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Coach-houses and stables are protected by sections 12 and 13, if their situation be such as the 13th section requires, and the value of the property stolen be 51. at least. If below 51. the offence remains as at common law. If there be a breaking, entering, and stealing, and they are not within the 13th section, as to locality, or there is a doubt about it, (provided the value is 5.,) the indictment should be drawn on the 12th section, and a count upon the 14th section, and a common count for larceny should also be added. Any property would be protected, it is apprehended, by these enactments, and their effects would not be limited to the usual furniture of a stable, as in Seas' case, Leach, 341.

Ships.-The goods stolen must be such as are generally lodged in ships: 2 E. P. C. 647. The words in the 17th section of 7 & 8 Geo. 4, 29, are "goods and merchandise," which are similar to those used in 24 Geo. 2, c. 25; the only difference seems to be in the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, not limiting the value to 40s. And it would not be sufficient, in an indictment for stealing goods from any vessel, on a certain navigable river, to prove in evidence that the vessel was aground in a dock, in a creek of the river: Leach, 357.

prisoner, the jury will have to consider all concomitant circumstances which tend to corroborate, or to weaken, or rebut the presumption. They are too numerous to be detailed, but they may be referred either to the prisoner himself, as his behaviour, or his vicinity to the spot, or to the property, as the interval between the committal of the offence and finding the property again, which may raise a presumption as toits identity, or its having often changed hands, 2 E. P. C. 656, and its nature, or other matters, which can hardly be referred to either of these heads, but may be considered as part of the offence; as the fact of concealment. Felonious intent is also rebutted by any fair pretence of property or right in the prisoner, and the court will direct an acquittal. But if any acts be done which manifest the contrary, as attempts to disguise the property, they are presumptive evidence of a felonious intent: 2 E. P. C. 659: 1 H. P. C. 506-7. The same principle applies to cases where the property is obtained by act of law. The intent of felony is also rebutted by proof, that the goods were taken by mistake, or accident, or for a purpose not felonious: R. v. Dickinson; R. & R. 420; 2 H. P. C. 507-9; and where there is no evidence of intention to convert them to private use: semb. Van Muyden's case, R. & R. 118. The taking, being without fraud, may amount only to a trespass: 1 H. P. C. 509; 4 Blac. Com. 232; and Phillips and Strong's case, 2 E. P. C. 662, cited. lf goods are found, the felonious intent is gathered or rebutted from the concomitant such as denying or secreting, or, circumstances, on the contrary, by endeavour to discover the owner, or making pub. lic the acquisition: Lamb's case, 2 E. P. C. 664; Wynne's case, Q 2

Felonious intent.-The felonious intent is essential to the offence, and in order to make it felony, the intent to steal ought to be at the time when the party first gets possession of the goods; such a pos. session, at least, as is distinct from the owner; for a fraudulent intent originating afterwards, to convert the goods, is not felony; but the original felonious intent may be collected from subsequent acts: 2 E. P. C. 655. This, therefore, is entirely matter of evidence. Upon a simple denial of the fact by the

Leach, 460. But the taking must be bona fide: 2 E. P. C. 664; H. P. C. 506; 2 H. P. C. 507; and Cartwright v. Green, 8 Ves. 405. The circumstance of goods having been delivered by a third person may be rebutted or confirmed, by the conduct of the prisoner, and by the length of time which has elapsed, from the losing to the finding of the goods: 2 E. P. C. 665.

The felonious intent may be rebutted by proof that the goods were delivered to the prisoner, by or on behalf of the owner, or were taken with his consent or approbation. For, if it be proved that there was no trespass or felonious intent in taking the goods, no subsequent conversion of them can amount to felony: 2 E. P. C. 665. The first inquiry, therefore, is whether they were taken invito domino: see R. v. M'Daniel and others, Fost. 121; 4 Blac. Com. 250. In this case, one Samuel conspired with M'Daniel and others, to procure two others, ignorant of the design, to rob him on the highway, in order to procure to themselves the reward given by act of parliament for apprehending robbers on the highway, and he accordingly went, in pursuance of such agreement, to the place appointed, where the supposed robbery was effected. It was held not to amount to felony. But it is otherwise where there is no concerting with the offender, or where merely a facility is given to commit the offence: Mordin's case, Fost. 129. See, also R. v. Eggington, 2 E. P. C. 666.

In this case, the owner of goods, knowing of an intention in the prisoners to steal, allowed his servant, (who had plotted to assist the thieves,) to open the outer door to them, into the house, where they broke open inner apartments, and took the goods. It was held lar

ceny by the majority, one doubting because of the master's assent to the felony by means of his servant.

The next inquiry is, whether in making the delivery, the owner intended to part with the property, or only with the possession of the thing delivered, for, if the property be parted with, by whatever fraudulent inducements the credit may have been raised, it cannot be felony. But if the bare possession be parted with, we must consider whether it has been by way of charge, or as a general bailment, or for some special purpose.

First, where the property is parted with, there can be no larceny, however fraudulent the intent may have been, by which the owner was induced to part with it. And a particular remedy is enacted by the legislature, when such credit is obtained by false tokens and pretence. Where a contract of sale for a horse was completed, and the horse delivered to the buyer, who rode away with it immediately, without paying the purchase-money, the court held it not to be felony, and said that the delivery was unconditional: it was a sale, and the property and possession both parted with: Harvey's case, Leach, 523. And where a man, being inveigled by sharpers to bet with them, parts with his money, under the idea that it was fairly won, it was held not to be felony; R. v. Nicholson, 2 Leach, 698. But where possession only, as a deposit for stakes, is intended to be parted with, it is felony: R. v. Robson, R. & R. 413; and R. v. Horner, 1 Leach, 305. And where a servant (without the master's consent,) took bills of exchange which were good for nothing, in payment, held that it was no larceny, the owner's servant having parted with the property, by accepting such in pay. ment: R. v. Parks, 2 Leach, 703.

And similarly, although the credit be obtained by fraudulently using the name of another person, to whom in truth the credit was intended to be given, if the delivery was made by the owner, or any person having power of disposal for that purpose: 2 E. P. C. 672, Coleman's case, 1 Leach, 339, and Atkinson's case, 2 E. P. C. 673; which cases are distinguished from Noah Pearce's case, id. 603. on that ground. In Wilkin's case, 2 Leach, 586, the person from whom the goods were obtained by the fraudulent representation, was only intrusted with a bare charge of them for a particular purpose; in this case, the possession of the master still continued by the hands of the servant. From these cases, we may deduce a rule by which it may be decided, whether the property, or merely the possession, has been parted with, (when the deli very has been made by another than the owner,) namely, by considering whether such person had a general, or only a limited power of disposal: in the first case, he may part with the property; in the second, he cannot.

But the property is not considered as having been parted with, wherever the delivery, from the circumstances, must be considered conditional; for instance, when a sale is incomplete: R. v. Sharpless, 1 Leach, 108, or wherever the goods have been delivered, by way of pledge, or the like, to have them returned, as in Patch's case, 1 Leach, 273, 2 E. P. C. 678; Moore's case, 1 Leach, 354; Watson's 's case, 2 Leach, 730. In these cases the possession was obtained by fraud, with intent to steal, but the property was not parted with. Where there has not been a sufficient delivery to change the property, the finding by the jury, of the preconceived fraudulent inten

tion is not essential to complete the offence: R. v. Sharpless, 1 Leach, 108. Similarly, where a bill was delivered to the prisoner, for the purpose of being discounted, who ran away with it before payment, it was held felony, as the property had not been parted with: R. v. Aickles, 1 Leach, 330. In all these cases it is evident that the property was not parted with, that such an intention never could have existed in the minds of the owners, that the delivery was strictly conditional and qualified. But where the circumstances of a case show that the owner, or some person having a general power of disposing, although deceived by fraudulent representations, really intended to part with property in the goods, there it is fraud, and not felony : see R. v. Adams, R. & R. 225; (and see ante, title, " Cheating"). It is apprehended that this principle will be found to apply to all cases, as to the parting either with the property, or merely the possession : see Cockwaine's case, Leach, 562; Wilkin's case, id. 586; Chapelle's case, id. 698; Hench's case, R. & R. 163. The latter case was decided upon that of Rex v. Wilkins, (supra,) and upon the ground, it is apprehended, that the person who made the delivery had only a limited power of disposal, or a bare charge, and could not, consequently, part with the property in the goods. Similarly, where the delivery is by way of pledge or security, the property is not parted with by the owner, and, consequently, larceny may be committed if the delivery were obtained frau. dulently, and with intent to steal: 2 E. P. C. 678; Patch's case, 1 Leach, 273; Moore's case, 1 Leach, 354; Watson's case, 2 Leach, 730; R. v. Horner, Leach, 305; and R. v. Robson, R. & R. 413; and see distinction between this case and

R. v. Nicholson, 2 E. P. C. 669, supra.

Where the property remains without doubt in the original owner, the only question is, whether possession has been so far parted with, as to exclude the idea of trespass in the taker. Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether such possession was parted with, either by way of charge, general bailment, or delivery for a special purpose. First, where the legal possession remains in the owner, larceny may be committed, as if no such delivery had been made. Secondly, where, by the delivery, a special property, and consequently, legal possession would be acquired, if there were no fraud, it amounts to larceny, if such delivery were fraudulently procured, with felonious intent to convert such property. Thirdly, after determination of a contract, larceny may be committed. Under the first head are included all cases where the persons to whom the delivery is made, have but a bare charge or custody of them, or a special use, as in the case of servants (see supra); Chipchase's case, Leach, 805; R. v. Waite, id. in notis, and the distinction taken between them, or guests in the owner's house. And journeymen to whom yarn or silk is delivered to be worked in the master's house: S. P. C. 25, and 2 E. P. C. 682. But it is otherwise, where the article is delivered to a weaver out of the house; he has thus a special property, and to make it larceny, a preconceived intent to defraud must, it is apprehended, be shown, which would bring it under the second head. Under this principle may be included cases, where the possession is allowed in the presence of the owner: see Clusser's case; Lord Raym. 275; and see 2 E. P. C. 684.

Under the second head are included those cases where, by the delivery, a special property is passed, and a legal possession, distinct from the owner, is acquired. The cases where the property is actually changed by the delivery have been considered, and it has been seen that felony cannot, in such cases, be committed. There is another case, where, although the actual property still remains in the owner, a special property and legal possession, distinct from the owner, would be acquired, if there was no fraudulent intent in the obtaining possession. This includes all cases, where the original delivery was in pursuance of a contract, and every case of bailment. Where a legal possession, primâfacie, exists, distinct from the owner, the person so entitled cannot commit larceny, as in every case of bailment and delivery by contract. In such cases, the primâ facie legal possession can only be rebutted by evidence tending to show,-1st, that possession has been obtained with a felonious intention, by fraud, threat, or duress; or, 2dly, that the privity of contract is determined by some precedent wrongful act of the bailee; or, 3dly, that it is determined according to the intention of the parties, 1st, By evidence of a precedent felonious intention, as where a prisoner hired a horse, on pretence of taking a journey, but, in truth, with intent to sell it, as was evidenced by his doing so, directly he obtained possession : R. v. Pears, 1

Leach, 253; Charlwood's case, Leach, 456; Major Semple's case, Leach, 470. But it must be recollected, that in cases of bailment or delivery by contract, the prisoner must be acquitted, unless there be such evidence as will prove the felonious intention to have existed, when the goods were first ob

tained; for, if such intention be not proved to have existed originally, no subsequent act of conversion can be evidence of it, so as to constitute a new felonious taking: R. v. Banks, R. & R. 441. If, therefore, a person obtain possession of goods by a lawful delivery, without fraud, although he afterwards convert them to his use, he cannot be guilty of felony; nor does it make any difference whether the purpose for which the delivery was made be ended or not, as to time or place: R. & R. 441. 2dly, When the privity of contract is determined by some precedent wrongful act of the bailee,-by any wrongful act of the bailee inconsistent with the contract, it is determined, and the property revests in the owner, although the actual possession remain in the bailee.

As where a carrier breaks open a package committed to him, the contract is by this act determined, and the property revests in the owner, so as to make any subsequent conversion felony: 1 H. P. C. 504; 1 Haw. P. C. c. 33, s. 5; 2 Inst. 107; 2 E. P. C. 695. But if the act which determines the contract, and the act of conversion, be one and the same, or contemporaneous, as where the porter carries off the goods and sells them without breaking them, it is only breach of trust, see supra and cases cited; therefore, the wrongful act must be precedent to the conversion: see also R. v. Brazier, supra. 3dly, By intention of the parties, as where the package delivered to the carrier had reached its destination: 1 H. P. C. 504-5.

LIBEL.

1 Ed. I, c. 1.

I. Be it enacted, &c., that whatsoever person or persons, The penalty from and after the first day of May next coming, shall de- for speaking irreverently prave, despise, or contemn the said most blessed sacra- of the most ment, in contempt thereof, by any contemptuous words, or blessed saby any words of depraving, despising, or reviling; or what crament. person or persons shall advisedly in any other wise contemn, despise, or revile, the said most blessed sacrament, contrary to the effects and declaration abovesaid; that then, he or they shall suffer imprisonment of his or their bodies, and make fine and ransom at the king's will and pleasure; and for full and effectual execution of the premises before devised, ordained, and enacted by this act, be it furthermore enacted, by the authority of this present parliament, that immediately after the first day of May next coming, the justices of peace, or three of them at the least, whereof one of them to be of the quorum, in every shire of this realm, and Wales, and all other places within the king's dominions, shall have full power and authority by virtue ofthis act, as well to take information and accusation by the oaths and depositions of two able, honest, and lawful persons at

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