early period, by joining her husband in an ordinary deed of conveyance, subject to certain prescribed formalities, which, in all cases, had to be strictly complied with. But these statutory enactments, which enabled a married woman to make a valid transfer or conveyance of real property, did not at all affect her disabilities in other respects. As to her, the deed only operated as a conveyance; therefore, all covenants contained in it were, in law, the covenants of the husband only. It followed, that if her deed was not sufficient, on its face, to pass her property, there was no relief but to induce her to make another; and if she declined to do so, equity would not compel her, nor would it reform the instrument, for such a suit could not, in any case, be maintained for either purpose, except upon the theory that a contract for a deed had existed between the parties. This, of course, could not be done in the case of a married woman, for the simple reason she could not make such a contract, nor, indeed, any at all; and of this the court would take judicial notice.

*

"The law, however, in respect to the right and disabilities of married women, has of late years undergone a radical change. By the acts of 1861, 1869 and 1874, married women are to-day, and were at the time of the execution of the mortgages in question, placed upon a common footing with married men in respect to all property rights, including the means to acquire, protect and dispose of the same. They may own, buy, sell, transfer and convey any and all kinds of property, to the same extent as married men or single women may, and subject to no other or different conditions or restrictions. Not only so, but their duties and obligations in respect to these rights and powers are the same as those of others sui juris. Like other persons, they must perform their contracts; and if they fail to do so, they are amenable to legal process to the same extent as if they were unmarried. If, in the execution of a deed by a married woman a mistake occurs, so that it does not truly state the contract between the parties, a court of equity will

correct it against her, just as readily as it would against any other person.

Question 36: (1) For what purpose did the complainant, Ellen J. Snell, bring the present suit? What was the theory upon which she based her right?

(2) Did a married woman at common law have any power to make a contract?

(3) By what sort of procedure did the courts work out a means by which she could convey her real estate?

(4) Why in a conveyance by a married woman under the early English law could a misdescription not be reformed by the court?

(5) How has the law in this respect been changed? (6)

Was Ellen J. Snell bound by the foreclosure suit in which the misdescription was corrected by the court?

§ 45. (Contracts, Sec. 13.) Insane persons. (Note: An insane person's contracts are generally considered voidable, and not void. He is liable for necessaries actually furnished him. However local statutes must be consulted. If a legal guardian or conservator has been appointed, it is generally provided that the acts of the insane person are void.)

Drunken persons.

§ 46. (Contracts, Sec. 14.) (Note: Drunkenness as a ground for avoiding a contract is not looked upon with favor. "Mere drunkenness is not enough to release a party from his contracts. To render a transaction voidable on account of the drunkenness of the party to it, the drunkenness must have been such as to have drowned reason, memory and judgment and to have impaired the mental faculties to such an extent as to render the party non compos mentis for the time being." (Martin v. Harsh, 231 Ill. 389.)

§ 47. (Contracts, Sec. 15.) Aliens.

(Note: An alien can contract with another alien or with a citizen. An alien enemy, however, cannot contract. The rights of such alien enemies are governed by legislation enacted as a wartime measure.)

§ 48. (Contracts, Sec. 16.) Corporations. (Note: See cases post, under Subdivision G.)

CHAPTER 8

OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE (1) WHAT
CONSTITUTES

A. Necessity of offer and acceptance.

B. What constitutes offer.

C.

Duration of offer.

D. The acceptance.

A. Necessity of Offer and Acceptance.

§ 49. Contracts, Sec. 17.) No contract without offer and acceptance.

Case 37. Bartholomew (Defendant) v. Jackson (Plaintiff), 20 Johnson's Reports (N. Y.), 28.

Facts: Jackson owned a stubblefield in which Bartholomew had a stack of wheat. Jackson, wishing to burn the stubble tried to communicate with Bartholomew to remove the wheat, but failed, whereupon he set fire to a remote part of the field. The fire spread rapidly and threatened the wheat, whereupon Jackson, to save it, removed it. He then sued for the value of his labor and had judgment for 50 cents, but Bartholomew appealed.

Point Involved: If one person does work for another without the knowledge and consent of that other is there a contract?

PRATT, J.:

The plaintiff performed the service without privity or request of the defendant, and there was in fact no promise, expressed or implied."

Question 37: Why was there no contract in Case 37?

B. What Constitutes Offer.

§ 50. No offer and acceptance because no communication to offeree. § 51. No offer because offer not uttered.

§ 52. Preliminary announcements intended to secure offers distinguished

from offers.

§ 53. Offer indefinite.

§ 54. Proposition incomplete.

§ 50. (Contracts, Sec. 18.) No offer and acceptance because no communication to offeree.

Case 38. Broadnax v. Ledbetter, 100 Texas Reports, 375.

Facts: Broadnax sues for a reward offered by defendant, Ledbetter, and alleges that defendant was a sheriff and as such had had in his custody one Vann, convicted of murder and sentenced to death; that Vann had broken jail and escaped; that defendant offered a public reward for his capture; that plaintiff thereupon made the capture and earned the reward. Defendant attacks the sufficiency of plaintiff's claim, contending that plaintiff makes out no case unless he further alleges that he knew of the offer of the reward when he made the capture. The court sustains this contention and gives plaintiff leave to amend, but plaintiff declines to do so, and stands upon the sufficiency of his claim, as originally stated, and appeals to this court.

Point Involved: If an offer is made, and the person to whom the offer is made, without knowledge of the offer does the thing called for by the offer, can he afterwards claim that the doing of such thing was an acceptance of the offer? Incidentally, must a plaintiff who sues in contract make out a contract in his pleading in order to put the defendant upon his defense.

WILLIAMS, J.: "The liability for a reward of this kind must be created, if at all, by contract. There is no rule of law which imposes it except that which enforces contracts voluntarily entered into. A mere offer or promise to pay does not give rise to a contract. That requires the assent or meeting of two minds, and therefore is not complete until the offer is accepted. Such an offer as that alleged may be accepted by any one who performs the

service called for when the acceptor knows that it has been made and acts in performance of it, but not otherwise. He may do such things as specified in the offer, but in so doing, does not act in performance of it, and therefore does not accept it, when he is ignorant of its having been made. There is no such mutual agreement of minds as is essential to contract The judgment of the lower court affirmed.

Question 38: (1) How was the point in Case 38 raised? What was that point? What did the lower court hold? Did the upper court sustain plaintiff? Do you think defendant won on a mere technicality or on the merits? (2) A magazine has various solicitors for subscriptions upon commission. It posts a notice offering $200 to the agent who will by December 31st next bring in the largest number of subscriptions. A, a solicitor, brings in the largest number. He is then told of the offer and admits he had no knowledge of it. Can he force the magazine to pay?

(Note to Case 38: There have been rulings allowing a recovery of reward in cases of ignorance by the party claiming the reward. On principle such cases are unsound. Statutes in some states allow a recovery upon rewards whether known or not. In such cases the recovery is based upon the statute, and not upon the theory of contracts.)

§ 51. (Contracts, Sec. 19.) No offer because offer not uttered.

Case 39. Benton v. Springfield Young Men's Christian Ass'n., 170 Massachusetts Reports, 534, 49 N. E. 928.

Facts: A committee of the Springfield Y. M. C. A. having requested plans from architects, with the right to reject all plans submitted, voted to accept the plans submitted by the Architect Benton and to employ him as architect for the proposed building. This action was never communicated to him, although he learned of it through unofficial channels. At a later meeting this vote was rescinded. Benton sues on the theory of contract.

Held: That no communication had been made to him and no contract existed.

Question 39: Why was there no contract in this case?