The New Orleans. persons cause their stipulations for costs to be performed, or show cause, in like manner, on the same day as aforesaid, why the like execution should not issue for the sum of $250; and it is further ordered, that John H. Clark, Samuel H. Seaman and Cornelius H. Delamater, the sureties of the claimants upon their said appeal, show cause at a Circuit Court to be held at the Court rooms, in the city of New York, on the 11th day of September, 1879, at the opening of Court, why a summary judgment should not be entered against them for the sum of $18,000, the amount of their said bond." In accordance with the last of the foregoing provisions, the libellants have moved this Court, on the 11th of September, 1879, to enter a summary judgment against the said Clark, Seaman and Delamater, as sureties on said appeal bond, for the sum of $18,000. The said sureties oppose said motion, on the ground that the case is one in which an appeal can be taken by the claimants of the steamer to the Supreme Court of the United States, from so much of the decree of this Court as awards a recovery against the steamer, and that, therefore, the motion cannot be made until the expiration of ten days after the rendering of the decree. It is provided as follows, by 1,007 of the Revised Statutes of the United States: 66 In any case where a writ of error may be a supersedeas, the defendant may obtain such supersedeas by serving the writ of error, by lodging a copy thereof for the adverse party in the clerk's office where the record remains, within sixty days, Sundays exclusive, after the rendering of the judgment complained of, and giving the security required by law on the issuing of the citation. But, if he desires to stay process on the judgment, he may, having served his writ of error as aforesaid, give the security required by law within sixty days after the rendition of such judgment, or afterwards, with the permission of a justice or judge of the appellate Court. And in such cases where a writ of error may be a supersedeas, executions shall not issue until the expiration of ten days." It is provided, by § 1,012, that appeals from the Circuit Courts "shall be subject to the same rules, The New Orleans. regulations and restrictions as are or may be prescribed by law in cases of writs of error." Section 997 provides for a citation, and § 1,000 provides, that the judge who signs a citation on a writ of error, shall "take good and sufficient security that the plaintiff in error or the appellant shall prosecute his writ or appeal to effect, and, if he fail to make his plea good, shall answer all damages and costs, where the writ is a supersedeas and stays execution, or all costs only, where it is not a supersedeas as aforesaid." It is contended for the sureties, that proceedings against the sureties upon the appeal bond are collateral to and for the enforcement of the decree, and are no part of the decree; that, where an appeal may be a supersedeas, no proceedings against the sureties in the appeal bond can be taken so long as no proceedings can be taken to issue execution on the decree; and that the words "process on the judgment," in §1,007, include the entry of judgment against the sureties in the appeal bond. The condition of the appeal bond is, that the appellants shall pay the damages and costs which shall be awarded against them by this Court, as appellants, if they shall fail to make their appeal good. The appellants are not under obligation to pay the sum awarded against them by the decree until the time when execution can issue on the decree, which is not until the expiration of ten days after the rendering of the decree. The obligation of the sureties being an obligation only that the appellants shall pay when obliged to pay, cannot be enforced against them in any manner, even to the extent of the entry of judgment against them, until the obligation of the appellants to pay comes into force; and such obligation of the appellants does not, in a case like the present, where the appeal may be a supersedeas, come into force until the expiration of ten days after the rendering of the decree. This is a case in which an appeal lies to the Supreme Court and may be a supersedeas, if taken by the claimants, and where no execution could issue on the decree against the vessel prior to the time when the motion for judgment against the sureties The Jesse Williamson, Jr. in the appeal bond was made. It follows, that the motion was prematurely made and must be denied. Scudder & Carter, for the libellants. Man & Parsons, for the sureties. THE JESSE WILLIAMSON, JR. Where, in a suit in rem, in Admiralty, in the District Court, the libellant, after a decree dismissing the libel, appeals to this Court, and this Court dismisses the libel, and the sum claimed in the libel is sufficient to allow of an appeal by the libellant to the Supreme Court, which may be a supersedeas, no summary judgment can be rendered by this Court against the sureties in the appeal bond executed on the appeal to this Court, until after the expiration of ten days after the rendering of the decree by this Court. (Before BLATCHFORD, J., Southern District of New York, October 11th, 1879.) BLATCHFORD, J. As the decree of this Court in this case dismisses the libel, and as the libellant, in his libel, claims damages to the amount of over $27,000, and as the District Court has dismissed the libel, it follows that this is a case in which the libellant can appeal to the Supreme Court and can have his appeal operate as a supersedeas and stay of execution. As the bond of the sureties on the appeal to this Court is, in its condition, the same as that in the case of The New Orleans, (ante, p. 216,) just decided, it follows, that the motion for judgment in this case against said sureties must be denied, for the reasons assigned in the decision in that case. Benedict, Taft & Benedict, for the sureties. Scudder & Carter, for the claimants. In re The Petition of the Norwich and New York Transportation Company. THE BLANCHE PAGE. Where, in a suit in rem, in Admiralty, in the District Court, the claimant, after a decree for the libellant, appeals to this Court, and this Court decrees for the libellant for a sum not sufficient to allow of an appeal by the claimant to the Supreme Court, a summary judgment can be rendered at once by this Court against the sureties in the appeal bond executed on the appeal to this Court. (Before BLATCHFORD, J., Southern District of New York, October 11th, 1879.) BLATCHFORD, J. As this is not a case in which the claimants can appeal to the Supreme Court, there can be no supersedeas or stay of execution on the decree made by this Court against the vessel libelled. Hence, the claimants, as appellants to this Court, are obliged to pay at once the amount of such decree, and the obligation of the sureties in the appeal bond to this Court came into force without waiting for ten days to expire after the rendering of such decree. The motion for judgment against such sureties must, therefore, be granted. Scudder & Carter, for the libellants. Benedict, Taft & Benedict, for the sureties. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF THE NORWICH AND NEW YORK TRANSPORTATION COMPANY. A collision occurred between a steamboat and a schooner, caused by negligence on the part of the former, without any design, neglect, privity or knowledge of her owners. She immediately took fire, and burned and sank in deep water, the fire being caused by the collision. She had a cargo, being carried on freight, which was totally lost. None of her pending freight was earned or received. She was raised and repaired. After that she was libelled, in In re The Petition of the Norwich and New York Transportation Company. Admiralty, in the District Court, by owners of part of the lost cargo. On a claim to her, she was appraised at $70,000, as her value after being raised and repaired, and she was released on a stipulation for that amount, purporting to be for the benefit of all persons having liens on her for losses by the collision. After decrees for the libellants, her owners petitioned the same District Court, for the benefit of a limitation of liability under the Act of March 3d, 1851, (9 U. S. Stat. at Large, 635.) That Court appraised her value, as she lay immediately after the collision and fire and before she was raised, at $2,500, and ordered that amount to be paid into Court. That was the value of the interest of the petitioners in her as she was immediately after the disaster. The value of that interest immediately before the collision was $70,000, At the time of the collision she was insured against fire and her owners received, on such insurance, over $49,000. She was not surrendered or transferred to a trustee: Held, (1.) The value of the interest of the owner of the steamboat, to be taken, under said Act, is not the value of her and her freight before the collision; (2.) The valuation of $70,000 is not to be taken as the measure of the liability of such owner; (3.) Such measure is the value of the steamboat in the condition in which she was immediately after the disaster, and not her value after she was raised and repaired; (4.) Such value in this case was $2,500, with nothing added for freight; (5.) After the collision, the value of the steamboat was not greater before the fire than after it; (6.) The proceeds of the fire insurance ought not to be added to the appraised value of the steamboat; (7.) It was proper for the District Court to restrain the libellants in the suits in rem from further prosecuting those suits or suits against the stipulators for the $70,000. (Before STRONG, J., Eastern District of New York, October 13th, 1879.) THIS was a proceeding commenced in the District Court, by the Norwich and New York Transportation Company, as petitioners, to obtain the benefit of the provisions of the Act of Congress, approved March 3d, 1851, (9 U.S. Stat. at Large, 635,) providing for the limitation of the liability of ship owners. The decisions of the District Court in the matter are reported in 6 Benedict, 330, and 8 Benedict, 312. After those decisions, appeals were taken to this Court by several parties. This Court found the following facts: "On the morning of the 18th of April, 1866, a collision took place between the steamboat City of Norwich, then owned by the |