contract tends directly to those results. It furnishes a temptation to plaintiff to resort to corrupt means or improper devices to influence legislative action.

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Question 109: What was the above agreement? Why invalid? Is it material whether any harm was actually accomplished?

Case 110. Kansas City Paper House v. Foley Rwy. Print Co., 85 Kan. 678, 39 L. R. A., new series, 747.

Facts: The K. C. Paper House sued the Foley Rwy. Printing Co. upon a promissory note. The defendant claimed a credit of $500, which it claimed the plaintiff owed Foley, the President of the defendant, and which such President had transferred to it. The only question involved was the validity of this $500 credit. The contract upon which Foley claimed this credit was made by the plaintiff company with Foley, under which Foley was to sell paper and other material to the state, the evidence going to show that his compensation was to be contingent upon his success.

Point Involved: The legality of contracts of agency by which the agent is to sell goods to a public body, his compensation depending on his success.

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MASON, J.: There was some evidence that the contract contemplated a payment for the exertion of personal and political influence upon members of the executive council, and that the services rendered were of that character. If that was the case, the contract was, of course, void. But there was also testimony that Foley was employed simply as an ordinary salesman, because of his experience in using and buying paper and other material handled by the plaintiff, and that his efforts were in accordance with that employment, and were confined to exhibiting samples and 'talking up' the goods and the responsibility of the house. If that was the case the contract was valid. In this aspect the question is merely one of fact to be decided by a tribunal which. sees and hears the evidence (the court below).

"The evidence suggested, but perhaps did not abso

lutely determine, that Foley's compensation was to be contingent upon the procuring of the state contract. There is a conflict of judicial opinion as to whether that circumstance should stamp the contract as illegal. * * *

(Here the court reviews certain cases holding such contracts on commission illegal, but distinguishes such cases by showing that they involve some additional element, such as personal and corrupt influence with the members of the governmental body.)

"The fact that the compensation of a salesman, employed to sell goods to the public, depends upon his success may tend to show a purpose to use illegal means, or a probability that such means will be used; but we do not think that it should be regarded as conclusive in either point, nor that in and of itself it should be deemed to characterize the employment as illegal. (Citing authorities.) Many of the cases in these collections involve contracts for influencing legislation, which are not entirely analogous to those for the sale of goods, and may well be regarded as subject to a more stringent rule.

Question 110: (1) State the facts, the point involved and the Court's decision in the above case.

(2) What element would render such a contract illegal?

(3) The Court says that contracts to procure legislation are subject to a more stringent rule than contracts to secure the sale of goods to the government. Why?

§ 98.

(Contracts, Sec. 66.) Agreements in restraint of marriage.

(Note: Agreements that tend to restrain marriage are against public policy and void. Gifts of property on condition the done,e do not marry are generally upheld.)

2. Contracts Illegal Because of Manner of Formation.

§ 99. Sunday agreements.

§ 100. Contracts made without required license.

§ 99. (Contracts, Sec. 67.) Sunday agreements.

Case 111. Richmond v. Moore, 107 Ill. 429.

Facts: This was a contract of employment for service alleged to have been broken. Damages were asked for such breach. Defense: That the supposed contract was void, being made on Sunday.

Point Involved: Whether a contract made on Sunday is illegal.

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MR. JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court: "The common law did not prohibit the making of such contracts. In Drury v. Deputaire, Taunt. 136, Lord Manfield said: 'It does not appear that the common law ever considered these contracts as void which were made on Sunday.' Judgment was accordingly given for the price of a horse sold on that day. The doctrine that contracts made on Sunday are void depends, therefore, alone on statutory enactments, and in various states of the Union the statutes vary in language or substance.

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"The 29th Car. II, Chap. 257, seems to be the basis of the various enactments of the Union. It is this: ‘That no tradesman, artificer, workman, laborer, or other person whatsoever, shall do or exercise any worldly labor, business or work on the Lord's day.' It contains exceptions of which are works of necessity or charity. The offense by that statute is the performance of labor or business, and by ours it is the disturbance of the peace and good order of society." (The Court holds the Illinois statute to be a more liberal statute than the English statute, and decided that the above contract is enforceable. In many states, however, the statute is a virtual adoption in its strictness of the British statute.)

Question 111: Was a contract made on Sunday invalid by the common law? What English statute made such contracts invalid? What exceptions were made? Do the states of the Union have similar statutes?

§100. (Contracts, Sec. 68.) Agreements made without required license.

Case 112. Buckley v. Humason, 50 Minnesota, 195. Facts: Defendants sold to August K. Barnum certain leasehold property, situated in Chicago, called the Ogden Flats, in exchange for property in St. Paul, valued at $175,000. Plaintiff Buckley was employed by defendants as their broker at Chicago, and he there procured the purchaser and acted as their agent in the transaction. This suit is for $4,375 commission for his services. An ordinance was in force in the City of Chicago, that it should be unlawful for any person to exercise within the city the business of real estate broker without a license, and provided the amount to be paid, and subjected violators to a pecuniary penalty for each violation. Plaintiff had no such license during the negotiation and exchange.

Point Involved: Whether one who is engaged without a license in a business in which the government requires a license for purposes of regulation can recover his fees under agreements made by him while so unlicensed.

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VANDERBURGH, J.: The particular transaction in question was therefore in violation of law, unless he was duly licensed, which was not shown. On the contrary, the answer alleges, and it stands admitted, for want of a reply, that the plaintiff was not duly licensed as a broker. The plaintiff cannot, therefore, recover his commissions. Hustis v. Pickands, 27 Ill. Ap. 270; Johnson v. Hulings, 103 Pa. St. 501; Holt v. Green, 73 Pa. St. 198.

"Business transactions in violation of law cannot be made the foundation of a valid contract; and the general rule is that where a statute makes a particular business unlawful generally, or for unlicensed persons, any contract made in such business by one not authorized is void.

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Question 112: What was the claim for in this case? Defense "ereto? Court's decision?

(Note to Case 112: The above decision is in line with the weight of authority. See Ames v. Gilman, 51 Mass. 239 (unlicensed attorney at law cannot recover fees); Deaton v. Lawson, 40 Wash. 486, 2 L. R. A. N. S. 392 (unlicensed physician cannot recover fees); Levison v. Boas, 150 Cal. 185, 12 L. R. A. N. S. 575 (unlicensed pawnbroker cannot claim fees or lien on pledges). It is brought out by the cases on this subject that where there is a law penalizing an act it impliedly prohibits it, and contracts based thereon are void.)

C. Intent to Put to Illegal Use Avails of Legal Contract.

§ 101. (Contracts Sec. 69.)

Knowledge by one of other's intent to commit crime.

(a) Knowledge of the Other's Intent to Commit Offense of Lesser Magnitude.

Case 113.

Graves v. Johnson, 179 Mass. 53.

Facts: A sold liquors to B, knowing that B intended to resell contrary to law, but he was wholly indifferent what use B made of the liquors. This is a suit for the price of such liquors.

Point Involved: Whether a contract in other respects fully in compliance with law is rendered illegal merely because one of the parties thereto, otherwise not in fault, knows that the other intends to make use of the results of the contract to commit a crime of lesser magnitude.

HOLMES, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court: In our opinion a sale otherwise lawful is not connected with subsequent unlawful conduct by the mere fact that the seller correctly divines the buyer's unlawful intent closely enough to make the sale unlawful. The defendant [B] was free to change his mind, and there was no communicated desire of the plaintiff's to co-operate with the defendant's present intent.

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Question 113: (1) State the facts, the question presented and the decision of the Court in the above entitled case.