claimed in the libel.1 If judgment is given for the libellant, for an amount less than a sum exceeding two thousand dollars, the respondent cannot appeal by showing that the interest on the judgment, at the time of the appeal, added to the judgment, amounted to more than two thousand dollars.2 And affidavits that the matter in dispute exceeds two thousand dollars, are not admissible. In a case where, upon a libel to recover damages against ship-owners, a decree was passed in the circuit court against them for over two thousand dollars, with leave to set off a sum due them for freight, and the respondents elected to set off the balance, and a decree was then entered for less than two thousand dollars, it was held that no right of appeal to the Supreme Court existed, although the proctors for the respondents, at the time of making their election, filed a statement in writing, that the election to set off was made without waiver of their right to appeal from the decree. The court will also take jurisdiction where the decree in the circuit court was rendered pro forma because the presiding judge had been of counsel in the case. But the court will not take jurisdiction by agreement of parties, if the amount in dispute, however agreed by counsel, is shown by the case not to be sufficient, or if on account of some 1 Udall v. Steamship Ohio, 17 How. 17; Olney v. Steamship Falcon, 17 How. 19. See Godfrey v. Gilmartin, 2 Blatchf. C. C. 340.

2 Knapp v. Banks, 2 How. 73; Walker v. United States, 4 Wallace, 163.

Richmond v. City of Milwaukie, 21 How. 391. Where several persons join in a libel and claim damages amounting in the aggregate to over two thousand dollars, and one of them only appeals to the Supreme Court, he may show by affidavits that his damage exceeded two thousand dollars. The Grace Girdler, 6 Wallace, 441.

4

Sampson v. Welsh, 24 How. 207.

• Steamer Oregon v. Rocca, 18 How. 570.

• Mordecai v. Lindsay, 19 How. 199. In Gruner v. The United States, 11 How. 163, the vessel was seized for a violation of the registry laws, and while the suit was pending in the district court, a written agreement was filed by the district attorney and the proctor for the claimant, that the vessel should be sold and the proceeds paid into the registry of the court, to abide the ultimate decision of the suit, the rights of neither party to be prejudiced by the sale. The vessel was sold for $850, and was afterwards condemned. There was an agreement on record, signed by the attorneys of the parties, admitting that the vessel was worth over two thousand dollars. The court held that the admission of the parties would be evidence of the value if nothing more appeared in the record, but that the consent of the parties could not give the court jurisdiction, and that, as it appeared on the face of the record that the sum in controversy was below two thousand dollars, the appeal must be dismissed.

informality the appeal should be dismissed,1 or if the case is not of a maritime nature.2

3

The Supreme Court has also "power to issue writs of prohibition to the district courts, when proceeding as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." This writ is issued where the district court has not jurisdiction of the cause brought before it. The writ commands the person to whom it is directed not to do something which, by the suggestion of the relator, the court is informed he is about to do. If the thing is already done, the writ of prohibition cannot undo it, and the only effect of the writ is to suspend all action, and to prevent any further proceeding. Hence, in a case where a writ was applied for to prevent a judge of a district court from proceeding any further in a certain cause in admiralty, and a rule was granted on the judge to show cause why the writ should not issue, and the judge thereupon, after the rule had been served upon him, on petition of the libellant, dismissed the suit, it was held that there was no ground for issuing the writ, as the suit was ended."

SECTION II.

THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

These courts have only an appellate admiralty jurisdiction from a district court, where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum or value of fifty dollars, and the appeal can be made only from final decrees of a district court. As to all pro

1 Montgomery v. Anderson, 21 How. 386; Ballance v. Forsyth, id. 389. Cutler v. Rae, 7 How. 729.

'Act of 1789, c. 20, 1 U. S. Stats. at Large, 81.

United States v. Peters, 3 Dallas, 121.

5 United States v. Hoffman, 4 Wallace, 158. It was also held in this case that the fact that there were other suits pending against the same relator, of the same character, in the same court, could have no legal force in the case before the court. It was said that if the relator could satisfy the court that the other cases were proper cases for the exercise of their authority, the court would probably issue writs instead of a rule.

⚫ Act of March 3, 1803, c. 40, § 2, 2 U. S. Stats. at Large, 244.

'Thus where a final decree of condemnation had been made of forfeited property, and no appeal had been interposed, and, after execution had been issued, the

ceedings subsequent to the appeal, they are incidents of the principal cause, and belong to the court which remains in possession thereof, and the property therefore follows the appeal into the circuit court. If there be an appeal to the supreme court, the property, in proceedings in rem, remains in the circuit court, and will be disposed of as the supreme court directs.2

The jurisdiction, both of the circuit and district courts, in prize as well as other causes, is limited by the bounds of their respective circuit or district; and it is therefore essential that the person or the thing against which the suit is directed, be within their local jurisdiction. The exceptions to this rule are those for which parties obtained a remission from the secretary of the treasury, and petitioned the district court that the executions which had been issued might be superseded, and they permitted to comply with the terms of the remission, and the district court having refused to grant the petition, the petitioners appealed to the circuit court, the court dismissed the appeal, on the ground that it was not regularly before the court. The final decree was made some time before, and no appeal had been made, and it had been settled in McLellan v. United States, 1 Gallis. 227," that this court has no jurisdiction over the proceedings on the bond, which is but an admiralty stipulation, unless it has possession of the cause to which it belongs." The Brig Hollen, 1 Mason, 431. See also Mordecai v. Lindsay, 19

How. 199, and cases supra.

The Grotius, 1 Gallis. 503; Hayford v. Griffith, 3 Blatchf. C. C. 36; The Collector, 6 Wheat. 194. In this case, it is said to be irregular for the marshal to distribute proceeds without order of court, but the irregularity may be cured by consent of all parties, if there be no mala fides.

2 The Collector, 6 Wheat. 194. The 24th section of c. 20, Acts of 1789, 1 U. S. Stats. at Large, 85, prescribes that "the Supreme Court shall not issue execution in causes that are removed before them by writs of error, but shall send a special mandate to the circuit court to award execution thereon." The act of 1803, c. 40, which changes the mode of carrying the case up from a writ of error to an appeal, provides that such appeals shall be subject to the same rules, regulations, and restrictions as are prescribed by law in cases of writs of error.

In Ex parte Graham, 4 Wash. C. C. 211, 212, the court, speaking of the inability of the courts to carry process out of their own districts, and reciting the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789, said: "These provisions appear most manifestly to circumscribe the jurisdiction of those courts as to the person of the defendant, by the limits of the district where the suit is brought; and that the process of those courts was considered by the legislature to be bounded by the same limits, is very obvious from two subsequent acts passed; the one on the 2d of March, 1793, authorizing subpoenas for witnesses to attend in the courts of one district to run into any other district, not exceeding in civil cases one hundred miles from the place of holding the court; and the other on the 3d of March, 1797, which authorizes writs of execution upon judgments obtained at the suit of

express provision is made by law. It would seem to follow, therefore, that no court can send process into another district than that in which it sits, to compel appearance; nor can a prize proceeding be directed against a person who is neither an inhabitant of nor actually within the district where process is served. So a decree against merchandise rendered in one district is valid against the merchandise, if it appear that the party charged with it had or has possession of it or of its proceeds; and it may be enforced on proper application to courts of other districts. But a libel in another district, against a resident citizen thereof, for the value of the merchandise, he being charged with having come into possession of it since the condemnation, cannot be sustained if he pleads that he was no party to the proceedings in the district where the decree was made, and that no process was served upon him there.1

If on appeal to the circuit court it appears that the judge is in anyways concerned in interest therein, or has been of counsel for either party, or is so related to or connected with either party as to render it improper for him, in his opinion, to sit in the trial of such suit, it is the duty of such judge, on application of either party, to cause the facts to be entered on the records of the court, and also to make an order that an authenticated copy thereof, with all the proceedings in such suit or action, shall be forthwith certified to the next convenient circuit court in the next adjacent State, or in the next adjacent circuit; 2 which circuit court shall, the United States, in any of their courts in one State, to run, and be executed, in any other State or Territory. It is very apparent that these provisions were made, not because they were supposed by Congress to be necessary in consequence of the eleventh section of the judicial act before mentioned, but because the jurisdiction of the courts was essentially confined by their organization within the limits of their respective districts, for, it is to be observed, that that section applies exclusively to original suits, and to the parties to those suits, and therefore it imposed no restraint as to writs of execution, and subpoenas for witnesses, so as to render the above provisions at all necessary." See also Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300, 330; and post, p. 218.

1 For the rules in these cases, see Wilson v. Graham, 4 Wash. C. C. 53; Ex parte Graham, 4 Wash. C. C. 211.

2 In Richardson v. City of Boston, 1 Curtis, C. C. 250, the plaintiff was a citizen of Rhode Island and brought suit in the United States circuit court in the district of Massachusetts. Both the judges of that court being disqualified, the case had to be removed to another circuit, and the question was whether it should

upon such record and order being filed with the clerk thereof, take cognizance thereof in the same manner as if such suit or action had been rightfully and originally commenced therein, and shall proceed to hear and determine the same accordingly, and the proper process for the due execution of the judgment or decree rendered therein, shall run into and may be executed in the district where such judgment or decree was rendered, and also in the district from which such suit or action was removed.1

SECTION III.

THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

The statute of 24th September, 1789,2 gave to these courts original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; and they thereby acquired all the powers of the courts of admiralty, both on the instance and the prize sides, and have jurisdiction of all cases of maritime trespass or tort.3

The original jurisdiction of the district court is not ousted by any State laws which relate to the same subject. As for example, laws respecting pilotage or liens of mechanics or material men,

be removed to the circuit court of Rhode Island or of New York. The case was ordered to be certified to Rhode Island. Curtis, J., said: "The leading idea of the law is, I think, proximity of place; and that circuit court which is competent to act, and nearest to the subject of the controversy, the witnesses, the parties, and the court whence the removal is to take place, is the most convenient circuit court within the meaning of this act." The learned judge also said: "There are two governing elements contained in the statute. The first is, "the most convenient circuit court"; the second, "in the next adjacent state or circuit." It is not difficult to see why the alternative was given, allowing a removal to a circuit court in the next adjacent circuit, instead of confining it to the next adjacent State. In admiralty appeals, or writs of error from the district court, if the judge of the Supreme Court be interested, it would not be in accordance with our system, and scarcely decorous in itself, to remove the cause to another district in the same circuit, to be heard by another district judge; and it is possible that a circuit court might not be found in the next adjacent State."

1 Act of 1839, c. 36, § 8, 5 U. S. Stats. at Large, 322.

Ch. 20, § 9, 1 U. S. Stats. at Large, 76.

Davis v. A New Brig, Gilpin, 473; The Amiable Nancy, 1 Paine, C. C. 111, 3 Wheat. 546, and cases cited in the reporter's note; Keene v. The United States, 5 Cranch, 304.