incalculable benefit to the practicing lawyers of this State. When the old Code was in force, what was known as "Voorhies' Code," prepared by John Townshend, Esq., was considered by our bar as an indispensable part of a working law library. The enactment of the first thirteen chapters of the present Code impaired, to a great extent, the usefulness of that compilation, but the first volume, prepared by Mr. Bliss, who incorporated so much of that as was relevant with his own labors, furnished as full and complete a collection of case law, upon the matters it related to, as was then practicable. By the adoption of the final chapters of the new Code the statute law regulating practice here became comparatively symmetrical, and an opportunity was afforded Mr. Bliss to finish what he had undertaken. This he has availed himself of in a manner which cannot fail to meet the approbation of the bench and bar of this State. As most of the profession are familiar with the first volume of the work, an extended notice of the one before us is unnecessary. From a somewhat thorough examination we are satisfied that no reported case of any value in relation to practice has been overlooked. And as such provisions of the statute law upon that subject as are not contained in the Code are referred to, and in some instances given in full, we do not hesitate to pronounce the entire work a complete hand-book of the law of procedure in our various civil courts.

The annotations to the chapter upon surrogates' courts, which are stated in the preface to be the work of Wm. T. Schley, Esq., will be found of peculiar value in view of the important changes made by the Code in regard to those courts and proceedings before them.

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

The subject of confining judges to work on the bench alone is attracting attention in other States. We have before us a letter from a well-known lawyer in New Hampshire, whose attention has been attracted to the discussion in Connecticut and elsewhere. He says: We are troubled with the same pernicious system here. The practice of permitting judges to appoint each other as referees, and of their sitting as such from the close of one term to the beginning of another -devoting no time to the preparation of their published decisions, or to the briefs or arguments of counsel-is having a disastrous effect upon the quality of their judgments and upon that respect which an intelligent profession ought to feel for the decisions of an intelligent court. I think some effort will be made to compel our court to attend to its legitimate duties.'"' Our excellent contemporary should reflect that a man at seventy is crowded for time, and rarely has much opportunity thereafter to lay up money, however efficient the training of the "preparatory school" may have been. The judges may not ask for pensions, but we think they would not refuse them, and that they ought to have them.

The December number of the American Law Review contains leading articles by James B. Thayer on Bedingfield's Case-Declarations as a part of the res gestæ, and by Joseph Willard on Right of a creditor to his sureties' securities. The November number of the Western Jurist has an article on Damages in tort as affected by insurance.

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Judgment affirmed with costs-The Union Dime Savings Bank v. Andariese; Decker v. Boice; Taintor v. Hemingway; Avery v. Wheat; Johnson v. Heiser; Patton v. Giles. Judgment affirmed -- The People v. Bork; The People v. Cox.-Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide event Davies v. The Mayor, etc., of New York; Schwinger v. Raymond; Devens v. The Mechanics and Traders' Insurance Com

pany. Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide event, unless plaintiff stipulates to reduce its recovery by striking therefrom $8,200, and interest thereon, in which event, judgment as so modified, affirmed with costs - The Chenango Bridge Company v. Paige.-Order reversed and motion for commission denied without costs- In re Hahn.-Order affirmed, and judgment absolute for respondent, on stipulation, with costs - Osborn v. Schenck. -Motion for re-argument denied without costs - In re Eldridge.

Delay, and by David Clopton on Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts over Suits against Municipal Corporations.- -One of the ablest and best known lawyers of this State writes us about Judge Davis' attack on Mr. Hewett: "A more inexcusable stab at private character was never dealt from the safe seclusion of the judgment seat."The Memphis Avalanche says:

"The ALBANY LAW JOURNAL should cultivate the Avalanche more intimately. We are very nice and companionable, and disposed to growl only at persons who insist that the people of the north and the south have any cause for making ugly faces at each other."

Four men in India bought several bales of India rugs, and also some cotton bales. That the rats might not destroy the cotton, they purchased a cat. It was agreed that each of the four should own a particular leg of the cat; and each adorned with beads, etc., the particular leg apportioned to him. The cat accidentally injured one of its legs and the owner of that member wound a rag around it, soaked in oil. The cat going too near the hearth set the rag on fire, and being in great pain rushed in among the cotton bales where she was accustomed to hunt rats and set fire to the cotton and rugs, which were consumed. The three owners of the unburnt legs brought a suit against the other to recover the value of the goods destroyed. The defendant denied his liability and claimed to recover against the plaintiffs. The court said: "The leg that had the oiled rag on it was hurt; the cat could not use that leg; in fact, it held up that leg and ran with the other three legs. The three unhurt legs, therefore, carried the fire to the cotton and alone are culpable. The injured leg is not to be blamed. The three partners who owned the three legs with which the cat ran to the cotton, will pay the whole value of the bales to the partner who was the proprietor of the injured

ordinary defenses. They are the most powerful body of men in the community, and are none too careful about exercising their power. If there is any need of legislation — which we doubt-it is to protect the community against the editors. We think the jury will take care of the citizens.

Mr. Justice Strong has retired from the bench of the United States Supreme Court, at the age of 72, and is entitled to his annual salary of $10,000 for life, having served for more than 10 years. He had previously served 10 years as chief justice of Pennsylvania, resigning in 1868. He was nominated to the Federal Supreme Court bench by President Grant in 1870. President Hayes has nominated Judge Woods to succeed him. Judge Woods was admitted to the bar in 1847, and pursued practice till 1857. He was then chosen to the Ohio Legislature and made speaker, and was re-elected in 1858. At the beginning of the civil war he became lieutenant-colonel of the Seventy-sixth Ohio infantry, and was mustered out as major-general in Alabama, where he settled in 1865. In 1868 he was made chancellor of the State, and after serving two years, was appointed Circuit judge of the United States for the Fifth Circuit, which includes the districts of Louisiana, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina and other Southern States. The Albany Argus says: "His character as a gentleman, his humanity and firmness as a magistrate, and his abilities as a jurist, are marked." It is rumored that Judge Erskine, of the Georgia Federal District Court, will be named to succeed Judge Woods. The selection of Judge Woods harmonizes with our views of geographical fitness, but the question arises, what becomes of Pennsylvania's interests? We really hope that when Judge Swayne retires, his successor will be taken from Pennsylvania. Probably by diligent inquiry the president could find one proper person, resident of that State, who was born in Ohio, if, as it seems, birth or residence in Ohio is essential to an appointment to office under the present administration.

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We wish to emphasize the idea, which we advanced the other day, that our Court of Appeals Reports should be owned and published by the State. This practice obtains in many States, and is preferable to the present custom. The labors of the reporter, for which the State pays, should be the property of the State, and if there is any profit in the sale, that should belong to the State. ent there are four different owners of the series, and as many different prices. Every three years hereafter it is possible that there will be a new publisher. The difficulty of getting a complete set is already very considerable, and must continually increase under this system. The purchaser, too, is at the mercy of such of the publishers as are not bound by the contract price beyond the term of three years. There is one price for purchasers in this State, and another for those residing in other States. Out of the present system have grown unseemly squabbles and litigations, and delay, inconvenience and

annoyance to the profession. It would be well if the State could purchase the interests of the present publishers at a fair price; but if this cannot be done, there is an excellent opportunity for the State to do what is greatly needed, namely, to publish a new edition of the past volumes, leaving out obsolete and overruled matter, and mere memoranda of decisions, and embracing such portions of Abbott's Decisions and Keyes' Reports as ought to be covered by the regular series, re-writing the head notes and statements of fact in many instances, omitting a great many of the citations of counsel, and giving the volumes cohesion by notes and references. Such a series would supplant the old, if the publishers would not listen to reason. But whether this were done or not, in the future the State should publish its own reports, at a fair price, and should not give them away.

Judge Macomber, at New York Special Term, in Kerrison v. Kerrison, has passed upon the vexed question of a marriage by a party divorced and forbidden to marry again during the marriage of the other party, and going to another State, for the purpose of evading the prohibition, and there contracting a second marriage during the marriage of the other party. Judge Macomber holds that such a marriage is valid. This was an action by the second wife to have the second marriage declared void. The decision was influenced by the fact that the plaintiff was herself cognizant of and assenting to the fraud, and therefore did not come with clean hands. It is possible that this circumstance may be sufficient to warrant the decision, and that the rest of the holding may be obiter. At all events, it is contrary to the General Term decision of Marshall v. Marshall, 2 Hun, 238, which it examines and disapproves. A correspondent writes us that there are two other decisions to the contrary, and following the Marshall case, now on their way up. See 21 Alb. L. J. 486.

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NOTES OF CASES.

N interesting case of definition is re Lord Lon desborough, Bridgman v. Lord Otto Fitzgerald, before Malins, V. C., Nov. 8, 1880, 43 L. T. (N. S.). 408. A. by his will bequeathed unto his wife absolutely all his or her "jewels, trinkets, gold and silver plate, ornamental and other china, and all objects of vertu and taste." And he directed that his wife should be entitled during life to his leasehold messuage with the appurtenances in Carlton Houseterrace, and the statuary, furniture, and other effects purchased by him therewith, or which might be therein at the time of his decease. After her death the said leasehold premises, statuary, and effects were directed to be sold, and the produce was made part of his residuary estate. There were in the said house at the testator's death, but not purchased by him therewith, ten pictures, valued at £15,000. Held, that the words "objects of vertu and taste" were intended to include only things ejusdem generis with those enumerated, and did not include the

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pictures, but that these passed under the gift of the furniture, statuary, and effects in the said leasehold messuage. Lord Londesborough was a nobleman of very large fortune, a man of great taste, a patron and lover of the arts, and lived in a very large house in Carlton House-terrace. Besides the articles above mentioned, he had a collection of armor and autographs, which are settled and made heirlooms. The pictures were all by English artists, except a head by Carlo Dolce, and included the "Monarch of the Glen," a well-known picture by Landseer; a child, said to be a portrait of the testator's daughter; and pictures by D. Roberts, Stanfield, Hollings, Ansdell, and Cook. The court said: "It is clear, and was decided in Sir George Kelly v. Powlett, 2 Amb. 605, by the then Master of the Rolls, that where there is nothing to show the contrary, pictures pass as part of the furniture of the house." "I must say that it seems to me very improbable that a man possessed of a collection of very valuable pictures, if he intended to give them absolutely, would omit the word pictures. If a man, knowing perfectly well that he had these pictures by the first painters, intended to give them, I cannot understand upon what principle the word 'pictures' was omitted. Mr. Bristowe argued that pictures were objects of vertu and taste, and that a virtuoso is a man who loves pictures as well as other works of art. Pictures are most undoubtedly articles of taste. commonly say that a man has a very great taste in pictures, but I suppose this is the very first will that has occurred in which pictures are to pass, if they do pass, by the words 'objects of vertu and taste.' There is a rule of construction which has always been acted upon, and which was acted upon in the case cited of Rawlings v. Jennings (ubi sup.), where words are used which would pass the whole property of the testator. In that case the words were 'all other goods,' but Sir Wm. Grant, acting on the rule, said they meant things ejusdem generis, not all the man's property, but things of the same nature as those which he had been disposing of. Mr. Bristowe says the pictures are of the same nature as the things he has been disposing of; a picture is an object of vertu and taste. So it is, I agree. I do not say by any means that the words are insufficient to pass pictures, but whether they do so or not depends upon the particular circumstances of the case, and therefore inasmuch as it would have been so very easy for the testator to have removed all difficulty on the subject by using the word pictures, I think that mentioning as he does 'gold and silver plate, ornamental or other china,' and then 'all objects of vertu and taste,' he means things ejusdem generis, such as painted snuff-boxes and small statuettes, and any thing of that kind about the house. hardly think that if he had meant those pictures to pass he would not have used the proper word 'pictures ' instead of those doubtful and ambiguous words 'objects of vertu and taste.'" "On the whole, therefore, I come to the conclusion that he considered those words 'vertu and taste' as comprehending every thing else of the same sort, or, as we lawyers say, ejusdem generis with those before enumer

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ated, and I cannot consider that by such words he intended to pass a valuable collection of pictures such as he had; and I am therefore of opinion that Lady Londesborough did not take them absolutely, but that she is entitled to the enjoyment during her life, under the next clause, of all the articles which were in the house at the time of the death. It was said that it was very improbable that he could have intended the portrait of his daughter to be sold. I agree that it is very improbable, but he may have forgotten that, or he may have thought the family were sure to buy it; probably it is not very valuable. I cannot think that that circumstance sufficiently controls the construction of the will to make those words have the operation which they otherwise would not have."

The matter of "catching bargains" comes up almost simultaneously in this country and in England. In Nevill v. Snelling, English High Court, Ch. Div., 43 L. T. (N. S.) 244, a money lender induced a younger son of a nobleman of high rank and great estate, while still under age, to borrow money of him on extravagantly usurious conditions, and to continue to do so after he had attained his majority, and made no inquiry into the position of the borrower, but relied for repayment, not on any definite expectations of the latter, but on the probability that if he should be unable to pay, his father or friends would pay to avert bankruptcy and exposure, or that he would himself pay if he should by any means come into any of the family property, and unconscientiously received and afterward insisted upon the continuance of payments originally made to him by the borrower under a mistake, and without any obligation to do so. Held, that the money lender was only entitled to obtain repayment of the sums actually advanced, with interest at five per cent from the dates of the several advances. And in Bogle's Estate, Orphan's Court of Dauphin county, Penn., March, 1880, 9 W. N. C. 256, the court said: "We find Bogle, a young man between twenty-three and twenty-four years of age, having been engaged in the grocery business for two or three years, to all appearances pretty closely pressed for money, borrowing from Mr. Sticker, or his wife, some $2,000, at a rate of interest of 18 per cent per annum, and applying to the same person for a new loan at like rate, this on the security of his patrimony in the hands of his guardian and not due for a little over a year. We find him afterward selling the claim at a discount of at least $1,000, receiving in payment the discharge of two small judgments amounting in all to $135, the balance due on a former mortgage, $200, some $357 in money, some small expenses paid, and notes at 6 and 12 months, $576.63 each, some $250 of a discount on the $500, and at least one of the notes, if not both, shaved at a discount of about 18 per cent. Mr. Bogle swears that he was to have the money when wanted. Is this such an oppressive and fraudulent advantage taken of Bogle under the circumstances as will entitle him to relief in equity? We must premise that his guardian, who had looked after his affairs