while he was crossing the bridge on foot. The question was fairly
put to the jury, as to the alleged contributory negligence. The
case was one for the jury. Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Amato,
465.

13. The Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. c. 517, pp. 826, 827,
having provided that no appeals shall be taken from Circuit Courts to
this court except as provided in that act and having repealed all acts
and parts of acts relating to appeals or writs of error inconsistent with
the provisions for review by appeals or writs of error contained in
that act, and the joint resolution of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1115,
having provided that nothing contained in that act shall be held to
impair the jurisdiction of this court in respect of any case wherein
the writ of error or the appeal shall have been sued out or taken to
this court before July 1, 1891, it is Held, that an appeal to this court
from a judgment entered in a Circuit Court November 18, 1890,
appealable before July 1, 1891, could not be taken after July 1, 1891.
National Exchange Bank v. Peters, 570.
14. A defendant indicted in a state court for forging discharges for money
payable by a municipal corporation with intent to defraud it, pleaded
in abatement to an array of the grand jury, and to the array of the
traverse jury, that all the jurors were inhabitants of the municipality,
but did not at that stage of the case claim in any form a right or
immunity under the Constitution of the United States. After convic-
tion, the defendant, by motion in arrest of judgment, and by exception
to the jurisdiction of the court, objected that the proceedings were in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States for the same reason, and also because the selectmen of
the municipality who prepared the jury list, and took the principal
part in drawing the jurors, were at the same time actively promoting
this prosecution. The highest court of the State held the objections
taken before verdict to be unfounded, and those after verdict to be
taken too late. Held, that this court had no jurisdiction to review the
judgment on writ of error. Brown v. Massachusetts, 573.

15. A judgment of a state court upon the question whether bonds of the
State were sold by the governor of the State within the authority
vested in him by the statute of the State under which they were
issued, involves no Federal question. Sage v. Louisiana, 647.

16. The judgment of a state court in a suit to compel the funding of state
bonds, that a former adverse judgment upon bonds of the same series
could be pleaded as an estoppel, presents no Federal question. Adams
v. Louisiana, 651.

17. Under Rev. Stat. § 914, and according to the Code of Civil Procedure
of the State of Nebraska, if the petition, in an action at law in the
Circuit Court of the United States held within that State, alleges the
requisite citizenship of the parties, and the answer denies each and
every allegation in the petition, such citizenship is put in issue, and, if

no proof or finding thereof appears of record, the judgment must be
reversed for want of jurisdiction. Roberts v. Lewis, 653.

See ADVERSE POSSESSION, 1;
JURISDICTION, C, 1;
LOCAL LAW, 1.

B. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS.

1. By section 6 of the act of March 3, 1891, establishing Circuit Courts of
Appeals, 26 Stat. 828, c. 517, the appellate jurisdiction not vested in
this court was vested in the court created by that act, and the entire
jurisdiction was distributed. Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 47.
2. The words "unless otherwise provided by law" in the clause in that
section which provides that the Circuit Courts shall exercise appellate
jurisdiction “in all cases other than those provided for in the preced-
ing section of this act, unless otherwise provided by law" were inserted
in order to guard against implied repeals, and are not to be construed
as referring to prior laws only. Ib.

See JURISDICTION, A, 1, 12.

C. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. In an action brought in the Circuit Court of the United States in Ala-
bama the complaint described the plaintiff as a bank organized in
accordance with the laws of the United States and as doing business
in Tennessee, and the defendant as residing in the State of Alabama.
The summons described the plaintiff as "a citizen of the State of Ten-
nessee," and the defendant "as a citizen of the State of Alabama."
The question of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in this court.
Held, that although greater care should have been exercised by
plaintiffs in the averments, the diverse citizenship of the parties
appeared affirmatively and with sufficient distinctness on the record.
Jordan v. Third National Bank, 97.

2. Under the provisions of the act of July 4, 1884, 23 Stat. 73, c. 179, the
United States Circuit and District Courts for the Northern District of
Texas, the Western District of Arkansas, and the District of Kansas
have concurrent jurisdiction, without reference to the amount in con-
troversy, and without distinction as to citizenship of the parties, over
all controversies arising between the Southern Kansas Railway Com-
pany and the inhabitants of the Indian nations and tribes through
whose territory that railway is constructed. Southern Kansas Railway
Co. v. Briscoe, 133.

3. The jurisdiction of a Federal court by reason of diverse citizenship is
not defeated by the mere fact that a transfer of the plaintiff's interest
was made in order, in part, to enable the purchaser to bring suit in a
court of the United States, provided the transfer was absolute, and

the assignor parted with all his interest for good consideration. Craw
ford. v. Neal, 585.

4. Four children of S. H. P., deceased, recovered judgment in the Circuit
Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee
against a life insurance company, a corporation of New York, on a
policy insuring the life of the deceased, to which judgment a writ of
error was sued out, but citation issued against only one of the plain-
tiffs. On this the company gave a supersedeas bond, securing the
sureties by pledging or mortgaging some of its property. Proceedings
were then taken in the courts of New York, under direction of the
attorney general of that State, which resulted in the dissolution of
that corporation, and the appointment of a receiver of its property,
who, by directions of the court, appeared in this court and prosecuted
the writ of error in order to release the property pledged. After
sundry proceedings the judgment of the Circuit Court was eventually
reversed, and the case was remanded to the Circuit Court. A new
trial was had there, but without summoning in the receiver, who did not
appear, and judgment was again obtained against the company. This
judgment was filed in the proceedings in New York as a claim against
the assets of the company in the hands of the receiver, and the claim
was disallowed by the highest court of that State. Held, that the
appearance of the receiver in this court for the purpose of securing a
reversal of the judgment below and the release of the mortgaged
property gave to the Circuit Court in Tennessee no jurisdiction over
the case, after the dissolution of the corporation, which could bind the
property of the company in the hands of the receiver, or prevent the
receiver from showing that the judgment was invalid because rendered
against a corporation which had at the time no existence, and pos-
sessed no property against which the judgment could be enforced.
Pendleton v. Russell, 640.

D. JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
See JURISDICTION, C, 2;
PRACTICE, 10.

JURY.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 3, 4.

LEGISLATIVE GRANTS.
See STATUTE, A, 1, 2.

LIMITATION, STATUTES OF.

See LOCAL LAW, 7.

LIS PENDENS.

See LOCAL Law, 6.

LOCAL LAW.

1. Upon the trial of this case in the District Court in Dakota, a verdict
was returned, November 24, 1888, in favor of plaintiff for $12,545.43,
and judgment was rendered accordingly November 26, 1888. On
November 28, 1888, the court made an order by consent extending
the time for serving notice of intention to move for a new trial, for
motion for new trial, and for settlement of a bill of exceptions until
January 28, 1889, which time was subsequently extended by order of
court for reason given, to February 28, and thence again "for cause'
to March 28, 1889, upon which day the following order was entered:
"The defendant having served upon plaintiff a proposed bill of excep-
tions herein, the time for settlement of same is hereby extended from
March 28, 1889, to April 10, 1889, and the time within which to serve
notice of the intention to nove for new trial, and within which
to move for new trial, is hereby extended to April 13th, 1889."
The time was again extended to May 31, 1889, and on the 23d
day of that month the following order was entered: "The date
for settling the bill of exceptions proposed by the defendant herein
is hereby extended to June 29, 1889. Defendant may have until
ten days after the settling of said bill within which to serve notice
of intention to move for a new trial, and within which to move
for a new trial in said action." This was the last order of extension.
On December 14, 1889, there was filed in the office of the clerk of the
District Court a notice of motion for new trial, which was as follows:
"Take notice that the motion for a new trial herein will be brought
on for argument before the court at chambers, at Jamestown, Dakota,
on September 12, 1889, at 10 o'clock A.M., or as soon thereafter as
counsel can be heard." On the margin of this notice appeared this
indorsement: "Hearing continued until the 21st September, 1889.
Roderick Rose, Judge." The notices and motion seem to have been
served September 3, 1889. The bill of exceptions was signed August
30, 1889, and filed September 3, 1889. The certificate thereto con-
cluded thus: "Filed as a part of the records in this action this August
30th, 1889, (and within the time provided by law, as enlarged and
extended by orders of the judge of this court)." On February 17,
1890, the judge further certified: "The above and foregoing certificate
is hereby modified and corrected so as to conform to the facts and
record in the case by striking out all that part of it in the two last
lines thereof preceding my signature and after the words and figures
'August 30th, 1889.'" On November 2, 1889, the State of North
Dakota was admitted into the Union. Held, (1) That this bill of
exceptions was not settled and filed within the time allowed by law
or under any order of the court; (2) That the alleged motion for
a new trial not having been filed until December 14, 1889, was not
made, and no notice of intention to make it was given, within the

time allowed by law or by any order of the court; (3) That a renewal
of notice and motion after the State was admitted, if it could have
been made, would necessarily have been in the state court, whose
jurisdiction would have attached to determine it. Glaspell v. Northern
Pacific Railroad Co., 211.

2. In Illinois the filing by the plaintiff under the statute of that State (2
Starr & Curtis' Stats. 1801) of an affidavit "showing the nature of his
demand and the amount due him from the defendant" does not prevent
the recovery of a larger sum if a larger sum is claimed by the plead-
ings and shown to be due by the evidence. Keator Lumber Co. v.
Thompson, 434.

3. Interest at the rate of 83 per cent in Nebraska is not usurious. Dodge
v. Tulleys, 451.

4. The right to intervene in a cause, conferred by secs. 89, 90 of the
Dakota Code of Civil Procedure upon a person interested in the sub-
ject of a litigation, relates to an immediate and direct interest by
which the intervenor may either gain or lose by the direct legal opera-
tion and effect of the judgment, and can only be exercised by leave of
the court, in the exercise of its discretion; and if the request to inter-
vene is made for the first time in a case which had been pending for
two years, and just as it is about to be tried, it is a reasonable exer-
cise of that discretion to refuse the request. Smith v. Gale, 509.

5. Since the enactment of the act of January 6, 1873, (Laws of Dakota
Territory, 1872-73, pp. 63, 64,) a deed of land within Dakota executed
and acknowledged without the State before a notary public having an
official seal, and certified by him under his hand and official seal, is
sufficient to admit the deed to record and in evidence, without further
proof; and the fact that the recording officer in making the record of
the deed fails to place upon the record a note of the official seal, does
not affect the admissibility of the original. Ib.

6. In Dakota a person purchasing real estate in litigation from the party
in possession, in good faith and without knowledge or notice of the
pendency of the litigation, may acquire a good title as against
the other party if no lis pendens has been filed. Ib.

7. Adverse possession of real estate in the District of Columbia, for the
period designated by the Statute of Limitations in force there, confers
upon the occupant a complete title upon which he can stand as fully
as if he had always held the undisputed title of record. Sharon v.
Tucker, 533.