an alteration of the record as will cause it to state untruly the events of the tril. The cases of Jarvis v. Sewall, 40 Barb. 449, and others, do not go to that extent. They only show that record evidence, imperfectly proved on the trial, may be exhibited upon the argument before the appellate tribunal, and this for the reason that it would be idle to send a cause back for a new trial upon an exception no longer tenable, and for the same reason a record not put in evidence upon the trial may in some cases be presented for the first time to an appellate court. Order in part reversed and in part aflirmed. Carter, appellant, v. Beckwith. Opinion by Danforth, J.

[Decided Sept. 21, 1880.]

ATTACHMENT-MOTION TO VACATE UNDER CODE, SECTION 682, IN TIME AFTER LEVY UNDER EXECUTION IN ACTION. Plaintiff obtained an attachment against property of defendants, Oct. 20th. On Oct. 22d he perfected judgment in the action and issued execution, under which the sheriff levied upon defendants' property. Subsequent to plaintiff's attachment an attachment against defendants' property was issued to W. On the 28th Oct. W. moved to vacate plaintiff's attachment. The question was whether, under the provision of Code, section 682, that the subsequent lienor may move to vacate a prior attachment "before the actual application of the attached property or the proceeds thereof to the payment of a judgment recovered in the action," the motion was made in time, the attached property having been levied upon under an execution. Held, that the motion was made in time. A mere levy under an execution is not such actual application as to bar such a motion. While a levy upon sufficient property has often been held to be payment of the debt, and to extinguish the judgment, it is only constructively so, and with reference to the equitable rights of others and the judgment may nevertheless not be in fact paid. The section referred to means an actual and real application of the property or its proceeds as distinguished from a constructive one. While the property remains before it has been actually transferred to the plaintiff, or in case of a sale, before its proceeds have gone to him, it is possible for the court to control and determine the liens upon it, fixing their order. The evil at which the provision was aimed does not exist where there is merely a levy, under which neither the property nor its proceeds have actually passed to the creditor. Order granting motion affirmed. Woodmansee v. Rogers. Opinion by Finch, J.

[Decided Sept. 21, 1880.]

GUARDIANSHIP-COURT MUST HAVE JURISDICTION

-WHAT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE JURISDICTION-INFANT SURREPTITIOUSLY BROUGHT INTO STATE. -The Supreme Court has authority to appoint guardians of infants, but only where the persons or property of such infants are within its jurisdiction. The jurisdiction does not depend upon the legal domicile of the infants. It is sufficient if the infant is a resident within the jurisdiction of the court where the proceedings are taken. This was determined by the House of Lords in Johnstone v. Beattie, 10 Cl. & Fin. 43, in which case it was held that the English Court of Chancery had power to appoint guardians for an infant, who was a resident in England, notwithstanding she had no property there and her domicile was in Scotland. So on the other hand property gives jurisdiction to appoint a guardian thereof, although the infant in whose behalf the application for guardianship is made is out of the jurisdiction and a resident abroad. Logan v. Jacob, 193; Stephens v. James, 1 M. & K. 627; Salles v. Savignon, 6 Ves. 572. But if the infant is not within the jurisdiction or domiciled there and has no property therein, there is no basis for the interposition of

the court. In the case at bar, the father of infants, who was living, was born in Rhode Island, removed to New York in 1858, where he engaged in business and was married. His wife died in 1873, leaving the infants, two in number, the fruit of the marriage. The father, in 1875, becoming suddenly insane, was taken by his brother, who resided in that State, to Rhodo Island, and placed in an asylum there. He recovered his reason and was discharged from the asylum. In 1877, upon a recurrence of the malady, he was again placed in the asylum, where he has since remained. He never returned to New York after leaving in 1875. The infants were taken to Rhode Island in 1875 and remained there until 1878, when one of them was secretly taken from a school she was attending, by a son-in-law of their maternal grandfather, and brought to the grandfather's house in New York, where sho has since resided. The evidence strongly tended to show that she was brought into this State for the purpose of having her within the jurisdiction of the courts here in order to the institution of proceedings for guardianship. Neither infant had property in this State. Held, that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for the infants upon the petition of the maternal grandfather. Order of General Term modified so as to reverse the order of Special Term appointing a guardian. In matter of guardianship of Hubbard infants. Opinion by Andrews, J [Decided Sept. 21, 1880.]

VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION-DISSOLUTION OF-COURTS WILL NOT INTERFERE AS TO, WHERE RULES OF ASSOCIA

TION PROVIDE REMEDY-NOT PARTNERSHIP. — Upon an application by certain members of a voluntary association instituted for moral, benevolent and social objects, for a dissolution and closing up of the same by a distribution of the funds belonging to it, the court say that in view of the purposes for which such societies are organized they should not be dissolved for slight causes, and if at all, only when it is entirely apparent that the organization has ceased to answer the ends of its existence and no other mode of relief is attainable. That there was in such a society strife and bickerings among the members and hostile feelings engendered, and contention as to the management of a fund belonging to the society, no resort having been made to the methods provided by the rules of the society to settle the difficulties, held, not to be a sufficient ground to authorize the interference of the court. When members claimed to have been chargeable with a violation of the rules of an association have not been called upon to answer under such rules, the power of the association, to remedy tho evils complained of, being ample and complete, the complaining members are not in a position to seek the interposition of a court of equity. Carlen v. Drury, 1 Ves. & B. 154; White v. Brownell, 6 Abb. (N. S.) 162. Courts should not, as a general rule, interfere with the contentions and quarrels of voluntary associations so long as the government is fairly and honestly administered, and those who have grievances should be required, in the first instance, to resort to the remedies for redress provided by their rules and regulations. In such a case the complainants are not entitled to relief on the ground that the members of the society are partners, for they are not partners; no partnership exists under such circumstances. 3 Kent's Com. 23; In re St. James Club, 13 Eng. L. & Eq. 589; McMahon v. Rauhr, 47 N. Y. 67. When such a society, for its own use, leases real property, which it fits up, and sub-lets what it does not require, and thus accumulates a fund, not unreasonable for the uses of the society, tho members are not partners as to such fund. Order affirmed. Lafond et al., appellants, v. Deems et al. Opinion by Miller, J.

[Decided Sept. 21, 1880.]

HUSBAND AND WIFE-VALID MORTGAGE BY WIFE RENDERED INVALID BY FORGERY OF NOTE IT WAS GIVEN TO SECURE JURISDICTION. —(1) The accommodation note of an individual partner, secured by a mortgage upon the wife's separate property, and made for the benefit of the firm, is utterly void in the hands of an innocent indorsee, as against the wife of the maker, where the name of the wife was forged, prior to indorsement, as the joint maker of such note, by the payee and managing partner of the firm. The mortgage given to secure the note, although duly executed by the husband and wife, is rendered void by such forgery. (2) In such case a Federal court could not assume jurisdiction of a suit by the assignee upon the mortgage alone, when the assignor and the mortgagor are both citizens of the same State. Sheldon v. Sell, 8 How. 441. Circuit, Iowa, June 23, 1880. Mersman v. Werges. Opinion by Love, D. J.

MARITIME LAW-CONTRACT FOR REPAIR OF VESSEL -JURISDICTION— PRACTICE-LIEN. A contract for the repair of a domestic vessel is a maritime contract. The Josephine, 39 N. Y. 19; Brookman v. Hamill, 43 id. 554; Hoole v. Kermit, 59 id. 554-556; The General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438. A suit to enforce a maritime contract is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the admiralty, "saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common-law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it." 1 U. S. Stat. 77, § 9; Vose v. Cockcroft, 44 N. Y. 415. The reservation of the act of Congress relates to well-known forms of actions and remedies, distinguished alike from those prosecuted in rem in courts of admiralty, and from those that are peculiar to courts of equity. A statutory remedy in the nature of a bill in equity to foreclose a mortgage, for the enforcement of a common-law lien founded upon a maritime contract, is not within the reservation of the act of Congress limiting the admiralty jurisdiction. A lien is not a collateral contract; it is a right in, or claim against, some interest in the subject of the contract, created by the law as an incident of the contract itself. See The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624; Hine v. Trevor, 4 id. 555. District, S. D. New York, July 2, 1880. Town of Pelham v. Schooner Woolsey. Opinion by Choate, D. J.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE-WHEN VOLUNTARY TO CHILD, NOT― PRESUMPTION OF ACCEPTANCE OF Deed. (1) A voluntary conveyance from a parent to his children, by way of settlement, while solvent and free from debt, and not disproportionate to his means, will be sustained, as against subsequent creditors, in the absence of fraud. Ellison v. Ellison, 8 Wheat. 239; Reade v. Livingston, 3 Johns. Ch. 481. There is no presumption of constructive fraud by such settlement, as there might be if debts existed and the debtor impaired the rights of creditors. Kehr v. Smith, 20 Wall. 31, 35. The rule may be summed up that the gift, conveyance, and settlement will be upheld "if it be reasonable, not disproportionate to the husband's means, taking into view his debts and situation, and clear of any intent, actual or constructive, to defraud creditors." Subsequent contributions of money, for the purpose of paying off incumbrances and improving the property, will not render such conveyance void. (2) In the absence of direct testimony the acceptance of the grant will be presumed, after the expiration of four years, where the grantees held, owned, controlled and managed the property from the time of the conveyance, and the only occupancy had been by their tenants, and for their sole and exclusive use. Harrison v. Trustees, etc., 12 Mass. 456; Hatch v. Hatch, 9 id. Appearing in 3d Federal Reporter.

5 Barn. & Cres. 632 (671); Hedge v. Drew, 12 Pick. 141. District, Minnesota, Feb., 1880. Circ., Minnesota, June, 1880. Herring v. Richards. Opinions by Nelson, D. J., and McCrary, C. J.

RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT ABCOURT STRACT.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAXATION - ASSESSMENT FOR STREET SEWER ACCORDING TO FRONTAGE AND

AREA VALID. — (1) A statute authorized the city of Providence to build sewers, and make assessments to pay for them at the rate of sixty cents for each front foot of abutting estates upon a street, and one cent for each square foot of abutting estates, between such street and a line not exceeding 150 feet distant from and parallel with such street; provided that where any estate is situated between two streets the area upon which such assessment is made shall not extend to more than one-half the distance between such streets; and that where any estate is situated at the corner of two streets, that portion of such estate assessed for a sewer in one of such streets shall not be liable to be assessed upon its area for the cost of constructing a sewer in the other of such streets, but only for its frontage upon such street. Held, that this statute as applied to the compact part of the city was not unconstitutional under a provision of the Constitution that "the burdens of the State ought to be fairly distributed." In Debois v. Barker, 4 R. I., a statute making abutting estates liable for curbstones set in front, was held valid. In other States it has been repeatedly decided that statutes authorizing assessments for sewers or other street improvements on the abutting lots according to their frontage, and without regard to value or benefit received, are constitutional and valid. Such assessments under statutes, or city ordinances authorized by statute, have been decided or recognized to be valid in Pennsylvania. Magee v. Commonwealth, 46 Penn. St. 358; Stroud v. City of Philadelphia, 61 id. 255; In re Washington Av., 69 id. 352, 361; in Indiana: Palmer v. Stumph, 29 Ind. 329; in Vermont: Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt. 174; in Ohio: Ernst v. Kunkle, 5 Ohio St. 520; Upington v. Oviatt, 24 id. 520; in Kansas: Parker v. Challiss, 9 Kans. 155; in Michigan: Motz v. City of Detroit, 18 Mich. 495; in New Jersey: State v. Fuller, 34 N. J. Law, 227; in Missouri: City of St. Louis v. Clemens, 49 Mo. 522; and in California: Emery v. San Francisco Gas Co., 28 Cal. 345; Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 id. 497, 514; People v. Lynch, 51 id. 15. In Missouri, an assessment for a street improvement on abutting lots, according to their area, has been held valid. City of St. Louis v. Eters, 36 Mo. 456. And assessments according to acreage, for the construction of levees, have been held to be valid in both Missouri and Mississippi. See, also, Selby v. Levee Commissioners, 14 La. Ann. 434. In Michigan, however, assessments for street improvements according to area, not limited to abutting lots, havo been held to be too clearly unequal to be sustained. The rule of assessment by frontage is unfair when extended to farm lands. Seeley v. City of Pittsburgh, 82 Penn. St. 360; Kaiser v. Weise, 85 id. 366. (2) The statute did not require notice to be given of the assessment, nor did it provide for an appeal. Held, not to render it invalid. Clapp v. City of Hartford, 35 Conn. 66; Stuart v. Palmer, 17 N. Y. Sup. 23; McMilken v. City of Cincinnati, 4 Ohio St. 394; Allen v. City of Charlestown, 111 Mass. 123; McMillen v. Anderson, 5 Otto, 37; Davidson v. New Orleans, 6 id. 97. (3) The statute provided for assessment for a sewer already constructed. Held, that there being no provision in the Rhode Island Constitution inhibiting retrospective legislation as such, the statute was not

legal relationship of the party to the case and the perpetrator. But though not strictly an accomplice, inasmuch as she is, in a moral point of view, implicated in the transaction, it would be proper for the jury to consider that circumstance in its bearing upon her credibility." Texas Court of Appeals, June 19, 1880. Watson v. State of Texas. Opinion by White, P. J.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FORMER CONVICTION-ASSAULT AND MANSLAUGHTER.-The defendant committed a violent assault upon one Morton, March 3d, 1879, and on the fourth day of March was prosecuted before the municipal court of Lewiston, and convicted of assault and battery. On the twenty-third day of March said Morton died of the injuries inflicted by the defendant, and the defendant was thereupon indicted for manslaughter, and when arraigned pleaded the former conviction of assault and battery in bar. Held, that the plea was no bar to the indictment. The general rule is that if the first indictment were such as the prisoner might have been convicted upon by proof

of the facts contained in the second indictment, an acquittal or conviction on the first indictment will be a bar to the second. 4 Bla. Com. 336; Rex v. Vandercomb, 2 Leach's C. C. 708; Stark. Cr. Pl. 355 (1st Am. ed); Commonwealth v. Roby, 12 Pick. 496; 1 Chit. Cr. Law, 453. This general rule is, however, subject to this exception. When, after the first prosecution, a new fact supervenes, for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense, and together with the facts existing at the time constitutes a new and distinct crime, an acquittal or conviction of the first offense is not a bar to an indictment for the other distinct crime. Case of Nicholas, Foster's Cr. L. 64; Burns v. People, 1 Park. C. C. 183; Commonwealth v. Evans, 101 Mass. 25; State v. Hattabough, Cent. L. J., Aug., 1879, 87 (S. C. Indiana). While the defendant under the Maine statute may be convicted on the indictment of assault and battery, on failure of proof that death resulted from the injuries inflicted, still he may protect himself from being twice in jeopardy for that offense by pleading in bar the former conviction of the crime of assault and battery embraced in the indictment and not guilty of manslaughter, and then if convicted of manslaughter he shall have judgment therefor. If acquitted of manslaughter he shall have the benefit of his plea in bar as to assault and battery. 2 Hale's P. C. 255, 392; Arch. Cr. Pl. 352; Commonwealth v. Curtis, 11 Pick. 133; Stark. Cr. Pl. 370.

Maine Supreme Judicial Court, January, 1880. State of Maine v. Littlefield. Opinion by Libbey, J.

GRAND JURY- IRREGULARITY IN DRAWING JUROR DOES NOT VITIATE ACTS OF JURY- STATUTORY CON

STRUCTION. The provisions of the second section of the act of Congress of June 30, 1879, prescribing the mode in which jurors in the Federal courts shall be drawn is mandatory; with this qualification, however, that an honest intention to conform to the statute and carry out its provisions in good faith is all that is required. Where a grand jury was drawn under the provisions of this act, and the name of one of the jurors who assisted in finding the indictment was not put into the box by any competent authority, nor drawn from it, and there was no imputation that such name appeared in the venire through bad faith, held, to be a mere irregularity, which would not vitiate the action of the grand jury. U. S. Cir. Ct., S. D. Ohio, May, 1880. United States v. Ambrose. Opinion by Swayne, C. J.

PRACTICE -WHEN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION COMMENCES-REMOVAL OF CAUSE. A criminal prosecution is commenced, within the meaning of section 643 of the Federal Revised Statutes, relating to the removal of such prosecution from a State to a Federal court, as soon as a warrant has been issued. Generally a criminal prosecution is commenced as soon as the

warrant is issued. It has been so held in the case of Queen v. Brooks, 1 Denis. 217. This was an indictment upon 9 Geo. IV, ch. 69. By the fourth section of the statute it was declared: "The prosecution for every offense punishable by indictment, by virtue of that act, shall be commenced within twelve calendar months after the commission of the offense." The offense was committed December 4, 1845. The information before justices and warrant were on December 19, 1845. Brooks was apprehended September 5, 1816, and Gibson, October 21, 1846. The indictment was preferred April 5, 1847. The question was reserved for the opinion of the judges whether the prosecution was commenced in time. They all concurred in holding that the prosecution was commenced within twelve calendar months after the commission of the offense. To the same effect see 1 East's P. C. 186; Rex v. Wallace, R&R. C. C. 369; and Rex v. Phillips, Russ. & Ry. 369. U. S. Cir. Court, N. D. Georgia, July, 1880. State of Georgia v. Post. Opinion by Woods, C. J.

OBITUARY.

LORD CHIEF BARON KELLY.

N the recent death of Sir Fitzroy Kelly, Lord Chief

Baron of the Exchequer, the English bench loses its

oldest judge. He was born in 1796. He had neither a public school nor a university education. He had held the offices of Solicitor-General and Attorney-General and had sat in Parliament. He began his legal career as a special pleader, and was all his life famous as a critic of pleadings, but was heartily in favor of consolidation and codification. He brought in a bill in Parliament to abolish capital punishment in all cases except treason and murder. When at the bar his earnings amounted to £25,000 annually, an income exceeded The Times says: "As a judge, the Lord Chief Baron by none of his contemporaries except Lord Selbourne.

showed the soundness for legal knowledge for which his career was a guaranty. His courtesy to those who But he appeared before him was unexceptionable. was a very slow judge, who asked numberless quesfacts; and while the matter of his decisions was seltions about comparatively unimportant dates and dom impeached, his Division got through less work than any other, and was less popular than any with suitors. He had some difficulty in hearing counsel, and more in making himself heard. His defects as a judge, indeed, were largely physical defects, due to the infirmities of age. His mind remained clear and his determination unshaken almost to the very end, and one of his acts a day or two before his death was to write a long letter of advice to a learned colleague." He was a bounteous dispenser of hospitality, very fond of society, a great converser, a warm friend and a bitter enemy. It is possible that with him the title of Lord Chief Baron may perish, for under the new judicature act the Queen has power, by recommendation of a council of judges, to abolish the title on the post becoming vacant. The Solicitors' Journal says: "In respect to longevity, Sir Fitzroy Kelly kept up the traditions of his office. Only nine appointments of Chief Baron have been made during the last ninety years. Sir William Alexander was appointed at the age of sixty-three, resigned at seventy, and died at eightyone. Lord Lyndhurst, who occupied the post in the interval between his first and second Chancellorships, attained the age of ninety-two. Lord Abinger was appointed at sixty-five and died at seventy-five. Sir Frederick Pollock was appointed at sixty-one, resigned at eighty-three and died at eighty-seven; and Sir Fitzroy Kelly was appointed at seventy and died at eighty-four. The title of Chief Baron appears to have been first used during the reign of Edward II. Walter de Norwich was appointed a Baron of the Ex

chequer in 1311, and received a fresh patent in the folowing year on the death of Roger de Scotre, the then senior baron, and in the patent granted to his successor he is described as nunc Capitalis Baro.' He retired from the court during his tenure of the office of Treasurer of the Exchequer, but returned to the bench in 1317, and was then distinctly appointed as Capitalis Baro.'"

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

SEYMOUR'S CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS.

The Law of Carriers of Passengers, illustrated by Leading Cases and Notes. By Seymour D. Thompson. St. Louis : F. H. Thomas & Co., 1880. Pp. lxiv, 619.

THIS

work is designed on the same plan as the same author's recent work on Negligence, of which we have spoken very highly, and which more intimate acquaintance leads us to value more and more highly every day. The present volume contains 49 leading cases. The division of subjects is as follows: the obligation to receive and carry; when the relation of carrier and passenger subsists; the obligation to carry according to advertisement or contract; the obligation to furnish safe and convenient stations and approaches; liability for negligence; contributory negligence; imputed negligence; police duties; regulations of carriers; liability for assaults by his servants; contracts limiting his liability for personal injuries; use of another's means of transportation—liability for consequential injuries; liability for damage by fault of connecting lines; street railway companies; carriers by water; liability in respect to baggage; remedies, procedure, and damages. The details of the execution are similar to those in the work on Negligence, and the work is marked by the same excellencies of selection, annotation and general editing. We may well economize space and time by saying that we regard these works of Mr. Thompson as among the most conscientiously and intelligently executed, the most interesting, and the most useful practical law books ever issued from the American press. The volume, like its predecessors, is admirably printed.

LAWRENCE'S DROIT INTERNATIONAL. Commentaire sur les Éléments du Droit International et sur l'histoire des Progrès du Droit des Gens de Henry Wheaton, par William Beach Lawrence. Tome quatrième. Liepzig, F. A. Brockhaus, 1880.

This edition of Mr. Lawrence's commentary on Wheaton must be well received by a distinguished circle of the legal profession-those who devote themselves to the study of public law. Wheaton's contributions to the law of nations are destined to a permanent place amidst the best of the text on that subject. "The Elements of International Law" and "The History of the Law of Nations" are deservedly famous; and Mr. Lawrence's commentaries - written in the "diplomatic language "— must add to this wide celebrity.

Few departments of modern scientific thought have advanced more rapidly than the law of nations; and this progress needs to be constantly noted and to have attention directed to it. Mr. Lawrence's work is, in this respect, a most valuable addition to Wheaton, but it is also, in many other respects, a valuable addition. The present volume of the commentaries is concerned with the second part of Wheaton's "Absolute International Rights of States," known as "The Rights of Civil and Criminal Legislation," and particularly with the subdivision, "Consular Jurisdiction" (Juridiction Consulaire), "Independence of the State as to its Judicial Power" (Indépendance de l'Etat quant au pouvoir judiciaire), "Extent of the Judicial Power over Crim

inal Offense" (Etendue du pouvoir Judiciare quant aux délits criminels), and "Legal Effects of a Criminal Sentence beyond the territorial limits of the State where such Sentence is pronounced" (Effets d'une sentence criminelle hors des limites territoriales où elle a été prononcée). The subjects "Consular Jurisdiction in Christian and non-Christian Countries" and "Extradition," are most thoroughly discussed by the commentator, with an unusual wealth of citations, and with learned textual references to recent State papers, adjudications and authorities.

This volume possesses the merit of a most excellent "table des matières," referring to the theme of each paragraph, which is also noted in the margins of the pagesa practice not only conducive to clearness of style, but of great assistance to the reader. The typographical work is excellent.

As America, both before and since its independence of European domination, has done so much toward a practical building up of the modern law of nations, it seems particularly fit that American authors should enter the domain of public law. It is a pardonable source of gratification that another American now follows so ably in the footsteps of Wheaton.

CORRESPONDENCE.

RELEASE Of Dower.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

If your correspondent, "F. L. M.," will turn to the case of Gillilan v. Swift, 14 Hun, 574, he will find that his question concerning the omission of the usual words, "dower and right of dower," has been directly answered by the courts of this State. While your answer, without reference to this case, is right in its result, it seems to me, in one respect, to fall short of your usual accuracy of statement. The deed does not, it seems to me, "carry the interest of the wife in the premises," as you suggest, but it rather estops her from asserting an interest. The difference may be purely theoretical, but it nevertheless exists. I am, sir, faithfully yours,

FRANCIS LYNDE STETSON.

NEW YORK, Oct. 11, 1880.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal: As a confirmation of your answer to the query of "F. L. M.," page 298, vol. 22, see Elmendorff v. Lockwood, 57 N. Y. 322. H. E. MORSE. CLAYTON, Jefferson Co., N. Y., Oct. 11, 1880.

[We think our theory is the right one. It is difficult to conceive of a deed that shall estop a married woman, in the absence of fraud on her part, unless it effectually conveys her interest, and if it conveys her interest there is no need of resorting to the theory of estoppel. Our first correspondent will find that the reference of our second correspondent strongly confirms our view. -ED. ALB. L. J.]