Micou v. Lamar. not revive when the war ceased, and the guardian was no longer accountable to the Courts of New York, as guardian, even after the close of the war. I can see no ground whatever for this position, so far as concerns the care and safe keeping of the property of the ward in the hands of the guardian, and his liability to account for it after the war was over. Doubtless, during the war, if the guardian had remained here, and his ward had become an alien enemy, his duties as guardian would be modified by that fact. He could not properly or legally remit funds for her support to any person in the hostile territory. But, he would still be under the same obligation as before, as to the safe keeping of the property, and, whenever the ward ceased to be an alien. enemy, by the termination of the war, there was no legal obstacle to her calling the guardian to an account for the property so held. Even if the war dissolved the relation, the effect of such dissolution would not be greater than would be that of the termination of the guardianship by the death of the ward, and, if the ward had died before the war began, the guardian must still account to her legal representative. If he ceased to be guardian, he still remained a trustee of the property, upon precisely the same trusts, as to its safe keeping, and under the same liability to account for it, according to the tenor of his appointment and bond, as before. The case of a copartnership between citizens of hostile States being dissolved by war is cited as controlling this case. If it were wholly analogous, which it does not seem to be, I do not perceive that it would touch the present question. By the acceptance of his appointment and his bond, the defendant's testator undertook and agreed to do certain definite things with the funds he received, to keep them invested in a certain way, which the law prescribes, and to account for them when required. It is alleged that he has failed to do so. It, certainly, is no answer for him to say, that, of his own free will, he made himself an alien enemy of the State of New York and of the United States, and thereby discharged himself from the obligation thus assumed under the laws of New York. Micou v. Lamar. Yet, this is what this defence amounts to, so far as it rests on his becoming a resident of Georgia, and, as such, engaging in the war against the United States. So far as this defence rests on the ward's being an alien enemy, her right to call him to account in respect to the funds received by him as guardian, before the war, was suspended, not annulled, by the war. In Insurance Co. v. Davis, (95 U. S., 425, 430,) the Supreme Court says: "If the agent has property of the principal in his possession or control, good faith and fidelity to his trust will require him to keep it safely during the war, and to restore it faithfully at its close." If this is so of an agent, it must, certainly, be said, with equal force, of a guardian, that good faith and fidelity to his trust will require him to keep his ward's money and its accumulations safely during the war, and to account for it at its close. Nor can the guardian better his position, in this respect, by himself voluntarily going into rebellion, as this guardian went from New York to Georgia, to join in a rebellion, for, he could not, by any act of his own, short of the complete discharge of his duty, relieve himself from his liability. (2.) The next defence urged is, that the guardian, to prevent the confiscation of the ward's money, withdrew it from its investment in bank stock in New York, and sent it to Montreal, Canada, where it remained invested, by his direction, in the bonds of cities within the rebel States and in Southern railroads. This point is, clearly, untenable. It is not contended that the new investments made were such as a guardian is allowed to make according to the laws of New York, and they were, obviously, extra hazardous. They are not to be justified on the plea that, if the funds had remained here, invested according to law, they would be liable to be confiscated by the United States. It is no part of the duty of a guardian to protect his ward's money against the lawful demands of his own Government. If, under such lawful demands, they are seized, the guardian would no longer be responsible for them. His duty, as a citizen, to interpose no obstruction to the efforts of his own Government in carrying Micou ". Lamar. on war, is his first duty. It is superior to any obligation he owes to his ward. If his ward's money was forfeited to the United States, he had no right nor duty to prevent, by its removal, the superior rights of the Government over it from being asserted. Moreover, the proofs show, that what he did. was, under color of protecting his ward's interests, to allow the funds to be loaned to cities and other corporations which were aiding in the rebellion, and, by this very act set up in excuse, he gave aid and comfort to the enemies of his Government. Such an act could not be pleaded in justification, because in itself unlawful, even if the circumstances warranted a removal of the fund to avoid confiscation, which, clearly, they did not. (3.) Another ground of defence set up is the transfer of what remained of the fund, in 1867, to a new guardian in Alabama, and his alleged release of the defendant's testator. At the time of the appointment of Mr. Micou guardian by the Alabama Court, the infant, Ann C. Sims, was domiciled in that State. The appointment was made upon her written request, and, as it appears by the statutes of Alabama put in evidence, it was, in all respects, in conformity with those statutes, and by a Court of competent jurisdiction. It is objected, on the part of the plaintiff, that a new guardian cannot be appointed till the former guardian is removed or superseded. This may be the rule where both guardians are appointed within the same jurisdiction. There seems, however, no legal objection to there being several guardians in several different States, if the infant has property in different States, which requires the care of a guardian. The defendant's testator was appointed guardian of the person and property of the infants. When they removed from the State of New York, which they did, with the relatives with whom they lived, in the year 1856, his duty and power, as guardian of the person, may have ceased or been suspended, at least until they might return, on the ground that his appointment, under the laws of New York, would give him no power to control persons beyond the local jurisdiction of those laws; and, their VOL. XVII.-25 Micou v. Lamar. when the infants became, as they did, domiciled in Alabama, I think the power of the State of Alabama to provide, by law, for the appointment of a guardian of their persons, and of such property as they might have within its jurisdiction, cannot be questioned. The fact that there was already a guardian of some of their property in another State or country is not inconsistent with the exercise of this power; and it would, certainly, be most proper, and, in many cases, convenient and for the true interest of the infant, that, in case of a change of domicile, a new guardian should be appointed within the new jurisdiction; and a transfer of funds from a former guardian to the new guardian appointed in the State of the infant's domicile, might, also, be very properly authorized by the Court to which the former guardian is accountable, upon the same principles of equity and comity on which the transfer of funds in the hands of an executor or administrator, to an executor or administrator in another State, may be authorized. (Parsons v. Lyman, 20 N. Y., 103.) In the present case, the former guardian, Mr. Lamar, requested of the near relatives of the infant the appointment of a new guardian. His reasons were his age and growing infirmities, and his own business cares and perplexities; and the appointment was asked for and made in accordance with this request. The reasons were valid and sufficient, and the circumstances made it proper that the new guardian should be appointed in Alabama; and I cannot doubt that, if the defendant's testator had applied to the Surrogate's Court of Richmond County, for leave to resign his trust and to transfer the ward's estate to the duly appointed guardian in Alabama, his petition would have been granted. What would thus have been approved as just and right, if asked for, can now be justified as done for the benefit of his ward. Therefore, in any accounting to be had, the defendant's testator should be credited with his cash payment to the new guardian, of $808 70. But, beyond this, the transaction referred to as a settlement with and release of the defendant's testator by the new guardian, neither purported to be, nor could, if so Micou v. Lamar. understood and intended by the parties, be a release of the former guardian from his liability to account for the residue of the infant's estate with which he was chargeable. The new trustee merely gave a receipt for sundry securities, mostly worthless, which the defendant's testator turned over to him. They were the remains of the investments which had been made of the ward's property. But, the original investments, being in bank stock, had been not such as the ward was, when of age, bound to accept; and, by the changes of value effected by the war, and by the investments made in consequence of the war and during the war, the result was, that the rest of the fund consisted of bonds of Southern cities and Southern railroads, of little value. It is too plain for argument, it seems to me, that a new guardian has no power to accept a transfer of such properties, as a full discharge of the former guardian's liability to account for and make good the moneys originally received. Such an act would be a gross abuse of his trust, by the new guardian. No Court would authorize or justify it, and, certainly, a guardian has no power, by virtue of his appointment, thus to give away the property and rights of his ward. If the new guardian has actually realized anything from the securities transferred, I see no reason why, in the taking of the account, the defendant's testator should not be credited with it. (4.) The defence of a ratification by the ward is not made out by the evidence. Such a ratification must be very clearly proved, and it must appear that it was made with full knowledge of all the facts, and a full understanding of the legal rights of the ward, affected thereby. (Adair v. Bremmer, 74 N. Y., 539, 554.) Neither of these circumstances is shown in this case. It is true, that, Ann C. Sims, in 1867, made a written request for the appointment of a guardian in Alabama, in place of her former guardian. She was then about sixteen years old. She became of age June 1st, 1872, and commenced this suit July 1st, 1875. She was not shown to have meanwhile done any act waiving her claim. It is true, that her uncle and aunt Micou, with whom she lived, had |