the time prescribed. For these reasons, I am of opinion, that, in order to complete the forfeiture, the notice must be given, and the forfeiture declared, at the general or special general meeting of the proprietors. Upon this ground, therefore, I think the judgment of the court below was right, and must be affirmed. MARTIN, B.-I am entirely of the same opinion: and I would only just add, that it is impossible to discover any sensible reason for requiring the thirty days' notice, unless this be the true construction of the 14th section *of the statute. If nothing that the shareholder [*751 could do would cure the forfeiture, it would be idle to give him notice. It could, therefore, only be given for the purpose of affording him an opportunity to come in and by payment in the interim avert the consequences of his default. CROMPTON, J.-The words of prohibition contained in the 14th section, no advantage shall be taken of such forfeiture of any share or shares, until after thirty days' notice shall have been given by the directors of the said company, under the hand of the clerk of the said company, to the owner or owners thereof, by notice in writing left at his, her, or their usual or last place of abode; nor unless the same shall be declared to be forfeited at some general or special general meeting of the said proprietors which shall be held not earlier than three calendar months next after the said forfeiture shall happen,"-seem to me to be conclusive. The company are taking advantage of the forfeiture, by withholding the plaintiff's shares. This they cannot do without first complying with the conditions prescribed by the statute. WATSON, B.-The ground of forfeiture, is, the non-payment of the calls. The time and manner of working out the forfeiture are prescribed by the subsequent part of the clause. Judgment affirmed, with costs. Smith, for the defendant in error, asked for interest upon the judg ment. *COLERIDGE, J.-The amount of the judgment was matter of arrangement in the court below. [*752 MARTIN, B.-The plaintiff may be very well contented with what he has got. Interest refused. ACKNOWLEDGMENT. declines to sell, and rescinds the agent's autho- WIFE, I. ADMINISTRATOR. See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. AFFIDAVIT. I. Description of deponent. An attorney was struck off the roll at his own 1. The proper time for an application for AGENT. I. Employment of. able remuneration for his work and labour, and 296 2. In such a case, a contract to pay what is 3. Semble, per Willes, J., that, under such II. Contract entered into by. 1. A contract for the conveyance of goods that the ship should be ready by a given Held, that S. J. C. was personally bound by 1. Where an agent employed for an agreed Victoria," is a place out of England. Cooke v. I tion of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, Wilson, 153 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125. Lury v. Pearson, 3. A declaration by S. J. C., after setting out the above contract in hæc verba, averred, that, although the goods were in the care and custody of the defendants for the purpose of their being taken on board, and the defendants took them on board at the ship's expense, yet, by their wrongful act, neglect, and default, certain of them were damaged, &c. :-Held, that the declaration disclosed a breach of duty arising out of the contract, for which the defendants were liable to an action at the plaintiff's suit. AGREEMENT. lb. ASSIGNMENT. Of copyright,-See COPYRIGHT, II. ATTACHMENT. For disobedience of a rule of court. 639 1. The court will not dispense with personal service of a rule nisi for an attachment for disobedience of a rule. Swinfen v. Swinfen, 364 2. A compromise having been entered into by the plaintiff's counsel on her behalf at the trial, and embodied in an order of Nisi Prius, afterwards made a rule of court-upon a mo Reformation of,-See PLEADING, II. 1. And see tion against her for an attachment for refusing CONTRACT. II. Reference under 8. 11 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854. 1. By a contract for the sale of a cargo of linseed cake (paid for on receipt of the shipping documents), it was provided that "any dispute as to quality, or as regards any question arising out of the contract, should be settled by arbitration in the usual manner, and that the contract should not be void on that account." An action having been brought by the buyers to recover back the money paid, on the ground that the cargo was not of the description represented, but a mere spurious imitation of linseed cake,-Quare, whether the case was one in which the court had power to stay the proceedings, under the 11th section of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 125), with a view to compel a reference? Wallis v. Hirsch, 316 2. But, held, that, there being a bonâ fide suggestion of fraud, the case was not one in which they would in the exercise of their discretion enforce the reference. 16. 3. By a charter-party, it was agreed that the charterers should insure the vessel, and that the policies should be delivered to and be the property of the owners: and the charter-party contained a stipulation that "any question or difficulty which might thereafter arise.out of that charter-party should be decided by arbitration," in a manner pointed out. An action having beon brought by the owners against the charterers for refusing to deliver them the policies, against which action it was admitted that there was no defence :-Held, not a case for the application of the 11th sec 1. An attorney received instructions to sue forty-five underwriters for particular average loss on certain policies on goods which had been shipped to Calcutta, and there sold. Having written ineffectually to each of them, demanding payment, he (under an impression that the only defence to be set up was a supposed set-off against the broker in whose name the policies were effected) sued out writs in the Lord Mayor's Court, though he knew that that court had no power to issue a commission for the examination of witnesses abroad. The actions (after consolidation) being defended, and a commission to examine witnesses at Calcutta being found necessary, the proceedings in the Lord Mayor's Court were necessarily abandoned : Held, that the attorney was guilty of crassa negligentia, and disentitled to sue his client for the costs of such abortive proceedings; and that it was no answer for him to say (upon the argument of a rule to set aside a verdict which had been found against him), that the diffi culty might have been got over by the removal to recover the whole amount :-Held, not a case of the causes by certiorari to one of the supe- for costs under the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, s. 86. rior courts. Cox v. Leech, 617 1. The mere fact that an action is pending upon an attorney's bill does not give a common law judge jurisdiction to refer the bill for taxation after the lapse of a year, without special circumstances. Cowdell v. Neale, 332 2. Whether charges for attendances, &c., in attempting to procure bail for a person who has been committed by a single magistrate for a breach of the peace, constitute charges for business done in a court of law, so as to enable a judge to refer the bill for taxation,-quære? IV. Answering matters. 1b. Upon a rule calling upon an attorney to answer matters, the charge against him being that he had received from a defendant an ex cessive sum for costs, upon a false statement that judgment had been signed and execution issued, when in fact no judgment had been signed, it appearing that the attorney himself had no personal knowledge of the matter, the court discharged the rule, but ordered him to refund the overcharge and pay the costs of the application. In re Eyre, 151 And see SCOTCH SEQUESTRATION. BENEFICE. See SEQUESTRATION. BENEFIT BUILDING SOCIETY. Forfeiture of shares. 1b. By one of the rules of a benefit building society, each member was to pay 10s. per share per month, together with certain fines in case of default; and it was provided that "any member not having executed a mortgage to the society as thereinafter mentioned, continuing to neglect the payment of his or her monthly subscriptions for six consecutive monthly nights, should thereupon cease to be a member of the society, and forfeit all his or her interest there-' in." By other rules, the general management was vested in twelve directors, a meeting or quorum of whom was to consist of five. The plaintiff, a member of the society (not having executed a mortgage), neglected for seven successive months to pay his monthly subscription in respect of a share held by him, but afterwards tendered the amount of his subscription, and the fines payable thereon, to two of the directors, who were in attendance for the purpose of receiving payments, and who accepted the same. At the first monthly meeting of the directors after the money was so paid, request, and afterwards (in the same term) ap- sixth default ceased to be a member of the soit was resolved that the plaintiff had on the plied to be restored. His affidavit described him as "one of the attorneys of the court:"ciety, and forfeited all his interest therein; and it was ordered that his name should be erased, The court required it to be amended. In re Simpson, and the money received from him by the two directors be returned to him: V. Restoring to the roll. An attorney was struck off the roll at his own BANKRUPT. 554 Held, that the share was properly forfeited; that the acceptance of the money by the directors under the circumstances did not amount to a waiver of the forfeiture; and that the rule was not unreasonable. Card v. Carr, BILL OF EXCHANGE. 197 Motion for costs under 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, 8. 86. 1. Upon a motion by a defendant for costs under the 86th section of the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849, on the ground that the plaintiff had without reasonable or probable cause made an affidavit in bankruptcy for a larger amount than he ultimately recovered, the Proof of consideration where bill forged. verdict of the jury, though entitled to consideTo a count upon a bill of exchange, by enration, is not conclusive. Gilbert v. Crosier, 632 dorsee against acceptor, the defendant pleaded, 2. And, for the purpose of ascertaining that he accepted the bill declared on and dewhether or not there was reasonable or proba-livered it to the plaintiff in renewal of a former ble cause, the judge's notes of the trial may be bill which purported to bear his acceptance, but which he subsequently discovered to be a 3. The plaintiff made an affidavit in bankruptcy, alleging the defendant to be indebted forgery, of which he gave the plaintiff notice, to him in the sum of 631. 68. At the trial, the that there never was any consideration for the jury returned a verdict for him for 101. in addi-drawing or endorsements of the bill, save as tion to 371. 108. paid into court on a plea of aforesaid; and that the plaintiff never gave tender. The judge who tried the cause report- value or consideration for the same, save as ing that he was of opinion there was evidence aforesaid. to show that the plaintiff was fairly entitled Replication,-that, when the bill alleged to had recourse to. Ib. |