in the Noctes: "Amai'st a' the lawyers I ken in the Parliament House are excellent domestic characters -that is to say, far frae being the dour deevils you wad suppose aforeharun from hearin' them gullorin at the bar, and flitin' on ane anither, like sae mony roudies." Lawyers and actors deserve great praise for being good-tempered and affable in private, and it must be claimed for our profession that they are the best fellows" in the world. 66 Sir James, in his younger days, was very gallant and tender to the ladies. Perhaps the most amusing electioneering appeal ever issued is the following written by him, on behalf of himself and another candidate for the House of Commons, in 1832: "To the ladies of Norwich. 'None but the brave deserve the fair. If ever the sweets of social virtue, the wrath of honest zeal, the earnings of industry, and the prosperity of trade, had any influence in the female breast, you have now a happy opportunity of exercising it to the advantage of your country,-your cause. If ever the feelings of a parent, wife, sister, friend, or lover had a sympathy with the public virtue, now is your time to indulge the fonder passion. If ever you felt for the ruin and disgrace of England, and for the miseries and deprivations occasioned by the obnoxious Reform Bill, you are called upon by the most tender and affectionate tie in nature to exert your persuasive influence on the mind of a father, brother, husband, or lover; tell them not to seek filial duty, congenial regard, matrimonial comfort, nor tender compliance, till they have saved your country from perdition!-posterity from slavery! History furnishes us with instances of female patriotism equal to any in the page of war and politics. Oh, may the generous and beatific charms of female persuasion prevail with the citizens of Norwich to espouse the cause of real liberty - of STORMONT AND SCARLETT. None but a handsome man would have dared make such an appeal, and it produced the desired effect. Sir James was elected, and posterity was safe. But when Sir James became Lord Abinger, and chief baron of the Court of Exchequer, he seems to have abated somewhat of his tenderness for the fair sex. In the case of Atkins v. Curwood, 7 C. & P. 759, the court held that the defendant, a poor barrister, was not bound for sundry drygoods, to the amount of £67, ordered by his wife as an outfit for a watering-place, whither her husband had forbidden her going; and in pronouncing judgment Lord Abinger exclaimed, "Let the wedding-dresses be struck off!" Such is the ingratitude of mankind. How could Sir James reconcile such a command with the "safety of posterity?" Again, in Lane v. Ironmonger, 13 M. & W. 368, his lordship declared that bonnets, laces, feathers, and ribands, to the amount of only £5,287 in part of a year, were extravagant! Sir James was not then a candidate for office, or Mrs. Curwood and Mrs. Ironmonger were not Norwich ladies. When he was at the bar, he was counsel for a Mr. Cole, defendant in a breach of promise case, and, it is said, resisted the introduction in evidence of certain letters written by his client, on the ground that they were not stamped! Whereupon a young counsel made the following impromptu: "If requests such as these in the Pleas are admitted, Our fair countrywomen will quite be outwitted, Unless in their reticules blank stamps they carry, And take a receipt for each kiss till they marry." Abinger's merits as a judge can be summed up by saying that he was sensible, rapid, accurate, and impartial. He distinguished himself neither on the bench or in Parliament. He was a conservative by nature and in politics, and yet was not a bigot, for he was not averse to a moderate degree of reform ported Macintosh and Romilly's efforts to mitigate and to religious toleration. Early in life he supthe Draconian severities of the criminal code. We even find, in Henry Crabbe Robinson's diary, that when the diarist visited Ireland, a public dinner was given him, at which a toast was drank to "Mr. Scarlett, and the liberal members of the English bar." After this he was accused of having "ratted." Aside from this, nothing seems to have been said against him, and not much for him. The biographer of the Countess of Blessington informs us that he had a fine taste in literature, and especially in the classics, and indeed his letters to the Countess indicate it. His private life appears to have been exemplary, and he does not seem to have been avaricious, for his estate was sworn under £18,000. Queerly enough, his will was informally executed. The best character ever drawn of him is by the author of The Bar, as follows: "Behind his brief-bag- - an enormous pile — He marks the sunken rocks and shelving shores, Confer along with riches and renown, The privilege to strike a man when down!" Abinger has not been celebrated by the poets. He has however received attention from a novelist. Bulwer, in Paul Clifford, introduces him under the name of Scarlet Jem, in company with a number of other public characters, at a flash tavern, called the "Jolly Angler," describing him as one with a very red face, and a lusty frame of body," and makes mine host thus discourse of him: "That, gentlemen, is Scarlet Jem; a dangerous fellow for a press, though he says he likes robbing alone, for a general press is not half such a good thing as it used to be formerly. You have no idea what a hand at disguising himself Scarlet Jem is. He has an old wig which he generally does business in; and you would not go for to know him again when he conceals himself under the wig. Oh, he's a precious rogue, is Scarlet Jem!" The allusion to the "press" is explained by the fact that Sir James, although he set out as a liberal, afterward changed his politi cal opinions, and incurred great unpopularity by a crusade against the newspapers. courts. The life of this lawyer teaches us the evanescent character of the celebrity of a mere advocate. He addicted himself exclusively to advocacy in the He took little part in public affairs. He cared little for mankind. His powers were absorbed in the business of getting verdicts. Doubtless he despised the lofty aspirations of Erskine and the versatile usefulness of Brougham. He got the verdicts of his contemporaries away from Brougham, but which will obtain the verdict of posterity? We must record him as we would an adept in operative surgery, who has never invented an instrument or devised a plan to facilitate his operations or diminish their pain, in comparison with the discoverer of anesthetic agents. He was a self-satisfied man. He had reason to be satisfied with his great success. But what self-satisfied man was ever of any particular use to the world beyond the little moment of his own active life? He lived in the applause and secure from the satire of his fellows, because there was nothing positive and independent in his character to excite the animadversion of any one. He hid his talent in a napkin. Although he lived in the greatest era of civil reform, and belonged to a profession whose proudest honor is to be champion of progress, liberty and amelioration, yet he was unwilling to identify himself heartily in that cause, and content to let others gain the glory of it. He contributed nothing to the increment of human knowledge of happiness. He sailed through the ocean of human life, a proud and stately ship, exciting admiration as he passed, but bearing no useful burden, and leaving no track behind. FINANCIAL LAW. SUPERIOR FORCE- PLEDGED SECURITIES. McLemore, plaintiff in error, v. Louisiana State Bank, the United States Supreme Court, Davis, J., delivering the opinion, has just considered an important question arising out of circumstances connected with the war of the rebellion. The case was this: The plaintiff was the owner of certain promissory notes and acceptances, in possession of the commercial firm in New Orleans, of which he was a member, which were pledged by the firm, in 1861 and 1862, to the bank, as security for money loaned to them. This was not met at maturity, and with the collaterals pledged for its repayment remained in possession of the bank until June 11th, 1863, when the bank was put into liquidation by order of Major-General Banks, and its effects transferred to military commissioners, appointed to close it up. The officers of the bank, while submitting to this order, because they had no power to resist it, deemed it unjust and oppressive, and entered a protest against it, on their minutes. During the administration of the affairs of the bank, by these commissioners, the pledged paper was sold for less than its face. In January, 1866, the military liquidation ceased, by order of Major-General Canby, and the effects of the bank which were unadministered, were restored to the corporators. Davis, J., said: The plaintiff, on the theory that the securities were parted with illegally, seeks to make the bank responsible for the proceedings of the commissioners, but this he cannot do. Certainly no act was done, or omitted to be done, by the bank, inconsistent with its duty, for it was only bound to take that care of the pledge which a careful man bestows on his own property. It is true it was the duty of the bank to return the pledge, or show a good reason why it could not be returned. This it has done by proof, that without any fault on its part, and against its protest, the pledge was taken from it by superior force; and where this is the case, the common law as well as the civil law holds that the duty of the pledgee is discharged. 2 Kent, 579; Story on Bailments, § 339; Commercial Bank v. Martin, 1 Anuual, 344. That the proceedings of General Banks and the liquidators appointed by him constituted "superior force," which no prudent administrator of the affairs of a corporation could either resist or prevent, is too plain for controversy. It was in the midst of war that the order was made, and with an army at hand to enforce it; there was nothing left but submission under protest. Any other course of action, under the circumstances, instead of benefiting, would have injured every one who had dealings with the bank. It has turned out that the plaintiff has suffered injury, but not through the fault of the officers of the bank, for they retained the notes and bills long after the paper for which they were given as security had matured, and until they were dispossessed of them by military force. Under such circumstances they have discharged every duty which they owed to the plaintiff, and if loss has been occasioned in consequence of the military order in question, the bank is not responsible for it. SUBSCRIPTIONS ΤΟ STOCK OBTAINED THROUGH FRAUD- LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDER OF INSOLVENT CORPORATION. THE liability of a stockholder in an insolvent corpo ration for subscription to stock obtained by fraud has just been considered by the United States Supreme Court in Upton, assignee, plaintiff in error, v. Tribilock. The action was brought by the assignee in bankruptcy of the Great Western Insurance Company of Illinois against defendant for eighty per cent of ten thousand dollars, the amount of stock subscribed by him. The defense was that the subscription was obtained by the fraudulent representations of the agent of the company to the effect that the defendant would only be legally responsible for twenty per cent of the amount of subscription; that defendant had paid this twenty per cent in full discharge of his liabilities on the stock. The word "non-assessable" was stamped on the certificate issued to defendant. It was held that the acceptance and holding of a certificate of shares in a corporation makes the holder liable to the responsibilities of a shareholder, and that any contract between the corporation and the stockholders limiting their liability as to unpaid installments of stock, was void as to the rights of the assignee, who represents creditors of the corporation. Hunt, J., who delivered the opinion, said: "The law is presumed to be equally within the knowledge of all parties. That a stockholder may relieve himself from his liability by proof that he was misinformed as to the effect of his contract when he made it, would be a disastrous doctrine. That a defendant, who could not by contract lawfully relieve himself from liability as a stockholder, can accomplish that result by proof that it was fraudulently represented to him that he could so relieve himself, would be strange indeed." Another point in the case arose upon the question whether defendant had used reasonable diligence in discovering the alleged fraud and in repudiating his contract. The transaction took place in 1870, and the defendant stated that he did not suspect that he was liable according to law as to the eighty per cent until the assignee demanded it of him in 1873. In February, 1871, the defendant had asked for a rescission of his contract on the ground that it had been fraudulently represented that a note, which he gave for his stock, should be held in Iowa, which representation had been violated by the removal of the note to Chicago. The judge charged the jury in effect that the attempt of the defendant to repudiate the contract in 1871, after finding that he had been deceived in some respects, could be made available in this action. Held, error. Miller, J., delivered a dissenting opinion, in which the Chief Justice and Bradley, J., concurred, holding that where an agent of an existing corporation procures a subscription of additional stock in it by fraudulent representations, the fraud can be relied on as a defense to a suit for the unpaid installments, when suit is brought by the corporation; and that, if the stockholder has in reasonable time repudiated the contract and offered to rescind before the insolvency or bankruptcy of the corporation, the defense is valid against the assignee of the incorporation. CIVIL WAR - EFFECT ON PARTNERSHIPS. אן Matthews v. McStea, the United States Supreme Court adjudicated the question whether a state of civil war dissolved a partnership existing between persons in the hostile sections. The cause of action arose in an acceptance of a bill of exchange by Brandon, Chambliss & Co., of New Orleans, it being alleged that Matthews was, at the time of the acceptance, a member of that firm. The bill of exchange was dated April 23, 1861, made payable in one year to the order of McStea, Value & Co., and it was accepted by Brandon, Chambliss & Co. on the day of its date. The principal defense was that, at the time when the acceptance was made, Matthews was a resident of New York; that other members of the firm were residents of Louisiana; and that, before the acceptance, the copartnership was dissolved by the war of the rebellion. The question before this court is, whether the partnership was dissolved by the war before April 23, 1861. The court held that the partnership was not dissolved at the time mentioned. Strong, J., who delivered the opinion, said that the general rule is that a state of war dissolves commercial partnership between citizens of the contending nations, for their continued existence would involve community of interest and mutual dealing between enemies. Still further, civil war brings with it all the consequences in this regard, which attend upon a state of foreign war. But while this is true, as a general rule, it is not without exceptions. Trading with a public enemy may be authorized by the sovereign, and even, to a limited extent, by a military commander. See Bynkershoek, Quæst. Jur. Pub., lib. 1, ch. 3; Halleck, Treatise on Laws of War, p. 676 et seq. In determining whether commercial intercourse was allowable between the North and South at the time of the acceptance herein involved, the character of the war and the manner in which it was commenced ought not to be overlooked. No declaration of war was ever made. The proclamation of the President, April 19th, declared a blockade of the ports of certain States. A previous proclamation, made April 15th, called for the militia to repossess the forts, property and places which had been taken from the United States government. The only interference with the business relations of citizens in all parts of the country, contemplated by the proclamation of April 19th, seems to have been such as the blockade might cause. That it was understood as an assent to continued business may be inferred from the subsequent action of the government in continuing mail service in Louisiana, and other rebellious States long after the blockade was declared. If it was not such an assent or permission, it was well fitted to deceive the public. In a civil war, it is important that unequivocal notice should be given of the illegality of commercial intercourse; for in a civil war only the government can know when the insurrection has assumed the character of war. It seems that commercial intercourse between the North and South, except as restricted by the blockade, was lawful, until the proclamation of August 16, 1861, issued in pursuance of the act of Congress of July 13, 1861. STUDIES THAT HELP FOR THE BAR. THE above formed the subject of a paper read recently by Sir Edward S. Creasy, ex-chief justice of Ceylon, at the opening meeting of the Law Amendment Society, Adam street, Adelphi, London. Sir E. S. Creasy said that his address was not intended to deal with schemes of legal education by which the law student received his strictly professional training for becoming a barrister. That matter had been fully provided for by the proper authority, the council appointed for the purpose by the four Inns of Court. He would only observe how gratifying it was to him to mark the general interest now taken in these matters, compared with the indifference which prevailed in times of which he had a strong personal recollection. The number and brilliancy of the prizes to be won through success at the English bar, and the sterling honors of a seat on the judicial bench, were continually increasing with the increase of imperial wealth, power, civilization, and intellectual energy. The spirit of enlightened jurisprudence, of comprehensive forensic philosophy, which they might hope to see soon prevalent over all the tribunals, would tell more and more in favor of the young advocate, who, to good natural abilities and a strong will, added the results of high mental training on sound principles. The competition would probably be more severe than formerly, but there would be less jostling with unworthy rivals. The new rules respecting the admission of students, as well as those which prescribed their forensic curriculum, must greatly, though gradually, purify the profession. The Margitis spirit was terribly rampant in England at present; and there was no class of students whom it was calculated to injure more than him who was meant for the bar. He spoke advisedly. He knew that the advocate in full practice was continually called on to deal at short notice with questions connected with almost every science .. and art; and it might seem that a discursive education was the best preparative for a discursive practice. But the fact was undeniable, that the very valuable forensic power of rapidly comprehending each subject pro re nata, could never be wielded by any who had not trained their minds to the thorough mastery of some one or more subjects. His advice to students long had been, "Learn some one or few chosen subjects laboriously and profoundly." Controversies, to be settled by argument and not by brute force, must necessarily exist among civilized men. To secure a fair trial it was indispensable to provide the means of bringing fully and fairly before the judge the facts and arguments on both sides. For this purpose it had been thought necessary in almost every civilized country, ancient as well as modern, to have a trained body of professional men, by one or more of whom the case on either side might be conducted, according to pre-appointed and orderly forensic regulations. This by no means involved any right for the professional advocate to employ any artifice or scheme of attack which would not be fairly open to the litigant himself if conducting his own case. A few years ago one, who had been most eminent in our courts, permitted himself to utter, on a great public occasion, the sentiment that "the first great duty of an advocate is to reckon every thing subordinate to the interests of his client." But this doctrine was promptly disowned and rebuked by the Lord Chief Justice of England, who was present, Sir Alexander Cockburn declared that the arms which an advocate wields he ought to use as a warrior, not as an assassin. He ought to uphold the interests of his client per fas, but not per nefas." As for the objection that no one should plead a cause unless he thoroughly approved of it, the answer was as true as old, that, until a case was tried out, they could not, in general, know which side was right or wrong; or, rather, they could not know on which side right or wrong preponderated. It was a remark made by Lord Eldon, that "people talk about the law as if each litigant's case was either all black or all white; whereas the great majority of cases are gray." First and foremost amongst the studies necessary to qualify men for the bar were English and classics. It was hardly possible for a barrister to follow up his profession if he were ignorant of the language of Roman law, and of all the medieval and of many of the modern commentators on that law. Greek, though not so palpably indispensable, could not be neglected without heavy loss, and was, in point of fact, always studied together with Latin under the joint title of the classics. Next he ranked the mathematics. He should go out of the proper bounds of his address if he were to attempt to set up any thing like a formal scheme for the study of rhetoric. He had indicated the sources; he would only add a few hints about using them. But first, he must say something about the detection of gross rhetorical, or, as they were generally called, of sophistical fallacies. These things must be learned, however resolved the student might be not to taint his mind practicing them. He must learn them, so as to grapple with adversaries who employ them against him. There had been great difference of opinion among able men as to the good and the ill effects of frequent and early part.cipation in the sham fights of debating societies. His own opinion was decidedly in favor of attending them, provided (and the proviso was very important) that the student always remembered the nature of the place and its proper purpose. The student, when at a debating society, should ever keep before his mind the fact that his purpose is not to win plaudits in that mimic encounter, but to get well trained for actual conflicts hereafter. He had a caution to add, which applied to an advocate when he had got full practice even more strongly than to a commencing student. In however honorable a spirit he might follow his profession, the habit of having always to maintain a pre-appointed side of finding arguments, and such arguments only as would suit the foregone conclusion, instead of letting the conclusion depend on a free and full examination of the arguments on all sides - had au unhealthy effect on the mind. In order to counteract as far as possible this evil influence, he should always keep up some line of study, seeking after truth for the sake of truth, and for the sake of truth alone. COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT. ABATEMENT. Stipulation of attorney against abatement of action.One Peck commenced an action against defendant to recover damages for an alleged wrongful ejection from defendant's car, and recovered a judgment therein, which was set aside upon appeal and a new trial granted. Subsequently, at a Circuit Court, where the cause was noticed for trial, the defendant's counsel applied for a postponement of the trial, and as a condition therefor, stipulated in writing that in case of the death of the then plaintiff before final judgment and determination of the action, the cause of action should survive, and any verdict and judgment therein be regarded as if rendered in his life-time. This stipulation was presented to the court with the application for postponement. The application was granted. Before the case came on for trial Peck died, and Cox, his executor, was substituted as plaintiff. Upon the trial judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, which was reversed on appeal and new trial granted, on the ground that the stipulation was invalid and the action abated. 6 N. Y. Sup. 405; 4 Hun, 176. Held, error; that the giving of the stipulation must, under the circumstances, be regarded as a compliance by the defendant's counsel with a condition imposed by the court upon granting the postponement, and, as such, was within the authority of the counsel, and that the court could lawfully exact it as a condition of postponing the trial. (Ames v. Webber, 10 Wend. 575, 624; S. C., 11 id. 186; Griffith v. Williams, 1 Cromp. & J. 47; Palmer v. Cohen, 2 B. & Ad. 966.) The plaintiff could, in view of the stipulation, have lawfully proceeded with the action in the name of the testator, or he could be substituted, as was done. The general term having reversed the judgment on the ground that the action abated, and denied a new trial without considering other grounds upon which a new trial was claimed, the judgment of the general term was reversed and the cause was remitted to that court for the consideration of the other questions in the case. Cox v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co. Opinion by Andrews, J. R. A. Stanton, for appellant. Isaac S. Newton, for respondent. ACTION. Against heir at law and next of kin.-Plaintiff brought action against defendant, as heir at law and next of kin of one D. who died intestate, leaving property, real and personal, to recover moneys, claimed to be due for services rendered said intestate in his life-time by plaintiff, pursuant to an agreement. The complaint alleged among other things that defendant had received from the proceeds of D.'s real estate, moneys equal in amount to plaintiff's claim. At the trial defendant proved that this claim had been presented to the administrators of D.'s estate, and had been by them rejected; that it was not referred pursuant to the statute, and that plaintiff failed to sue within six months thereafter. It was also proved that there was a large sum of money in the hands of the administrators unadministered when the action was brought, but which was afterwards distributed. The referee dismissed the complaint. Held (affirming the judgment below), that plaintiff could not maintain the action on the grounds (1) that it did not appear that the deceased left no personal assets out of which the debt could be obtained, or that it could not be collected in the manner provided by 2 R. S. 452, § 32; (2) that the action having been commenced, within two years after letters of administration were granted, was barred by 2 R. S. 109, § 53, and this objection was not waived by an omission to plead it; (3) that plaintiff having presented his claim to the administrators, and it having been rejected by them, he had no remedy under 2 R. S. 90, § 42; (4) that the action was not brought within six months after its rejection by the administrators as required by 2 R. S., p. 89, § 38-such requirement being applicable as well in an action against an heir at law as against an administrator or executor. Selover v. Coe. Opinion by Miller, J. Joseph M. Pray, for appellant. APPEAL. In an action to determine the validity of a lease, the plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that if the lease was adjudged valid the pecuniary result would not be objectionable to plaintiffs. Held, that this was not a surrender by the plaintiffs of the right to appeal from the judgment of a court, nor did it amount to an estoppel of the exercise of such right. The right to appeal being a valuable right, an agreement to surrender it must be based upon a consideration, or the facts must amount to an estoppel. Ogdensburg and Lake Champlain R. R. Co. v. Vermont and Canada R. R. Co. Opinion by Earl, J. MANUFACTURING CORPORATION. Defendants, trustees of a manufacturing corporation, organized under chapter 40, Laws of 1848, were charged with a violation of 1 R. S. p. 601, § 2, in having declared and paid dividends from the capital stock and not from surplus profits. Held (affirming the judgment below, 5 N. Y. Sup. 305; S. C., 4 Hun, 648), that the case was governed by section 13 of the act of 1848, and not by the Revised Statutes, and that the act of 1848 provides the only penalty recoverable as such, in cases of the kind, and alone names the class of persons who may sue therefor. Excelsior Petroleum Co. v. Lacey. Opinion by Folger, J. W. H. Dickinson, for appellant. J. E. Parsons, for respondent. MAYHEM. Indictment and conviction for mayhem under 2 R. S. 664, § 27, in biting off a portion of the ear of complainant. There was no evidence tending to show that the prisoner lay in wait for the complainant, or that prior to the commission of the offense he had con |