tional cases, and as between the original parties, indorser and indorsee, any relation, antecedent agreement, or state of facts from which a controlling equity arises, may be pleaded and proved by parol in bar of an action on the warranty. Thus the relation of principal and agent may be shown-for the agent takes no title or warranty from the indorser, but holds as agent. So, second, it may be shown, that the note was indorsed to the holder for some special purpose and is holden in trust, as where it is indorsed and delivered for collection merely. Lawrence v. Stonington Bank, 6 Conn. 521, is an example of this class of cases in our own reports. In like manner, thirdly, the relation of principal and surety may be shown, and that the indorsement was made at the request and for the accommodation of the immediate indorsee, for the relation forbids the enforcement of the contract. Such was Case v. Spaulding, 24 Conn. 578. So, fourthly, it may be shown that there was an equity arising from an antecedent transaction including an agreement that the note should be taken in sole reliance on the responsibility of the maker and that it was indorsed in order to transfer the title in pursuance of such agreement, and that the attempt to enforce is a fraud. Such was Downer v. Chesebrough, 39 Conn. 39. These exceptions illustrate the rule. But this plea shows no equity, trust, equitable relation, or equity connected with an antecedent transaction constituting a consideration for the agreement, or which would justify a court of equity in interfering to prevent an enforcement of the contract of warranty which the law implies. It presents a naked case of an attempt to prove by parol that a clear and unambiguous contract of warranty is not such, and to contradict it in terms-to turn an indorsement without restriction, before maturity into a restricted [qualified] indorsement. Such a plea cannot be sustained without a violation of essential principles." Question 522: What is the rule of this case? What exceptions did the Court make? (Contra to this case: True v. Bullard, 45 Nebr. 409.) § 495. (Nego. Instru., Sec. 103.) Obligation of party indorsing irregularly, etc. Case 523. Rockfield et al. v. First National Bank of Springfield, 77 Ohio St. 311. Facts: A note was made in the following form: "$10,000. Springfield, Ohio, December 12, 1904. On demand after date, we jointly and severally promise to pay the First National Bank of Springfield, Ohio, or order, at its banking house, ten thousand dollars for value received, with six per cent interest after date. (Signed) The Springfield, Charleston, Washington & Chillicothe Railway Co., H. L. Rockfield, President; E. H. Ackerson, Secretary.' On the back of the note appeared these names: "John Snyder, Frank Patterson, L. M. Goode, E. H. Ackerson." The First National Bank brings suit on this instrument against these parties whose names are on the back of the notes, averring that such names were on the note prior to its delivery. Defense, that the defendants signed for accommodation only, receiving no consideration, and that they were not notified by the holder of the note of its non-payment by the maker at maturity. Point Involved: The nature of the undertaking of parties irregularly endorsing a note before its delivery; whether such parties are indorsers and as such entitled to the notice of dishonor which the law requires to be given to indorsers in order to charge them. 66* SPEAR, J.: The theory of the defendants' pleading is that Rockford and Snyder, by writing their names across the back of the note, became indorsers in the commercial sense, and therefore entitled to notice of demand at maturity of the maker and of non-payment, and, failing that, no liability attached. The theory of the petition [of the plaintiff] is that these defendants, having signed the note before delivery, must be held to have signed with the purpose of giving it credit and of aiding negotiability, and therefore stand as makers, and although their names appear on the back of the instru ment, and they are in law sureties, yet they are not endorsers in the commercial sense and therefore not entitled to notice of demand and non-payment. This view is the one adopted by the trial Court. Which is the correct view is the question we have. That the conclusion adopted by the lower courts is in accord with the law as held in this state from early times and with all the decisions of this Court thus far made is conceded. By "The statute referred to is the act of April 17, 1902, known as the Negotiable Instruments Act. the provisions of these sections a person placing his signature upon an instrument otherwise than as maker, drawer, or acceptor is deemed to be an indorser unless he clearly indicates by appropriate words his intention to be bound in some other capacity. Then follows as to liability, this: Where a person not otherwise a party to an instrument places thereon his signature on blank before delivery, he is liable as indorser: (1) If the instrument is payable to the order of a third person, he is liable to the payee and all subsequent parties. (2) If the instrument is payable to the order of the maker or drawer, or is payable to bearer, he is liable to all parties subsequent to the maker or drawer. (3) If he signs for the accommodation of the payee he is liable to all parties subsequent to the payee. Every indorser who indorses without qualification guarantees to all subsequent holders the genuineness of the instrument, the title, the capacity of previous parties to contract, etc., and engages that on due presentment, the instrument shall be accepted or paid, or both, as the case may be, and that if it be dishonored and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder or to any subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it. Presentment for payment must be made at a reasonable hour on a business day at a proper place to the person primarily liable on the instrument, or, if he is absent or inaccessible to the person found at the place where the presentment is made. When such instrument has been dishonored by non-acceptance or non-payment notice of dishonor must be given to the drawer and to each indorser and any drawer or indorser to whom such notice is not given is discharged. ** * "It follows from these conclusions that by force of sections of the Revised Statutes of 1906, a person who, being a stranger to a promissory note, places his name on the back by blank indorsement, is an indorser of the paper and cannot be held in any other capacity. As such, he is entitled in order to render him liable, to notice of demand upon those who are primarily liable, and failing such demand, and due notice to him, he is discharged. The answer [of the defendant] therefore, stated a defense and the sustaining of the demurrer and rendering judgment for the bank upon the note was error."-Judgment reversed and cause remanded. Question 523: (1) In what manner did the defendants in this case sign? (2) What was their defense? (3) On what theory did the plaintiff attempt to hold them? (4) What did the bank omit to do that freed the indorsers from liability? (5) What was the law of Ohio on this point prior to the enactment of the Uniform Law in 1902? Would the defense have been good prior to that date? Why? (6) law? Did the Negotiable Instruments Act change the Ohio § 496. (Nego. Instru., Sec. 104.) Order of liability among indorsers. Case 524. Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, Sec. 68. "As respects one another indorsers are prima facie liable in the order in which they indorse; but evidence is admissible to show that as between or among themselves they have agreed otherwise." Question 524: In what order are indorsers liable? CHAPTER 61 PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT AND FOR § 497. (Nego. Instru., Sec. 106.) In general. (Note: Now we come to consider the procedure necessary to fix liability of parties secondarily liable. Their liability, being of a secondary or contingent sort, must be fastened upon them by certain procedure designed to furnish them immediate information that the paper upon which they are secondarily liable has been dishonored by the party who should, or was expected to, honor it. Without this procedure the party secondarily liable is discharged, unless he has or does waive the procedure, except in cases where such procedure is for reasons to be stated not required or dispensed with.) (Note: Sometimes the impression prevails that it is necessary to sue a maker or acceptor before holding an indorser or drawer. This is not correct. The indorser or drawer is liable if the liability is duly fastened upon him by presentment for payment, notice of dishonor, etc.) A. Presentment for Payment to Parties Primarily Liable. § 498. Not necessary to charge parties primarily liable. § 499. § 500. Presentment for payment necessary to charge parties secondarily liable. What presentment sufficient. § 501. When presentment for payment not required. § 498. (Nego. Instru., Sec. 107.) Presentment for payment not necessary to charge parties primarily liable. Case 525. Hyman v. Doyle, 103 N. Y. Suppl. 778. GIEGERICH, J.: The only effect of qualifying a promise to pay by a mere specifying of a demand |