft for the purpose of opening the same and preparing for the day's business. They unlocked and opened the outer door, and after entering closed the same, but did not lock it, and thus left it so that it could be opened by merely turning the knob. While they were engaged in their duties, two persons opened the door with pistols in their hands, and, after assaulting the employees, took and carried away a large amount of silks. It did not appear whether the wrongdoers closed the door behind them as they entered; but they did so close it when they left. On these facts it was held (two justices dissenting) that the burglary in question was not covered by the policy. The court said: "While, in a general sense, the entrance and exit of the wrongdoers was accompanied by force and violence, this force and violence were not manifested in the precise act of making an entry into, or departure from, the premises, but rather characterized what was done after the men had entered. All that it was necessary for them to do in entering the premises was to turn the knob and open the door, and when they left this was closed. There was no forcing of locks or doors, or any other act which left any mark upon the premises, unless

the temporary and ordinary condition of an open door during business hours would constitute such mark, and this is not claimed. . . . We believe that the requirement that the violence and force employed in effecting a burglarious entry into premises must produce 'visible marks upon the premises' thus entered is plain beyond the need of argument, and that it means that the force and violence in 'making entry' must create visible traces upon the premises themselves, which survive the act that produces them, and which, being seen, are evidence of a burglary; that it would be a distortion of the meaning of language to hold, as argued, that this provision is satisfied, under the circumstances of this case, by proof of acts performed by wrongdoers after entry in assaulting occupants and carrying away the contents of a building which leave no marks 'upon' the premises, and which are only visible to one who happens to be watching at the instant they are performed."

VALIDITY OF STATUTE PROHIBITING THE SELLING OF GOODS IN ONE PLACE CHEAPER THAN AT ANOTHER.-In Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 33 U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 66, the United States Supreme Court had under consideration the validity of a South Dakota statute providing that anyone "engaged in the production, manufacture, or distribution of any commodity in general use, that intentionally, for the purpose of destroying the competition of any regular established dealer in such commodity, or to prevent the competition of any person who in good faith intends and attempts to become such dealer, shall discriminate between different sections, communities, or cities of this state, by selling such commodity in another section, . . . after equalizing the distance from the point of production," etc., shall be guilty of a crime. The question in dispute was whether the above statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution in that it denied the equal protection of the laws because among other things it affected the conduct of only a particular class, those selling goods in two places in the state. The question was decided in the negative. Mr. Justice Holmes, through whom the court rendered the decision, said: "It is urged that to punish selling goods in one place lower than at another in effect is to select the class of dealers that have two places of business for a special liability, and in real fact is a blow aimed at those who have several lumber yards along a line of railroad, in the interest of independent dealers. All competition, it is added, imports an attempt to destroy or prevent the competition of rivals, and there is no difference in principle between the prohibited act and the ordinary efforts of traders at a single place. The premises may be conceded without accepting the conclusion that this is an unconstitutional discrimination. If the legislature shares the now prevailing belief as to what is public policy, and finds that a particular instrument of trade war is being used against that policy in certain cases, it may direct its law against what it deems the evil as it actually exists without covering the whole field of possible abuses, and it may do so none the less that the forbidden act does not differ in kind from those that are allowed. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 81, 55 L. ed. 369, 3378, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 337, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205, 32 L. ed. 107, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1161. That is not the arbitrary selection that is condemned in such cases as Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 54 L. ed. 536, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 287, 19 Ann. Cas. 1247. The 14th Amendment does not prohibit legislation special in character. Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 294, 42 L. ed. 1037, 1043, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594. It does not prohibit a state from carrying out a policy that cannot be pronounced purely arbitrary, by taxation or penal

laws. . . If a class is deemed to present a conspicuous example of what the legislature seeks to prevent, the 14th Amendment allows it to be dealt with, although otherwise and merely logically not distinguishable from others not embraced in the law. . We must assume that the legislature of South Dakota considered that people selling in two places made the prohibited use of their opportunities, and that such use was harmful, although the usual efforts of competitors were desired. It might have been argued to the legislature with more force than it can be to us that recoupment in one place of losses in another is merely an instance of financial ability to compete. If the legislature thought that that particular manifestation of ability usually came from great corporations whose power it deemed excessive and for that reason did more harm than good in their state, and that there was no other case of frequent occurrence where the same could be said, we cannot review their economics or their facts."

New Books.

Railroads: Rates and Regulation. By William Z. Ripley, Ph.D., Nathaniel Ropes Professor of Economics in Harvard University. Maps and diagrams. Pp. xviii+659. Longmans, Green, & Co.: New York and London. 1912. There is a wealth of information contained in Professor Ripley's book with respect to the history of transportation in the United States from early times to almost the present moment, and it is handled in a thoroughly satisfactory manner by one who seems to have the questions discussed at his finger tips. In fact the author says that the treatise is the outcome of a continuous personal interest in railroads practically coincident in point of time with the period of active participation in the Federal Government in their affairs. Such subjects are treated as the theory of railroad rates, rate making in practice, personal and local discrimination, problems of routing, freight classification. Moreover, the Act of 1887 to regulate commerce, together with its various amendments, receives careful consideration as to both history and effect. Frequent references in the foot notes to opinions of the Interstate Commerce Commission, court decisions, reports of various committees and text books on the subject give weight to the author's text statements, and the work is further helped by forty-one maps and diagrams.

The Canadian Torrens System. By Douglas J. Thom of the Bar of Saskatchewan. Pp. xxvi+782. Burroughs & Co., Limited Calgary, Canada. 1912.

The work at hand purports to be a complete explanation of the Torrens system of land titles as it exists in the Canadian provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba. It also contains an apparently exhaustive discussion of the two hundred or more decisions which have been handed down in those provinces upon the act. The author has also dealt with the leading cases in Australia, where the system originated. The work is thus both complementary and supplementary to Hogg's Australian Torrens System, and will, if it finds favor with the Bench, undoubtedly replace the earlier work as the authoritative text book in the Canadian courts. Although the introduction of the Torrens system has done a great deal to simplify the legal steps incident to the transfer of land, a casual reading of the book will show that the legal questions which can arise under it are often complex