and to commence at the expiration of that term, inures to the benefit of the partnership, is by no means novel doctrine. In Perry v. Lorillard Fire Ins. Co., 61 N. Y. 214, a policy-holder was declared an involuntary bankrupt; and his property was assigned. Held, that this worked such a change in the title and possession of the property as avoided the policy. In Glen and Hall Manuf. Co. v. Hall, 61 N. Y. 226, the plaintiffs having fraudulently and falsely advertised themselves as doing business at No. 10 South Water street, Rochester, New York, which was the long-established place of business of the defendant, were restrained from the use of those words. In Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362, the plaintiff having contracted to enter defendant's service at a future day, on the arrival of the day tendered performance, but the defendant repudiated the contract; held, that this was a breach of the contract for which plaintiff had an immediate right of action, that the action was for damages and not for wages, and that it was not necessary for the plaintiff after such breach to tender service or keep in readiness to perform. In Westcott v. Fargo, 61 N. Y. 542, the plaintiff delivered to an express company a package for transportation, and received a receipt providing that the defendant should not be liable for any loss or damage "to any box, package or thing for over fifty dollars, unless the true value thereof is herein stated," and that the party accepting the receipt agrees to the condition. Held, that the condition did not include a loss occasioned by the company's negligence. The court assumed that the condition was a part of the contract, and while they admitted that carriers may by clear and distinct expressions relieve themselves even from liability for their own negligence, yet they held that the words in question do not cover such a case.

A very

Stepping across the border into old Massachusetts, we are greeted at the outset by the unquiet question of false representations as to value. In Parker v. Moulton, 114 Mass. 99, it is said that false representations as to the condition, situation and value of real estate, knowingly made by the vendor to the purchaser, are not actionable unless the purchaser has been fraudulently induced to forbear inquiry as to their truth, and in that case the means by which he has thus been induced to forbear inquiry must be specifically set forth in the declaration. singular case is Gray v. Boston Gas-light Co., 114 Mass. 149. The defendants, without plaintiff's consent, had so fastened a wire to a chimney of his building as to render it unsafe, and eventually to cause it to fall on a passer-by; the injured party brought suit against the owner of the building, and the owner, after notifying the company to defend, and the company refusing, settled the action; held, that the company was liable to the owner for the amount so paid, and for his expenses. In Bailey v. N. E. M. Life Ins. Co., 114 Mass. 177, it is held that

the beneficiary of a life policy cannot maintain an action on such policy when it runs to the insured, his legal representatives and assigns. A note by the reporter discloses considerable diversity of opinion on this subject. The contrary has been held in our State and Pennsylvania. That all is not "fair in love" was decided in Commonwealth v. Stratton, 114 Mass. 300, where it was held that one who gave a young woman figs, containing "love powders,” which were eaten by the recipient in ignorance of that fact, and her health was thereby injured, was guilty of assault and battery. In Favor v. Boston and Lowell Railroad Corporation, 114 Mass. 350, the defendants were held not liable for injury to a horse occasioned by the passsage in an ordinary manner of a train of its cars over a bridge spanning a highway on which the plaintiff was driving, even though no warning of the train was given. In Hawes v. Knowles, 114 Mass. 518, the defendant's servant carelessly and wantonly drove defendant's coach against the plaintiff's wagon, and it was held that the fact of the wantonness and mischievousness of the servant not only did not absolve the master from liability, but enhanced the damages. In Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530, an action brought for the breach of a written agreement to purchase land, before the expiration of the time given for the purchase, is not maintainable, although the vendee absolutely refused ever to complete the purchase. The reporter's note shows this to be in conflict with several other authorities, including Burtis v. Thompson, in our own State. It may be presumptuous for us to criticize such high authority, but we venture to say it seems to us that the reason of the whole matter may be tested by one question, namely: What obligation is the vendee under to take the property until the appointed time comes; and until that time, of what force is his declaration that he will not take it? Massachusetts is still sound on Sunday traveling, as appears from Connolly v. City of Boston, 117 Mass. 64. Here the plaintiff worked at night, and at nine o'clock of a Sunday evening was walking to see his employer, to ask him for daywork instead of night-work, when he sustained an injury by reason of a defect in a highway. Held, neither necessary nor charitable, and the action was dismissed. In Doyle v. Lynn and Boston Railroad Company, 118 Mass. 195, a contrary result was reached, because the plaintiff was going to Boston to visit and render assistance to a sick friend. The plaintiff testified that he did not go to Boston to see the great fire, although he knew it was then raging. A most curious instance of the application of the law of place was afforded in Le Forest v. Tolman, 117 Mass. 109. The defendant's dog, owned and kept in Massachusetts, strayed into New Hampshire, and bit the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought an action for the injury in Massachusetts, on a statute which affords a remedy in such

been if on time. Held, that the tardiness of the train was not the proximate cause of the injury. In Webb v. Hoselton, 4 Neb. 308, it was held that the bona fide holder of a promissory note secured by a mortgage, takes the mortgage as well as the note discharged of equities between the original parties. In Prior v. Downey, 50 Cal. 388, a statute attempting to validate a judgment void for lack of jurisdiction, was held unconstitutional.

In

In Fletcher v. State, 49 Ind. 124, it was held that where an accused person testifies on his own behalf, his reputation for truth and veracity may be impeached, but not his general moral character. In this connection, we also note, Commonwealth v. Nichols, 114 Mass. 285, where it is held that an accused person, testifying on his own behalf, waives his privilege as to criminating himself, and may be cross-examined as to every thing relevant to the issue. Surely, this latter case makes the accused worse off than any other witness. Hollingsworth v. Swedenborg, 49 Ind. 378, held, that the mother of a minor child is not entitled, after re-marrying, to recover for the child's services, in the absence of an agreement to pay her therefor. In Smith v. Sloan, 37 Wis. 285, the limited power of one member of a non-trading partnership to bind his partners by note is clearly defined. There must be express authority; it must be necessary to the carrying on of the business, or it must be usual in similar partnerships. In Pringle v. Dunn, 37 Wis. 449, the record of a mortgage, where the clerk had neglected to record the names of the subscribing witnesses, was held ineffectual.

We had intended to comprehend in one notice this volume and the 20th, which is also published, but we found this volume on examination too rich in interest to be dismissed so summarily. There

seems to be no abatement of the care and intelligence of the editing, and every one of the one hundred and seventy cases seems to have been indispensable. In point of variety this series can never be surpassed. Its pages display the different degrees of civilization and intelligence in this country, from the surly Puritanism of New England, displayed in its Sunday laws, to the motley population and crude justice of Texas, which tries a man for murder with nine jurors who do not understand English.

THE ALBANY LAW SCHOOL.

AMONG the various institutions having for their object the training of young men for practice at the bar, the Albany Law School deserves particular mention. Although not the oldest law school in the country, it had at the time of its organization, in 1851, no competition in this section of the country, except that of Harvard. It was started, and has always been maintained, without endowment, and its steady prosperity from the first is an indication that the instruction there given has been thought by those who have

had the benefit of it, of sufficient value to compensate the students for bearing the entire expense of maintaining it. It has been subjected to much criticism, most of which has come from local or individual jealousy. Persons interested in rival schools, having a different course of study, have sometimes indulged in comments upon the fact that its curriculum covered only a single year, and those who favored the old method of study in an office only have frequently made unfavorable comparisons between the technical knowledge of its graduates, as compared with that of clerks in their own offices. The day for such criticisms is, however, over. The more than sixteen hundred graduates of the school, most of them practicing lawyers, filling positions of trust and honor in every part of the country, indicate that the training given was thorough and practical.

The chief labor of organizing the school fell upon the late Amos Dean, who gave it seventeen years of hard work, and was sustained during all those years by the vigor and strength of Judges Harris and Parker. On the death of Mr. Dean, in January, 1868, Isaac Edwards, of this city, assumed his place and duties. The school is well located; the city is more centrally situated than any other place of the same size; it combines the advantages of city and country; it has many fine libraries; it is the capital of a great State; many courts, State and Federal, including the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, are held here; and it is not an expensive place to live in.

The course of instruction has been from the outset substantially the same as that pursued in the German universities, in the study of the civil law. In order to systematize their labors, the faculty distribute among themselves the different subjects and branches of the law; and, by a suitable arrangement of topics and time, two lectures a day, on different subjects, are delivered through the entire academical year; and as each professor retains the same subject, from year to year, it is quite certain to be ably and fully presented.

As an important aid in the application of legal principles, two printed cases or questions are discussed every week, after a reasonable time to examine them and prepare for the argument. In this exercise the student learns the bearing and application of legal principles to the various transactions of daily life. He learns the law as a principle, and as an applied rule of actual justice. He studies it with a view to its intent and purpose; as a means of defending life, property and personal rights.

Direct oral questions are also daily used to insure a perfect understanding of legal principles; and from time to time written questions are submitted, demanding written answers.

After the new judiciary article and under it the statute of 1871 were adopted, the school promptly and cheerfully accepted the spirit of the new rules of court. It insisted upon a prior course of study, in an office, under private instructions, so as to insure a better training in the school than can be gained by a simple clerkship in an office. As every lawyer knows, there are rival opinions in regard to the best method of studying law. The old line insist upon the office as the true place in which to learn the law, and others upon a two years' course in a law school, as better suited to the end to be attained. The Albany School defers to both opinions; it recognizes the advantages of the office as a means of learning the practice; and it re

gards the school as the true place in which to gain a knowledge of the principles and spirit of the law. Among those well known at the bar and upon the bench or as prominent educators, who have been or are connected with the school, we will mention these: Hon. Ira Harris, of the Supreme Court and United States Senate, who, from its opening until the day of his death, kept his place as a teacher; Amos Dean, Esq.; Hon. Amasa J. Parker, of the Supreme Court; Isaac Edwards, Esq.; Hon. Wm. F. Allen, of the Court of Appeals; Hon. William L. Learned, of the Supreme Court; Hon. Matthew Hale; Hon. H. E. Sickles, State Reporter; Dr. Henry Coppee; President Eliphalet Nott Potter; Charles T. Spoor, Esq.

"377.00.

HUNTINGDON, PA., May 5, 1875. "Sixty days after date I promise to pay to the order of W. H. Woods, at the Union Bank of Huntingdon, three hundred and seventy-seven dollars, and five per cent collection fee if not paid when due, without defalcation. Value received. SAMUEL STEFFEY."

The protest of this note at its maturity had been waived by an indorsement on the back of the note signed by Woods. It appeared upon the trial that this note was but a renewal of another note, which also was a renewal, the original note having been discounted for the benefit of the drawer by the bank on the 28th of August, 1871, and renewed from time to time.

The defense made by the defendant below at the trial was, first, that the note, because of the insertion of the clause, "and five per cent collection fee if not paid when due," was not negotiable, and therefore the defendant was not liable for his indorsement. The reception of the note in evidence was objected to upon this ground, but the objection was overruled and the note admitted, and defendant took a writ of error to this court. Other defenses not material here were also set up.

Opinion by SHARSWOOD, J.

It is a necessary quality of negotiable paper that it should be simple, certain, unconditional, and not subject to any contingency. It would be a mere affectation of learning to cite the elementary treatises and the decided cases which have established this principle. It is very important to the commercial community that it should be maintained in all its vigor. Applying it to the note sued upon in this case, we are of opinion that it violates the rule. If it had been made payable at sixty days with five per cent it would have been objectionable as usurious on its face. It would

not, however, on that account have invalidated the note or destroyed its negotiability. A negotiable note may be made payable with interest from its date, and if more than lawful interest is stipulated for, it does not, in Pennsylvania, make the contract void, but only the usury. Hence, such a note is sufficiently certain. It is payable at maturity with lawful interest. But in the paper now in question there enters as to the amount an undoubted element of uncertainty. It is a mistake to suppose that if the note was unpaid at maturity the five per cent would be payable to the holder by the parties. It must go into the hands of an attorney for collection. It is not a sum necessarily payable. The phrase "collection fee" necessarily implies this. Not only so, but this amount of percentage cannot be arbitrarily determined by the parties. It must be only what would be a reasonable compensation to an attorney for collection. This in reason and the usage of the legal profession depends upon the amount of the note. Five per cent would, probably, be considered by a jury as a reasonable compensation upon the collection of a note of $377. But if it were $3,000 they would, probably, think otherwise, and certainly so if it were $30,000. How then can this note be said to be certain as to its amount, or that amount unaffected by any contingency? Interest and costs of protest after non-payment at maturity are necessary legal incidents of the contract, and the insertion of them in the body of the note would not alter its negotiability. Neither does a clause waiving exemption, for that in no way touches the implicity and certainty of the paper. But a collateral agreement as here, depending, too, as it does, upon its reasonableness, to be determined by the verdict of a jury, is entirely different. It may be well characterized like an agreement to confess a judgment was by Chief Justice Gibson, as "luggage," which negotiable paper, riding, as it does. on the wings of the wind, is not a courier able to carry. If this collateral agreement may be introduced with impunity, what may not be? It is the first step in the wrong direction which costs. These instruments may come to be lumbered up with all sorts of stipulations, and all sorts of difficulties, contention and litigation result. It is the best rule, obsta príncipiis. Judgment reversed.

COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

APPEAL.

Review of facts by general term.-The general term has power to review upon the facts only when the appeal is from the judgment of a referee or that of a judge who has tried the case without the jury (Code, § 48). Judgment below affirmed. Van Valkenburgh, adm'r, v. Am. Popular Life Ins. Co. Opinion by Folger, J. [Decided June 19, 1877.]

CRIMINAL LAW.

1. Seduction under promise of marriage: evidence.In the trial of an indictment for seduction under promise of marriage, this question was put to prosecutrix: "Did you believe him when he had connection with you that he would marry you?" Held proper as tending to make out that the consent of the prosecutrix to the intercourse was given under and by reason of the promise of marriage. Judgment below affirmed. Armstrong, plaintiff in error, v. People. Opinion by Folger, J. Church, C. J., dissented from decision of court on ground that the evidence of the prosecutrix was not supported.

2. Evidence: direction to witness to tell her own story. The prosecutrix was directed to go on and state in her own way what took place on the evening of the intercourse. Held proper. Ib.

3. Evidence: pregnancy of prosecutrix.- Testimony of the prosecutrix, an unmarried woman, that at the time of the trial she was in the family way, held proper. Ib.

4. Supporting evidence: what necessary. The supporting evidence required by the statute to corroborate the testimony of the prosecutrix in such a case must be as to two of the matters named in the act and as to them only, namely, the promise of marriage and the carnal conversation. The supporting evidence need be such only as the nature of these matters admits. Circumstances tending to show the existence of the acts may be given and it is for the jury to determine their strength. Ib.

5. Supporting evidence: relevancy of.-It was claimed that the prosecutrix limited her testimony to a single act of intercourse. Held, that it did not follow that the supporting testimony should refer directly to the same act, general testimony not pointing to any particular time, but covering the period when the act was alleged to have occurred held sufficient. Ib. [Decided June 5, 1877.]

EMINENT DOMAIN.

Acquisition of land by railroad company: description of lands in petition.-The provision of the statute (Laws 1850, chap. 140, § 14), relating to the acquirement of land for the purposes of railroads, that the petition must contain a description of the real estate which the company seeks to acquire, is not complied with unless there is such a description of the land as will show its location and the precise boundaries thereof with certainty. And the petition itself must contain the description, and reference cannot be had to another instrument to remedy defects in such description. Order below reversed. Matter of N. Y. Cent. and H. R. R. R. Co. v. Rau. Opinion per Curiam.

[Decided June 19, 1877.]

LEASE.

Agreements in: when grantee of lessor not bound by: termination of.-By the terms of a lease the lessor reserved the right to sell the demised premises, and the parties covenanted that upon the sale the lease should be determined and the term ended, and that the lessor would pay the tenant a fair compensation for all permanent improvements made by such tenant, with a provision for arbitration in case of disagreement. The lessor sold and conveyed the premises without reservation or exception. Held, that the lease was thereby terminated, and the grantee took the premises free from any claim on the part of the tenant, and that on a refusal by the lessor to pay the claim of such tenant for his improvements, or to arbitrate the same, the tenant had a right of action against the lessor for the value of the improvements. Judgment below affirmed. Morton v. Wier. Opinion by Allen, J. [Decided June 22, 1877. Reported below, 5 Hun, 177.] GIFT.

Of check payable after death of donee: bank book.— A father intending to make a gift of $6,000 to each of his sons, John and Robert, delivered to each of them a check for the amount named, and pass-books upon the several savings banks where he had moneys deposited for a larger amount than the checks. Each check was made payable four days after testator's

death, and had a memorandum at the top to the effect that "the pass-book must be presented with this check." When the checks were delivered he said he wanted it in this shape as he wanted the control of the money as long as he lived to receive the interest. He also said at the time: "You will want these books to get the money. I don't consider them safe here;" and remarked to his son Robert: "You take them, and take care of them;" and, upon signing the checks, said: "Boys, this is something which will do you good when I am gone. It will not do you any good while I am here." Robert took the books, and they were by him placed in an envelope on which was written the name of the father, "bank-books to have when called for." and put in a secure place. Held (1) not to constitute a valid gift to the sons, nor (2) to be sustainable in equity as a declaration of trust by the donor for the donees, or as (3) gifts by appointment or appropriation by the donor for the use of the donees. Judgment below affirmed. Curry v. Powers. Opinion by Miller, J. [Decided June 19, 1877.]

LIFE INSURANCE.

1. Statements in application: construction of: liver disease. An application for a life insurance policy contained the question whether applicant had "ever had disease of the liver?" Held, not to refer to a temporary,slight ailment, but to such an ailment as to indicate a vice in the constitution, or so serious as to have some bearing on the general health and the continuance of life, and the circumstance that the attending physician of the applicant testified in an action on the policy, that previous to the making of the application he had attended applicant for slight attacks which he treated as affecting the liver, his testimony being in some respects in conflict with that of another physician, who knew applicant and his general physical condition, would not authorize the taking of the case from the jury upon the question whether applicant was affected with liver disease. Judgment below affirmed. Cushman v. United States Life Insurance Co. Opinion by Earl, J.

2. Usual medical attendant, who is: estoppel - In answer to a question who was his usual medical attendant, applicant answered that Dr. Purdy was. It appeared that Dr. Purdy had always been his father's family physician and he had called on him yearly for many years for advice and treatment. Dr. Greenleaf had attended him one brief illness, and he had received treatment from Dr. Ormsby, not over half a dozen times during some few years before his death. Held, that the question was properly answered, and a statement in the proof of death made in accordance with the requirements of the insurance company by the personal representative of applicant to the insurance company, wherein it was stated by Dr. Ormsby, who certified to the death and who attended applicant in his last illness, that he was applicant's family physician and had been from a time preceding the policy, did not show breach of warranty or conclude the personal representative as to the truth of the statement. Ib.

3. Practice: general objection to evidence.-A general objection to the testimony of a witness will not raise one on the ground that a proper foundation for the testimony was not laid, if by laying a proper foundation the testimony would have been competent. Ib. [Decided June 5, 1877. Reported below, 4 Hun, 783.]