Opinion of the Court. last instant recognized as the tug's duty, namely, to stop and reverse, the accident would have been avoided. It is also said for the ship that, for the purposes of this appeal, it may be considered that she was in fault in not keeping her course, although the conduct of those in charge of the tug, as established by the findings of fact, goes far to show that the ship's situation was one of embarrassment, and was reasonably believed to be one of extremity, requiring her to change her course to avoid collision, yet those in charge of the tug cannot escape the responsibility of their negligence and misconduct in failing to have a proper lookout, and recklessly keeping on at full speed until the vessels were so near together that the mate of the tug abandoned the wheel and the pilothouse, only before doing so ringing the bells sufficiently to stop the engine but not to reverse it. It is also urged that the determination of eighteen relative positions of the colliding vessels, given in findings 13 and 14, beginning twenty-three and three-quarters minutes and ending two and one-half minutes before the collision, must all fail, if there was any mistake in the premises or calculation of the court, and that the conclusion must be that the facts thus found are theoretical and speculative. It is also contended that the only misconduct to be charged against the ship, in the light of the special findings, was in changing her course; but that that was to be excused by the misconduct of those in charge of the tug, leading the ship into embarrassment and causing those in charge of her to believe that she was in extremity and was compelled to change her course; and that, therefore, she ought to be relieved from liability, while the tug cannot escape an apportionment of the damages to which her fault contributed, including those suffered by the ship and set forth in her answer and her crosslibel. But we are of opinion that the foregoing contentions are of no avail in favor of the ship, against the findings of fact of the Supreme Court of the Territory. We think that the additional findings made by that court do not modify the findings made by the District Court, and that, therefore, the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the two courts are substan Opinion of the Court. tially identical. There is no bill of exceptions, and, therefore, the only question is whether the findings of fact made by the Supreme Court support the conclusions of law which it made. The navigation rules in force June 11, 1885, when this collision occurred, were those established by the act of March 3, 1885, c. 354, 23 Stat. 438. That statute provides as follows: "Art. 17. If two ships, one of which is a sailing ship and the other a steamship, are proceeding in such directions as to involve risk of collision, the steamship shall keep out of the way of the sailing ship. "Art. 18. Every steamship, when approaching another ship so as to involve risk of collision, shall slacken her speed, or stop and reverse, if necessary." "Art. 22. Where by the above rules one of two ships is to keep out of the way, the other shall keep her course. "Art. 23. In obeying and construing these rules, due regard shall be had to all dangers of navigation, and to any special circumstances which may render a departure from the above rules necessary in order to avoid immediate danger. "Art. 24. Nothing in these rules shall exonerate any ship, or the owner, or master, or crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to carry lights or signals, or of any neglect to keep a proper lookout, or of the neglect of any precaution which may be required by the ordinary practice of seamen or by the special circumstances of the case." In the present case, therefore, the steam-tug was required to keep out of the way of the ship, and the ship was required to keep her course. The tug adopted proper measures, by porting her helm, to avoid the ship, and those measures would have been effectual if the ship had not changed her course by starboarding her helm. Finding 14 finds that 2 minutes before the collision, when the tug and the ship were about one-third of a mile apart, and the tug bore about one-half a point off the port bow of the ship, and the ship bore about 13 points off the port bow of the tug and showed both of her lights to the bark and her red light to the tug, and the bark bore dead ahead from the ship, the tug, for the purpose of avoiding the ship, put her helm hard-a-port and swung to starboard, and that the Opinion of the Court. ship immediately thereafter, instead of keeping her course or putting her helm to port, either of which she could have done, and one of which she should have done, and either of which would have avoided the collision, negligently put her helm hard-a-starboard, and kept it in that position until the collision occurred. It is also found, by finding 18, that if the ship had kept her course or her helm had been put to port at the time it was put to starboard, the collision would have been avoided; by finding 19, that no special circumstance existed at any time mentioned, which rendered a change of course on the part of the ship necessary or excusable; by finding 20, that as soon as it was possible for those on board of the tug to discover that the ship had put her helm to starboard, everything was done on the tug to avoid the collision and lessen the damage; by finding 21, that up to the time the helm of the ship was put to starboard no one on board of the tug had any reason to expect or anticipate any change of course on the part of the ship, and that after the ship's helm was put to starboard, nothing that the tug could have done would have averted the collision; by finding 22, that the mate of the tug was a competent person for that position, and faithfully performed his duties at all times mentioned in the findings, although he had no license; by finding 23, that the collision was caused and all the damage resulting therefrom was occasioned solely by the negligence, want of skill and improper conduct of the officers and persons navigating the ship, and not from any fault, negligence or improper conduct on the part of any person on board of the tug; by finding 24, that no misplacement or fault of construction in the side lights of the ship contributed to the collision, and that they were at all times brightly burning; and by finding 25, that, although the tug had no such lookout as was required by law, that fact in nowise contributed to the collision. It is well settled that the absence of a lookout is not material, where the presence of one would not have availed to prevent a collision. In the case of The Nacoochee, 137 U. S. 330, the collision was between a steamer and a schooner, and the claim was made that the schooner was in fault in sailing too Opinion of the Court. shorthanded in a fog and having only two men on deck, one of them forward, charged with the double duties of a lookout and of blowing the horn, and one astern, at the wheel. It was not found by the Circuit Court as a fact that the absence of another lookout contributed to the collision, nor were there any facts found which could justify that conclusion, either as fact or law. So far as the findings were concerned, the man forward properly discharged his double duties. He blew the fog-horn, and it was heard on board of the steamer; and it was not found that he did not blow it properly, or that he could have performed the duties of a lookout better than he did, or that any different manner of performing those duties, either by him or by an additional lookout, could or would have made any difference in the result, or that the steamer could or would have been seen by the schooner any sooner than she was seen. This court held that, under all the circumstances and in view of the actual findings, it could not be said that there was any lack of vigilance on the part of the schooner in the matter of a lookout; and the cases of The Farragut, 10 Wall. 334; The Fannie, 11 Wall. 238, 243; and The Annie Lindsley, 104 U. S. 185, 191, were cited in support of that view. In the present case, it is found that the lookout of the tug first sighted the ship at about two miles distant, and that the red light of the ship was then seen about three-tenths of a point on the port bow of the tug; and it is also found that although the tug had no such lookout as was required by law, that fact in nowise contributed to the collision. The provision of article 24 of the act of March 3, 1885, is that a vessel is not to be exonerated from the consequences of any neglect to keep a proper lookout. It does not say that a vessel shall, because of not keeping a proper lookout, be visited with the consequences of a collision. If the collision does not result as a consequence of neglecting to keep a proper lookout, the vessel is not thereby made responsible for the consequences of the collision, and the exemption of the tug necessarily results from the finding as a fact that the absence of the proper lookout in no wise contributed to the collision. As it is found as a fact that no special circumstance at any Opinion of the Court. time existed which rendered a change of course on the part of the ship necessary or excusable, under article 23 of the statute, she cannot have any benefit from that article. The Maggie J. Smith, 123 U. S. 349, 354. We think that the keeping on of the tug at the full speed of two miles an hour by the shore, and her not stopping or reversing her engine until the captain, coming on deck, ordered the mate to do so, was not a fault on the part of the tug. Knowing that the ship was a sailing vessel, from her showing to the tug only her red light and no white light, and further knowing that it was the duty of the tug to avoid the ship and of the ship to keep her course, and supposing that the ship would keep her course, and the tug having ported her helm in discharge of her duty of avoiding the ship, she naturally kept on without stopping or reversing, because, under article 18, it was her duty to slacken her speed, or to stop and reverse, if necessary, only if her approach to the ship involved risk of collision. There was no risk of collision involved until the ship starboarded, which she did only after the tug had hard-a-ported her helm and had swung to starboard; and then the peril was so great and the vessels were such a short distance apart that the tug may well be considered as having been in extremis. By finding 14, it is found that the tug put her helm hard-aport and swung to starboard only 2 minutes before the collision, and when the vessels were about one-third of a mile apart. They were approaching each other at the rate of about ten miles an hour, the tug going about two miles an hour by the land, and the ship about eight miles an hour by the land. The approach was at the rate of a mile in about six minutes. As the tug began to port only 2 minutes before the collision, and had to get her helm hard-a-port and swing to starboard, before the ship starboarded, then got her helm hard-a-starboard, and then changed her course so materially as to attract the attention of the tug, the fair deduction from the findings is that the tug was in the situation of in extremis before the time when it became her duty to stop and reverse. It was the fault of the ship in changing her course that put the tug in that situation, and any error of judgment at that |