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Opinion of the Court.
dollars per quarter." What, then, was the duty of the auditor? To do precisely as he did do, viz. : “report such fact to the Postmaster General.” The duty of the auditor in the premises thereupon ceased. It was completed; and the statute then cast a duty upon the Postmaster General, viz. : to
assign the office to its proper class and fix the salary of the postmaster, as provided by section one" of the act. The fifth finding by the Court of Claims shows that herein the Postmaster General performed the duty enjoined upon him by the statute; for, on the 27th of September, 1886, an order was issued from his department as follows:
“ Ordered, That the post office at Chadron, Nebraska, be assigned to the third class, and the salary of the postmaster fixed at $1600 a year, from October 1, 1886.
“A. E. STEVENSON, “First Assis't P. M. General.”
All this was in exact conformity to the letter of the statute of 1883. The gross receipts of the office for the four quarters ending July, 1886, were more than $4200 and less than $5000; consequently the statute fixed the salary of the postmaster at $1600 a year. By section 3 of the act the change made in the salary could not "take effect until the first day of the quarter next following the order.” The next quarter commenced October 1, 1886. Thus it was that the order of the First Assistant Postmaster General designated October 1, 1886, as the day when it should go into operation. The statute was then fulfilled. Its terms had been carried out. The office had been properly changed to one of the third class, and the salary of the postmaster had been changed to meet the mandate of the law. Whoever was then performing the duties of postmaster at that office became entitled to the salary thus fixed. It matters not that the President did not commission a third-class postmaster at that office until some months thereafter. The President had nothing to do with the salary attached to the office. That had been fixed absolutely by the Postmaster General, under the express directions
of a law of Congress. Neither could the salary of the postmaster be affected by any subsequent order of the Sixth Auditor, as was attempted to be done in this case; for, as already stated, his duty and authority in the premises ceased when he made his report of the business transactions of the office to the Postmaster General. The whole theory of the act of 1883 is that every postmaster shall receive a salary dependent upon and regulated by the amount of business done at his office. The intent of the statute in this respect appears so plain upon a careful reading of it that it is difficult to elucidate it by argument or illustration. The mere statement of its terms is the best argument in favor of the conclusion we have reached. The judgment of the Court of Claims was correct, and it is
HEINZE v. ARTHUR'S EXECUTORS.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
STATES FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.
No. 146. Argued March 2, 1892. – Decided March 14, 1892.
Gloves made of cotton and silk, in which cotton was the material of chief
value were imported in January, 1874, and charged by the collector with a duty of 60 per cent ad valorem, that rate of duty being chargeable only on “silk gloves," under the act of June 30, 1864, c. 171, 13 Stat. 210, and on “ready made clothing of silk, or of which silk shall be a component material of chief value,” under $ 3 of the act of March 3, 1865, C. 80, 13 Stat. 493. The importer protested and appealed and brought suit. His protest stated that the goods were only liable to a duty of 35 per cent less 10 per cent “ being composed of cotton and silk, cotton chief part, the duty of 60 per cent being only legal where silk is the chief part." The goods were made on frames; Held, (1) Under $ 14 of the act of June 30, 1864, c. 171, 13 Stat. 214, 215, the pro
test set forth distinctly and specifically the grounds of the objection of the importer to the decision of the collector, and was
sufficient; (2) It was immaterial that the protest did not specify that the gloves
were made on frames;
Opinion of the Court.
(3) The goods were dutiable only at 35 per cent less 10 per cent under
§ 22 of the act of March 2, 1861, 12 Stat. 191, and § 13 of the act
The case is stated in the opinion.
Mr. Stephen G. Clarke (with whom was Mr. Edwin B. Smith on the brief) for plaintiffs in error.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Parker for defendants in
MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an action at law, brought in the Superior Court of the city of New York, July 15, 1874, by Otto Heinze and Francis Gross against Chester A. Arthur, collector of the port of New York, to recover $174.99, as duties paid under protest on gloves made of cotton and silk. The goods were entered at the custom-house of the port of New York, January 14, 1874, and the duties were paid the same day. The protest was filed February 6, 1874, and an appeal was duly taken to the Secretary of the Treasury, February 24, 1874, and decided April 30, 1874. The suit was duly removed by the defendant into the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, by writ of certiorari. The only question involved in the case is as to the sufficiency of the protest. The defendant having died, his executors were substituted as defendants in his stead, in January, 1887. The case was tried before the court and a jury, in June, 1888, and a verdict was rendered for the defendants under the direction of the court, followed by a judgment in their favor, for costs, to review which the plaintiffs have brought a writ of error.
The protest signed by the plaintiffs was as follows: “On an importation of the undersigned firm, per steamer City of Brussels from Liverpool, duty paid January 14, 1874, containing partly cotton gloves mixed with silk, the appraisers of this port have levied a duty of 60% ad valorem, although the
Opinion of the Court.
article is only liable to a duty of 35% less 10%, being composed of cotton and silk, cotton chief part, the duty of 60% being only legal where silk is the chief part. We have paid the excess in order to get possession of the goods, but shall hold you and the government responsible for the return of the same."
The bill of exceptions states that the plaintiffs' counsel, in opening the case, “announced to the court and jury that they claimed that the goods involved in the suit were dutiable at 35% either as 'gloves made on frames,' under section 22 of the act of March 3rd, 1861, and the 13th section of the act of July 14th, 1862, or as manufactures of cotton not otherwise provided for,' under section 6 of the act of June 30th, 1864.” It also states that the plaintiffs, to maintain the issues on their part, “introduced evidence tending to show that on January 13th, 1874, they had imported gloves made on frames, composed of cotton and a slight admixture of silk, from 10 to 25% in value, and that the collector, Chester A. Arthur, had assessed thereon a duty of 60% ad valorem, which plaintiffs had paid;" that all other requirements as to appeal and suit were complied with; that thereupon the plaintiffs rested, and the defendants' counsel moved the court to direct a verdict for them, on the ground that the protest was insufficient, in that it did not distinctly and specifically point out to the collector the ground of the plaintiffs' objection to his classification, and contained no allegation that the goods in question were made on frames, and that, while there were in force at the time the protest was served many provisions of law, (including those alluded to by the plaintiffs’ counsel in his opening, as well as others,) providing for a duty of 35 per cent, which might be applicable to the plaintiffs' goods, there was nothing in the protest to show which one of them was relied on by the importers; that the court granted the motion and the plaintiffs excepted; and that the jury, under the direction of the court, found a verdict for the defendants.
The only statutory provisions in force at the time this importation of gloves, composed of cotton and silk, was made,
Opinion of the Court.
under which it could be claimed they were chargeable with a duty of 60 per cent ad valorem, were § 3 of the act of March 3, 1865, c. 80, (13 Stat. 493,) which imposed a duty of 60 per cent ad valorem on “ready-made clothing of silk, or of which silk shall be a component material of chief value," and § 8 of the act of June 30, 1864, c. 171, (13 Stat. 210,) which imposed a duty of 60 per cent ad valorem on “silk
gloves,” the same section imposing a duty of 50 per cent ad valorem on “all manufactures of silk, or of which silk is the component material of chief value, not otherwise provided for.”
By § 22 of the act of March 2, 1861, c. 68, (12 Stat. 191,) a duty of 30 per cent ad valorem was imposed upon “caps, gloves, leggins, mits, socks, stockings, wove shirts and drawers, and all similar articles made on frames, of whatever material composed, worn by men, women or children, and not otherwise provided for,” and on “clothing, ready-made, and wearing apparel of every description, of whatever material composed, except wool, made up or manufactured wholly or in part by the tailor, seamstress or manufacturer.”
By § 13 of the act of July 14, 1862, c. 163, (12 Stat. 555, 556,) an additional duty of 5 per cent ad valorem was imposed on “caps, gloves, leggins, mits, socks, stockings, wove shirts and drawers, and all similar articles made on frames, of whatever material composed, worn by men, women and children, and not otherwise provided for,” and on “clothing, ready-made, and wearing apparel of every description, of whatever material composed, except wool, made up or manufactured wholly or in part by the tailor, seamstress or manufacturer;" and also (p. 557) upon "manufactures not otherwise provided for, composed of mixed materials, in part of cotton, silk, wool or worsted, hemp, jute or flax.”
By $ 6 of the act of June 30, 1864, c. 171, (13 Stat. 208, 209,) a duty of 35 per cent ad valorem was imposed “on cotton shirts and drawers, woven or made on frames, and on all cotton hosiery,” and “on cotton braids, insertings, lace, trimming, or bobinet, and all other manufactures of cotton, not otherwise provided for."