Salvage-Jurisdiction.-By the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, s. 460, the High Court of Admiralty has no jurisdiction in respect of salvage, if the sum claimed for remuneration does not exceed £200, and the services are performed within the kingdom, or within three miles of the shore. By the "sum claimed" is meant the amount asked for before any legal proceedings have been commenced. By the Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act, 1862, s. 49, the High Court of Admiralty has likewise no jurisdiction in respect of salvage, if the property saved is not of the value of £1,000. A disputed agreement as to remuneration for salvage services is not sufficient to give the Court either the jurisdiction of which it has been deprived by the Merchant Shipping Act, 1864, or that which has been transferred by the Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act, 1862. The master of a vessel agreed to pay the sum of £140 for salvage services to be rendered to his vessel. After the assistance had been given, proceedings were taken before certain Justices, who overruled the agreement as exorbitant, and awarded the sum of £70; and a cause of salvage was thereupon instituted in the High Court of Admiralty : Held, that the suit be dismissed with costs (The William and John, 8 Law Tim. Rep., N. S., 56). STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.-Refusal to recognise the right-Breach of duty-Bill of lading-Costs of objection to pleadings.-As the Examiners very frequently ask questions on stoppage in transitu, the following may be useful, and may be added to 1 Exam. Chron. 25. The refusal of the master of a ship to recognise the right of the vendor of goods to stoppage in transitu is a breach of duty, for which the vessel may be liable under the Admiralty Court Act 1861, s. 6. The right of stoppage in transitu means the right not only to countermand delivery to the vendee, but to order delivery to the vendor. The indorsement and delivery of one of triplicate bills of lading does not necessarily operate as an endorsement of all. The mere indorsement and delivery of one of triplicate bills of lading is not necessarily such a negotiation as to preclude a vendor from exercising his right of stoppage in transitu. On objection to the pleadings, the questions for decision involved the whole case, and not merely slight alterations. L. and S., the holders of triplicate bills of lading, indorsed one to B., and B. having afterwards become insolvent, they then indorsed another to themselves, presented it to the master and claimed the goods: Held, that their right to stoppage in transitu did not also require that they should represent to the master that B. had not negotiated his bill of lading: Held, that the unsuccessful party must be condemned in costs (The Tigress, 8 Law Tim. Rep., N. S., 117). Dr. Lushington said: "The first ground of objection is that the plaintiffs cannot claim the wheat under the bill of lading indorsed to themselves, because they had pre viously endorsed a bill of lading to Bushe, and an indorsement of one bill of lading operated as an indorsement of all, and that the subsequent endorsement of the duplicate bill of lading by the plaintiffs to themselves was therefore ineffectual. I think this position of the defendant is opposed to the law as laid down in the case of Fearon v. Bowers (1 H. Bl. n. 364), and adverted to in Smith's Lead. Cas. vol. I., p. 705. This case is cited with approbation in Lickbarrow v. Mason (1 Smith's Lead. Cas. 681), alike by Lord Loughborough (p. 705), in the Ex. Ch., and also by Buller, J. (p. 714), in the H. of L., and in no way infringes the doctrine that the indorsement of a bill of lading passes the property. In the case of Fearon v. Bowers, as in the present, the master had executed more than one bill of lading of the same tenor, under the usual proviso that if one was accomplished the others were to stand void. The consignor endorsed one of the bills to the vendee and another to his own partner, with instructions to present it in case the vendee was not solvent. On the arrival of the vessel the partner presented his bill of lading, and at the same time an indorsee for value from the vendee presented his bill of lading. The captain thought fit to deliver to the consignor's partner, and the endorsee for value thereupon brought an action for detinue against the master. It was held by Lee, C.J., that, nakedly considered, a bill of lading transferred the property and a right to assign that property by indorsement, but that, according to the usage of trade, the captain was not concerned to examine the best right on the different bills of lading; all he had to do was to deliver the goods upon one of the bills of lading, which was done, and the Chief Justice therefore directed the jury to find for the defendant. It is clear that that case was a stronger one than the present, for there the counter claimant was an indorsee for value; here there is no evidence of any indorsement for value, nor even of any claim by the vendee himself. However, it is unnecessary to decide this case upon the claim by the plaintiffs under the bill of lading, for it is clear that the use by them of the bill of lading was only auxiliary to their alleged right to stop in transitu, which right I proceed to consider. As to this the defendant objects, in the first place, by denying altogether the right of the plaintiffs to stop in transitu, if I correctly understand the argument. It is said at the bar that the plaintiffs lost their right from the moment that they indorsed the bill of lading to Bushe, for the right to stop is defeated by negotiating the bill of lading with a bona fide indorsee. Now, according to my apprehension of the meaning of the term negotiating, there is no such fact in this case. All that appears is that the vendor, on receiving the bill of exchange, indorsed over one of the bills of lading to the vendee. This is no negotiation of the bill of lading so indorsed, as EXAMINATION QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. would have been the case if, for instance, this bill of lading had been indorsed over by Bushe to a third party for a valuable consideration. Such latter transaction might be correctly called a negotiation, and would transfer such title to the property as the indorser had a right to convey, free from the counter-right to stop in transitu. But the rule of law, that the right to stop in transitu would not be affected by the mere fact of the vendor indorsing a bill of lading to the vendee, is, I think, scarcely to be doubted; for I do not perceive how the right to stop in transitu could, in a large number of cases, be effectually exercised if it were otherwise." WAY OF NECESSITY.-Implied grant-Severance-Two properties held by same owner and afterwards severed.-It seems that a way of necessity is limited by the necessity, and terminates at that point, It appeared where the shortest approach to the land terminates. in the following case that a testator, the owner of two contiguous farms, one of which was occupied by a tenant, and the other by the testator, devised the farm occupied by the tenant to his son A., and The farm devised to A. was inacessible the other farm to his son J. from the highway, except by a road lying across the farm devised to J., which was used by the tenant up to the testator's death. The enjoyment of A.'s farm in the state in which it was when devised was not complete without this road; but, though convenient, such The will made no mention of ways: road was not a way of necessity. Held, that, by implication, the road, as used at the time of the testator's death, passed to A. under the devise, and not merely a way of necessity (Pearson v. Spencer, 11 Week. Rep. 471). EXAMINATION QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. I. A plaintiff delivers the following declaration, "The plain- upon bills ANS.-The plea of never indebted is not a proper plea, as by the 7th Plead. Rule of Trin. Term, 1853, in all actions of exchange and promissory notes the plea of non assumpsit and In such actions a plea in "never indebted " is inadmissible. denial must traverse some matter of fact, exempli gratia, the draw ing or making, or indorsing, or accepting, or presenting, or notice of dishonour of the bill or note. (Pract. Com. Law 128, 129.) In the case put by the examiners the defendant should plead his non-acceptance of the bill. (Roscoe's Evid. 254, 9th ed.) II. What is the rule as to costs where a plaintiff sues in contract in the Superior Court for £20, or under, judgment being signed for default of appearance? ANS.-In such cases the plaintiff is not entitled to his costs, except the Judge certifies for them, for by 19 & 20 Vic. c. 108, s. 30, where an action of contract is brought in one of the Superior Courts to recover a sum not exceeding £20, and the defendant in the action suffers judgment by default, the plaintiff shall recover no costs, unless upon an application to such Court, or a Judge thereof, such Court or Judge shall otherwise direct. In all actions on contract under £20, in a Superior Court, it is prudent for the plaintiff to indorse upon his writ the following:-"Take notice that if judgment be signed for default of appearance, the plaintiff will, without summons, apply to a Judge for his costs of suit, unless before such judgment you give notice to him or his attorney that you intend to oppose such application." After judgment on a writ so indorsed, if the defendant gave such notice, the plaintiff takes out a summons before a Judge in the ordinary way; and in cases where the Superior Courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the County Courts, the Judge is bound to make the order. If no such notice be given by the defendant, the plaintiff produces his affidavit of service and the writ served containing the above notice to the Judge's clerk, who will mark the writ with the Judge's initials, which will be sufficient authority for the taxing master to tax the costs. (Reg. East. T. 1857; 29 Law Journ., Ex., 471; 1 Archb. Pract. 195, 11th ed.) III. What persons are exempt from arrest on civil process, and what is the difference between a temporary and permanent privilege? ANS. The royal family, officers and domestics engaged in the service of the Queen, peers, peeresses, foreign ambassadors and their domestic servants, are permanently privileged from arrest. Members of Parliament, during the session, and forty days before and after it, clergymen performing divine service, or going to or returning from the same, barristers, attorneys, suitors, witnesses, and other persons necessarily attending any Courts upon business, or going to or returning therefrom, are temporarily privileged. Seamen and soldiers for debts under £30. Executors, administrators and heirs cannot be held to bail for the debts of the deceased, unless they have given a binding promise in writing. (See Pract. Com. Law, pp. 85-88, where the authorities are mentioned.) There is no other difference between a permanent and temporary privilege beyond what is evident from the terms themselves in the one case the party can never be arrested, in the other he is liable to arrest after the circumstances which create the privilege have ceased to exist. As to the sheriff's non-liability, see Princ. Com. Law, 302, 303. : IV. Explain the maxim Actio personalis moritur cum persona, and are there any exceptions? ANS. The maxim meant that a personal right of action (that is, ex delicto, and not ex contractu) died with the person. With the exception presently mentioned, the rule still exists, considering the personal right of action to be strictly such, that is, not for an injury to property. The exception was originated by the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, by which, whensoever the death of a person is caused by any wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then the person who would have been liable, if death had not ensued, may be sued for damages, notwithstanding the death of the party injured; and although the death was caused under such circumstances as amounted in law to felony. The action must be brought by the executors or administrators of the deceased, and commenced within a year from the death. Damages can only be awarded for some pecuniary loss, and not by way of solatium; they are to be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent, or child of the deceased, in such shares as the jury shall direct. (F. Bk. 245, 246; as to the maxim, see Princ. Com. Law, 363, et seq.; 1 Ex. Chron. 225.) V. What is the rule as to allowing applications to set aside process or proceedings for irregularity? ANS.-No application to set aside process or proceedings for irregularity is allowed, unless made within a reasonable time, nor if the party applying has taken a fresh step in the cause after knowledge of the irregularity. (Reg. Gen. Hil. T. 1853, pl. 135.) VI. When may different causes of action be joined in the same suit? Are any forms of action excepted; and upon what statute does the law upon this subject rest? ANS. By the C. L. P. Act, 1852, s. 41, causes of action of whatever kind, provided they be by and against the same parties, and in the same rights, may be joined in the same suit, but this does not extend to replevin or ejectment; and where two or more of the causes of action so joined arise in different counties, the venue may be laid in either of such counties, but the Court or Judge may M |