« PreviousContinue »
Opinion of the Court.
equity in cases of public nuisance is by information at the suit of the Attorney General,” p. 267. Mr. Justice Story said that an information in equity at the suit of the Attorney General would lie in cases of purpresture and public nuisance, the jurisdiction of courts of equity being sustained because of “ their ability to give a more complete and perfect remedy than is attainable at law, in order to prevent irreparable mischief, and also to suppress oppressive and vexatious litigations.” Eq. Jur. SS 922, 923, 924; The People v. Vanderbilt, 26 N. Y. 287, 293; District Attorney v. Lynn & Boston Railroad Co., 16 Gray, 242, 245; Kerr on Injunctions, 262, 263; 1 Joyce on Injunctions, 120.
These principles are applicable to the present case. The remedy at law for the protection of the State in respect to the phosphate rocks and phosphatic deposits in the beds of its navigable waters is not so efficacious or complete as a perpetual injunction against interference with its rights by digging, mining and removing such rocks and deposits without its consent. The Coosaw Mining Company, unless restrained, will not only appropriate to its use property held in trust for the public, but will prevent the proper administration of that trust, for an indefinite period, by obstructing others, acting under lawful authority, from enjoying rights in respect to that property derived from the State. These conflicting claims cannot be so effectively or conclusively settled by proceedings at law, as by a comprehensive decree covering all the matters in controversy. Proceedings at law or by indictment can only reach past or present wrongs done by the appellant, and will not adequately protect the public interests in the future. What the public are entitled to have is security for all time against illegal interference with the control by the State of the digging, mining and removing of phosphate rock and phosphatic deposits in the bed of Coosaw River. Such security was properly given by the decree below.
UNITED STATES er rel. JONES v. COUNTY COURT
OF MACON COUNTY.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.
No. 257. Argued March 29, 30, 1892. – Decided April 11, 1892.
The judgment below is affirmed upon the authority of United States v.County
of Macon, 99 U. S. 582.
This was a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the levy of a tax to satisfy a judgment recovered against Macon County upon bonds issued by the county. The bonds were of the same issue which was before this court in United States v. County of Macon, 99 U. S. 582, and the remedy sought for was the same remedy which was prayed for in that suit. The court below dismissed the writ upon the authority of that
Mr. George A. Sanders for plaintiff in error. Mr. T. K. Skinker and Mr. Joseph Shippen filed briefs for same.
Mr. Ben Eli Guthrie for defendant in error.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE : The judgment is affirmed upon the authority of United States v. County of Macon, 99 U. S. 582.
KELLAM V. KEITH.
THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR
THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS.
No. 269. Argued and submitted April 1, 1892. – Decided April 11, 1892.
On the authority of Stevens v. Nichols, 130 U. S. 230, Jackson v. Allen, 132
U. S. 27, and La Confiance Compagnie v. Hall, 137 U. S. 61, the decree below in this case is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to
Statement of the Case.
remand it to the Circuit Court, it not appearing in the record that the diverse citizenship which was the cause of removal from the State Court
existed at the commencement of the action. In such case the appellees are entitled to their costs in this court and in the
This was a suit for the cancellation of a deed, and to compel a reconveyance of land, commenced in the District Court of Shawnee County in the State of Kansas. The complaint did not disclose the citizenship of the parties. The defendants, before pleading, presented a petition as follows for the removal of the cause to the Circuit Court of the United States:
“And now come the said defendants Edward P. Kellam and Cyrus K. Holliday, by Rossington, Smith & Dallas and John T. Morton, their attorneys, and represent and aver that in this action the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs and interest, the sum and value of five hundred dollars, and in fact exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum of two thousand dollars, and that in this suit there is a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different States, the said plaintiff being a citizen of the State of Nebraska and both of said defendants being citizens of the State of Kansas, and that the controversy can be fully determined as between them, the said plaintiff and said defendants.
“ These defendants therefore ask that this cause be removed into the Circuit Court of the United States in and for the Dis trict of Kansas to be held in said district; that this court accept this petition and the bond herewith filed and proceed no further in this action, and that this cause be removed into said Circuit Court."
After removal the Circuit Court ordered the pleadings to be recast, whereupon the plaintiff filed a bill in equity in which the parties were described as follows: “Morrell C. Keith, of North Platte, Nebraska, and a citizen of the State of Nebraska, brings this his bill against Edward P. Kellam, of Topeka, and a citizen of the State of Kansas, and Cyrus K. Holliday, of Topeka, and a citizen of the State of Kansas ; and thereupon your orator complains and says, etc.”
The case then proceeded to judgment, and, a decree for the plaintiff being rendered, the defendants appealed to this court.
Mr. W. H. Rossington, Mr. Charles Blood Smith, Mr. Everett J. Dallas and Mr. John T. Morton, for appellants, submitted on their brief.
Mr. E. S. Quinton for appellee. Mr. A. B. Quinton and Mr. A. Bergen were with him on the brief.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Upon the authority of Stevens v. Nichols, 130 U. S. 230; Jackson v. Allen, 132 U. S. 27; La Confiance Compagnie v. Hall, 137 U. S. 61, and other cases, the decree in this case must be reversed, at the costs of appellants in this court and in the Circuit Court, and the cause remanded to the Circuit Court with directions to remand it to the state court.
NATIONAL EXCHANGE BANK OF BALTIMORE v.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA.
No. 1369. Submitted April 4, 1892. – Decided April 18, 1892.
The Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. c. 517, pp. 826, 827, having pro
vided that no appeals shall be taken from circuit courts to this court except as provided in that act and having repealed all acts and parts of acts relating to appeals or writs of error inconsistent with the provisions for review by appeals or writs of error contained in that act, and the joint resolution of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1115, having provided that nothing contained in that act shall be held to impair the jurisdiction of this court in respect of any case wherein the writ of error or the appeal shall have been sued out or taken to this court before July 1, 1891, it is Held, that an appeal to this court from a judgment entered in a circuit court November 18, 1890, appealable before July 1, 1891, could not be taken after July 1, 1891.
MOTION TO DISMISS.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Opinion of the Court.
Mr. Robert M. Hughes and Mr. Alfred P. Thorn for the motion.
Mr. William F. Frick, Mr. John Neely and Mr. G. M. Dillard opposing.
Mr. Chief JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the court.
This was a bill brought against the receiver of an insolvent national bank and its late directors, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia, to which a demurrer was sustained and the bill dismissed, No vember 18, 1890. On August 20, 1891, an appeal was allowed to this court, bond for costs given and approved, and citation issued and served. The case comes before us on a motion to dismiss.
Section 4 of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, (26 Stat. c. 517, pp. 826, 827,) provides : “ That no appeal, whether by writ of error or otherwise, shall hereafter be taken or allowed from any District Court to the existing Circuit Courts, and no appellate jurisdiction shall hereafter be exercised or allowed by said existing Circuit Courts, but all appeals by writ of error [or] otherwise, from said District Courts shall only be subject to review in the Supreme Court of the United States or in the Circuit Court of Appeals hereby established, as is hereinafter provided, and the review, by appeal, by writ of error, or otherwise, from the existing Circuit Courts shall be had only in the Supreme Court of the United States or in the Circuit Courts of Appeals hereby established according to the provisions of this act regulating the same." By section 14 of that act, section six hundred and ninety-one of the Revised Statutes, and section three of the act of February 16, 1875, c. 77, (18 Stat. 316,) and “all acts and parts of acts relating to appeals or writs of error inconsistent with the provisions for review by appeals or writs of error in the preceding sections five and six of this act,” were repealed.
By section 5 it is provided that appeals or writs of error