to such minor. Johnson v. Gibson, 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y. C. P.), 231.

Where husband and wife are divorced for the acts of the husband, and the court awards the custody of the children to the mother, she may provide for them as a part of her family, and he will be liable for the expenses thus incurred. Stanton v. Willson, 3 Day, 37; Plaster v. Plaster, 47 Ill. 290; Bazeley v. Forder, L. R., 3 Q. B. 559. But see Finch v. Finch, 22 Coun. 411. Payment of an infant's bills, made after notice to the dealer not to trust him, and when, at the time of payment, the father gives a new notice not to trust the infant, will not bind the father to pay debts afterward contracted by the son. Wilkes v. McClung, 29 Ga. 371. Where one trades with an infant, and gives credit to him alone, with a knowledge of all the facts in the case, he cannot sustain an action against the father for the necessaries so delivered. Gordon v. Potter, 17 Vt. 348.

The legal liability of the parent ceases when the infant arrives at full age. Mills v. Wyman, 3 Pick. 207; Wood v. Gills, Coxe, 449.

DISBARRING ATTORNEYS.

HE Supreme Court of Maine has recently had occa

parte Garland, 4 Wall. 378; Case of Austin et als., 5 Rawle, 203.

When we consider the duties and powers devolved upon an attorney at law in virtue of his office, and the temptations to abuse his professional franchise, the importance and necessity of the power of the court, to remove him from the bar, can scarcely be overstated. An attorney at law in general may waive objections to evidence, make admissions in pleading or by parol, enter nonsuits and defaults and make any admission of facts and any disposition of suits that his clients could make. Upon his advice and consent in the management of causes, the protection of the property, reputation and even the life of his clients, in a great degree, is not unfrequently made to depend. In order to fit him for this trust, the possession of a character, fortified by high moral principle, is indispensable. The statute makes "a good moral chara condition precedent to his admission to the bar. By his admission, the court hold him out to the public as worthy of public confidence and patronage. Upon this indorsement by the court, the public have a right to rely and to presume that his moral character continues to stand approved by the court. If "a good moral character" is indispensable to entitle one to admission to the bar, it is obvious that the necessity for its continuance becomes enhanced by the conflicts,

acter

an attorney, and in doing so, delivered an opinion of considerable interest, as bearing on the duties and obligations of attorneys. We give below all of it, except the discussion of the facts of the case.

This is a complaint for the removal of the respondent from his office as attorney and counselor at law. The complaint, which is in the form of a motion, signed by A. Sanborn, Esq., of and for the Penobscot bar, prays for a rule upon the respondent to show cause why he should not be removed from the office of an attorney and counselor at law of this court, upon and for the following charges, to wit: That he does not possess a good moral character, in that at the February term of said court, A. D. 1860, he was convicted of the crime of forgery, and, at the next August term of said court, he was sentenced to confinement to hard labor in the State prison for the term of two years; and in this, that he has been guilty of repeated dishonest, if not criminal, acts, and in one, if not more, of obtaining money under false pretenses; and of unprofessional practice in this, that he has wittingly promoted and sued false and groundless suits, and otherwise violated his oath and the duties of his said office. An attorney at law is an officer of the court, as appears from the terms of his oath of office, to wit: "You will conduct yourself in the office of an attorney within the courts, according to the best of your knowledge and discretion and with all good fidelity, as well to the courts as your clients." The order of his admission to the bar is the judgment of the court that he possesses the requisite legal qualifications and good moral character to entitle him to practice the profession of an attorney at law. From the moment of his entrance upon the duties of his office he becomes responsible to the court for his official misconduct. The tenure of his office is during good behavior, and he can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and determined by the court, after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. In the absence of specific provision to the contrary, the power of removal is commensurate with the power of appointment. Ex

is daily liable. For his official misconduct there is no power of removal but in the court. This power, there-fore, is at once necessary to protect the court, preserve the purity of the administration of justice, and maintain the integrity of the bar. The power of removal, says Chief Justice Bigelow, in Randall's Case, post, was given, not as a mode of inflicting a punishment for an offense, but in order to enable the courts to prevent the scandal and reproach which would be occasioned to the administration of the law, by the continuance in office of those who had violated their oaths or abused their trust, and to take away from such persons the power and opportunity of injuring others by further acts of misconduct and malpractice."

The power of removal, however, is a judicial power to be exercised by a sound, judicial discretion and in accordance with well-established principles of law, where the evidence is of a conclusive character. But while its use calls for judicial discretion, it also involves judicial firmness.

The proceedings for the removal of an attorney at law do not partake of the nature of criminal procedure in which a party has a right to insist upon a full, formal and technical description of the matter with which he is charged. They are usually commenced by motion to the court, setting forth the misconduct of the attorney, in terms that may be readily comprehended by him, and praying for a rule on him to show cause why he should not be removed from the bar, for the causes assigned. This course was pursued in the case at bar. The motion contains the general charge that "the respondent does not possess a good moral character," and then states, in general terms, the acts by which he has forfeited his claim to such character. We think the motion is sufficiently specific to advise the respondent of the charges he is required to meet, and, if sustained by the evidence, affords sufficient ground for his removal from his office as attorney at law. Randall, pet'r for mandamus, 11 Allen, 479.

The causes for which an attorney at law may be re

moved from the bar, from the nature of the case, are divers and numerous. He may be removed for violating his official oath; for conviction of perjury or other felony; for attempting to get an opposing attorney drunk in order to obtain advantage of him in the trial of a cause; for obtaining money of his client by false pretenses; for advocating the admission in evidence of a forged copy of a letter, kuowing it to be forged, when offered by his associate counsel; for ceasing to possess a good moral character," and for any ill practice attended with fraud and corruption, and committed against the principles of justice and common honesty. Ex parte Brownsholl, Cook, 829; Austin's Case, ante; Dickens' Case, 67 Penn. 169; People v. Ford,. 54 Ill. 520; Rice v. Commonwealth, B. Monr. 485; Mills' Case, 1 Mann, 393; In re Percy, 36 N. Y. 651; Bryant's Case, 24 N. H. 255; Burr's Case, 1 Wheel. Crim. L. 503; Leigh's Case, 1 Munn, 481.

It is a mistaken view of this subject, as the foregoing authorities show, to conclude that an attorney at law can only be disbarred for acts done "in his office as attorney" or "within the courts," in the terms of his oath of office. On the contrary, an attorney may be guilty of disreputable practices and gross immoralities in his private capacity and without the pale of the courts, which render him unfit to associate with gentlemen, disqualify him for the faithful discharge of his professional duties in or out of court, and render him unworthy to minister in the forum of justice. Where such a case arises, from whatever acts or causes the cardinal condition of the attorney's admission to the bar, the possession of “a good moral character" is forfeited, and it will become the solemn duty of the court, upon a due presentment of the case, to revoke the authority it gave the offending member as a symbol of legal fitness and moral uprightness, lest it should be exercised for evil or tarnished with shame.

In Leigh's Case, ante, Judge Roane says: "None are permitted to act as attorneys at law but those who are allowed by the judges to be skilled in law, and certified by the court to be persons of honesty, probity and good demeanor. Having obtained the sauction of the court touching these two particulars, an attorney is licensed or allowed to practice, and the court have also a continuing control over him, with power to revoke his license for unworthy practice or behavior."

In Percy's Case, ante, the court says: "It is insisted by the appellant that the misconduct justifying the removal is some deceit, malpractice or misdemeanor, practiced or committed in the exercise of the profession only, and that general bad character or misconduct will not sustain the proceeding. I cannot concur in this position. It has been seen that the right of admission to practice is made by the statute to depend upon the possession of a good moral character, joined with the requisite learning and ability.

"It is equally important that this character be possessed after admission, while in the practice of the profession, as that it should exist at the time. It would be an anomaly in the law to make the good moral character a prerequisite to admission to au office of life tenure, while no provision is made in case such character is wholly lost."

In Mills' Case, ante, the court held that a bad moral character is good cause for disbarring an attorney. In that case, Whipple, C. J., remarked as follows: "Should this court, after being officially advised that one of its officers has forfeited the good name he possessed when permitted to assume the duties of his

office, still hold him out to the world as worthy of confidence, they would, in my opinion, fail in the performance of a duty cast upon them by the law. It is a duty they owe to themselves, to the bar and the public, to see that a power, which may be wielded for good or for evil, is not intrusted to incompetent or dishonest hands. The extreme judgment of expulsion is not intended as a punishment inflicted upon the individual, but as a measure necessary to the protection of the public, who have a right to demand of us that no person shall be permitted to aid in the administration of justice whose character is tainted with corruption."

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.*

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

1. A valid delivery is necessary to give legal existence to a deed or note; and this applies to negotiable instruments as well as to any other. Chipman v. Tucker.

2. Where, therefore, a negotiable note, and a mortgage securing it, were placed in the hands of a mere custodian, who had at the time the character of an indifferent person between the parties, with an express understanding that the instruments were not to be delivered to the payee of the note except upon the happening of a certain event, which never occurred, and the custodian, without any authority whatever, turned over the instruments to the payee, and suit was brought on them by one who had the rights of a purchaser in good faith, for value, before maturity, no facts appearing to charge the defendant with negligence in allowing the instruments to be put into circulation, held, that they are void. Ib.

SLANDER.

1. Words are actionable which directly tend to the prejudice of any one in his office, profession or business. Gottbehnet v. Hubacheck.

2. Under this rule words are actionable which charge the chief engineer of a fire department with being drunk at a fire which it was his duty to extinguish. Ib.

3. In slander or libel, where the words charged are actionable per se, it is the duty of the court to so instruct the jury. Ib.

WATER-COURSE.

1. A "water-course" is a stream of water, usually flowing in a certain direction, in a regular channel, with bed and banks; though it is not necessary that the water should flow continually, but the channel may be sometimes dry. Eulrich v. Richter.

2. The term "water-course" does not include occasional bodies of surface water descending from the hills at certain seasons, down the hollows and ravines, without any definite channel, during times of rains or the melting of snow and ice. Ib.

3. In the case of such mere surface water, not constituting a water-course, the owner of lower land has a right to obstruct its natural flow over his land by preventing it from coming within his boundaries. Ib. 4. The question in this case being whether water whose flow was obstructed by defendant (as owner of the lower land) was a 46 water-course." Held, that upon the evidence this was a question of fact for the jury, and it was error to instruct them as matter of law that the stream was a water-course. Ib.

* From O. M. Conover, Esq., State Reporter.

OBITUARY.

SIR GEORGE HONYMAN.

IR GEORGE late a judge of the

S English Court of Common Pleas, died at Tunbridge

Wells, on September 16. He was born in the year 1819, and was the eldest son of Colonel Sir Ord J. Honyman, of Armadale, Sutherlandshire. He was called to the bar at the Middle Temple, in June, 1849, and was a member of the Home Circuit. In 1866 he was made a queen's counsel, and in January, 1873, he was appointed a judge of the court of Common Pleas; but this office he was compelled to resign from illhealth in the early part of the present year. At the bar, especially before he was made queen's counsel, he had a large commercial practice, and was well known as among the foremost of the counsel retained by the chief London firms. But almost immediately after his promotion premonitory signs of the malady, to which he has succumbed, betrayed themselves, a deterioration in his intellectual force and in his power of self-control becoming apparent to those who had the opportunity of observing him. Had health and strength been continued to him, we can hardly doubt that his career on the bench would have corresponded to the expectations of those who appreciated his talents at the bar.

THE

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

HE following decisions were handed down in the New York Court of Appeals on Friday, October 8, 1875:

Motion to dismiss appeal granted, with costs of appeal to time of making motion- Ryan v Waule.Motion of plaintiff to open default granted, and motion of defendant to open default and reinstate appeal denied, without costs on either motion-Crouse v. Marshall.- - Judgment affirmed with costs-Smith v. New York and Oswego Midland Railroad Co.; Ross v. Terry; Miles v. Brown; The Chapman Slate Co. v. Sutcliffe. Order granting new trial affirmed, and judgment absolute for defendant on stipulation, with costsJones v. Walker. Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide the event - The Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlard. No. 147. The Union National Bank v. Kupper. Argument resumed and concluded.No. 145. Edward Strong, applt. v. James E. Lyon, respt. Argued by Thomas Allison of counsel for applt. and by Hiram A. Johnson for respt.- No. 158. Maria S. Swift, respt. v. The Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., applt. Submitted by respondent. Argued by George Bliss for applt.- No. 159. Stephen C. Lusk, respt. v. John C. Campbell and another, applts. Submitted.Proclamation made and Court took a recess to Tuesday, November 9, 1875.

Chief Justice, W. B. Richards; Puisne Judges, S. H. Strong, of Ontario; J. T. Taschereau, of Quebec: T. Fourrier, of Quebec; W. A. Henry, of Nova Scotia; and Wm. J. Ritchie, of New Brunswick. Robert Cassels, of Ottawa, has been appointed register of the court. Senator Edmunds, of Vermont, has been tendered the position of United States circuit judge, made vacant by the death of Judge Woodruff.

The thriftlessness of professional men is proverbial, and notwithstanding the popular notion that lawyers are an overpaid and greedy set of fellows and of the fact that they are, as a class, fairly paid, they seldom accumulate a competence from professional fees. This is not because they labor for fame rather than "pelf," but because they are careless of their own pecuniary interests. The London Spectator gives the following reason for this carelessness, and we do not doubt that it is the true reason: "No doubt one of the great reasons why professional men are, on the whole, so thriftless in proportion to their gains is this: that the occupation which absorbs their energies is not one, the gains of which can be extended by the help of judicious saving and investment. A man cannot be successful in commerce, nor, indeed, very successful even as a skilled laborer, without a strong motive for saving in order to secure more success, either of the same sort or at least of a closely analogous sort. But a professional mau who is very successful rarely has a strictly professional motive for saving. The more his heart is absorbed in his work, the less he thinks of providing for himself in directions which are in no way bound up with his work."

The following Order was made by the Court of Appeals on the 7th inst.: "Ordered, That the Clerk make a new calendar for the 9th day of November next, to which day this Court will take a recess by adjournment on the 8th instant, and that he place on such calendar all causes on the present calendar which shall not have been heard or otherwise disposed of; also, all such pending appeals as shall be regularly noticed for argument, and in which proof of notice of argument shall be filed with the Clerk on or before the 25th day of October instant."

The following anecdote of Mr. Webster is told by a correspondent of the Cleveland Herald, as an illustration of the uncertainty of worldly fame, and the folly of making it the controlling object of life: "A few years since, but before the great Northern Railroad passed through his farm, he was on his way to the old homestead. He took the stage at Concord, N. H., and had for a companion a very old man. After some conversation he ascertained that the old man was from the neighboring town of Salisbury, and asked him if he ever knew Captain Webster. Surely I did,' said the old man; and the captain was a brave and good man, sir; and nobly did he fight for us, with General Stark, at Bennington.' 'Did he leave any children?' said Mr. Webster. 'Oh, yes; there was Ezekiel, and, I think, Daniel.' And what has become of them,' asked Mr. Webster. Why, Ezekiel - and he was a powerful man, sir- I have heard him plead in court often; yes, sir, he was a powerful man, and fell dead while pleading at Concord.' 'Well,' said Mr. Webster, and what has become of Daniel?' 'Daniel, Daniel,' replied the old man, thoughtfully: why Daniel, I believe, is a lawyer about Boston somewhere.'"'

Justice Davis, again to criticise me. I refuse to run this risk; I refuse to take a cent myself, and I deny your honor's jurisdiction to award either of us any thing at this stage." We are surprised that Judge Lawrence did not at least reprimand the counsel for his remarks; for no matter what opinions may be entertained of either Judge Davis or of Judge Daniels, such an assault upon them ought not to be tolerated in the very court of which they are members. Judge Lawrence has, however, reported the language to the General Term, so that Judge Davis has before him this time a genuine "contempt case."

In

The last number of the American Law Review contains a conveyancer's romance, entitled "The History of a Title," which ought to be carefully studied by those lawyers who are known as "conveyancers," and more especially by lawyers who are not known as "conveyancers," but who "step over" to the County Clerk's Office "to see that the title is all right." We can do the story but scant justice in this brief space, but here is its outline: Thomas Ingalls, dying in 1830, devised the locus in quo, situate in Boston, to his wife for life, then over in fee to his only child, William Ingalls, to whom also he gave the large residue of his property, after directing his executors to pay $25,000, each, to two nephews. The testator dying, his personal estate proved to be barely sufficient to pay his debts. 1845, the widow dying, the son entered into possession of the estate and enjoyed it for fifteen years, when, in 1860, the two cousins claimed that the real estate should be applied to the payment of their legacies. As there was no limitation of actions for legacies (Kent v. Dunham, 106 Mass. 586), the claim, though made thirty years after the testator's death, was not barred; and as the will gave the son what he would have taken by inheritance, the law regarded the devise to him as void, and the estate being therefore an undevised residue, was assets to be applied to the payment of legacies. Ellis v. Page, 7 Cush. 161. The estate was therefore sold, and the cousins became the purchasers. Soon after they were startled by a summons "to answer unto John Rogers in a writ of entry," and these were the facts: In 1750, John Buttolph, the then owner, devised an estate tail in the property to his brother Thomas, who died in 1775, leaving an only daughter, the wife of Timothy Rogers. She died in 1790, leaving two sons and a daughter, having devised the estate to her daughter, who, in 1800, conveyed to Thomas Ingalls. Peter, the oldest son of Mrs. Rogers, was a non compos; he died in 1854, without issue. John Rogers, the demandant, was the oldest son of the second son of Mrs. Rogers. As in Massachusetts, an estate tail descends, according to the old English rule, to the oldest son, and to the daughter only in

default of a son (Corbin v. Healy, 20 Pick. 514); and as an estate tail cannot be devised by a tenant in tail (Hall v. Priest, 6 Gray, 18), therefore the will of Mrs. Timothy Rogers was of no effect, and the estate in fact descended to her oldest son, Peter. He being a non compos, the statute of limitation did not begin to run against him. His heir in tail, the demandant, had, under the statute, ten years after his uncle's death within which to bring his action (Mass. Gen. Stat., ch. 154, § 5), and John Rogers recovered judgment.

And now some enterprising young limb of the law discovered that the estate was conveyed to John Buttolph, in 1730, by Hosea Johnson, and that it was conveyed to the latter, in 1710, by Benjamin Parsons, whose deed, however, did not mention "heirs. " Therefore, Johnson took only a life estate. Buffum v. Hutchinson, 1 Allen, 58. Johnson died in 1786. The sole party then entitled to the reversion as heir of Parsons was his granddaughter just married. She died in 1861, but, having been under the legal disability of coverture all the time, the statute of limitation gave her heirs ten years after her death to bring their action. Those heirs, in 1889, recovered from Rogers the land which he had just recovered from "the cousins," and they sold it to John Smith. The buildings on the land were destroyed during the great fire in Boston. Smith thereupon built an elegant block of buildings, covering the entire estate. And now

it was discovered, that when the land was conveyed in 1660, it was upon the express condition that no building should ever be erected upon a portion thereof. Smith had broken this condition, and a forfeiture of the estate could be enforced if the true parties in interest could be found. Gray v. Blanchard, 8 Pick. 284. Happily, it turned out that Mr. William Ingalls, who had years before lost the estate to satisfy his cousins' legacies, was the party to enforce the forfeiture, and he ultimately “came to his own again," with a new block of buildings thereon. There is a moral to this story too obvious to be appended.

Senator Edmonds having declined the United States Circuit Judgeship it has been tendered to Alexander S. Johnson, late of the Court of Appeals. We doubt if a better man or a worthier successor of Judge Woodruff could have been selected. Judge Johnson has had, in the old Court of Appeals, in the Commission of Appeals, and recently in the present Court of Appeals, a long and valuable experience, but beside and beyond that he is a man of unusual ability, and a lawyer of more than ordinary erudition. It was a loss to the State when he retired from the Bench, and it will be a subject for gratulation if he shall consent to return to judicial life.