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general and periodical, individual and occasional, to counteract the principle of caducity; that there should be revision to counteract the principle of obsolescense, and that revision is neither dishonest, nor inexpedient nor unprecedented; that the revising power of a court is unfit and inexpedient; that there is need of special boards of revision, and that obsolete charities may be converted into more suitable form, and directed against evils more suitable for relief. It considers the question whether the State should especially favor charitable endowments, by pecuniary assistance through grants directly to them, and grants for supervision, and by remission of taxation upon them; by relaxation of legal rules affecting the constitution of them, the acquisition of property by them, the protection of their property, and the administration of it. It concludes with a statement of the reforms still

needed in England, in the laws relating to charities, in

the way of supervision, central and local, restriction and revision.

From this synopsis of the plan of the essay and of its contents it is seen that it is both practical and interesting. It is well written, and seems to come from a study of the subject and thorough acquaintance with it. The subject is philosophically treated. The book may be read with profit by all concerned in the care and administration of endowed charities, whether public or private, or in the framing or executing of laws affecting those matters. We commend it to the attention of the student of social science, and suggest that the leisure of the lawyer will find interest in it.

100 UNITED STATES REPORTS.

This volume, containing decisions of the October term, 1879, is perhaps the most important ever issued in this country. The following is a summary of the cases of general interest: Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, p. 24.- Concerning passengers' baggage; the Russian lady's lace case, where a recovery of $10,000 was sustained, three judges dissenting. See 20 Alb. L. J. 409. Cowell v. Springs Co., p. 55.-A condition in a deed avoiding it if intoxicating liquors are retailed as a beverage on the premises is valid. See 20 Alb. L. J. 487. Holden v. Trust Co., p. 72.- After maturity of a contract for payment of money, interest follows the statutory and not the conventional rate. Trade-Mark Cases, p. 82.- Holding the Federal trade-mark registration law unconstitutional. See 20 Alb. L. J. 447. Dow v. Johnson, p. 158.-Jurisdiction of State courts as to official acts of Federal military officers. See 21 Alb. L. J. 188. Savings Bank v. Ward, p. 195.-Liability of attorney to vendee upon certificate of title to vendor. See 21 Alb. L. J. 206. Hough v. Railway Co., p. 213.Servant not liable for contributory negligence in working with defective machinery which master has promised to repair. See 21 Alb. L. J. 129. Oates v. National Bank, p. 239.- Note transferred as collateral security for antecedent debt, in consideration of extension of time of payment, held for value. Tennessee v. Davis, p. 257.- Jurisdiction of Federal courts over criminal acts by Federal revenue collectors. See 21 Alb. L. J. 271. Strauder v. West Virginia, p. 303; Virginia v. Rives, p. 313; Ex parte Virginia, 339; the colored jurors' cases. See 21 Alb. L. J. 309, 332, 329. Ex parte Seibold, p. 372; Ex parte Clarke, p. 399.-The Federal marshals' election cases. See 21 Alb. L. J. 247, 256. Packet Co. v. St. Louis, p. 423; Vicksburg v. Tobin, p. 430. A municipal corporation may rent wharves on public waters. Guy v. Baltimore, p. 434.- Discrimination in city wharfage against products of other States. See 21 Alb. L. J. 371. Removal Cases, p. 457.-Hauenstein v. Lynham, p. 483.-The case of Swiss alienage. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, p. 491.- A State may tax residents for debts due by non-residents evidenced by bonds secured upon real estate in another State. See 20 Alb. L. J.

469. Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, p. 514.- On the extinction of a town and the division of its territory among others, the latter are proportionally liable for its debts. People v. Weaver, p. 539; Williams v. Weaver, p. 547.-National bank taxation cases. See 21 Alb. L. J. 210. Kidd v. Johnson, p. 617.-A trade-mark is assignable on a sale of the manufactory of the article to which it has been affixed. National Bank v. Graham, p. 699.- A National bank is liable for the grossly negligent loss of special deposits received with the acquiescence of its officers. See 21 Alb. L. J. 311. Cox v. National Bank, p. 704.- A bill of exchange accepted without specifying any place of payment is payable at the address of the drawee as named in the bill.

NOTES.

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THE American Law Review for August contains a long article on Homicide in Self-defense, by Seymour D. Thompson. -Justice Dillard of the Supreme Court of North Carolina may serve as example of Democratic habits and personal independence. It is related that the late Judge Kerr once saw Dillard in a second-class car. "Hi!" said Kerr, “how comes it a man of your cloth is caught in a secondclass car?" 'Because there is no third-class," quietly replied Judge Dillard, and asked for a match to light his pipe.- Exchange. Our judges are still more democratic-they go afoot.

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It seems not unlawful to assault a ghost. We learn this from a Newburyport newspaper. The facts in the case appear to be as follows: One morning a company of young men thought it would be a good joke to throw a stone into the chamber window of one of the citizens of the town of West Newbury. A member of the family, however, overheard the young fellows plotting mischief, and hurrying home informed the old gentleman of the plan, and he, quickly donning a portion of his under-garments only, hastened to put himself in ambush. When the young rioters came along he sprang out, and all ran but one, who stood up and knocked the old gentleman down twice. Whereupon a warrant for assault was issued, and when brought into court the defendant pleaded that "he thought it was a ghost, and he wasn't going to run from it." Accordingly his honor discharged him.

We have recently seen what the Kansas courts think of the restlessness of the small boy. Now, in State v. Prizer, 49 Iowa, 531, we find what the Iowa courts think of a certain idiosyncracy of lovely woman. The court there said: "The reputation of a man or woman does not always accord with the true character of the individual. The good and pure are often traduced by bad men and women, and suffer in reputation by reports invented and circulated through motives having their origin in enmity, malevolence and hate. The reputation of women for chastity is especially exposed to such assaults. A scandal having its origin in falsehood or imagination has no limit to its circulation, and the unfortunate subject of the slander will usually hear no voice from her own sex lifted up in her defense. A direct and confidently asserted charge of impurity is usually accepted by womankind as evidence of want of virtue, and often the poor suffering victim of slander 18 driven from society by the good and pure of her own sex without evidence of her guilt. This sad truth is familiar to all. It is strange, indeed, that the heart of woman, so tender toward the afflicted, so full of charity, so forgiving, and always prompting to deeds of kindness, should be closed to the victims of slander ameng her own sex. It may be that the inexorable laws of society, which banish the slandered woman, tend to protect and preserve virtue by presenting the most powerful motives for its practice, while they often inflict the most cruel injustice. The law, however, can recognize no such rules."

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, AUGUST 21, 1880.

CURRENT TOPICS.

N anticipation of the meeting of the Institute of

States during the civil war, her eyes will be likely to be opened. Public opinion has been highly favorable to the institute, and many governments have paid it marked attention. At the meeting in Brussels last September it was unanimously agreed to prepare a manual of the international laws of war for the use of the armies, and submit the same to the several governments. The articles of war given to the troops in many countries were mostly devised many years ago, and are partly antiquated. The work has been done, and the book is said to be clear, brief and pointed, and easy of comprehension by a simple corporal or private. The work will be submitted to the institute, at its meeting in Oxford, and after it has been agreed upon, it will be recommended to the governments for the use of their armies. In this way it is expected that the institute will, before the end of the year, make its first approach to the governments.

The third annual meeting of the American Bar As

September, one of its leading members, Prof. Bluntschli, of the Heidelberg University, gives in the Berlin Gegenwart an account of what has been accomplished by the institute since its formation in September, 1873. At the meeting for organization, held in Ghent in Flemish Belgium seven years ago, it was asked: Will it be possible to unite in a compact society and in mutual labors the most eminent representatives of the science of international law from all civilized countries? If that succeeds, will the members continue to make the needful sacrifices of time, energy and money for the common cause? Will the academy be able to come to an understand-sociation was held at Saratoga Springs on Wednesday, ing on the vexed questions and problems of international law, or will the contrast of nations and schools increase and sharpen the uncertainty and contradictions of opinions? What will be the attitude of public opinion and of the governments to the academy? To what extent will it gain moral and intellectual authority? These questions, writes Prof. Bluntschli, can now, after seven years' existence and activity, for the most part, be answered with certainty. The experiment has been successful. The number of regular members was limited to fifty at the beginning, and the membership now comprises the majority of the most eminent authors of works on international law. The labors of the members of the institute are shown in the contents of the Revue de Droit International and in the annual of

the institute, the third volume of which has recently been published. The yearly meetings in Ghent, Geneva, the Hague, Zurich, Paris and Brussels have been largely attended by the members, although many have been compelled to make long and expensive journeys for the purpose. The fear that the great diversity of nationality and opinions would lead to endless confusion was soon shown to be entirely groundless. An agreement was soon reached upon nearly all questions of international law which were considered. The conflict of opinions has mostly been over subordinate matter. It is remarkable that the only great question upon which an agreement has not been reached is that of the exemption of private property at sea from seizure in time of war. The representatives of England cling tenaciously to the right of seizure, and, in answer to the arguments of the American and ContinentalEuropean representatives that private property should be respected at sea as well as on land, they maintain that the contributions and requisitions which armies demand in hostile countries, are in reality confiscations. But some time, when England's commerce is subject to depredations like those suffered by the merchant marine of the United VOL. 22.- No. 8.

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Thursday, and Friday, August 18, 19 and 20, 1880. We go to press too early for a report in this number. The programme announced was as follows: On Wednesday the address of the president, Benjamin H. Bristow, Esq., of New York, was to be delivered at the opening session. This was to be followed by the nominations and elections of members, election of the general council, reports of the secretary and treasurer, and report of the executive committee. Papers were to be read by Henry E. Young, Esq., of Charleston, South Carolina, on "Sunday Laws; " by George Tucker Bispham, Esq., of Philadelphia, on "Rights of Material Men and Employees of Railroad Companies as against Mortgagees;" and by Henry D. Hyde, Esq., of Boston, on Extradition between the States." On Thursday the session was to be openeda by the annual address by Cortlandt Parker. Aftery

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this was to follow the consideration of the resolutions recommended by the committee on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar, viz.: Resolved, That the several State and local bar associations in the United States be respectfully requested to recommend and further the enactment of laws for assimilating throughout the Union on principles of comity, the standing of members of the bar already admitted to practice in their own States, by admitting to equal rights and privileges as practitioners of law in the courts of all the other States those who have practiced for three years in the highest court of the State of which they are citizens. Resolved, That the several State and other local bar associations be respectfully requested to recommend and further in their respective States the maintenance by public authority of schools of law, provided with faculties of at least four well paid and efficient teachers, whose diploma shall, upon being unanimously granted, after a full and fair written examination, be essential as a qualification for practicing law. Resolved, That the said State and other local bar associations be respectfully requested to recommend and further in such law schools a general course of

instruction, to be duly divided, for ordinary purposes, into studies and exercises of the first year, of the second year, and of the third year, including, at least, the following studies: I. Moral and Political Philosophy. II. The Elementary and Constitutional Principles of the Municipal Law of England; and herein: 1st, Of the Feudal Law; 2d, The Institutes of the Municipal Law generally; 3d, The origin and progress of the Common Law. III. The Law of

Real Rights and Real Remedies. IV. The Law of Personal Rights and Personal Remedies. V. The Law of Equity. VI. The Lex Mercatoria. VII. The Law of Crimes and their Punishments. VIII. The Law of Nations. IX. The Admiralty and Maritime Law. X. The Civil or Roman Law. XI. The Constitution and Laws of the United States of America, and herein of the jurisdiction and practice of the Courts of the United States. XII. Comparative Jurisprudence, and the Constitution and Laws of the several States of the Union. XIII. Political Economy. Resolved, That the said State and other local bar associations be respectfully requested to recommend and further in such law schools the requirement of attendance on at least the studies and exercises appointed for said course of three years, as a qualification for examination to be admitted to the bar. On Thursday evening, reports of the standing committees, reports of special committees, and nominations and election of officers. On Friday morning, miscellaneous business.

In another column we give the result of the convention called to devise measures to relieve our overburdened courts. This problem is the most important matter of general interest now agitating our profession except the scheme of general codification. One thing must be borne in mind, namely, that we have a vast amount of necessary law business; and keeping this in mind, the question is, how to do it, and not, how not to do it. Recently we saw some Somments on the comparative number of superior judges in this State and in England - about 160 in this State, and some 34 in England. This is illusive reasoning, for there is a large number of county commissioners and other magistrates in England, who do a great amount of civil as well as criminal business. It must be remembered that our county judges do very little civil business. But the vital secret after all is that the amount of litigation in this State of five millions of inhabitants is much greater than in England with its thirty millions. This may seem a startling statement, but we have no doubt we can verify it. The calendars in England are amusingly small in comparison with ours, and yet the English judges are as badly in the lurch as our own, and the English law journals are full of complaints about it. It is our firm conviction that we must have a double Court of Appeals bench; must make our county judges do circuit business; must somewhat increase our present circuit judicial force; and must remodel our General Term system, adopting something like the old. But the impression that we have a sufficiently large judicial force,

because it is larger than the English, will work mischief with the public interests. The all-sufficient refutation of that idea is the evident fact that our superior judges are all greatly overworked.

We have received "The Special and Local Laws Affecting Public Interests in the City of New York, in force on January 1, 1880, compiled by George Bliss, Peter B. Olney, and William C. Whitney, corporation counsel, commissioners under chapter 536 of the laws of 1879," forming two volumes of 2,200 pages, in the aggregate. The Legislature at the last session passed an act repealing the laws and portions of laws contained in the second table preceding this compilation, entitled "Repealed and Superseded Laws;" but the bill was not signed by the Governor. The Legislature also passed an act, which the Governor approved, as follows: "SECTION 1. The volumes entitled 'The Special and Local Laws Affecting Public Interests in the City of New York,' and printed by order of the Legislature of 1880, may be read in evidence and cited in any court or proceeding. Said volumes shall be considered as containing presumptively all special or local laws affecting public interests in force in the city of New York, on the 1st day of January, 1880, but this presumption shall not be considered as extending to special laws relating to any corporation (other than the mayor, aldermen and commonalty), or to any association or society, nor shall the insertion or omission of any law relating to any such corporation be construed as in any manner affecting the corporate existence of any such corporation or its possession of its franchises." What effect the refusal of the Governor to approve the repealing act will have on the matter we cannot conjecture. The work is vastly important, and has been executed with commendable promptness. From the excellent abilities of the commissioners it is presumable that it has been thoroughly and accurately done.

We have recently seen in one of our exchanges a communication advocating the fuller reporting of the arguments of counsel and the fuller statement of facts and pleadings. This would indeed be a step backward. That which renders some of our law reports abominable and costs lawyers a great deal of unnecessary outlay is this very padding. Law reports are designed to tell the profession what the courts have decided and their reasons for their decisions. They are not designed to instruct lawyers how to plead or argue. Any thing more than a synopsis of the arguments, and a bare statement of what the pleadings were, is an imposition on the profession. Why should we be compelled to pay for page on page of tedious common-law pleadings and page on page of evidence? As to the statement of facts, if the court has made it, that is usually enough. If it is not complete, supplement it sufficiently, but do not make it all over again. To read the facts in the head note, then in the reporter's statement, and finally in the opinion of the court, is "damnable iteration," and as senseless as the reading of a hymn

and then singing it, in church. By proper compression the number of our annual reports could be reduced nearly one quarter.

IN

NOTES OF CASES.

N Johnson v. Donaldson, U. S. Circuit Court, Southern District of New York, July 15, 1880, 3 Fed. Rep. 22, Wallace, J., held that the publication and sale of chromos designed from a picture found in a foreign publication do not constitute a breach of copyright of similar chromos where such copyright was obtained after the circulation of such foreign publication. The court said: "The sketch in the foreign publication was public property, which any person could rightfully reproduce. If the plaintiff had obtained his copyright by appropriating this sketch, and recording the description, and complying with the other formal requisites of the act of Congress for obtaining a copyright, he would have acquired no exclusive right to it, because he would not have been the author, designer, or proprietor of the sketch. Assuming the plaintiff to have been the artist and designer of the picture copyrighted by him, the defendant was not liable if he did not avail himself, directly or indirectly, of the plaintiff's production. A copyright secures the proprietor against the copying, by others, of the original work, but does not confer upon him a monopoly in the intellectual conception which it expresses. An artist cannot acquire such an exclusive right to the conception embodied and expressed in his picture as to preclude others from the exercise of their own creative genius or artistic skill, or from availing themselves of any part of the general contribution of artistic production. The law of copyright originated in the recognition of the right of another to be protected in the manuscript which is the title of his literary property. This protection could not be adequate unless he was invested with the exclusive privilege of copying the manuscript, whether for sale or for publication. It does not rest upon any theory that the author has an exclusive property in his ideas, or in the words in which he has clothed them. If each of two persons should compose a poem identically alike, he who first composed it would have no priority of title over the other, nor would he acquire priority by first publishing it. The law of copyright would protect each in his own manuscript, but would not prevent either from using his own." To the same effect, Lucas v. Cooke, 21

Alb. L. J. 364.

In Western Union Telegraph Company v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, U. S. Circuit Court, District of Kansas, June 30, 1880, it was held by McCrary, C. J., and Foster, D. J., that a provision in a contract between a telegraph company and a railroad company, to the effect that the telegraph company will transmit the family, private and social messages of the executive officers of the railroad company free, is against public policy, and immoral, and taints the entire contract, so that a court of equity will not enforce it, or grant any relief to a

party claiming under it. The court said: "That this provision of the contract is against public policy and therefore void, is, to my mind, entirely clear. It amounts to an agreement to give to each of the officers of the company who made the contract, and to each of their successors who should maintain it, a valuable consideration for his official action in that behalf; a consideration of a private and personal character, inuring to the officers' private benefit and gain, and not to the benefit of the company or other stockholders. It is said, however, that this feature of the contract may be eliminated, and that the remainder may stand and be enforced. It is true that the policy of the law is to effectuate rather than defeat a contract, and to this end parts or provisions which are comparatively unimportant, and which may be severed from the contract without impairing its effect or changing its character, will sometimes be suppressed. 2 Pars. on Cont. 505. But the clause above quoted cannot be set aside as unimportant. It constituted, to say the least, one

of the considerations on which the contract was made, and it is well settled that if the contract be made on several considerations, one of which is illegal, the whole contract is void, and that whether the illegality be at common law or by statute.' "The officers of a railway company are quasi public officers. Their duties are of a fiduciary character. They are, in an important sense, trustees. To pay them individually any thing of value for executing a corporate contract is grossly unlawful, and taints such contract with moral turpitude. Vast interests, in which the public, as well as the immediate parties, are deeply concerned, are intrusted to the control and management of such officials; and in my judgment, there are important considerations of public policy which demand that courts of justice shall hold them to a strict account, and shall never for a moment recognize as valid a contract obtained by paying directly or indirectly to such officials any consideration, whether large or small."

In Armstrong v. Kleinhans, Louisville Chancery Court, 1 Ky. L. Rep. 112, the plaintiff carried on the clothing business at No. 150 West Market street, Louisville, in a leased building with an observatory, which was called the "Tower Palace," and advertised his business under that name by signs and publications. Subsequently he removed to West Jefferson street, to a building with no tower or observatory, and continued the designation "Tower Palace." After his removal the owner of the first premises himself carried on the carpet business there, under the name of "Tower Palace Carpet Store." Later he rented the premises to defendants, who carried on the clothing business, under the designation, "Tower Palace." The plaintiff filed a bill to restrain defendants from the use of that designation, but the bill was dismissed. The court said: "Plaintiffs insist that the house is not a palace nor the observatory a tower. But while this is true, we are compelled to speak with entire accuracy, and although the plaintiff has proved by

an architect that the 'tower' is not a tower, but has been called a 'chicken-coop,' yet I think it is too much to expect of men that in naming a conspicuous building they shall not be allowed to use the language of compliment. And it seems to me that a fine house may be called a palace, and that the ornament on a high building like this may be called a 'tower;' and that 'tower-palace' is not in the language of compliment a too exaggerated name for this particular structure. The newspaper, in describing the plaintiff's opening, called particular attention to this tower, setting forth its command of all the territory adjacent to Louisville. It is to be observed that the sign on the tower was simply 'Tower Palace,' and not Tower Palace Clothing House, and it is further proved that the iron slab at the front door has the words 'Tower Palace' cast in it. I think this name was suggested and | adopted as appropriate to this particular building, and was given to the building itself, and that it does not matter who first called it 'Tower Palace." "What is true of the name of an article must be equally true of the name of a building. It would be unjust to its owner to limit him as to his tenants, or to prevent him from taking a proper advantage of its notoriety. No new tenant has any right to deceive the public into thinking the building is still occupied by a former tenant. But in so far as the public are deceived by the fact that the name of the building continues to be used, such misleading cannot be avoided, any more than a belief that the first firm that manufactured Paraffine Oil' or 'Essence of Anchovies' will continue to exclusively supply the market with these articles. To make this even plainer, suppose a house built of red granite called by its first tenant Red-Granite House, or of brown stone so named Brown-Stone Palace, could such a tenant move away his business and sign to a brick house or a frame house and prevent all other tenants from calling the houses by their appropriate names? I am not willing to put this case solely on the ground that the name "Tower Palace' was appropriate or descriptive of this building. I am inclined to think that whatever name had been given must adhere to it." See "Antiquarian Book-Store " case, Choynski v. Cohen, 39 Cal. 501; 2 Am. Rep. 476; "No. 10 South Water street case, Glen & Hall Manufacturing Co. v. Hall, 61 N. Y. 226; 19 Am. Rep. 278.

In Pratt v. State, 35 Ohio St. 514, it was held that necessary and suitable clothing furnished by a husband to his wife, or purchased by her with money or means given to her by her husband for that purpose, does not become her separate property within the meaning of the statute concerning the rights and liabilities of married women. The court said: Notwithstanding the very comprehensive terms of this statute, a majority of the court are of the opinion that they do not embrace the wearing apparel of his wife, furnished by the husband, or purchased by her with money or means given to her by the husband for that purpose. As to such property, it was not intended by the statute to deprive the

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husband of all ownership and control; for surely, while the duty of the husband to furnish his wife with necessary and suitable clothing is continued, it was not intended to deprive him of the right to control and preserve it. Nor does it make any difference, where a wife purchases her apparel with pin money, given to her by her husband to be expended according to her will and pleasure. Of such property, the possession of the wife is the possession of the husband. It has been held, however, by the Supreme Court of Indiana, that a statute similar to ours operates as to clothing of the wife acquired otherwise than from the husband, or through his means, so as to invest her with a separate estate therein. Stevens v. State, 44 Ind. 469. See, also, 17 Ala. 415; Hawkins v. Providence & Worcester Railroad Co., 119 Mass. 596; S. C., 20 Am. Rep. 353; 51 Ill. 162; 1 Am. L. Reg. 434. And we are inclined to think that there are good grounds for the distinction. Where the wife's clothing is furnished by the husband, in discharge of his marital duty toward her, the statute does not divest him of the property contrary to his intentions; while on the other hand, where the property is otherwise acquired by the wife, the statute simply prevents a title vesting in him by virtue of his marital relation. Under the statute, the gift,' which is declared to be the separate property of the wife, is a voluntary one, as all gifts must be, and does not embrace necessaries which a husband is under a legal duty to furnish his wife." Under our statute a married woman can sue in her own name for injury to her paraphernalia; Rawson v. Penn. Railroad Co., 48 N. Y. 212; S. C., 8 Am. Rep. 543; but in the absence of proof of a gift to her, the husband can sue. Curtis v. Delaware, etc., Railroad Co., 74 N. Y. 116; S. C., 30 Am. Rep. 271. In State v. Pitts, 12 S. C. 180, it was held, that while a married woman may acquire title to articles of apparel by gift from her husband, yet her mere use and enjoyment of such articles purchased by her husband does not give her title thereto as her separate property; and on an indictment for stealing such articles, laying them as the property of the husband, the question of title is for the jury.

COMPELLING PRISONER TO FURNISH PERSONAL EVIDENCE OF HIS IDENTITY.

ONE

NE of the most interesting questions in the law, and one of frequent recent occurrence is, how far can a person accused of crime be compelled to furnish personal evidence of his identity with the perpetrator, and thus to make evidence against himself? It will be useful to group and review the decisions pro and con.

To commence with the most recent. In State v. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 79, on a question of personal identity, in a trial for murder, a witness testified. that the defendant had certain tattoo marks on his person. The court compelled the witness, against his objection, to expose his person to the jury. Held, no error. This was held by two judges, the

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