Opinion of the Court.

and that a defendant may resist a bill for specific performance, by showing that under the circumstances the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief he asks. Omission or mistake in the agreement, or that it is unconscientious or unreasonable, or that there has been concealment, misrepresentation or any unfairness, are enumerated among the causes which will induce the court to refuse its aid." This principle is reasserted in Hennessy v. Woolworth, 128 U. S. 438, 442, in which it was said that specific performance is not of absolute right, but one which rests entirely in judicial discretion, exercised, it is true, according to the settled principles of equity, and not arbitrarily or capriciously, and always with reference to the facts of the particular case. Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. 557, 567; Marble Co. v. Ripley, 10 Wall. 339, 357; 1 Story's Eq. Jur. sec. 742; Seymour v. Delancey, 6 Johns. Ch. 222, 224; White v. Damon, 7 Ves. 30, 35; Radcliffe v. Warrington, 12 Ves. 326, 331.

66

These principles apply with great force to the contract under consideration in this case. Not only are the stipulations in paragraphs 9 and 11 unusual and oppressive, but there is much reason for saying that they were not understood by the defendant as importing any obligation on his part beyond the termination of his license. Indeed, the operation of these covenants upon his legitimate business was such that it is hardly possible he could have understood their legal purport. The testimony upon this point was fully reviewed by the court below in its opinion, and the conclusion reached that the contract was an artfully contrived snare to bind the defendant in a manner which he did not comprehend at the time he became a party to it." We have not found it necessary to go into the details of this testimony. While we are not satisfied that his assent to this contract was obtained by any fraud or misrepresentation, or that the defendant should not be bound by it to the extent to which it is valid at law, we are clearly of the opinion that it is of such a character that the plaintiff has no right to call upon a court of equity to give it the relief it has sought to obtain in this suit. We express no opinion upon the question whether an action at law will lie upon the

Syllabus.

covenants of the ninth clause of the contract not to manufacture or sell the devices therein specified.

The decree of the court below dismissing the bill is, therefore,

Affirmed.

POPE MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. GORMULLY & JEFFERY MANUFACTURING COMPANY. (No. 1.) Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the United States for the

Northern District of Illinois. No. 205. Decided April 4, 1892. Decided April 4, 1892. MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the court.

Argued March 9, 10, 1892.

The bill in this case appears to be brought against the defendants as successors of Gormully under the contract of December 1, 1884, which was also made the basis of the suit No. 204, just decided. As it is admitted in the brief that if the court refused relief against Mr. Gormully for want of equity in the prior suit, there is no reason why it should not refuse it in this case, it is unnecessary to go into its details.

The decree of the court below dismissing the bill is, therefore,

Affirmed.

Mr. Lewis L. Coburn and Mr. Edmund Wetmore for appellant. Mr. Charles K. Offield and Mr. W. C. Goudy for appellees.

POPE MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. GORMULLY & JEFFERY MANUFACTURING COMPANY. (No. 2.)

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.

No. 206. Argued March 10, 11, 1892. - Decided April 4, 1892.

Pope Manufacturing Co. v. Gormully, ante, 224, applied to this case so far as the plaintiff claims to recover for a violation of a contract.

Letters patent No. 252,280, Claims 1 and 2, issued January 10, 1882, to Curtis

Statement of the Case.

H. Veeder for "a seat for bicycles," when properly construed is not infringed by the defendant's Champion saddle.

Letters patent No. 197,289, Claim 2, issued November 20, 1877, to A. L., G. M. and O. E. Peters for an anti-friction journal box, are void for want of novelty.

Letters patent No. 245,542, issued August 9, 1881, to Thomas W. Moran for velocipedes, if it involves any invention, is void for want of novelty in the alleged invention protected by them.

Claims 1 and 3 in letters patent No. 310,776, issued January 13, 1885, to William P. Benham for improvements in velocipedes are void for want of novelty in the alleged invention protected by them.

The second and third claims in letters patent No. 323,162, issued July 28, 1885, to Emmit G. Latta for a mode of protecting the pedals of a velocipede with india-rubber are void for want of invention; as it is clear that the coating of pedals to prevent slipping being conceded to be old, the particular shape in which they may be made is a mere matter of taste or mechanical skill.

THE Court stated the case as follows:

This was a bill in equity for the infringement of eight patents granted to different parties for devices used in the manufacture of bicycles and velocipedes. Upon a hearing in the court below the bill was dismissed, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. 34 Fed. Rep. 885.

The assignment of errors covers only five patents:

1. Patent No. 252,280, issued January 10, 1882, to Curtis H. Veeder, for "a seat for bicycles," which the court below held to be limited by previous patents to Lamplugh and Brown, to Shire and to Fowler, and as so limited, not to have been infringed by the defendants.

2. Patent No. 197,289, issued November 20, 1877, to A. L., G. M. and O. E. Peters for an anti-friction journal box, which was held to be anticipated, and, if not anticipated, not to have been infringed.

3. Patent No. 245,542, issued August 9, 1881, to Thomas W. Moran for handles for velocipedes, which the court held did not involve invention, and was void.

4. Patent No. 310,776, issued January 13, 1885, to William P. Benham, for improvements in velocipedes, which the court held had not been infringed by the defendants.

Opinion of the Court.

5. Patent No. 323,162, issued July 28, 1885, to Emmit G. Latta, for an improvement in velocipedes, which the court, in view of the state of the art, held to be void for want of novelty.

Mr. Lewis L. Coburn and Mr. Edmund Wetmore for appellant.

Mr. Charles K. Offield for appellees. Mr. W. C. Goudy was with him on the brief.

MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the court.

The bill in this case, in addition to the usual allegations of a bill for the infringement of a patent, sets forth as a distinct ground for recovery the violation of the contract of December 1, 1884, which it was claimed was obligatory upon the defendants. As this claim was, however, disposed of in the cases Nos. 204 and 205, just decided adversely to the plaintiff, upon grounds which are equally available here, we shall take no further notice of it. The case is, therefore, resolved into an ordinary suit for the infringement of a patent.

(1) Patent No. 252,280, to Curtis H. Veeder, is for a "seat for bicycles." In his specification the patentee states that his "improvements relate to the class of seats known as 'saddles,' and especially to devices for suspending the leather or other flexible material of which the seating-surface is composed, and for stretching or taking up the slack in the same, and for connecting the same with the perch or supporting-bar for the seat, and by means of which the seat is made adjustable backward and forward over the perch or bar; and my present invention consists, first, in a divided metallic spring, or supporting-plate for the flexible seat; second, in a modification of that portion of said metallic spring which forms the framework for the rear of the seat; third, in mechanism for elongating or extending said metallic spring so as to take up the slack of the flexible seat; and fourth, in mechanism for completing the support of the seat and connecting the same with the perch or supporting-bar of the vehicle, so as to be adjustable backward and forward thereon."

Opinion of the Court.

He further states that he is aware "that a spring has been used to support the seat or saddle of a bicycle," and, therefore does not claim the general application of a spring for this purpose, but does claim:

"1. A suspension-saddle, constructed with a flexible portion C, and having an under spring in two or more parts, B D, to which the flexible portion is attached at either end, and which metallic parts are extensible, substantially as and for the purposes set forth.

"2. In a velocipede seat, the combination of plates B and D, clamp F, stop 62, adjusting bolt F1, substantially as shown and described."

Referring to the state of the art, as disclosed by prior patents, there appears in the patent of John C. Miller, of April 10, 1866, a saddle seat suspended at both ends upon springs; the seat, however, has a framework of iron, and consequently is not flexible, and, of course, has no provision for taking up the slack. In the patent to Fowler of 1880, there is a saddle seat, suspended at the front end upon a coil spring, and at the rear end upon a long plate spring; the seat is rigid, however, and lacks the flexibility which characterizes the Veeder patent, and there was apparently no provision for mutual adjustment of the springs. The Shire patent of 1879 has a flexible saddle seat, the front end of which is attached to a strap which passes through a loop, and is susceptible of being shortened or lengthened by means of a buckle. It also has an under spring to which is attached the forward end of the flexible saddle. It differs principally from the Veeder patent in the fact that the slack is taken up by means of a strap and buckle, instead of by an adjustment of the two springs of the Veeder patent. The Bishop patent of 1859 exhibits a flexible seat suspended upon springs at either end, but it also lacks the adjustable feature.

None of these prior patents exhibit a flexible seat supported at either end by two parts of a spring, which are made adjustable relatively to each other, in such manner as to take up the slack; and for the purposes of this case it may be conceded that there was invention in this device, notwithstanding that

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