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The United States v. Aucarola.
New York all right. After that I will teach you music." He gave the boy a paper with an address in New York where to go, and told him not to let himself be seen by any officer, for they might arrest him, and if any one asked him what he was going to do, not to say that he was going with a padrone. He also told him, if any one asked him what his business was, to say that he was a printer, and, if they asked where he was going, to say that he was going to Montreal, and, if they asked to whom, to say that he was going to an uncle. He did not have an uncle in Montreal.
The statute of Italy, of December 21st, 1873, referred to in the charge of the Court to the jury, was put in evidence. Portions of the charge of the Court to the jury were excepted to by the defendant. One portion of the charge was as follows: “In connection with the evidence in respect to the arrangement made in Italy, it will be important for you to consider the law of Italy relating to the employment of children in wandering professions. But, it must be remembered that the accused is not on trial for violating the law of Italy, and cannot be found guilty by you because of any violation of the law of Italy that you may believe to have been disclosed by the evidence. He must be found guilty, if at all, for a violation of the law of the United States that you have heard read. The law of Italy has been admitted in evidence as bearing upon the question of inveiglement, and solely for the purpose of showing the character of the act to which the consent of these children was obtained in Italy. The law of Italy provides as follows: ‘Section 1. Any person who shall intrust, or under whatever pretence shall commit, to natives or strangers, other persons of either sex under the age of eighteen years, though his or her own children or pupils, and any native or stranger who shall receive them with the intent to employ them in the kingdom, in whatever manner or under whatever denomination, in the practice of wandering professions, as saltinbanks, witches, charlatans, errant players or singers, rope dancers, guessers, fortune tellers, animal exposers, beggars and similar
The United States v. Aucarola.
wanderers, shall be punished with imprisonment from one to three months, and fined from fifty-one to two hundred and fifty lire. Section 3. Any one who shall trust or deliver in the kingdom, or take abroad in order to trust or deliver to natives or strangers abroad, persons under eighteen years of age, however his or her own children or pupils, and any native or stranger who shall receive such persons in order to take, trust or deliver them abroad, for the purpose to employ them in whatever way, and under whatever denomination, in the practice of wandering professions, as shown in section one, shall be punished with imprisonment from six months to one year, and fined from one hundred to five hundred lire. You will observe, that the arrangement to which the assent of these children was procured in Italy was unlawful, provided the children were intended to be employed in a wandering profession, such as errant players, or beggars, or similar wanderers. It has been contended here, that these children were not intended to be employed as wanderers, in violation of the law of Italy, because the evidence is, that they were to be employed to play the harp, or be musicians, in Chicago. But, gentlemen, a child of eleven or thirteen years of age may be a wanderer in the streets of a great city, and if, upon considering the evidence and what has been proved in regard to the character of the arrangement made in Italy, and the age of the children, and their ability to earn money for the accused by labor, you conclude that the arrangement made in Italy in regard to those children, or either of them, contemplated the delivery of the children to the accused, to be by him brought to this country for the purpose of being employed as beggars or street musicians in Chicago, and that the child was then and there enticed to consent to such an arrangement, then you will be justified in finding that such child had been inveigled in Italy.” The foregoing portion of the charge was excepted to by the defendant.
After charging that it must be “proved that the accused brought the child here with the intent to hold the child, when so brought, to involuntary service as a beggar or as a
The United States v. Aucarola,
musician,” the Court proceeded as follows: “Upon this ques-
of the children had been inveigled in Italy, and no evidence that the defendant had the intent to hold any of the children to any involuntary service in this country.
Inveigle” is defined by Worcester thus: “ To persuade to something bad; to wheedle; to entice; to seduce; to beguile.” He defines “entice” thus: “To allure to ill; to attract; to lure; to draw by blandishments or hopes; to decoy; to tempt; to seduce; to coax.” To inveigle or persuade or entice necessarily implies that the person is persuaded or enticed and yields assent as the result of the persuading or enticing. Yet the statute is founded on the view that the person so assenting and so inveigled may be brought here by one who knows the circumstances of the case, with the intent to hold such person to involuntary service, although the serrice be the one to which the inveigling related. The arrangement made in Italy was, clearly, a transfer of the children to
The United States v. Aucarola.
the service of the defendant, to earn money for him as street musicians in Chicago. They were of an age to be able to do so. The influence brought to bear upon them by their parents and uncles, and by the statements of the defendant, to induce them to consent, in view of their condition in life and their ages and their inexperience, was enticement and inveiglement. The charge on this subject was proper and not open to excep-, tion. (Moody v. The People, 20 Illinois, 315, 319.)
In regard to the other portion of the charge, the children, in serving the defendant as street musicians, for his profit, to the injury of their morals, subject to his control, could not properly be considered as rendering him voluntary service. They were incapable of exercising will or choice affirmatively on the subject. They were cast off by their parents, in violation of the law of Italy, and their being in this country at all with the defendant was, on all the facts, really involuntary on their part, although the sham form of their consent was gone through with. The charge seems to us entirely correct. (Moody v. The People, 20 Illinois, 315, 319; The State v.
. Rollins, 8 N. H., 550, 565.)
The observations already made, taken in connection with the testimony recited, show that there was ample evidence to warrant the jury in finding inveiglement in Italy and the intent of the defendant, with full knowledge of such inveiglement, to hold the children in this country to involuntary service to him as street musicians.
The motions are denied.
William P. Fiero, (Assistant District Attorney) for the
Charles S. Spencer, for the defendant.
Faulks v. Kamp.
Isaac FAULKS AND OTHERS
Jacob C. KAMP AND CHARLES BROWN. IN EQUITY.
Whether letters patent No. 68,282, granted August 27th, 1867, to Charles
Brown, for an improvement in baling short cut hay, are valid, is doubtful, short cut hay having been known before, and the invention consisting only in
applying to short cut hay the well known process of baling hay. The defendant, owning an interest in the patent, conveyed such interest to the
plaintiff. Afterwards, the defendant continued to practise the invention, and he acquired a prior patent, which he alleged covered the same improvement. In a suit in equity against him by the plaintiff, for infringement: Held, that he was estopped, by his conveyance, from denying the validity of the patent, and that the acquiring by him of the prior patent enured to the benefit of the
plaintiff. (Before WHEELER, J., Southern District of New York, January 27th, 1880.)
WHEELER, J. This suit is brought for relief against infringement of letters patent No. 68,282, dated August 27th, 1867, and granted to the defendant Charles Brown, for an improvement in baling short cut hay. The orators claim to have the title to the whole of the patent for the New England States, New Jersey, and New York, except Erie county, and allege infringement at the city of New York. Their title is not disputed, except that the defendants allege that one Lemuel B. Clark owns a share in the patent, said to be one-twenty-fourth part; and they justify under a license granted' by former owners to Angelina Brown, wife of Charles Brown. The share of Clark does not appear to cover the territory involved in this suit; and the license to Angelina Brown was revocable, and was revoked by the conveyance of the title of the licensors, so that the orators are considered as holding the title to the patent for this territory. Of course, the whole of their title must have been derived from the de