§ 20. it shall be valid and effectual for all purposes in his hands, and he may enforce it as if it had been filled up within a reasonable time and strictly in accordance with the authority given.' ILLUSTRATIONS. 1. Bill drawn payable to or order. Any holder for value may write his own name in the blank, and sue on the bill." 2. B., who is indebted to C., gives him a blank acceptance for 1007. C. dies. If C.'s administrator fills up the paper as a bill payable to drawer's order, and inserts his own name as drawer, he can enforce payment thereof against the acceptor.3 3. B., who is indebted to C., gives him a blank acceptance for 1007., and then dies. C. may fill in his own name as drawer and payee after B.'s death, and recover the amount from B.'s estate.* 4. B., having authority to do so, gives a blank acceptance for 1007. in the name of his firm. It is filled up after B.'s death. The surviving partners are liable." 5. B. gives C. a blank acceptance to accommodate him, and without receiving value. After B.'s death it is filled up and discounted with D., who sees it filled up. D. cannot recover the amount from B.'s estate. 6. B. gives a blank acceptance to a money-lender, who fills it up as a bill payable to drawer's order, inserting a fictitious signature as that of drawer and indorser. If the bill afterwards gets into the hands of a holder in due course he can recover from B.7 7. B. puts a blank acceptance in his desk. It is stolen, and then filled up as a bill. Even a holder in due course cannot recover from B., for he never delivered the inchoate instrument for the purpose of conversion into a bill.R 8. B. gives a blank acceptance in the name of his firm to C. without the authority of his co-partners. C. gives the bill in this state to his own partner for a private debt, who then fills in the name of C.'s firm as drawer and payee. C.'s firm cannot recover on this bill from B.'s firm.' 1 Schultz v. Astley (1836), 2 Bing. N. C. 544; Foster v. Mackinnon (1869), L. R. 4 C. P. at p. 712. 2 Crutchly v. Mann (1814), 5 Taunt. 529. 3 Scard v. Jackson (1875), 34 L. T. N. S. 65. 4 Carter v. White (1882), 20 Ch. D. 225; affirmed (1883), 25 Ch. D. 666, C. A., where it was held that a surety for the acceptor, not party to the bill, was not discharged. 5 Usher v. Dauncey (1814), 4 Camp. 97. 6 Hatch v. Searles (1854), 2 Sm. & G. 147; 24 L. J. Ch. 22; approved France v. Clark (1884), 26 Ch. D. 257, at p. 262, C. A. 7 Schultz v. Astley (1836), 2 Bing. N. C. 544; London & S. W. Bank v. Wentworth (1880), 5 Ex. D. 96. 8 Baxendale v. Bennett (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 525, C. A. 9 Hogarth v. Latham (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 643, C. A. 9. B. and X. sign as makers a joint and several note, with blanks for date and payee's name. B. signs on condition that the note shall only be issued if Y. also will join as maker. Y. refuses to join. X., who is in possession of the note, represents to plaintiff that he has authority to issue it. He fills in plaintiff's name as payee, and transfers the note to him for value. Plaintiff cannot recover from B.1 10. B. signs as acceptor a bill on a 6d. stamp, with the amount left blank. In the margin is 47. This is fraudulently altered to 407., and the bill is filled up for forty pounds. A holder in due course can recover 40l. from B.2 11. B., a bankrupt, gives a blank acceptance. It is filled up and negotiated after his discharge. The holder can recover, for it did not constitute a provable debt.❜ 12. In 1840 B. gives a blank acceptance on a 58. stamp to A. to accommodate him. In 1852 A. fills up the document as a bill for 2007. and signs as drawer. He then negotiates it to a holder in due course. The holder can recover from the acceptor.* 13. An incomplete bill (no drawer's signature) which is sent by railway and lost, is not a security for the payment of money within the meaning of the Carriers Act. 14. A drawer in Bavaria signs a bill with the amount and date left in blank. His agent in England fills up the blanks, and in fraud of the drawer indorses it away for a private debt. A holder in due course can recover on it, and it is not material that the bill bears only a foreign bill stamp." This section is supplemented by sect. 12, ante, p. 32, which provides for the special case of a bill payable after date, or an acceptance payable after sight being issued undated. See "holder" defined by sect. 2, and "holder in due course" by sect. 29, post, p. 88, and note that it enters into the latter definition that the bill is "complete and regular on the face of it"; if not, caveat emptor. In Hatch v. Searles, Vice-Chancellor Stuart says: "As to a bona fide holder the question as to the effect of the acceptance or indorsement having been written on a blank piece of paper can be of no importance, unless he can be fastened 1 Awde v. Dixon (1851), 6 Exch. 869. 2 Garrard v. Lewis (1882), 10 Q. B. D. 30. › Goldsmid v. Hampton (1858), 5 C. B. N. S. 94; 27 L. J. C. P. 286; Cf. Ex parte Hayward (1871), L. R. 6 Ch. 546. Montague v. Perkins (1853), 22 L. J. C. P. 187. 5 Stoessiger v. S. E. Railway Co. (1854), 3 E. & B. 549; but such an instrument if in the hands of the drawer might be a security for money within the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96. Reg. v. Bowerman, (1891) 1 Q. B. 112. 6 Cf. Barker v. Sterne (1854), 9 Exch. 684. 7 Hatch v. Searles (1854), 2 Sm. & G. 147; approved France v. Clark (1884), 26 Ch. D. 257, at p. 262, C. A. § 20. § 20. Delivery to complete contract. with notice of that imperfection. If the holder has notice of the imperfection he can be in no better situation than the person who took it in blank, as to any right against the acceptor or indorser who gave it in blank. But if he be a bona fide holder without notice, he must have taken the negotiable instrument in a perfect shape and in terms a complete contract." An instrument which is wanting in some one or more of the requisites of a complete bill is in effect a transferable authority to create a bill, and while incomplete is subject to the ordinary rules of law relating to authorities, e.g., an authority coupled with an interest is not revoked by the death of donor or donee, while an authority not coupled with an interest is revoked by the donor's death; see Illustrations 2 to 5. The liabilities of the parties accrue from the time when the instrument is issued in a complete form, and not from the time when their signatures are attached.1 The section refers only to blank signatures, &c., on stamped paper. Quare, if the rule of expressio unius applies? The question has not hitherto arisen as to an unstamped instrument, and under the present stamp laws it could only arise in the case of a demand draft or a bill or note made abroad. 21. (1) Every contract on a bill, whether it be the drawer's, the acceptor's, or an indorser's, is incomplete and revocable, until delivery of the instrument in order to give effect thereto. Provided that where an acceptance is written on a bill, and the drawee gives notice to or according to the directions of the person entitled to the bill that he has accepted it, the acceptance then becomes complete and irrevocable.' 1 Montague v. Perkins (1853), 22 L. J. C. P. 187, Statute of Limitations; Ex parte Hayward (1871), L. R. 6 Ch. 546, petitioning creditor's debt. 2 Cox v. Troy (1822), 5 B. & Ald. 474; Nouguier, § 551. The drawee, unlike the drawer or indorser, has no property in the bill, therefore less is required to make him attorn to the holder. By German Exchange Law, Art. 21, an acceptance once written cannot be cancelled. ILLUSTRATIONS. § 21. 1. B., who owes C. 1007., makes a note for the amount payable Delivery. to C. B. dies, and the note is afterwards found among his papers. C. has no right to this note, and if it be given to him he cannot enforce it.1 2. B. makes a note in favour of his servant, and hands it to his solicitor, telling the solicitor to retain the note till his death, and then hand it to the servant, if still in his service. B. dies, and the solicitor hands the note to the servant. The servant can (perhaps) prove for the amount in the administration of B.'s estate.2 3. B. makes a note in favour of C., and delivers it to a stakeholder (e.g., trustee under composition deed). C. thereby acquires no property in the note.3 4. C., the holder of a bill, specially indorses it to D., and transmits it by post to X., his own agent. X. informs D. that he has received the bill, but does not give it him or undertake to hold it on his account. C. (probably) can revoke the transaction and cancel his indorsement to D.4 5. C., the holder of a bill, specially indorses it to D., and incloses it in a letter addressed to D. The letter, which is put in the office letter-box, is stolen by a clerk of C.'s, who forges D.'s indorsement and negotiates the bill. The property in the bill remains in C.5 6. By the regulations of the English Post-office, a letter once posted cannot be reclaimed. If, then, the indorsee of a bill authorize the indorser to transmit it to him by post, the property in the bill passes to the indorsee, and the indorsement becomes complete as soon as the letter which contains the bill is posted." 7. The holder of a note payable to bearer wishes to remit money to D. For safety of transmission he cuts the note in half and posts one half to D. Before he posts the second half he changes his mind, and writes to D. demanding back the half he has sent. He is entitled to do so, for a partial delivery is ineffectual.7 8. A bill is left with the drawee for acceptance. The drawee writes an acceptance on it. The next day the holder calls for the bill: he is merely informed that it is mislaid, and is requested to call the next day. In the meantime the drawee hears that the drawer has failed. He accordingly cancels his acceptance, and the 1 Cf. Bromage v. Lloyd (1847), 1 Exch. 32. 2 Re Richards (1887), 36 Ch. D. 541; criticised Re Whitaker (1889), 42 Ch. D. 119, at p. 125, C. A. 3 Cf. Latter v. White (1872), L. R. 5 H. L. 578. Brind v. Hampshire (1836), 1 M. & W. 365; Muller v. Pondir (1873), 55 New York R. 325. Query, since the Judicature Acts ? 5 Cf. Arnold v. Cheque Bank (1876), i C. P. D. at p. 584. Ex parte Cote (1873), L. R. 9 Ch. 27; Sichel v. Borch (1864), 2 H. & C. 954; 33 L. J. Ex. 179. Query, if there be no authority to send by post? Smith v. Mundy (1860), 29 L. J. Q. B. 172; cf. Redmayne v. Burton (1860), 2 L. T. N. S. 324. § 21. By whom. Conditional delivery. next day delivers the dishonoured bill back to the holder. This is no acceptance; the drawee was entitled to cancel it.1 9. A firm is indebted to D. X., who is a partner in the firm, and also agent for D., writes the firm's indorsement on a bill held by the firm, and puts the bill with some other papers of D.'s, of which he has the custody. This is a valid indorsement by the firm, and the property in the bill passes to D.2 By sect. 2, ante, p. 4, "delivery" means transfer of possession, actual or constructive, from one person to another. "To constitute a contract," says Bovill, C.J., "there must be a delivery over of the instrument by the drawer or indorser for a good consideration, and as soon as these circumstances take place the contract is complete, and it becomes a contract in writing." "In order to make the property in bills pass," says Mellish, L.J., “it is not sufficient to indorse them. They must be delivered to the indorsee or to the agent of the indorsee. If the indorser delivers them to his own agent, he can recover them; if to the agent of the indorsce, he cannot recover them." A delivery by mistake may be revoked by mutual consent." (2) As between immediate parties, and as regards a remote party other than a holder in due course, the delivery (a) in order to be effectual must be made either by or under the authority of the party drawing, accepting, or indorsing, as the case may be ;7 (b) may be shown to have been conditional or for a special purpose only, and not for the purof transferring the property in the bill.s pose 1 Bank of Van Diemen's Land v. Bank of Victoria (1871), L. R. 3 C. P. 526. 2 Lysaght v. Bryant (1850), 9 C. B. 46. 3 Abrey v. Crux (1869), L. R. 5 C. P. at p. 42. See, too, Denton v. Feters (1870), L. R. 5 Q. B. 475. Ex parte Cote (1873), L. R. 9 Ch. 27, where the question was the effect of the French post-office regulations. • Ibid. 6 See holder in due course defined by sect. 29, and delivery by sect. 2. 7 Bromage v. Lloyd (1847), Exch. 32; cf. Re Richards (1887), 36 Ch. D. 541; as criticised Re Whitaker (1889), 42 Ch. D. 119, C. A. Bell v. Lord Ingestre (1848), 12 Q. B. at p. 319; cf. Salmon v. Webb |