264

CHANGES IN A CONSTITUTION.

[ESSAY III. a constant accession of light. The intellectual condition of the world is advancing with onward strides. And both these considerations intimate that forms of government should be capable of admitting, without disturbance, those improvements which experience may dictate or the advancing condition of a community may require. To reject improvement is absurd: to incapacitate ourselves for adopting it is absurd also. It surely is no unreasonable sacrifice of vanity to admit, that those who succeed us may be better judges of what is good for themselves than we can be for them. Upon these grounds, no constitution should be regarded as absolutely and sacredly fixed, so that none ought and none have a right to alter it. The question of right is easily settled. It is inherent in the community, or in the legislature as their agents. It would be strange, indeed, if our predecessors five or six centuries ago had a right to make a constitution for us, which we have no right to alter for ourselves. Such checks ought, no doubt, to be opposed to alterations, that they may not be lightly and crudely made. The exercise of political wisdom is to discover that point in which sufficient obstacles are opposed to hasty innovation, and in which sufficient facility is afforded for real improvement by virtuous means. The common disquisitions about the value of stability in governments, like those about the sacredness of forms, are frequently founded in inaccurate views. What confusion, it is exclaimed, and what anarchy and commotions would follow, if we were at liberty continually to alter political constitutions! But it is forgotten that these calamities result from the circumstance that constitutions are not made easily alterable. The interests which so many have in keeping up the present state of things make them struggle against an alteration; and it is this struggle which induces the calamities, rather than any thing necessarily incidental to the alteration itself. Take away these interests, take away the motives to these struggles, and improvements may be peacefully made. Yet it must be acknowledged that to take away these interests is no light task. We must once again refer to "the present condition of mankind," and confess that it may be doubted whether any community would possess a stable or an efficient government, if no interests bound its officers to exertion. To such a government patronage is probably at present indispensable. They who possess patronage, and they who are enriched or exalted by its exercise, array themselves against those propositions of change which would diminish their eminence or their wealth. And I perceive no means by which the existence of these interests and their consequent operation can be avoided, except by that elevation of the moral character of our race which would bring with it adequate motives to serve the public without regard to honours or rewards. It is however indisputably true, that these interests should be as much as is practicable diminished; and in whatever degree this is effected, in the same degree there will be a willingness to admit those improvements in the form of governments which prudence and wisdom may prescribe.

"Let no new practice in politics be introduced, and no old one anxiously superseded, till called for by the public voice."* The same advice may be given respecting the alteration of forms; because alterations which are not so called for may probably fail of a good effect from the want

* Godwin: Pol. Just. v. ii. p. 593. This doctrine is adverse to that which is quoted in the first page of this chapter, where to be able to provide for mere physical wants is stated to be a sufficient qualification for the reception of an entirely new system of politics.

CHAP. 6.]

POPULAR GOVERNMENT.

265

of a congenial temper in the people, and because, as the public wish is the natural measure of sound political institutions, even beneficial changes ought not to be forced upon them against their own consent. The public mind, however, should be enlightened by a government. The legislator who perceives that another form of government is better for his country, does not do all his duty if he declares himself willing to concur in the alteration when the country desires it: he should create that desire by showing its reasonableness.-Unhappily there is a vis inertiæ in governments of which the tendency is opposite to this. The interests which prompt men to maintain things as they are, and dread of innovation, and sluggishness, and indifference, occasion governments to be among the last portion of the community to diffuse knowledge respecting political truth. But when the public mind has by any means become enlightened, so that the public voice demands an alteration of an existing form, it is one of the plainest as well as one of the greatest duties of a government to make the alteration: not reluctantly but joyfully, not urging the prescription of ages, and what is called "the wisdom of our ancestors," but philosophically, yet soberly, accommodating present institutions to the present state of mankind.

If, then, it is asked by what general rule forms of government should be regulated, I would say,-Accommodate the form to the opinion of the community, whatever that community may prefer: and, adopt institutions such as will facilitate the peaceable admission of alterations as greater light and knowledge become diffused. I would not say to the sultan, Adopt the constitution of England to-morrow; because the sudden transition would probably effect, for a long time, more evil than good. I would not say to the King of France, Descend from the throne and establish a democracy; because I do not think, and experience does not teach us to think, that democracy, even if it were theoretically best, is best for France at the present day.

evi

Turning, indeed, to the probable future condition of the world, there is reason to think that the popular branches of all governments will progressively increase in influence, and perhaps eventually predominate. This appears to be the natural consequence of the increasing power of public opinion. The public judgment is not only the proper, but almost the necessary, eventual measure of political institutions; and it appears dent that as that judgment becomes enlightened, it will be exercised, and that, as it is exercised, it will prevail. The expression of public opinion upon political affairs, and consequently the influence of that opinion, partakes obviously of the principles of popular government. If public opinion governs, it must govern by some agency by which public opinion is expressed; and this expression can in no way so naturally be effected as by some modification of popular authority. These considerations, which appear obvious to reasoning, are enforced by experience. There is a manifest tendency in the world to the increase of the power of the public voice; and the effect is seen in the new constitutions which have been established in the New World and in the Old. Few permanent revolutions are effected in which the community do not acquire additional influence in governing themselves.

It will not perhaps be disputed, that if the world were wise and good, the best form of government would be that of democracy in a very simple state. Nothing would be wanting but to ascertain the general wish and to collect the general wisdom. If, therefore, the present propriety of

1

266

CHARACTER OF LEGISLATORS.

[ESSAY III. other forms of government results from the present condition of mankind, there is reason to suppose that they may gradually lapse away, as that condition, moral and intellectual, is improved. Whether mankind are thus improving readers may differently decide; and their various decisions will lead to various conclusions respecting the future predominance of the public voice: the writer of these pages is one who thinks that the world is improving, that virtue as well as knowledge is extending its power; and therefore that, as ages roll along, every form of government but that which consists in some organ of the general mind will gradually pass away. It may be hoped, too, that this gradual lapse will be occasioned, without solicitude on the part of those who then possess privileges or power, to retain either to themselves. That same state of virtue and excellence which enabled the people almost immediately to govern themselves would prevent others from wishing to retain the reins. Purer motives than the love of greatness, of power, or of wealth would influence them in the choice of their political conduct. They might have no motive so powerful as the promotion of the general weal. As no limit can be assigned to that degree of excellence which it may please the Universal Parent eventually to diffuse through the world,—so none can be assigned to the simplicity and purity of the form in which government shall be carried on. In truth, the mind, as it passes onward and still onward in its anticipations of purity, stops not until it arrives at that period when all government shall cease; when there shall be no wickedness to require the repressing arm of power; when terror to the evil-doers and praise to them that do well, shall no longer be needed, because none will do evil though there be no ruler to punish, and all will do well from higher and better motives than the praise of man.

In speaking of political constitutions, it is not sufficiently remembered in how great a degree good government depends upon the character and the virtue of those who shall conduct it. There is much of truth in the political maxim that "whatever is best administered is best." But how shall good administration be secured except by the good dispositions of the administrators? The great present concern of mankind, in the selection of their legislators, respects their political opinions rather than their moral and Christian character. This exclusive reference to political biases is surely unwise-because it leaves the passions and interests to operate without that control which individual virtue only can impart. Thus we are obliged to contrive reins and curbs for the public servants, as the charioteer contrives them for an unruly horse; too much forgetting that the best means of securing the safety of the vehicle of state are found in the good dispositions of those who move it onward. Political tendencies are important, but they are not the most important point: moral tendencies are the first and the greatest. The question in England should be, less, "ministerialist or oppositionist?" in America, less, "federalist or republican?" than in both, "a good or a bad man?" Rectitude of intention is the primary requisite; and whatever preference I might give to superiority of talents and to political principles, above all, and before all, I should prefer the enlightened Christian: knowing that his character is the best pledge of political uprightness, and that political uprightness is the best security of good government.

СНАР. 7.3

POLITICAL INFLUENCE.

267

CHAPTER VII.

POLITICAL INFLUENCE-PARTY-MINISTERIAL UNION.

THE system of governing by influence appears to be a substitute for the government of force,-an intermediate step between awing by the sword and directing by reason and virtue. When the general character of political measures is such that reason and virtue do not sufficiently support them to recommend them, on their own merits, to the public approbation, these measures must be rejected, or they must be supported by foreign means: and when, by the political institutions of a people, force is necessarily excluded, nothing remains but to have recourse to some species of influence. There is another ground upon which influence becomes, in a certain sense, necessary, which is, that there is so much imperfection of virtue in the majority of legislators, they are so much guided by interested, or ambitious, or party motives, that, for a measure to be recommended by its own excellence is sometimes not sufficient to procure their concurrence; and thus it happens that influence is resorted to, not merely because public measures are deficient in purity, but because there is a deficiency of uprightness in public men. While political affairs continue to be conducted on their present, or nearly on their present, principles, I believe influence is necessary to the stability of almost all governments. How else shall they be supported? They are not sufficiently virtuous to bespeak the general and unbiased support of the nations; and without support of some kind, they must fall. That which Hume says of England is perhaps true of all civilized states: "The influence which the crown acquires from the disposal of places, honours, and preferments may become too forcible, but it cannot altogether be abolished without the total destruction of monarchy, and even of all regular authority." A mournful truth it is! because it necessarily implies one of two things-either that the acts of "authority" do not recommend themselves by their own excellences, or that subjects are too little principled to be influenced by such excellences alone.

While the generality of subjects continue to be what they are, influence is inseparable from the privilege of appointing to offices. With whomsoever that privilege is intrusted, he will possess influence, and consequently power. Multitudes are hoping for the gifts which he has to bestow; and they accommodate their conduct to his wishes, in order to propitiate his favour and to obtain the reward. When they have obtained it, they call themselves bound in gratitude to continue their deference; and thus the influence and the power is continually possessed. Now there is no way of destroying this influence but by making men good: for until they are good, they will continue to sacrifice their judgments to their interests, and support men or measures, not because they are right, but because the support is attended with reward. It matters little in morals by whom the power of bestowing offices is possessed,

* History of England.

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POLITICAL INFLUENCE.

[ESSAY III unless you can ensure the virtue of the bestower. Politicians may talk of taking the power from crowns and vesting it in senates; but it will be of little avail to change the hands who distribute, if you cannot change the hearts. If a man should ask whether the influence of the crown in this country might not usefully be transferred to the House of Commons, I should answer, No. Not merely because it would overthrow (for it certainly would overthrow) the monarchy, but because I know not that any security would be gained for a better employment of this influence than is possessed already. In all but arbitrary governments it appears indispensable that much of the privilege of appointing to offices should rest with the executive power. It is the peculiar source of its authority. In our own government, the peers possess power independently of their political character, and the commons possess it as representatives of the public mind; but where, without influence, would be the power of the king? So it is in America. They have two representative bodies, and a third estate in the office of their president. But that president could not execute the functions of a third estate, nor the office of an executive governor, without having the means of influencing the people. I do not know whether it was with the determinate object of giving to the president a competent share of power that the Americans invested him with the privilege of appointing to offices, but it is not to be questioned that if they had not done it the fabric of their government would speedily have fallen.

The degree of this influence, which may be required to give stability to an executive body (and therefore to a constitution) will vary with the character of its own policy. The more widely that policy deviates from rectitude, the greater will be the demand for influence to induce concurrence in its measures. The degree of influence that is actually exerted by a government is therefore no despicable criterion of the excellence of its practice. In the United States, the degree is less than in England; and it may therefore be feared that we are inferior to them in the purity of the general administration of the affairs of state.

There is no neces

Influ

But let it be constantly borne in mind, that when we thus speak of the "necessity" for influence to support governments, we speak only of governments as they are, and of nations as they are. sity for influence to support good government over a good people. All influence but that which addresses itself to the judgment is wrong,in morals, and therefore indefensible upon whatever plea. wrong ence is in part necessary to a government in the same sense as oppres sion is necessary to a slave-trader,-not because the captain is a man, but because he has taken up the trade in slaves:—not because the government is a government, but because it conducts so many political affairs upon unchristian principles, or in an unchristian manner. The captain says, I cannot secure my slaves without oppression :-Let them go free. The government says, I cannot conduct my system without influence :Make the system good.

And here arises the observation, that if a government should faithfully act upon moral principles, that demand for influence which is occasioned by the ill principles of senators or the public would be diminished or done away. The opposition which governments are wont to experi ence, indefensible as that opposition frequently is, is the result, principally, of the general character of political systems. Men, seeing that integrity and purity are sacrificed by a government to other considera.