titude of deeds and transactions which are always complicated and generally inconsistent. Both in arranging the final decree, therefore, and in settling the intermediate orders and references which the substantial justice of the case requires, great latitude must necessarily be left to the Judge; much interlocutory conversation takes place between him and the counsel; and as two people seldom agree respecting the course of inquiry or discussion it would be most expedient in such case to pursue, the learning and discretion of one Judge is more likely, than the conflicting counsels of several, to conduct the business, at the least expense of time and money, to that termination which is most reasonable and consistent in itself, and most satisfactory to all parties who are interested in the issue."-pp. 46, 47.

Besides which, not only has the Chancellor the power of calling for the assistance of other Judges, both of common law and equity, in his own court, when he thinks it expedient, but all the Judges of the Court of Chancery have the opportunity of sending cases to the courts of law, for their opinion upon such points of law as are frequently raised in equitable suits, and create considerable difficulty in the decision of them. It is much to be regretted, that such opinions are of less service to the law in general than they might be, in consequence of the disuse of the practice which once obtained, of the Judges delivering them openly, with their reasons, in their own courts. The advantage of such a practice, in making the decision of each case tend to the establishment or confirmation of some legal principle, is evident;-the only excuse for its discontinuance, is the overwhelming accumulation of the demands on the time of the court and Judges-an excuse which is, indeed, unanswerable; but the use of which, unfortunately, lessens the weight of those opinions, as much as the manner in which they are given diminishes their utility.

The sittings of the Master of the Rolls, who, though a very high and responsible officer, is, in the eye of the law, only an assistant to the Lord Chancellor, have been so fixed as not to interfere with those of his principal. Therefore, as there are only about twenty juridical days in the year, namely, a few days immediately after the close of each term, upon which the Chancellor does not sit if not prevented by other duties-and his sittings are always in the morning-the Master of the Rolls, except upon those days, sits in the evening, or rather in the night, for his court opens at six, and scarcely ever closes till ten, and often later. He also sits in the morning for an hour before the Chancellor's court opens; but this is only for the despatch of such business as is almost of course. There was perhaps formerly some wisdom in this arrangement, when the quantity of business in the Court of Chancery was not more than the Chan

cellor and the Master of the Rolls could manage within the hours allotted to them, nor were the counsel practising at the Chancery bar sufficiently numerous to supply two courts sitting at once; when, too, the habits of the age so divided the day by the principal meal, that every man was refreshed, and ready for what was then called evening work, at the same time of the day when he is now faint and exhausted with the labour of the protracted morning. But when the business of the Court of Chancery had increased so much, that even the industry and abilities of Lord Eldon and Sir W. Grant were unequal to its weight, and the necessity of appointing a third Judge brought with it the necessity of having (at least sometimes) two Judges sitting at the same hours, it would certainly have been wise to remodel at once the whole distribution of judicial labour, with reference to the exigencies and habits of modern times.

"If the sittings of the Rolls Court were now to be appointed for the first time, there probably is not a single individual to be found who would recommend them to take place at the intervals of time and hour of the day at which they are now held. Why, then, should they not be altered?

No objection has ever been made to the adoption of this proposal, except that it would alter the situation and duties of a well-known officer, and might prevent the practice of a portion of the bar from being quite so lucrative as it otherwise would. Neither of them is deserving of much consideration. It is undoubtedly true, that no officer, either judicial or political, ought to have his character or duties altered, unless it can be clearly shown that the exigencies of the state require it. In this instance, the existing exigency will not be desired; the projected change is liable to as little inconvenience and danger, as can ever attach to a measure of a similar nature; and to insist that the Master of the Rolls should sit only two days, instead of three, and at six at night, instead of ten in the morning, for no other reason than because he has hitherto been accustomed to do so, would evince a disregard of public opinion and perverse hostility to rational improvement, which no person in the present day will be forward to exhibit. The effect which such a measure would have upon the bar is entitled to still less attention. If the interests of the country and the bar can be consulted at the same time, they ought in every case to be so. But the instant they become incompatible, there can be no room for hesitation which of them ought to yield. It is the duty of the bar to accommodate itself to the circumstances of the country,-not that of the country to accommodate itself to the bar; and both the public and the bar will eventually sustain equal injury in every instance where this principle is either counteracted or forgotten."-pp. 52, 53.

In truth, the objection taken in favour of the interest of the bar is as weak as can well be imagined, though we have no doubt of its having been that which has chiefly prevented the change. If it were rendered ever so impracticable for the lead

ers of the Chancery bar to be concerned at once in causes before the Master of the Rolls and the Vice-Chancellor, it is plain that they might still employ as much of their time in court as is spent there by their brethren of the common law; and the labours of the former branch of the profession are certainly not less adequately recompensed than those of the latter.

Though the Master of the Rolls is, theoretically, only an assistant to the Chancellor, he is, in practice, to a considerable extent, independent of him; but the Vice-Chancellor is, by the express terms of the act which created his office, (53 G. 3 c. 24,) subjected entirely to the direction of the Chancellor, both as to the matter of his jurisdiction, and the times of exercising it; a state of dependence in which we think, with Mr Miller, that the Vice-Chancellor is too high an officer to be placed. The changes which we conceive it would be proper to make in the duties of the Judges of the Court of Chancery, will, however, be more conveniently introduced hereafter. We decline following our author through his observations on the subordinate offices and the procedure of the Court of Chancery. These have been, since the publication of his book, very minutely considered by Commissioners, whose report is now before Parliament and the public: : no new discussion, which did not include their propositions, could deserve attention; and such an examination of these latter as our limits would allow, would be unworthy of the importance of the subject.

That Mr Miller has justly represented the modern constitution of the House of Lords, as the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction, to be in the highest degree defective, will, we suppose, be universally admitted. Formerly, when the number of appeals was small, it was not difficult for the Chancellor to bestow such a portion of his own time, and to obtain such assistance from other Peers, as was requisite for the purpose of hearing them. But lately, when the accumulation of appeals had rendered this evidently impossible, the House, by a standing order, compelled the attendance of so many of its members, by daily rotation, as would make up the number sufficient, by its already existing rules, to transact business; and the noble Lord, then Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, and afterwards Master of the Rolls, was appointed deputy-speaker, for the purpose of hearing appeals two days in the week, in addition to the three on which only the Chancellor's other duties permitted him to attend. The theoretical absurdity of the first branch of this arrangement is too glaring to escape notice; but the appointment of a deputy-speaker is, perhaps, still more open to objecIt lessens the importance of the Chancellor, by sending

him to preside in an inferior court, while another judge occupies that eminent place, which sound reason, as well as long established prescription, had made the people of England consider the Head of the law alone competent to fill. It lessens the dignity of the House itself, by placing it under the presidency of a judge inferior in rank, and who must, therefore, be presumed inferior in talent, to one who is sitting elsewhere; and it tends to introduce an invidious distinction between the importance of English appeals, which are heard by the speaker himself, and Scotch appeals, which are heard by the deputy,-a distribution of business which was nevertheless necessary, to avoid the extreme absurdity of the Master of the Rolls hearing appeals from the judgment of the Chancellor. It is true, that this arrangement was understood to be only temporary; but the recent appointment of the learned Judges, the Master of the Rolls, and the Chief Baron, to supply the vacancy occasioned by the death of the late noble deputy, shows, that the period when the office can be dispensed with, is still at an indefinite, and, we fear, a considerable distance.

We readily acknowledge, that it is much easier to point out defects, than to suggest amendments, in an established order of things; yet we venture with great diffidence to offer the following outline of a modification of our present judicial system, into which we have endeavoured to introduce the changes required by the necessities of modern times, with as little violence as possible to the forms which have been rendered venerable by the practice of our ancestors. We propose, then, that during the session of Parliament, the Chancellor should devote himself exclusively to the House of Lords, excepting such occasional adjournments as he may find necessary for the despatch of very urgent business in cases of Lunacy or Bankruptcy; in both of which, all such matters as do not require immediate decision should be heard only when Parliament is not sitting: And for the purpose of securing to the Chancellor a competent number of assistants in the House, the Master of the Rolls, the Vice-Chancellor, and the common law Judges, should, ex officio, have place and voice in it when it sits as a court of justice, and then only; not, of course, hereby excluding such of them as may be Peers from their rights as such. We are not supposing that it would be practicable, or even desirable, that all, or even any considerable number of the judges, should attend at once. Upon very extraordinary occasions, their assistance might be expected, and required, as it is now, except that they would be summoned as members, instead of advisers only; but ordinarily, we should propose that the Chancellor, and two other VOL, XLVI. NO. 91. K

members, whether Peers or Judges, should be sufficient to make a house for the despatch of judicial business; and it should be understood, that the presence of two of the Judges would always be expected, the rest being left at liberty to give or withhold their attendance at their discretion. We have already hinted our opinion, that a fifth Judge might advantageously be added to each of the courts of common law; and we think that the duties imposed upon these additional Judges, particularly in the Courts of Common Pleas and Exchequer, would not occupy so much of their time, as to interfere with their sitting in the House of Lords.

The business of the Welsh Circuits might perhaps also be conveniently assigned to these Judges, or they might be very usefully employed in assisting to despatch the business, which now accumulates upon the English Circuits to such an amount, that much of it is often of necessity left undone; and as it is not usual for the two Chief Justices to go the Spring Circuits, they would then be at liberty to attend as judicial members of the House. The Master of the Rolls and the Vice-Chancellor could not, from the nature of their duties, attend either regularly or frequently; but we think they should be members as well as the other Judges, because they are superior to most of them in rank and in the importance of their offices, and because, on some very important occasions, their assistance would be so much more valuable than that of the other Judges, that they might with propriety be called away from their own Courts to bestow it. This arrangement would in no way interfere with the judicial authority now possessed by each individual peer, except, indeed, so far as that authority would be lessened by being communicated to a greater number of persons; while the circumstance that the Chancellor would be the permanent head of the court, of which the Judges would be only members occasionally attending, would still preserve him in the possession of that preponderant authority which he ought to have in the House, and at the same time, if the presence of other members is supposed necessary as a check upon him, (which seems the only reason why he might not as well sit alone as with his present compulsory assistants,) the Judges would fill that office with much more effect, and their legal habits and learning would prevent the House from falling into that error which the Peers have sometimes committed, of confounding their judicial with their legislative functions, and forgetting that when they sit as a court of justice, they are to administer the law as it is, not to make it what it ought to be. The alteration here proposed in the composition of the House of Lords as a court of appeal, is in fact little more than