discussed the subjects have, so far as we can discover, conceded such to be the fact.

"On principle, we think the power of attorney of an infant, and the acts and contracts made under it, should stand on the same footing as any other act or contract, and should be considered voidable in the same manner as his personal acts and contracts are considered voidable. If the conveyance of land by an infant personally, who is of imperfect capacity, is only voidable, as is the law, it is difficult to see why his conveyance made through an attorney of perfect capacity should be held absolutely void. It is a noticeable fact that nearly all the old cases cited in support of this exception to the general rule are cases of technical warrants of attorney to appear in court and confess judgment. In these cases the courts held that they would always set aside the judgment at the instance of the infant, but we do not find that any of them go as far as to hold that the judgment is good for no purpose and at no time.

"The courts have from time to time made so many exceptions to the exception itself that there seems to be very little left of it, unless it be in cases of powers of attorney required to be under seal, and warrants of attorney to appear and confess judgment in court. See Freeman's note to Craig v. Van Bebber, 18 Am. St. Rep. 629 (s. c., 100 Mo. 584, 13 S. W. 906); Schouler, Dom. Rel. Sec. 406; Ewell's Lead. Cas. 44, 45, and note; Bishop, Cont. Sec. 930; Metcalf, Cont. (2d Ed.) 48; Whitney v. Dutch, 14 Mass. 457-463; Bool v. Mix, 17 Wend. 119-131.

"Hence, notwithstanding numerous general statements in the books to the contrary we feel at liberty to hold, in accordance with what we deem sound principle, that the power of attorney from plaintiff to Dorr, and the deed to Brown under that power, were not absolutely void because of plaintiff's infancy, but merely voidable and that they were ratified by him after attaining his majority."

Question 21: (1) Why was it important to determine in Case 21 whether the power of attorney was void or voidable?

(2) What was the early test whether an infant's contract was binding on him?

(3) What constituted ratification in the above case?

(4) State the present general rule as to a minor's power to make a contract.

(5) Is it your opinion that the other party to the contract may raise the point of the infancy of the minor, in order to avoid his contract, if the minor himself does not raise it?

(Note to Case 21: While the courts of the United States are in unison in holding the general rule to be that the contracts of a minor are voidable and not void [except the implied contracts to pay for necessaries received by the minor which are neither voidable nor void, but binding], they differ as to the power of a minor to appoint an agent, especially agents with formal powers to confess judgments, sell real estate, etc. See the authorities cited in the above opinion. See also Hiestand v. Kuns, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 345; Cole v. Pennoyer (obiter), 14 Ill. 158, contra to above case. "Probably courts would still hold an infant unable to authorize a confession of judgment, or to appoint an agent for judicial proceedings; but there seems no reason except the antiquity of the rulings to that effect which can support the broad proposition that an infant's power of attorney or appointment of an agent is void; and, generally, in recent cases courts have been disposed to treat the creation of an agency by an infant, like other agreements made by him as merely voidable." Williston on Contracts, Sec. 227.)

§ 40. (Contracts, Sec. 8.) Minors' liability for necessaries.

Case 22. Nash v. Inman (1908), 2 K. B. 1, 1 British Ruling Cases 143.

Facts: Defendant, a minor, was a freshman at Trinity College, Cambridge, in October, 1902. The plaintiff, a tailor, sent a traveling salesman to Cambridge to solicit orders. The salesman heard that the defendant was spending money very freely and he called upon him, and between Oct. 29, 1902, and June 16, 1903, the defendant had run up a bill of $1,451 for clothing of an extravagant and ridiculous style. Defendant was already adequately supplied with clothing by his father. Plaintiff sues for

the price and defendant pleads infancy. Defendant had judgment below and plaintiff appeals.

Points Involved: What is the nature of the liability of a minor to pay for necessaries furnished him? What are necessaries? Is the test solely the nature of the goods sold, or must the minor's actual present needs in respect to such goods also be considered?

FLETCHER-MOULTON, L. J.: "I think that the difficulty. and at the same time the suggestion of hardship to the plaintiff in such a case as this disappear when one considers what is the true basis of an action against an infant for necessaries. It is usually spoken of as a case. of enforcing a contract against the infant, but I agree with the view expressed by the court in Rhodes v. Rhodes (1890) 44 Ch. D. 94, 59 L. J. Ch. N. S. 298, 62 L. T. N. S. 342, 38 Week Rep. 385, in the parallel case of a claim for necessaries against a lunatic, that this language is somewhat unfortunate. An infant, like a lunatic, is incapable of making a contract of purchase in the strict sense of the words; but if a man satisfies the needs of the infant or lunatic by supplying to him necessaries, the law will imply an obligation to repay him for the services so rendered, and will enforce that obligation against the estate of the infant or lunatic. The consequence is that the basis of the action is hardly contract. Its real foundation is an obligation which the law imposes on the infant to make a fair payment in respect of needs satisfied. In other words, the obligation arises re and not consensu. I do not mean that this nicety of legal phraseology has been adhered to. The common and convenient phrase is that an infant is liable for goods sold and delivered, provided that they are necessaries, and there is no objection to the phraseology so long as its true meaning is understood. But the treatment of such actions by the courts of common law has been in accordance with that principle I have referred to. That the articles were necessaries had to be alleged and proved by the plaintiff as part of his case, and the sum he recovered was based on a quantum meruit. If he claimed

anything beyond this he failed, and it did not help him that he could prove that the prices were agreed prices. All this is very ancient law, and is confirmed by the provisions of No. 2 of the sale of goods act, 1893,-an act which was intended to codify the existing law. That section expressly provides that the consequence of necessaries sold and delivered to an infant is that he must pay a reasonable price therefor.

"The sale of goods act, 1893, gives a statutory definition of what are necessaries in a legal sense, which entirely removes any doubt, if any doubt previously existed, as to what that word in legal phraseology means. (The Lord Justice read the definition.) Hence, if an action is brought by one who claims to enforce against an infant such an obligation, it is obvious that the plaintiff in order to prove his case must show that the goods supplied come within this definition. That is to say, the plaintiff has to show, first, that the goods were suitable to the condition in life of the infant; and, secondly, that they were suitable to his actual requirements at the time, or, in other words, that the infant had not at the time an adequate supply from other sources. There is authority to show that this was the case even before the act of 1893.

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the judge came to the conclusion, to use the language of the court in Ryder v. Wombell, supra, that there was no evidence on which the jury might properly find that these goods were necessary to the actual requirements of the infant at the time of the sale and delivery, and therefore, in accordance with the duty of the judge in all cases of trial by jury, he withdrew the case from the jury and directed judgment to be entered for the defendant. In my opinion he was justified by the practice of the court in so doing, and this appeal must be dismissed."

Question 22: (1) For what did plaintiff sue in Case 22? What was the defense? Did it prevail? Why?

(2) Suppose that a minor buys an overcoat, admittedly a

necessary for him, and agrees to pay the sum of fifty dollars therefor, can he be held to that price? Why?

(3) Where the minor purchases an article that would be a necessary for him were he not already adequately supplied, is the burden of proof on the seller to show both that the article comes within the class of goods that may constitute necessaries and also that the purchasing minor was as a fact not adequately supplied?

(Note to Case 22, answering the last question: The above case holds that the burden of proof is on the seller to show that the goods were necessaries to the minor (taking into consideration his station in life), and also that the minor was not being supplied from other sources. In a note to this case in 1 British Ruling Cases, at page 159, it said: "To summarize, it may be said that while the decisions are harmonious, where it appears that an infant lives with his parents or is under the care of a guardian, that one who seeks to charge the infant for articles otherwise conceded to be necessaries must, in order to overcome the presumption that he was properly supplied, show that such is not the case, there is a conflict of opinion whether or not, where the infant does not live with his parents, nor is under the care of a guardian, the burden is upon the plaintiff to show that the infant was not sufficiently provided.")

§ 41. (Contracts, Sec. 9.) What are necessaries?

(a) Kinds of advantages that may constitute necessaries.

(b) Station in life as factor.

(e) Minor already supplied.

(d) Necessaries must be actually supplied.

(a) Kinds of Advantages That May Constitute Necessaries.

Case 23. Coke upon Littleton, 172. (a) "An infant may bind himself to pay for his necessary meat, drink, apparel, necessary physic, and such other necessaries, and likewise for his good teachings and instruction whereby he may profit himself afterwards."

Question 23: What are "necessaries" for which a minor is legally bound to pay, according to the above quotation?