enforce payment. In an action against the Justices for so proceeding and making an order and issuing their warrant, under which the plaintiff's goods were seized, it was held that the proper questions for the jury were, first, whether the plaintiff bond fide disputed the rate when before the Justices, and gave notice thereof at the time; and, secondly, whether there was reasonable and probable cause for the Justices determining that the rate was not bond fide disputed, and whether the Justices acted without malice. After the seizure of plaintiff's goods they instituted a replevin suit in the County Court, and recovered damages and costs, and it was held that the judgment in the County Court was a bar to recovery of damages for the seizure in the action in the superior court. (Pease v. Clayton, 8 Law Tim. Rep. 612.)

GAME CONVICTION.-1 & 2 Will. IV. c. 32, s. 30—Bonâ fide claim of right to shoot-Jurisdiction of justices.-A person charged, under the 1 & 2 Will. IV. c. 32, s. 30, with trespassing in pursuit of game in the daytime on land in the occupation of a tenant to A., set up a claim of right to shoot over the land, on the ground that he and every one who chose had always shot there till some recent acts of interruption, and declared his readiness to try the right with A.; it was held that the mere assertion of such a general right in himself and every one else, though he really believed it, without showing any such claim of right as would be a defence to an action of trespass, did not oust the jurisdiction of the magistrates to convict under the statute in question. (Leatt v. Vine, 8 Law Tim. Rep. 581.)

MARRIAGE. Dissolution of marriage-Second marriage of one of the parties-20 & 21 Vic. c. 85, s. 57.-By the 56th section of the Divorce Act either party dissatisfied with the decision of the full Court on any petition for the dissolution of a marriage may, within three months after the pronouncing thereof, appeal therefrom to the House of Lords if Parliament be then sitting, or if Parliament be not sitting at the end of such three months, then within fourteen days next after its meeting. By s. 57, when the time hereby limited for appealing against any decree dissolving a marriage shall have expired, and no appeal shall have been presented against such a decree, or when any such appeal shall have been dismissed, or when in the result of any appeal any marriage shall be declared to be dissolved, but not sooner, it shall be lawful for the respective parties thereto to marry again, as if the prior marriage had been dissolved by death. Where after a decree of dissolution of marriage, one of the parties to such marriage was married in fact within the time limited by the 20 & 21 Vic. c. 85, s. 57, and during the lifetime of the other party to the marriage, the Court held the latter de facto marriage to be null and void in law. (Chichester v. Mure, 8 Law Tim. Rep. 676.) MORTGAGES.-Locke King's Act-17 & 18 Vic. c. 113-Mortgage

-Exoneration of mortgaged estate.-A testator gave his residuary personal estate to trustees, upon trust in the first place "to pay all his just debts, funeral and testamentary expenses," and after these payments to hold the same upon certain trusts therein declared: it was held (in accordance with the decision in Eno v. Tatam, 8 Law Tim. Rep. 127) that this was a sufficient expression of his intention to make his personal estate primarily liable for his mortgage debts. (Moore v. Moore, 8 Law Tim. Rep. 562.)

NUISANCE. Injunction-Publicnuisance-Powers of vestry-Bonâ fide exercise of Metropolis Local Management Act.-Although public bodies acting under the general powers given them by statute have not therefore a license to do whatever they think right, yet, if the Court is called upon to interfere, it is its duty first to consider whether the proposed exercise of the power is or is not bona fide. The defendants, acting under the Metropolis Local Management Act, were about to erect a urinal nearly opposite to the plaintiff's residence, the 88th section of that Act providing that "it shall be lawful for every vestry, &c., to provide and maintain urinals, &c., in situations where they deem such accommodation to be required, &c., and any damage occasioned to any person by the erection thereof, &c., is to be defrayed under this Act." The Lords Justices being satisfied upon the evidence that the urinal intended would not of necessity be a public nuisance, and further that it was neither certain nor probable that the defendants were exceeding, or would exceed, their powers, and that they were not influenced by any improper motive, dissolved an interlocutory injunction which Stuart, V.C., had issued against them. (Biddulph v. Vestry of St. George, Hanover-square ; 8 Law Tim. Rep. 558.)

PAPER-BOOKS.-Appeals from Justices-Delivery of paper-booksC. L. P. A., 1852-Practice Rules Hil. T., 1853-Costs.-The proper place for the delivery of paper-books for the Judges under rule 16 of the Practice Rules of Hilary Term, 1853, prescribing the practice in special cases, demurrers, and appeals from Justices, is Judges' Chambers; therefore, where a party delivered his paperbooks duly as regards the time for delivery, but unduly as regards the place (he delivering them to the Judges' clerks at Westminster), the Court visited him with the penalty inflicted by the rule, making him pay for the copies delivered, in his default, by the other side. (Howell v. Wynne, 8 Law Tim. Rep. 577.)

PARTITION.-Costs-Sale of infant's share. Where an order has been made in a suit for partition, and the costs of the suit are to be paid, some of the parties entitled being under disability, the Court will order an inquiry whether it be for their benefit that the estate, or any and what part of it, be sold before partition. Semble, if the inquiry be answered in the affirmative, the sale will be made without further order. (Copewell v. Lawrence, 8 Law Tim. Rep. 602.)

Parties under disability-Costs-Sale of entirety.-Where some of the parties to a suit for partition are under disability, and it appears to be for their benefit that the costs of the suit be raised out of the estate before partition, the shares of all parties being properly chargeable with their costs, the Court will direct a sale of the entirety of the estate for the purpose of paying costs. (Thackeray v. Parker, 8 Law Tim. Rep. 602.)

PATENT.-Particulars of objections.-The principle upon which the Court of Chancery proceeds in regulating the form of particulars of objections on the trial of a patent case is to guard against a surprise upon the plaintiff by production on the trial of evidence of prior user or publication of which he has no notice. Therefore it will require the defendant, in stating those instances on which he intends to rely, to put the plaintiff in possession of all he himself knows, so far as to enable him to identify the instances alleged. (Curtis v. Platt, 8 Law Tim. Rep. 657.)

PATENT.-Motion for decree-Destruction of machines-Damages -Certificate of Judge-21 & 22 Vic. c. 27-15 & 16 Vic. c. 83, s. 43.-The Court of Chancery will not in all cases order the destruction of a defendant's machines which are infringements on the plaintiff's patent, but it will order them to be marked so as to prevent their being used hereafter in such a way as to continue the infringement. When the bill prays, in the alternative, an inquiry as to damages, or an account of the defendant's profits, but no issue as to damages was submitted to the jury, the Court will not refer an inquiry to assess damages to chambers, but will grant the alternative. It is not necessary after a trial before a special jury, under the 21 & 22 Vic. c. 27, that the Judge give his certificate for the special jury. On a suit for infringement before the Court of Chancery, the Judge may certify to the validity of the patent, as upon an action in a court of common law. (Needham v. Ocley, 8 Law Tim. Rep. 604.) PUBLIC COMPANY.-Land Clauses Act, 1845-Purchase by companies-Costs of reinvestment.-The rule that, where a reinvestment is sought of the purchase moneys paid into court by two or more companies, the costs of that reinvestment shall be borne by the companies in equal shares, and not in proportion to the amounts severally paid in or applied, will not be departed from except in cases of great hardship. And where the whole of company A.'s money was taken, and only a small part of company B.'s, it was held not to be such a hardship, although company B. might thereafter become liable to the costs of an investment of the balance of its fund, and a second petition. (Re Byron, 8 Law Tim. Rep. 562.)

Winding up-Transfer of shares after a call _made_but before the date of payment-Validity of the same-Registration -Right of creditor's representative to appear-7 & 8 Vic. c. 110.

-A proprietor in the above company transferred his shares after a call had been made, but before it became payable. Held, that the transfer was valid under the 54th section of the 7 & 8 Vic. c. 110. Where a transfer of shares is not returned to the registrar's office, the transferor will be liable to the creditor of the company, but not liable to contribute as between himself and the other shareholders. In the case of a contributory, a creditor's representative has a right to appear, and will have his costs. (Re Orpen, 8 Law Tim. Rep. 596.)

RAILWAYS.-Excursion train-Passenger's luggage. The following case is one of interest as to the liability of a passenger to pay for the carriage of luggage, he having only paid for an excursion ticket, the terms of which were that no luggage was to be taken. It appeared that the defendants were a railway company issuing excursion tickets at a lower rate than the ordinary fare, on condition that no luggage should be taken; and it was held that they had a lien upon the luggage of a passenger who had taken such an excursion ticket for its carriage. (Rumsey v. North East. R. Co., 8 Law Tim. Rep. 666.)

RECEIVER.Accounts-Penalties of neglect.-The second rule of the 24th of the Consolidated Orders provides as follows:"And with respect to such receivers as shall neglect to leave and pass their accounts, and pay the balance thereof at the time so to be fixed for that purpose as aforesaid, the Judge before whom such receivers are to account shall, from time to time, when their subsequent accounts are produced to be examined and passed, not only disallow the salaries therein claimed by such receivers, but also charge them with interest after the rate of £5 per cent. per annum upon the balances so neglected to be paid by them during the time the same shall appear to have remained in the hands of such receivers." A receiver neglecting to pass his accounts and pay the balance was, under the above 24th of the Consolidated Orders, disallowed his poundage, and charged at the rate of £5 per cent. per annum interest on the balances that were in his hands. (Bristowe v. Needham, 8 Law Tim. Rep. 652.)

RE-HEARING.-Lapse of time-Decree not warranted by pleadings. -Although the usual time for re-hearing a cause may have elapsed, the Court will order a re-hearing upon the application of persons whose interests have been injuriously affected by a decree which has gone further than the question before the Court at the time of the original hearing required. Thus, where a suit was instituted for the purpose of having the interests of certain tenants for life in the share of a deceased co-tenant for life declared, and the M. R. declared those rights, and that there were cross-remainders between them, the Lords Justices gave leave to present a petition of re-hearing to the

children of a tenant for life, who died only in December last. (Walmesley v. Foxhall, 8 Law Tim. Rep. 558.)

REVIEW.-Petition for leave to file a bill of review-Order under Trustee Relief Act.-On a petition for leave to file a bill of review it is necessary to make out a prima facie case of facts discovered since the proceedings sought to be impeached and that there is a claim. An order under the Trustee Relief Act has the same force as a decree for the purpose of being impeached by a bill of review. (Re Smyth, 8 Law Tim. Rep. 598.)

SETTLED ESTATES.-Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act, 20 Vic. c. 120-Lunatic.—A person of unsound mind, not found lunatic by inquisition, was entitled to a charge of £200 per annum upon the property proposed to be dealt with under the Act: it was held that such person was not a necessary party to a petition under the Act, as the Court would direct that what was to be done under the petition should be subject to that charge. (Re Tarbutt, 8 Law Tim. Rep. 602.)

ATTORNEY'S PRACTICE (ante, p. xx.).

GENTLEMEN,-Looking through the CHRONICLE for July, the peculiarly interesting question of "E." (p. xx.) struck my notice, as doubtless it has that of many other law students, who, like myself, have probably been induced, carefully and with curious pleasure (although, pour moi, with very little experience), to sift and examine the confusion of principles in one's disorderly head, to discover if any be apropos of the point, which may (but may it be graciously forbidden) be of personally practical interest some time hence.

My impression, prima facie, would be that the practice of a solicitor could not be sold by his assignees, for this reason it is something purely personal to the practitioner himself, consisting of the exercise of his mental powers, and of the practical application of his knowledge. It is, therefore, quite incapable of transfer. It cannot pass to the assignees, being nothing in esse-nothing over which they can exercise any control; and, moreover, it is nothing which the solicitor himself can put them in possession of, so as to enable them to make a disposition thereof. The sale of a practice is, in effect, an undertaking, for a sum of money, to advise those who (relying on your fitness) have entrusted their affairs to your management to confide them to the care of another. Now, even if it were competent for one solicitor to agree to recommend another-not for skill and competence, but for a pecuniary consideration-it is thought that third persons could not call upon him (for the purpose of liquidating a debt to them) to persuade men to entrust their fortunes into the hands of another, and that other the man who offers the largest