sidered, but exemplary damages are not proper. Roose v. Perkins, 9 Neb. 304, p. 409.

CONSPIRACY.-The eighteen defendants, journeyman tailors, working for the plaintiff by the piece, by conspiracy stopped work simultaneously, and returned their work to the plaintiff unfinished, and worthless in that condition. The plaintiff was unable to get any hands to finish the work. Held, that he might maintain an action of damages. Mapstrick v. Ramge, 9 Neb. 390, p. 415. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. An act of the Legislature authorizing the opening of an existing judgment is unconstitutional. Ratcliffe v. Anderson, 31 Gratt. 105, p. 716.

A statute providing that no person shall recover damages from a municipality for an injury from a defect in a highway, unless he resides in a country where similar injuries constitute a like cause of action, is unconstitutional. Pearson v. City of Portland, 69 Me. 278, p. 276.

A farm overseer is not a "laborer" within the constitutional provision giving to mechanics and laborers a lien on the subject of their labor for their compensation. Whitaker v. Smith, 81 N. C. 340, p.

503.

The right to exemption from execution is a personal privilege which the debtor may waive, and such a waiver in a promissory note is binding upon him. Brown v. Leitch, 60 Ala. 313, p. 42.

CONTRACT. A note written and dated in Maine, but signed in Massachusetts by the wife of a citizen of that State, as surety for her husband, and returned by mail to the payee in Maine, is a Maine contract, and is enforceable in Maine although void by the laws of Massachusetts. Bell v. Packard, 69 Me. 105, p. 251

Where a bank discounted a note, its officers knowing that the proceeds were to be used for an unlawful purpose, but not intending to aid such purpose, the note is not invalid. Henderson v. Waggoner, 2 Lea, 133, p. 591.

The plaintiff agreed, in writing, to serve the defendant for three years, as superintendent and manager of his manufactory of clothing, and to devote his whole time, attention and skill thereto; and the defendant agreed to pay him therefor $3,000 a year, in equal monthly payments. The plaintiff, without fault on his part, was arrested and kept in jail for about a fortnight, during the busiest season, and the defendant hired another person in his place. On being released the plaintiff tendered his services, which the defendant refused. He had been paid in full for the time he actually worked. Held, that the plaintiff could not maintain an action of damages for breach of the agreement. Leopold v. Salkey, 89 Ill. 412, p. 93.

A stipulation by the vendee of a newspaper to pay "all of the outstanding liabilities" of the paper, will not make the vendee liable for the damages for libel subsequently recovered against the vendor, in a suit pending when the sale of the paper was made. Perret v. King, 30 La. Ann. 1368, p. 240. CORPORATION. A corporation, with power to purchase "property deemed desirable in the trans

|

|

action of its business," may purchase its own stock. Iowa Lumber Co. v. Foster, 49 Iowa, 25, p. 140.

CRIMINAL LAW. It is unlawful for the occupant of lands to set spring-guns or other mischievous weapons on his premises, and if the same cause death to any trespasser it is a criminal homicide. But to authorize a conviction of assault with intent to commit a murder, a specific felonious intent must be proved; and so, where one plants such weapons with the general intent to kill trespassers, and wounds a particular person, he cannot be convicted of assault with intent to commit murder. The intent to kill that particular person alone must be shown, and cannot be implied from the general conduct. Simpson v. State, 59 Ala. 1, p. 1.

A receipt for money as part of the purchase-price of a farm is an acquittance" within the statute of forgery, and an indictment for forgery thereof is good without charging any extrinsic dealings between the parties. State v. Shelters, 51 Vt. 102, p. 679.

A county treasurer, without authority, issued and negotiated instruments for the payment of money, | purporting in the body to be the obligations of the county, but signed only by him in his own name, with the addition, "treasurer." Held, not to be forgery, the same not "being or purporting to be the act of another" within the statute. People v. Mann, 75 N. Y. 484, p. 482.

Where the prisoner, in sport and without criminal design, aimed a pistol at another, both supposing it to be unloaded, and the prisoner pulled the trigger, whereby the pistol was discharged and the other was killed, held, no crime. Robertson v. State, 2 Lea, 239, p. 602.

Where an officer had in custody a prisoner charged with a misdemeanor, and the prisoner trying to escape, the officer shot and killed him, without intending his death, he was guilty of manslaughter. Reneau v. State, 2 Lea, 720, p. 626.

One who finds lost goods which have no marks or indications of ownership, and who does not know the owner, is not bound to exercise diligence to ascertain the owner, and is not guilty of larceny in retaining the goods. State v. Dean, 49 Iowa, 73, p. 143.

A corporation is indictable for libel, and the joinder of an individual in a separate count is not error. State v. Atchison, 3 Lea, 729, p. 663.

Every man is primarily presumed sane, but when facts are proved tending to engender a doubt of the sanity of a person accused of crime, it devolves on the State to remove that doubt and establish the sanity of the prisoner to the satisfaction of the jury, beyond all reasonable doubt. Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269, p. 360.

The complainant was fraudulently induced by two confederates to expose some money in his hand; one of them then snatched it from him and ran away, while the other held him so that he should not pursue, and a struggle between them ensued. Held, that this did not constitute robbery. Shinn v. State, 64 Ind. 13, p. 110.

A statute provided for the punishing of the se

duction of any unmarried woman "of previously chaste character." Held, that "character" referred | to moral qualities and not to reputation, and evidence of reputation was not admissible upon the issue of character, but only to impeach or corroborate testimony regarding particular acts of unchastity. State v. Prizer, 49 Iowa, 531, p. 155.

DAMAGES. An abutting owner, who does not own the soil of the street, cannot recover for any injury to his freehold resulting from the presence of a steam railway in the street, but only for damages resulting from such misconduct in its management as amounts to a nuisance, as leaving cars standing an unreasonable time, unnecessary noises and dangerous speed. Grand Rapids & Indiana R. R. Co. v. Heisel, 38 Mich. 62, p. 306.

DEED. A purchaser of land is not affected with constructive notice of a prior unrecorded conveyance by the mere fact that he was one of the subscribing witnesses thereto. Vest v. Michie, 31 Gratt. 149, p. 722.

EVIDENCE.

In an action on a policy of insurance on the life of one for the benefit of another, the declarations of the insured, before or after the insurance, are not competent evidence, unless part of the res gesta. Mobile Life Insurance Co. v. Morris, 3 Lea, 101, p. 631.

An instrument in this form: "Received of A. $500 due on demand," is open to parol explanation of its consideration, to show that it was intended as a mere receipt. De Lavallette v. Wendt, 75 N. Y. 579, p. 494.

In the case of a mother, aged sixty-nine years, her son-in-law, aged forty-five, and his two children, aged respectively ten and seven years, who all perish in the same shipwreck, there is no presumption of survivorship. Newell v. Nichols, 75 N. Y. 78, p. 424.

EXEMPTION. - A partnership is not within the language or intendment of the exemption law, and hence none of the property of a partnership is exempt from seizure on execution. White v. Heffner, 30 La. Ann. 1280, p. 238.

Partnership property is not exempt from execution, before division and settlement of the partnership affairs. Spiro v. Paxton, 3 Lea, 75, p. 630.

GIFT.-S. deposited in a savings bank moneys belonging to her in trust for M. and K., who were her distant relatives. She retained the pass-books until her death, drawing out only one year's interest, and M. and K. were ignorant of the deposit. Held, that the transaction constituted an effectual trust for their benefit on the death of S. Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134, p. 446.

INFANCY. - Plaintiff, falsely representing himself to be of full age, bought a wagon, paying part, and giving his note secured by a lien on the wagon for the remainder. After using the wagon until the use was worth more than what he had paid, and until it had depreciated by more than a like sum, he made default in payment, whereupon defendant took the wagon under his lien, and sold it at action. Plaintiff brought assumpsit for the money he had paid.

Whitcomb v.

Held, that he was entitled to recover. Joslyn, 51 Vt. 79, p. 678. INSURANCE. Where, in a contract of insurance which covers a storehouse and the goods therein, it is stipulated that should the assured subsequently take out a policy in any other company the assurers should receive notice of it on pain of forfeiting their policy, a subsequent assurance of the house or the goods in another company, without notice to the assurers, will work the forfeiture of the contract with them, whether the subsequent contract was legally enforceable or not. Allen v. Merchants' Mutual Ins. Co., 30 La. Ann. 1386, p. 243.

A policy of fire insurance conditioned to be void for over-valuation is avoided by any substantial overvaluation, whether fraudulent or innocent. Boutelle v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 51 Vt. 4, p. 666.

INSANITY. - A widow, in consequence of her lunacy, neglected to dissent from the provisions of her husband's will within the statutory time. Held, that she might afterward, in equity, claim her rights in the estate as if she had duly dissented. Wright v. West, 2 Lea, 78, p. 586. JUDGMENT. A physician sued for services, in a justice's court; the defendant answered, but withdrew his answer, and the plaintiff got judgment without consent. Held, a bar to a subsequent action by the defendant against the physician, for malpractice in rendering those services. Blair v. Bartlett, 75 N. Y. 150, p. 445.

MARRIAGE. - A married woman, by the terms of a deed to her, assumed and agreed to pay a mortgage existing upon the conveyed premises. Held, that this made her personally liable for the mortgage debt, and that her grantee, in like manner assuming the mortgage, was likewise liable, and a judgment against him for deficiency on foreclosure was proper. Cashman v. Henry, 75 N. Y. 103, p. 437.

Equity will enforce a note executed by a husband to his wife, during coverture, in consideration of her moneys received or collected by him. McCampbell v. Mc Campbell, 2 Lea, 661, p. 623.

Under a statute which enables married women to acquire, hold and deal with property, and to sue and be sued in the same manner as if unmarried, and relieves all such property, except such as comes by gift from their husbands, from liability to the disposal of their husbands or for their debts, a married woman may maintain an action against her husband on a note given directly to her by him for a valuable consideration during coverture. May v. May, 9 Neb. 16, p. 399.

A divorce was granted in a suit brought in the name of an insane wife, in confinement in an asylum in another State. On a bill on her behalf to set aside the divorce, alleging that it was procured by the fraud of the husband, held, that, whether there was fraud, in fact or not, the law would presume fraud, and set aside such a divorce, no matter by whose advice it was obtained. Bradford v. Abend, 89 Ill. 78, p. 67.

as a jail, is subject to a mechanics' lien in favor of one who built it for the municipality. McKnight v. Parish of Grant, 30 La. Ann. 361, p. 226.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. - A person who voluntarily attempts to pass over a sidewalk of a city, which he knows to be dangerous by reason of ice upon it, which he might easily avoid, cannot be regarded as exercising ordinary prudence, and cannot maintain an action against the city to recover for injuries sustained by falling upon the ice. Schaefler v. City of Sandusky, 33 Ohio St. 246, p. 533.

Alleys are not primarily designed as streets, but simply as a means of local convenience to a limited neighborhood, and a roof twelve or fifteen feet over and above an alley is not necessarily an obstruction. Beecher v. People, 38 Mich. 289, p. 316.

A municipal corporation granted permission, by ordinance, to a street railway company to lay a double track in its streets. The company proceeded to do so, and expended large sums of money in the work. Held, that the municipal corporation could not thereafter restrict the permission to a single track, it not appearing that the double track would cause any injury or inconvenience. City of Burlington v. Burlington Street Railway Co., 49 Iowa, 144, p. 145.

NATIONAL BANK. - A National bank organized as successor to a State bank may maintain an action to foreclose a mortgage of real estate executed to the State bank as security for a note, and assigned to it by the State bank on the formation of the National bank. Schofield v. State National Bank of Lincoln, 9 Neb. 316, p. 412.

A National bank has no power to deal or speculate in promissory notes or to acquire title thereto, except by discount. First National Bank of RochesPierson, 24 Minn. 140, p. 341.

ter v.

Under the National Bank Act, in an action upon a note usuriously discounted by a National bank, the amount of the usury may be set off by an accommodation indorser, although the note does not carry interest on its face. National Bank of Auburn v. Lewis, 75 N. Y. 516, p. 484.

One who transfers a negotiable promissory note by indorsement without recourse impliedly warrants the genuineness of the prior signatures, and that so far as he is concerned the paper expresses the exact legal obligations of all such prior parties. Challiss v. Mc Crum, 22 Kans. 157, p. 181.

OFFICE AND OFFICER. A county treasurer and his sureties are not liable for public moneys of which the principal was violently robbed without his fault. Cumberland v. Pennell, 69 Me. 351, p. 284.

PARENT AND CHILD. A father gave his son, ten years of age, to a man of good character and ample means, to keep him during minority. The father dying three years afterward, the mother brought habeas corpus for the child. Held, that she was entitled to his custody, although she was poor and dependent, and he preferred remaining with defendant. Moore v. Christian, 56 Miss. 408, p. 375.

PARTITION. The court has no jurisdiction to order partition of lands, between heirs of a father, where the petition alleges that one heir is alive and that the mother is pregnant by the father. Gillespie v. Nabors, 59 Ala. 441, p. 20.

PARTY WALL. - One owner of a party wall, who adds to it for his own use, may maintain an action of contribution against the other owner who has used such additions, for one-half the value of the additions when made. Sanders v. Martin, 2 Lea, 213, p. 598.

SALE. Where goods are sold for cash, and delivered, the vendor taking the vendee's check for the price, which on presentment four days thereafter is dishonored, the vendor may rescind the contract and reclaim the goods. Hodgson v. Barrett, 33 Ohio, 63, p. 527.

On a sale of goods by a manufacturer for a particular purpose, there is an implied warrant of fitness for that purpose; but the manufacturer is not bound to furnish the best that are or can be made, but only such as are usually made and used, and as are reasonably fit for the purpose. Harris v. Waite, 51 Vt. 481, p. 694.

A boy, twelve years of age, was injured while playing on a railway turn-table, left unlocked and unguarded, in an open prairie, where persons frequently passed. Held, that the questions of negligence and contributory negligence were for the jury. Kansas Central Railway Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 22 Kans. 586, p. 203.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT. —A mere promise to pay a forged note, when such promise is given by the supposed maker of the note without any new consideration, and after the promisee has acquired

the latter cannot be held therefor merely upon his acknowledgment of the correctness of the account and his oral promise to pay it. Hendricks v. Robinson, 56 Miss. 694, p. 382.

SLANDER AND LIBEL.-To charge a physician with "malpractice" in a particular case is not conclusively libellous in itself, if untrue, but it is for the jury to determine whether the word was used in a general and actionable sense. Rodgers v. Kline, 56 Miss. 808, p. 389.

To charge a candidate for a popular office with being uneducated, lazy, idle, and ignorant, is not libellous; nor is it libellous per se to charge him with being "a social leper" who should be "deodorized." But otherwise to charge him with being a professional gambler, bully, thief and whore-master. Sweeney v. Baker, 13 W. Va. 158, p. 757.

Da

Where one walking on the Lord's day for exercise went into a beer shop and drank a glass of beer and on resuming his walk was injured solely by a defect in the highway, held, that he might recover. vidson v. City of Portland, 69 Me. 116, p. 253. TRIAL. — A separation of the jurors in a civil case, after the jury has retired to consider of the verdict, induced by a sudden alarm of fire in the vicinity of the jury-room, is not of itself such misconduct as will vitiate the verdict made on reassembling. Armleder v. Lieberman, 33 Ohio St. 77, p. 530. WATER AND WATER-COURSES. —A railroad company constructed an embankment on its own land, whereby the surface-water was thrown upon the land of an adjoining owner. Held, that no action would lie therefor, although the company could have prevented the injury by a culvert. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. Hammer, 22 Kans. 763, p. 216.

The owner of land planted a row of trees on his own land, and along the division line between his land and that of an adjoining proprietor, the effect of which was to obstruct the passage of drift-wood carried upon the land of the adjoining proprietor, by the overflow of a water-course adjacent to the lands of both proprietors, to the injury of such adjacent land. Held, that no action would lie therefor. Taylor v. Fickas, 64 Ind. 167, p. 114.

WITNESS. An accomplice who is introduced as a witness and testifies to the facts within his knowledge, withholding nothing because of its tendency to self-crimination, has an equitable claim to executive clemency, or the solicitor may enter a nolle prosequi, but the fact does not constitute a legal defense to a prosecution against him for the same offense. State v. Lyon, 81 N. C. 600, p. 518.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE PARTICULAR JURISPRUDENCE OF NEW YORK.

V.

THE laws of New York, enacted in the proprietary

and the succeeding periods of government, were not abrogated either by the flight of James II. or by the English Revolution. The legal effect of the revolution was analogous to the demise of the Crown; the prerogatives remain substantially the same as before, but the right of the house of Brunswick to exercise them was deduced from the convention of 1688. (3 Hal. Const. Hist. 95.) This principle, though ascribed to England, applied equally to the trans-atlantic dependenc es of the Crown.

The government of the Province of New York was, by the new sovereigns, William and Mary, placed on a permanent footing through the definitive grant of a representative assembly. The royal commission to Colonel Sloughter-the first governor after the change of succession-authorized him, with the advice of the council, to summon assemblies as need should require.

(3 Col. Doc. 623.) This grant, the Crown had afterward no power to either retract or annul. (Chitty's Prerog. 33.) As thus established the constituents of the provincial government were as follows: the governor— deriving his power from the King's commission under the great seal, and his rules of conduct from the King's instructions under the sign manual-was the immediate representative of the Crown; the provincial councilderiving their authority, both legislative and executive, from the King's instructions-constituted the upper legislative house; while the representative assembly, chosen by the provincial electors, comprised the lower house, representing the commons of the Province.

The formation of the provincial government of New York remains a subject of interest, for even now — quite aside from the source from which the powers of government emanate its structure is but slightly modified.

The limitation on the legislative powers of the provincial government - that the laws made by their authority should not be repugnant to the laws of England-long remained a fruitful theme of controversy. The Anglo-American inhabitants contended that the English Constitution, as it was exhibited in the great fundamental acts, was the paramount law of their new situation. The qualified denial of this last principle furnishes the key to the future differences with the parent land. By the colonists' assertion, that the plantations and provinces of America were entitled to the common law of England, the Constitution of England was meant; for the common law was conceived to be a limitation, within well-established bounds, of the prerogative and of those powers of subordinate legislation, judicial and otherwise, which flowed from the prerogative. It is important that this general assertion on the part of the colonists should not be confounded with their right to the purely juridical rules concerning the extra-territorial operation of particular parts of the statute and judiciary law of England - a question, in tho main, of minor moment. Notwithstanding the fact that tho municipal laws of the original colonies exhibited differences at the time of the American revolution-differences which have continued to effect their jurisprudence- there was a unanimous assertion of their right to the English Constitution in so far as it related to political and civil rights, and their respective guaranties.

Tho distinguishing feature of the government of Englishmen had thitherto from the earliest periods been its entire subordination to the law of the land, the folk law, or jus commune. The American Revolution was a vindication of this principle and the subordination of the present government, State and Federal, to the fundamental law of the land-but a protean form of the common law exhibited in constitutional codes-is perhaps but the evolution of certain rugged principles of the common law. The permanence of established institutions may be said, in somo respects, to depend on the closest adherence to race principles of legislation, and any wido departure from them, to jeopardize institutions of a normal growth. It is doubtless for this reason that many Americans instinctively distrust any arbitrary attempt at a codification, fearing that it aims at engrafting the subtler elements of the Roman juridical system which has never permanently coalesced with free institutions. In this connection, the legislation of the province of New York is interesting to present conditions.

The era of regular legislation in New York is said to begin with tho year 1691, doubtless because the revisers of the provincial laws were directed to begin with the acts of the assembly of that year. But, as has already been pointed out, the Assemblies of 1683-4 and '65 must not be disregarded, for they at least indicate

the condition which the provincial law had attained when the assemblies of the more regularly organized provincial establishments began. (24 Wend. 625.) The New York Civil List (ed. of 1867) contains an interesting account of the early Assemblies. But in reading it, we should notice that it is now esteemed an error to designate the convention of the delegates from the Long Island towns in 1665 a legislative assembly, for it was convened for a special purpose only the settlement of town boundaries, and it possessed no legislative powers. (Dawson's Sons of Liberty, p. 16; 2 Brodhead's N. Y., 67-9.) The first regular legislative assembly of New York was that of 1683-4; an instructive and able account of its proceedings, as well as of those of the second Assembly, held in 1685, appears in the late Dr. O'Callaghan's Historical Introduction to the Journal of the Legislative Council, published by the State in 1861. The Civil List contains also references to the Leisler Assemblies (p. 28), but it is doubtful whether these may properly be deemed legislatures. During the troublesome times in England attending the downfall of the house of Stuart, Captain Jacob Leisler, who had seized the government of New York in the name of William, issued writs requiring the several counties to send representatives to New York. For want of legal authority the Leisler delegates may hardly be considered an Assembly of the Province.

From 1691 until 1716 new assemblies were elected every two years. The Assembly chosen in 1716 continued over ten years, but from 1726 until 1737 there were four assemblies elected. An act was passed in 1737 providing for triennial elections, but it was repealed by the King. In December, 1743, another act was passed limiting an Assembly to seven years, unless previously prorogued. After an existence of ninety- | two years the provincial legislative assembly adjourned to the 3d of April, 1775, and was never again convened. A continuous journal of both the upper and lower houses have been published at a large outlay by the public authorities.

In view of the fact that many editions of the New York provincial laws have now become rare even among bibliomanists, an account of the various imprints may be of some use to those who have given the subject little or no attention. The statutes enacted by provincial authority prior to the year 1691 have been already noticed. (Vol. 21 L. J., p. 268.) The first domestic imprint of the Assembly laws is known as Bradford's edition of 1694, and it contains the acts promulgated between the years 1691-4. This volume, highly prized by collectors, was unquestionably the first book printed in New York; * but few copies of it are extant and these fetch extremely high prices on the rare occasions of a sale. One copy of the 1694 edition is in the Lenox collection; another, the Van Schaak copy, the property of Mr. A. J. Vanderpoel, of New York, is perhaps the most perfect in existence. Imperfect copies are possessed by the Society Library and the Secretary of State at Albany. A reputed perfect specimen was lately sold at the Brinley sale, to the New York State Library for $1,600.

Shortly after Bradford's appointment as King's printer in New York, he seems to have begun printing the acts of Assembly, session by session, but he preserved a continuous pagination. From time to time he struck off title pages, and doubtless issued bound volumes of the laws. In many cases the title pages are

*The first printing press in New York was set up by William Bradford in 1693. The 1694 edition of the New York laws was its first regular work. Bradford received his first warrant as King's printer in 1693, and it was probably for the major part of the 1694 edition. Wallace's Com. Address on the 200th Birthday of Bradford, p. 63; Vol. I Thomas's History of Printing in America, p. 291.

not an index to the laws included in the various bound volumes now extant, as the original subscribers have, for their own convenience, caused the laws of sessions of a date later than the title page to be included by the binders. The least known of the regular editions of Bradford's imprints are those of 1894 and 1710. That of 1710 may be considered a revision of the laws between 1691 and 1709, for it was published in one volume, in obedience to an order of the Assembly, that Mr. Bradford do print all the acts of the Assembly "now in force." A copy of the 1710 edition is in the New York Historical Society collection. In 1713 Bradford struck off another title-page edition, which includes the acts passed between 1709 and 1713; a copy of the latter is in the State Library at Albany. The New York Historical Society has also a title-page edition of 1719, which includes the laws enacted between 1713 and 1719. A copy of Bradford's title-page edition of 1726, containing the laws passed between 1719 and 1725, is in the libraries of the New York Law Institute and the Historical Society. The latter society possesses also a copy of Bradford, which contains the acts from 1726 to 1735, in addition to those printed in the edition of 1726. The Bradford editions of a date later than 1710 are not trustworthy guides to the Assembly laws.

The Assembly, having in several former sessions, as well as in that held in 1741, observed, "how incorrectly the laws were printed and the irregular manner in which they were bound up" were of the opinion that a new revision was necessary. (Assem. Jour., 13th Nov., 1741.) Daniel Horsmanden, who afterward became chief justice of the Supreme Court, was thereupon designated the reviser, but he never proceeded under the act. (2 Smith's History N. Y. 67.) In 1750 another act “to revise, digest, and print the laws of the Colony," was passed (1 L. & S., p. 443); it recites, that the laws of New York had from time to time been very incorrectly printed and irregularly bound up. William Smith, Jr., and William Livingston were appointed revisers by this act, and were directed to begin with the laws enacted by the Assembly held in 1691. Smith and Livingston's revision, though it is generally esteemed complete, contained none of the acts of the Assemblies of 1683-4 and '65. The revisors, indeed, in the introduction to the first volume, announce that they omitted also many later acts which they were unable to find after diligent search. They censure the later Bradford editions for containing "acts which have been practised upon that were never passed by the whole Legislature," and for omitting others which wero duly enacted. The first volume of Livingston & Smith's revision was published in 1752; the second, containing the later acts and a complete index, in 1762. The revisors proceeded upon the plan originally reported by Mr. Horsmanden. (Assembly Journal, Nov. 13, 1741.)

In 1753 Governor Clinton, by instructions from the lords justices of England, recommended a codification of the New York laws, which was, on the first of June of that year, declined by the Assembly on account of the very considerable expense lately incurred in the revision of Smith and Livingston. (Assembly Journal, May 30 and June 1, 1753.)

The last revision of the laws of the Province was undertaken by Peter Van Schaak, pursuant to an act of Assembly passed in 1772. (Chap. 1543 Van Schaak's Laws, p. 676.) It contains, in addition to the laws included in Smith & Livingston's Revision, the acts passed between 1753 and the 8th of March (13 Geo. 3), 1773. The remaining acts of the Assembly, passed in 1774 and 1775, were published in one volume by the public printer, Hugh Gaines. In addition to the various imprints already mentioned there is a London edition of those New York laws enacted between the year 1691 and 1718. It is known as the Baskett edi