2. If the barge is sunk and the cargo is
lost, by contact with ice, while the
barge is being towed by the tug, the
owner of the cargo must show neg-
ligence on the part of the tug, in or-
der to recover against it for such
loss.
id.

3. It was held not to be negligence in
the tug to keep on, after reaching ice,
instead of lying by, or making a har-
bor; that the towing hawser was
not too long; that the speed was not
too great; that nothing could have
been done by the tug to avoid the
danger, when the obstruction which
actually caused the loss was seen;
and that the barge and the vessels
in the tow with her were not im-
properly arranged.
id.

4. To make the tug liable for keeping
on, it must appear that the error
was one which a careful and prudent
navigator, surrounded by like cir-
cumstances, would not have made. id.

5. The judgment of witnesses as to
speed, formed long after the event,
and not based upon anything which
specially attracted attention at the
time, is rarely to be depended upon.
id.

6. M. delivered to an Express Com-
pany, for transportation, a trunk, with
contents of the value of $4,172, tak
ing a receipt exempting the company
from loss by fire and from liability
beyond $50, "at which sum said
property is hereby valued, unless the
just and true value thereof is stated
herein." The value of the trunk and
contents was n ́t stated in the receipt.
Through the negligence of the em-
ployees of a railroad company em-
ployed by the Express Company to
transport the property, it was de-
stroyed by fire. In a suit by M.
against the Express Company, for
the value of the property: Held,

(1.) Common carriers cannot exon-
erate themselves from liability for
the negligence of their own agents;

(2.) The Express Company is lia-
ble notwithstanding the stipulation
against liability by fire;

(3.) The limitation of the liability
to $50 is binding upon M., as a rea-
sonable condition;

7. The defendant, a railroad company,
received from W. goods for transpor
tation to Pittsburgh, giving W. a bill
of lading containing a condition that
the company should not be responsi
ble for loss or damage by tre, un-
less it could be shown that such dam-
age or loss occurred through the neg
ligence or default of the agents of the
company. On the arrival at Pitts-
burgh of the car containing the goods,
a mob took possession of it, and con-
tinued to hold it against the military
power of the State, and ultimately
fired and destroyed the goods; Held,
that W. must prove that the loss by
fire arose from the negligence of the
defendant or its agents, and that, in
the absence of such pro f, the defend-
ant was not liable for the value of the
goods. Wertheimer v. Pennslyvama
R. R. Co.,
421

CHARTER-PARTY.

1. A charter-party for the voyage of a
vessel from New York to Santa Cruz,
(Canary Islands,) and thence to Ha-
vana, Cuba, provided that the re-
spondents were to be allowed, for the
loading and discharging of the ves-
sel, dispatch for loading at New
York and discharging at Havana;
thirty running days for discharging
at Santa Cruz;" and that, if the ves
sel should be longer detained by the
respondents, demurrage, at so much
per day, should be paid, day by day,
for every day so detained: Held, that
the customs and rules of the port of
Havana were not to control as to the
time for discharging there, but that
the respondents were bound to take
the cargo, at Havana, as rapidly as
the vessel could deliver it. Sleeper
v. Puig,

36

2. By the rules of the port the cargo
could be delivered only at the mole.
The vessel came to anchor and was
ready to deliver her cargo. There
was no room for her at the mole.
She was delayed till room was found:
Held, that, under the terms of the
charter-party, the risk of delay in ob-

7. A schooner and her cargo were lost
by a collision with a steamer. The
steamer being sued separately for the
two losses, both vessels were held in
fault. The damages for the loss of
the schooner were apportioned be-
tween the two vessels. A decree was
given to the owners of the cargo
for the full amount of their loss; and
a credit was allowed to the steamer,
on the decree in favor of the schooner
against her, for a sum equal to one-
half of the decree in favor of the
owners of the cargo.
id.

88

As, in the suit by the schooner, both
parties had appealed to this Court,
the costs in this Court in that suit
were equally divided between them.

id.

9. Under Rule 4 of the statutory Nav-
igation Rules, (Rev. Sat., § 4.233,)
requiring steam vessels, when tow-
ing other vessels," to "carry two
bright white mast-head lights verti
cally," and requiring that each of
those mast-head lights shall be of the
same character and construction as
the mast-head lights prescribed by
Rule 3, a steam tug, which has no
mast, and cannot carry a light at her
must-head, must carry two bright
white lights vertically, of a character
to be visible five miles away, on a
dark night, with a clear atmosphere,
and so constructed as to show a uni-
form and unbroken light ahead, and
from ten points on one side to ten
points on the other, of the tug. The
Jesse Williamson, Jr.,

106

10. Whether, if two lights, of a power
equal to what is required for mast-
head lights, are suspended vertically
on the flag-staff at the stern of a tug,
in such a manner as to show a uni-
form and unbroken light ahead over
an arc of twenty points of the com-

pass, they would be the legal equiv-
alent of two mast-head lights, quere.

id.

11. If circumstances are such as to make
it proper for a steam tug to keep a tow
400 or 500 feet behind her, she should
be specially careful not only to notify
approaching vessels that a tow is fol-
lowing, but, as near as may be, where
it is.
id.

12. Whether Rule IX of the board of
supervising inspectors appointed un-
der the authority of the Act of Feb-
ruary 28th, 1871, (16 U. S. Stat. at
Large, 440, Rev. Stat. §§ 4,405 and
4,412,) has the force of law in re-
spect to the lights to be carried on
canal boats and barges, while being
towed by steam vessels, quere.
id.

13. A large ocean steamer has no right
to leave her moorings in a narrow
slip crowded with ot er craft, by the
use of her own propeller, without
taking the utmost care to prevent ac-
cidents by the disturbance of the
water which necessarily follows. The
Nevada,

122

14. She must maintain complete con-
trol of herself, and, if she cannot get
out by the use of her own propeller,
without doing damage to o her ves-
sels that are lawfully moored near
her, she must employ a tug. id.

15. In leaving the slip, she must keep
a lookout astern, and over her side,
into the slip, if necessary.
id.

16. A steam tug moving in a slip, in a
fog, and inside of the ends of the
piers, is not required to sound her
steam whistles, as a signal to a steam-
er moving up the river outside of the
slip, and which runs into the slip and
collides with her. The Shady Side,

to be raised. She was sold to the
libellant for $18, in a suit against her
by the person who rai-ed her. The
libellant afterwards paid the charge
for raising her, $600. The expense
of repairing her, added to the cost
of raising her and a reasonable de-
murrage, exceeded what would have
been her value when repaired. This
Court allowed the libellant $3,500, as
her value at the time of her loss, as a
total loss. The value of what was
saved was sufficient to pay the ex-
pense of saving it, but no more; and
the value of the tug when raised was
equal to the expense incurred in
searching for and raising her, but no

20.

id.

A steamer collided with a sailing
ship in the night, having changed her
course and stopped and backed her
engine, in an endeavor to avoid the
collision. It appeared that, if the
steamer had kept her course and
speed, and the ship had done what
she in fact did do, there would have
been no collision. But, as the steamer
had skilful officers, who exercised
good judgment, in view of the ap-
pearances of, and changes in, the
ship's lights, it was held that the
steamer was not in fault. The Adri
atic,

176

21. The ship sank with all on board,

and the steamer was held not to have
been in fault for her conduct alter
the collision, in respect to getting out
her boats and proceeding on her voy-
age.

See ADMIRALTY, 4.

COMMON CARRIER.
See CARRIER.

id.

(1.) Under the statute the same pa-
per may be both a letter and a circu-
lar, and the paper deposited in this
case was both;

(2.) The indictment need not state
that the paper was one concerning a
lottery "offering prizes;"

(3.) The omission, if any, in the
first count, of averments to show the
illegal quality of the paper, was a
defect cured, after verdict, by $ 1,025
of the Revised Statutes, as a defect
of form, not tending to the prejudice
of the defendant;

(4.) The paper set forth in the first
count shows, on its face, that it is
such a letter as is within the prohibi-
tion of the statute;

(5.) The second count is bad, be
cause it does not set forth the circular
in haec verba, and the defect is one
which is not cured by said § 1,025,
and one which can be availed of on
a motion in arrest of judgment.
United States v. Noelke,

554

12. In empanelling the jury, a juror
was asked, by the defendant: "Have
you any prejudice against the lot-
tery business, or those who are en
gaged in it?" 'Are you disposed,
in your mind, to put an end to the
traffic in lottery tickets?"

"

Are you
in favor of active measures for the
suppression of the lottery business?"
The questions were successively ex-
cluded. The juror had before testi-
fied that he knew nothing about the
case, and be a terwards testified that
he had heard nothing and read noth-
ing, and had not talked with any one,
about the prosecution of lottery deal
ers, and that he felt that he could de-
cide the case by the evidence, with-
out prejudice. He was sworn as a
juror: Held, that affirmative answers
to the three questions would not have
been ground for rejecting the juror.

id.

13. Other papers enclosed in the same
envelope with the paper set forth in
the first count, were admissible in
evidence, as they tended to show
that said paper related to a lottery,
and were part of the res gesta.
id.

14. It was proper to allow a witness to
testify that he visited the place of
business referred to in the paper set

15. After the testimony for the prose
cution had been closed, the defendant
objected that no evidence had been
introduced tending to show the exist
ence of a lottery. The Court granted
time to supply such proof: Held, that
the matter was within the discretion
of the Court.
id.

16. The Act of the Legis'ature of Louis.
iana, passed August 11th, 1868, (Laws
of 1868, p. 24.) on the subject of lot-
teries, is a public Act, and provable
by the introduction of a volume of the
Laws of 1868, purporting to have
been published by authority.

17.

id.

It was not necessary for the prose
cution to prove that the lottery had
a legal existence, or that the company
carrying it on was a corporation. id.

18. The occupation of the defendant,
the passage of said Act, and other ex-
trinsic circumstances, were proper to
be considered by the jury on the
question whether the letter related
to a lottery.
id.