for the agreement. As a part can never be equal to the whole, payment of a part of a debt presently due gives the creditor nothing that he was not entitled to, and deprives the debtor of nothing he was not bound to part with before, and therefore there is no consideration. The logic is unimpeachable, but it fails to take into consideration the practical importance of the difference between the right to a thing and the actual possession of it. As said in Ebert v. Johns, supra, 'To a merchant with a note coming due, $5,000 before 3 o'clock today, which will save his commercial credit, may well be worth more than $20,000 tomorrow, after his note has gone to protest.' If the debt is not due till tomorrow, the payment of the lesser sum, under all the cases, will be a good accord and satisfaction; but if the debt was due yesterday, but the debtor can only pay part of it today, the benefit to the creditor of getting that part now, rather than the whole when it is too late, is just as great, and whatever conclusion the scholastic logic and theoretical reasoning may lead to, the importance of the practical result is a matter for the creditor to decide for himself, and, having so decided and got the benefit of it, justice and common honesty ought to hold him to his agreement. For this reason, the force of which is universally accepted, the courts, so far as they could without sacrifice of the maxim of stare decisis, have brought the law into closer accord with modern business principles. "In the present case the debtor, being in failing circumstances and contemplating bankruptcy, offered the plaintiffs 30 per cent of his debt as a settlement in full. The plaintiffs dissuaded him from going into bankruptcy, accepted his alternative offer, received the money, and closed the account. They have now brought this suit for the balance. In the absence of any express decision in this state on this point, the learned judge below did not feel at liberty to depart from the general rule. We have no such hesitation. The exact point is whether the debtor's relinquishment of his intention to seek a discharge in bankruptcy, and his payment of 30 per cent instead, constitute a sufficient consideration to bind the creditor to the agreement. On that point we have no doubt. A valuable consideration may consist in some right, interest, or benefit to one party, or some loss, detriment, or responsibility resulting, actually or potentially, to the other. Bouvier's Law Dict. 'If there is any advantage to the creditor, the law will not weigh the adequacy of the consideration.' Fowler v. Smith, 153 Pa. 639, 25 Atl. 744. The accord in this case was good on both branches. By it the creditors got a sum certain, instead of the chances of an uncertain dividend in bankruptcy. On the other hand, the debtor assumed the responsibility of paying a sum certain, whether his assets were sufficient or not, and gave up his right to a release of his future assets, and to a discharge from his whole debt, without regard to the sufficiency of his present assets. "The decisions on this exact point in other states are not numerous, but the general trend is uniform to the result we have reached. In Hinkley v. Arey, 27 Me. 362, it was said by Tenney, J., 'In this case the plaintiff was informed that the defendant contemplated taking the benefit of the bankrupt act, which was then in force. If this intention had been carried out, the plaintiff would lose the whole debt, beyond what he might receive as a dividend; and the latter, judging from his letter, he did not consider as very valuable. To save himself from a greater loss under the law, he agreed upon the terms of composition offered. The defendant, upon the agreement and payment to Hubbard, took no further steps to obtain relief under the bankrupt law.' It was accordingly held that the accord and satisfaction were good. The same ruling was made in Dawson v. Beall, 68 Ga. 328. And in Curtiss v. Martin, 20 Ill. 557, 578; Engbretson v. Seiberling, 122 Iowa, 522, 64 L. R. A. 75, 101 Am. St. Rep. 279, 98 N. W. 319, and Rice v. London & N. W. American Mortg. Co., 70 Minn. 77, 72 N. W. 826, the courts went still farther, and held the satisfaction valid where the debtor was insolvent or in failing circumstances, though there was no express intention to seek a discharge in bankruptcy. In the last-named case it was held that an agreement on behalf of the estate of a debtor supposed to be insolvent was good, though it turned out in fact that it was solvent. And in Pettigrew Mach. Co. v. Harmon, 45 Ark. 290, the principle that part payment by a third person makes the accord valid was held to govern, where the third person was one to whom the debtor had assigned his assets for the payment of his debts. On principle and on authority, therefore, the agreement in the present case was binding; and, there being no dispute on the material facts, the defendant's sixth point, asking for binding instructions, should have been affirmed." Question 94: What were the facts, the question presented and the decision of the court in the above case? (Note: The exact question presented in this case has seldom been raised, and there are very few authorities on the point. See note to the above case in 11 Lawyer's Reports Annotated, New Series, on page 1024, citing as in accord with the above case, Engbretson v. Seiberling, 122 Iowa 522; Seegmiller v. Kelley, (Iowa) 99 N. W. 1131; Herman v. Schlesinger, 114 Wis. 382; Rice v. London & N. W. Am. Mort. Co., 70 Minn. 77. Contra, Beaver v. Fulp, 136 Ind. 595.) Case 95. Varney v. Connery, 77 Me. 527. VIRGIN, J.: "If a debtor gives, and the creditor receives, in full satisfaction of the debt, a note indorsed by a third person for a less sum than the amount of the debt, it is a good accord and satisfaction to bar a subsequent suit by the creditor to recover the baalnce of the debt. Boyd v. Hitchcock, 20 Johns. 76; Dolvear v. Arnold, 10 How. Pr. 529; Brooks v. White, 2 Met. 283; S. C. 37 Am. Dec. & note, 98. And a subsequent promise to pay the balance is not binding. Phelps v. Dennett, 57 Maine, 491. So that even if the case does not come within the provisions of R. S., c. 82, § 45, the verdict is not for that reason against law." Question 95: What was received in settlement in this case? If it was a good settlement, why would a subsequent promise to pay the debt not be binding? Case 96. Harper v. Graham, 20 Ohio, 106. Facts: Graham obtained a judgment against Harper for $1,716.86 and costs. Harper being hard up, propositions of compromise were made and finally Graham's lawyers proposed that Harper should pay on the judgment....$500.00 Costs Total ... 100.00 56.44 $656.44 which was to be paid and received in full satisfaction. Harper thereupon paid $656.44 in specie and Graham's lawyers gave him a release in full. This is a suit for the balance. RANNEY, J.: 66* As stated by Alderson, B., in Sibner v. Tripp, 15 Mee. & Welsb. 37: 'If you substitute for a sum of money a piece of paper, or a stick of sealing wax, it is different, and the bargain may be carried out in its full integrity. A man may give in satisfaction of a debt of £100, a horse of the value of five pounds, but not five pounds.' In this case it was held that the acceptance of the negotiable security of the debtor himself, by the creditor, was in law a satisfaction of a debt of greater amount. This decision was made as late as 1846, and the learned judge from whom I have quoted, ventures to intimate in respect to the whole subject, that 'the courts might very well have held the contrary, and have left the matter to the agreement of the parties.' We see, then, that the payment of a less sum than is due, the day before a debt falls due, will discharge it-payment at another place than is stipulated will do so-the delivery of a collateral article of any value will do sothe acceptance of the debtor's note with security, the note of a third person, or even the negotiable note of the debtor himself, will do so; and yet the payment of as much money in hand as is called for by such note, will have no such effect!-although it is demonstrable that the utmost the creditor can get from such note can not exceed the amount that he gets in hand in the other case, without trouble, delay, or expense. It may seem to some persons, not having a great veneration for those institutions of antiquity, for which no reason can be given, that a rule so effectually undermined, and having neither rhyme nor reason to support it, ought to be at once overruled and the whole matter placed upon the footing of reason and common sense. Especially, as the exigencies of modern commerce frequently compel the most deserving men, with the aid of friends, to compromise their debts for less than the amount due-an operation mutually beneficial to both debtor and creditor, as the creditor gets a part, where otherwise he would lose the whole, and the debtor is left free to commence again with the hope of better success. These considerations will necessarily arise whenever it becomes necessary to decide the general question. In this case we aspire to nothing higher than to follow in the footsteps. of the sages of the law, and hold this one of the cases 'taken out' of the rule." Question 96: What was the amount of the original debt in this case? The amount paid and the agreement under which it was paid? Was that agreement effective? Why? Did the court depart from the general rule that a payment of part cannot operate as a satisfaction of the whole, or did it say the facts made an exception to the rule? (c) Debt Unliquidated. Case 97. Snow v. Griesheimer, 220 Ill. 106. Facts: There was a dispute between the parties as to the amount of rent due from G. to S. on account of certain repairs made by G., the tenant, for which he claimed S., as landlord, promised to reimburse him. G. sent checks to S., marking them as in "full payment." S. received and banked the checks but insisted that they were only received on account, and afterwards sued for the balance claimed. Point Involved: If the amount of a debt is in dispute, is an agreement to accept in full settlement an amount |