Now be the hardships or felf-denials what they will, if they make us more like to Chrift, they have done more for us, than all the prosperity in the world can do; and he that defends himself at the expence of any temper, that was the temper of Chrift, has done himself an injury greater than the worst and molt powerful of his enemies can bring upon him.

AND all this is founded upon this one reafon, because there is but one thing needful, the falvation of our fouls. It is this that changes the natures of all human things, and makes every thing good or evil only fo far as it promotes or hinders this one end of life. The falvation of the world is the only happiness of the world; and he that has fecured his fhare in that, has fecured to himself all the joy and gladness that can befal human nature.

A CHRISTIAN therefore that is not content with falvation, that wants to add a worldly joy and pleafure to the great things of religion, is more fenfelefs than the man that should think he had hard ufage to be faved from a shipwreck, unless he was carried off upon a cedar plank.

CHAP. VII.

Some farther confiderations upon the reafonableness of felf-denial.

BEFORE I proceed any farther in other inftances of felf-denial, it may be proper to fhew in what the duty of felf-denial is founded, or wherein the reasonablenefs and neceffity of it confifts.

EVERY duty or virtue of the Chriftian life is founded in truth and reafon, and is required because

of

**

of its fitness to be done, and not because God has power to command what he pleases.

If we are commanded to be meek and humble, it is because meeknefs and humility are as true judgments, and as fuitable to the truth of our state, as it is a true judgment, and fuitable to the ftate of every dependant being, to be thankful for mercies.

IF we are bid to rejoice, it is at fomething that is truly joyful; if to fear, it is to fear fomething that is really dreadful. Thus we are called to no tempers, but fuch as are so many true judgments, and as truly founded in the nature and reafon of things, as if we were bid to believe two to be the half part of four.

GOD is reafon and wisdom itself, and he can no more call us to any tempers or duties, but such as are ftrictly reasonable in themselves, than he can act against himself, or contradict his own nature.

As we can fay with affurance, that God cannot - lye; fo we may with the fame certainty affirm, that he cannot enjoin any thing to rational creatures, that is contrary to the reafon of their nature, no more than he can enjoin them, to love things that are not lovely, or hate things that are in their nature not hateful.

WHEN God fpeaks, we are as fure that infinite reafon fpeaks, as we are fure there is a God.

A LITTLE reflection upon this matter, will give us the utmost affurance in fuch reafonings as this.

As fure therefore as there is a God, fo fure is it, that a religion. from God has only reasonable commands to reasonable creatures. No tempers can be impofed upon us by way of task and impofition, which we might as reasonably be without, if it was not required of us. God can only will, that reafonable creatures fhould be more reasonable, more perfect, and more like himself, and confequently can enjoin us no duties or tempers of mind, but fuch as have this tendency. All his commands are for our fakes, founded in the neceffities of our natures, and are only fo many inftruc

inftructions to become more happy, than we could be without them.

A GOOD man that enjoys the use of his reason, is offended at madmen and fools, because they both act contrary to the reafon of things. The madman fancies himself, and every thing about him, to be different from what they are; the fool knows nothing of the value of things, is ridiculous in his choices, and prefers a shell before the most useful things in life.

Now a good man merely thro' the love of reason, is offended at their conduct, and would do all that he could to abate the frenzy of the one, and the ftupidity

of the other.

LET this a little represent to us the conduct of God towards fallen man. God is reafon itself; how highly therefore must he be offended at the follies and ftupidity of mankind? if a madman seems so unreasonable a creature to us, because he fancies himself to be fomething that he is not; how unreasonable muft fallen man, who is fallen from all true knowledge of himfelf, appear to him who is infinite reason?

AGAIN, God is goodness itself; if therefore human goodness is inclined to endeavour the cure of madmen and fools, muft not goodness itself be much more inclined to correct the madness and folly of fallen man?

WE fee that men are faid to be mad, when they fancy themselves, and the things about them, to be different from what they are; they are faid to be fools, when they mistake the value of things: now if this be true, as it most certainly is, it may ferve to fhew us, that man in his present state of disorder and ignorance, must appear to God both as fool and mad; for every finner is truly mad, as he imagines himself, and all things about him, to be what they are not; he is really a fool, as he is ridiculous in his choices, and miftakes the value of things.

Now religion is our cure, it is God's merciful communication of fuch rules and discipline of life, as may ferve to deliver us from the infatuation and ignorance

of

of our fallen state. It is to teach us the knowledge of ourselves, and all things about us, that we may no longer act like madmen; it is to teach us the true value of things, that we may know our good and evil, and not be as idiots in the choice of things.

Now fools and madmen have their paradife, and are pleased with their imaginary happiness; this makes them averfe from all methods of cure.

FOR this reason, God preffes his inftructions upon us with terrors and threatenings, and makes those virtues which are the natural good and cure of our fouls, fuch duties to him, as he will punish the neglect of them.

So that the power of God is mercifully employed to move us to fuch a reasonable way of life, as is neceffary for our happiness.

SOME people are fo weak, as to wonder, what we call fin fhould be fo odious to God, or what it can fignify to God, whether we are wife or foolish.

LET fuch confider, that God is wisdom, and reafon itself, and confequently every thing that is contrary to reafon and wisdom, is contrary to his nature; fo that a ftate of fin, is a state of contrariety to God. To ask therefore why God hates all fin, is the fame thing as to ask why God cannot tell any fort of lye; it is because every deviation from truth is contrary to his nature, which is truth itself; fo every inftance of fin, as it is an unreasonable act, is contrary to his nature, who is reafon itself.

THERE is therefore a neceffity from the nature of things, that every creature be delivered from fin, before it can enter into the beatifick presence of God; for if God could reward wicked beings, and make them happy by the enjoyment of his prefence, he would as much ceafe to act according to the nature of things, as if he should punish a being that lived in innocence; for to punish innocence, and to reward fin, are equally contrary to the nature and reason of things. THIS obfervation may teach us to admire the ex

cellency

ellency of the Chriftian religion, which restores finners to God by so great an atonement for fin, and which only admits the repentance and devotion of fallen man, through the merits and mediation of the Son of God.

To return: Let fuch people alfo confider, that even reasonable men have a neceffary diflike of fools and madmen, they cannot poffibly make them the objects of their pleasure and affection.

Bur now, if fome things are fo odious in themfelves, that even the reason of man cannot but abhor them, how much more odious, how much more contrary to the perfection of the Divine Nature, muft the folly and madness of fin be?

THUS if we confider what reason is in ourselves, that it neceffarily diflikes unreafonable perfons as well as things; we may have fome notion how all fin and finners, that is, all beings which act contrary to reafon, must be in a state of the utmost contrariety to God, who is the highest reason.

GOD is love; yet it is certain, that he can only love fuch things as are lovely; fo God is goodness, yet he cannot make finners happy, because there is as much contradiction to reafon and perfection in making finners happy, as in loving things that are not truly lovely, or in hating things that are not hateful. This may ferve to give us in fome measure a true idea of the nature of religion and the nature of fin.

THAT religion is God's gracious method of delivering us from the unreasonableness and corruption of our natures, that by complying with its rules and difcipline, we may be fo altered in our natures, fo restored to reason, as to be fit for the rewards of an infinitely wife and perfect being.

THAT fin is the mifery and diforder, the madness and folly of our nature, which as neceffarily feparates us from God, as God is contrary to all unreasonablenefs.

I HAVE juft mentioned these things, to help us to

con