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Marriage set

valid as a purchase.

Voluntary settlement void as against creditors.

Marriage, as we have seen (n), is a valuable consitlement equally deration. Every settlement, therefore, made by parties of full age, previously to and in consideration of marriage, or made subsequently to marriage in pursuance of written articles (o), stands on the footing of a purchase, and has equal validity. But a voluntary settlement is liable to be defeated by the creditors of the settlor, if he was so much indebted at the time as to bring the settlement within the provisions of the statute of the 13th of Elizabeth (p) already noticed (q), by which the alienation of goods and chattels made för the purpose of delaying, hindering or defrauding creditors, is rendered void as against them. For although by the phrase "goods and chattels" was intended only such personal property as could be taken by the sheriff under an execution on a judgment (r), yet as almost all kinds of personal property may now be taken in execution (s), or charged with the payment of judgment debts (t), it would seem that all such property is now within the compass of the statute. The voluntary assignment of goods or chattels, or delivery or making over of bills, bonds, notes or other securities, or the voluntary transfer of any debts made by a person being at the time insolvent (u), is also void in the event of his bankruptcy (x). This provision appears to embrace all personal estate capable of assignment or transfer (y); but it does not extend to a gift of money (z).

(n) Ante, p. 63.

(0) Stat. 29 Car. II. c. 3, s. 4.

See ante, p. 67.

(p) Stat. 13 Eliz. c. 5.

(q) Ante, p. 43.

(r) Sims v. Thomas, 2 Adol. & Ell. 536. See ante, p. 45.

(s) Stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 12. See ante, p. 102.

(t) Stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 14; 3 & 4 Vict. c. 82, s. 1.

Ante, pp. 102, 155, 170.

(u) See Cutten v. Sanger, 2 You. & Jerv. 459.

(x) Stat. 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, s. 73. (y) Brown v. Bellaris, 5 Mad. 53.

(2) Ex parte Shortland, 7 Ves. 88; Kensington v. Chandler, 2 Mau. & Selw. 36; Ex parte Skerratt, 2 Rose, 384.

Although a voluntary settlement may thus be de- Voluntary settlement binding feated by creditors, yet, when once completed, it is on the settlor. binding on the settlor, who cannot, by any means, undo it (a). Thus, in one case (b), a maiden lady, not immediately contemplating marriage, but thinking such an event possible, transferred a sum of stock into the names of trustees in trust for herself until she should marry, and, after her marriage, in trust for her separate use for her life, free from the control of any person or persons with whom she might intermarry, and after her decease, upon trusts for the benefit of any such husband, and her child or children by any husband or husbands. She -afterwards, being still unmarried, filed a bill in Chancery, praying that the settlement might be delivered up to her to be cancelled, and that the stock might be ordered to be retransferred by the trustees. But the court held that she was bound by the settlement she had made, and was not entitled to any assistance to release her from it.

If however the object of the settlor is merely his own benefit or convenience, the settlement will be revocable by him at his pleasure. Thus where a man, without any communication with his creditors, puts property into the hands of trustees for the purpose of paying his debts, his object is said to be, not to benefit his creditors, but to benefit himself by the payment of his debts (c). He may accordingly revoke the trust thus created (d), so long as the creditors remain in

(a) Ellison v. Ellison, 6 Ves. 656; Edwards v. Jones, 1 My. & Craig, 226.

(b) Bill v. Cureton, 2 My. & Keen, 403; see also Petre v. Espinasse, 2 My. & Keen, 496.

(c) Per Sir C. Pepys, M.R., 2 My. & Keen, 511, cited by Wig- ·

ram, V.C. in Hughes v. Stubbs, 1
Hare, 479.

(d) Garrard v. Lord Lauder-
dale, 3 Sim. 1; Acton v. Wood-
gate, 2 My. & Keen, 492; Ra-
venshaw v. Hollier, 7 Sim. 3;
Law v. Bagwell, 4 Dru. & War
ren, 398.

Settlement for benefit revocable by him.

settlor's own

Voluntary settlements of personal estate not void against subsequent purchasers.

Stamps on settlements.

ignorance of it (e). This rule, however, though well established, seems to attribute to debtors a somewhat light estimation of the claims of their creditors; and there appears to be no disposition in the courts to extend it (f).

The statute of Elizabeth (g), by which voluntary settlements of lands and other hereditaments are void as against subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration, though it extends to chattels real (h), does not apply to purely personal estate (i). A voluntary settlement of personal estate cannot therefore be defeated by a subsequent sale of the property by the settlor.

Settlements of any definite and certain principal sum of money, or share in the funds, or Bank, East India, or South Sea stock, are liable to an ad valorem duty, according to the amount of the money or the value of the stock or shares settled (k); and every duplicate of such settlement is also liable to the same duty.

(e) Browne v. Cavendish, 1 Jones & Lat. 606, 635.

(f) See Wilding v. Richards, 1 Coll. 661; Simmonds v. Palles, 2 Jones & Lat. 489; Kirwan v. Daniel, 5 Hare, 493, 499-501

(g) Stat. 27 Eliz. c. 4; Prin-
ciples of the Law of Real Pro-
perty, 56.

(h) Co. Litt. 3b; 6 Rep. 72.
(i) 2 My. & Keen, 512.

(k) The following is the table.
If the same do not amount to
1000l., 1. 15s.; amounting to
1000l. and not to 2000l., 2l.;
amounting to 2000l. and not to

3000l., 31.; amounting to 3000l. and not to 4000l., 4l.; amounting to 4000l. and not to 5000l., 5l.; amounting to 5000l. and not to 7000l., 71.; amounting to 70001. and not to 9000l., 97.; amounting to 9000l. and not to 12,000l., 127.; amounting to 12,000l. and not to 15,000l., 15l.; amounting to 15,000l. and not to 20,000l., 201.; amounting to 20,000l. or upwards, 251.

The progressive duty for every entire quantity of 1080 words beyond the first 1080, is 11.5s.

CHAPTER II.

OF JOINT OWNERSHIP AND JOINT LIABILITY.

THERE may be a joint ownership of any kind of per- Joint owners. sonal property in the same manner as there may be a joint tenancy of real estate (a); and the four unities of possession, interest, title, and time, which characterize a joint tenancy of real estate, apply also to a joint ownership of chattels. But as no estates can exist in personal property, the distinctions which hold with respect to joint estates for life, in tail, or in fee, do not occur in a joint ownership of personalty. If personal property, whether in possession or in action, be given to A. and B. simply, they will be joint owners, having equal rights as between themselves, during the joint ownership, and being, with respect to all other persons than themselves, in the position of one single owner. Hence it follows, Joint bond, all that if a bond or covenant be given or made to two or more jointly, they must all join in suing upon it (b); and a release by one of them to the obligor is sufficient Release by one to bar them all (c). As a further consequence of the unity of a joint ownership, the important right of survivorship, which distinguishes a joint tenancy of real estate, belongs also to a joint ownership of personal property. Whether the subject of the joint ownership be a chattel real as a lease, or a chose in possession as a horse, or a chose in action as a debt or legacy, the surviving joint owner will be entitled to the whole, un

Petrie v. Bury, 3 Barn. & Cres.
353; 1 Wms. Saund. 291 i.
(c) 2 Rol. Abr. 410 (D), pl.

(a) See Principles of the Law of Real Property, part 1, c. 6, p. 99. (b) Slingsby's case, 5 Rep.18b; 1, 5.

must sue.

bars all.

Survivorship.

Trustees of personal estate made joint

owners.

The shares of joint owners under a will

need not vest at the same time.

Limitation to joint owners, their executors,

and assigns.

affected by any disposition which the deceased joint owner may have made by his will, unless the joint tenancy should have been previously severed in the lifetime of both the parties (d). And for this reason, trustees of settlements of personal estate are always made joint owners, in order that the surviving trustees may take the entire fund, rather than that the executors or administrators of any trustee who may happen to die should have any right to intermeddle with the share of the deceased.

If the joint ownership be created by a will, it is not necessary that the shares of all the joint owners should vest at the same time. Thus under a bequest to A. for life, and after his decease to the issue (e) or children (ƒ) of B., without words of severance, all the issue or children, born in A.'s lifetime, will become entitled jointly, though some may not be living when the shares of the others become vested interests. On the decease of any of them therefore before payment, the survivors will become entitled to their shares. A similar exception to the unity of time occurs also in the case of a devise of real estate by will (g).

In analogy to the rule by which a joint estate in feesimple in lands is created by a limitation to two or administrators, more, their heirs and assigns, it is customary with conveyancers to make a gift of personal estate to two or more jointly, by limiting it to them their executors, administrators, and assigns. This, however, though usual, is not strictly necessary. In ill-framed instruments, limitations of personalty are sometimes made to

(d) Litt. sects. 281,282; Lady Shore v. Billingsley, 1 Vern. 482; Willing v. Baine, 3 P. Wms. 115; Morley v. Bird, 3 Ves. 629. (e) Bridge v. Yates, 12 Sim.

645.

(f) Amies v. Skillern, 14 Sim.

428.

(g) See Principles of the Law of Real Property, 102.

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