Defendant, H. S. L., had one store at Great Bend, Pa., and he conducted another store at Meadsville, Pa., for several years with his brother as the agent in charge, who as such agent had bought goods from plaintiffs for several years prior to July, 1867. Just prior to that date, they sold a bill of goods to defendant at the Meadville store amounting to about $8,000 and this was paid in August, 1867, but there was a difficulty about the bill and the parties ceased to deal with each other until October, 1869. The store at Meadsville was burned in July, 1867, and defendant admits that the brother had authority before the fire, but claims at about that time it was revoked. In November and December, 1869, the brother made the purchases that are now in controversy, making them ostensibly as the agent of the defendant for the Meadsville store.

"It is a familiar principle of law that when one has constituted and accredited another his agent to carry on a business, the authority of the agent to bind his principal continues, even after an actual revocation, until notice of the revocation is given; and, as to persons who have been accustomed to deal with such agent, until notice of the revocation is brought home to them. The case of such an agency is analogous to that of a partnership, and the notice of revocation of the agency is governed by the same rules as notice of the dissolution of a partnership. As to persons who have been previously in the habit of dealing with the firm, it is requisite that actual notice should be brought home to the creditor, or at least, that the credit should have been given under circumstances from which notice can be inferred.

"But the court submitted to the jury the further question whether, independently of the question of notice in fact, the circumstances were such as to put the plaintiffs on inquiry as to whether the authority of the agent continued, and charged them that if they were, the plain

tiffs were charged with notice of the facts which the inquiry would have disclosed. In other words, the question was submitted to the jury whether, although the plaintiffs had no notice in fact, they had constructive notice of the revocation of the agency.

*

"The mere fact that the store at Meadville was burnt did not indicate that the defendant intended to discontinue business there; and if business had been promptly resumed and purchases for that store renewed by the defendant's brother, there could have been no reason, in the absence of any notice from the defendant, to suppose that the agency had been discontinued. The principal feature in the case is the delay of two years and upwards between the fire and the resumption of purchases, by the defendant's brother, for the Meadville store. But, under the circumstances, this delay might well have been attributed by the plaintiffs to the difficulty between them and the defendant, in July and August, 1867, which resulted in the defendant suspending all dealings with the plaintiffs, notwithstanding that he continued his business at Great Bend. And when the defendant, in 1869, resumed his dealings with the plaintiffs, without giving them notice of any change in his business arrangements with his brother, at Meadville, the plaintiffs were warranted in believing that the suspension of the dealings of the brother was attributable to the same cause which had deterred the defendant himself from making purchases; and when, immediately after the defendant himself resumed dealings, the brother applied to make purchases as before, for the Meadville store, the plaintiffs would not, naturally, attribute the suspension of dealings for that store, in the meantime, to a revocation of the agency, nor suspect that the brother was committing a fraud. We must, in considering the portion of the charge excepted to, assume, as we have assumed, that no notice was given by the defendant to the plaintiffs that he had discontinued his business at Meadville or revoked the authority of his brother, and that the plain

tiffs knew nothing of it, for the charge expressly submits the question of constructive notice, independently of the question of notice in fact, and expressly states that the jury are to pass upon it in case they find that there was no notice in fact.

"We think that the circumstances existing at the time of the sale of the goods in question were not sufficient to constitute constructive notice of the revocation of the agency, and that the case should have been submitted to the jury only upon the question of notice in fact. In this there is no hardship upon the defendant; it was his. duty, after he had accredited his brother for a series of years as authorized to deal in his name and on his responsibility, when he terminated that authority, to notify all parties who had been in the habit of dealing with his agent, as the plaintiffs had been to his knowledge. This was an act easily performed and would have been a perfect protection to him and prevented the plaintiffs from being deceived. Justice to parties dealing with agents requires that the rule requiring notice in such cases should not be departed from on slight grounds, or dubious or equivocal circumstances substituted in place of notice. If notice was not in fact given, and loss happens to the defendant, it is attributable to his neglect of a most usual and necessary precaution."

Question 261: What is the rule as to the notice that must be given of the termination of the agency?

§ 283. (Agency, Sec. 99.) Death of principal.

(See Yerrington v. Greene, 7 R. I. 589, set out as Case No. 184, supra.)

(Note: An exception to this rule is when the agency is coupled with an interest.)

§ 284. (Agency, Sec. 100.) Death of agent.

(See Yerrington v. Greene, supra.)

(Note: An exception is in case of an agency coupled with an interest.)

§ 285. (Agency, Sec. 101.) Insanity of one of the

parties.

(Same rule as in death.)

§ 286. (Agency, Sec. 102.) By bankruptcy. (See subject of bankruptcy.)

§ 287. (Agency, Sec. 103.) Termination by war.

Case 262. Insurance Co. v. Davis, 95 U. S. 424. Facts: Suit on policy of life insurance issued by New York Life Ins. Co. of New York before the war on life of

Sloman Davis of Virginia, containing a provision that policy was to be void if premiums not promptly paid. The company's agent in Virginia was once A. B. Garland, who on the outbreak of the war became a Confederate major. After the war the premiums were tendered to him, but he declined to receive them.

Point Involved: Whether war terminates relation of principal and agent between citizens of the hostile

"But we deem it proper to consider more particularly the question of agency, and the alleged right of tendering premiums to an agent, during the war.

"That war suspends all commercial intercourse between the citizens of two belligerent countries or states, except so far as may be allowed by the sovereign authority, has been so often asserted and explained in this court within the last fifteen years, that any further discussion of that proposition would be out of place. As a consequence of this fundamental proposition, it must follow that no active business can be maintained, either personally or by correspondence, or through an agent, by the citizens of one belligerent with the citizens of the other. The only exception to the rule recognized in the books, if we lay out of view contracts for ransom and other matters of absolute necessity, is that of allowing the payment of debts to an agent of an alien enemy, where such agent resides in the same state with the debtor. But this indulgence is subject to restrictions. In the first place, it must not be done with the view of transmitting the funds to the principal during the continuance of the war; though, if so transmitted without the debtor's connivance, he will not be responsible for it. Washington, J., in Conn. v. Penn, Pet. C. Ct. 496; Buchanan v. Curry, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 141. In the next place, in order to the subsistence of the agency during the war, it must have the assent of the parties thereto,-the principal and the agent. As war suspends all intercourse between them,