out again; that in a fish net proper the funnel was left hanging loose, so that there was no opening for the fish to come out; and that these particular nets were made with the opening, and with strings tied from the end of the funnel or opening to the main side of the net, so that, when the net was set as these nets were set, the opening of all the funnels was pulled open thereby, giving the fish plenty of room to swim out after they went into said nets; that all of said nets were so arranged, and for the purpose of letting fish which swam in, swim out, and that the turtles which went in could not get out because of their size and shape; that all of these nets were hoop nets; that these nets were set differently than nets were set for catching fish; that these nets were set with pieces of heavy chains at the bottom, so that the bottom of the nets would be in the mud, and to catch them the nets had to be on the bottom, and were set in about 12 to 15 feet in depth of water; that in setting nets for fish there are no chains on the bottom to hold them in the mud, for the reason that fish do not crawl on the bottom; that the respondent told Hammond (the deputy game and fish warden), in the winter before, that he was going to set nets for the purpose of catching turtles, and that said Hammond saw said respondent set said nets long before the time of taking these nets, and said nothing about it; that the respondent told said Hammond that he (respondent) had caught turtles in said nets before Hammond took them up, and that there were a few fish in them, and that respondent put them back in the water unharmed." It appeared that the nets were drawn by the deputy game warden, and that fish were found therein. The trial court refused to give to the jury certain instructions, asked for by defendant's counsel, respecting respondent's intent and purpose in setting the nets, and instructed the jury as follows: "If you shall find that the nets that were set there were such nets as would take and catch fish,-I say, if you find those to be the facts, and beyond reasonable doubt, then this respondent would be guilty of the offense here charged, although he may not have drawn the nets himself. If you find that the nets were drawn by this game warden, and fish were then and there caught in those nets, and that those nets belonged to and were set by this respondent, then he would be guilty, under this act, of unlawfully taking or attempting to take or catch fish. The intent with which he set those nets there has nothing to do with the law of this case, and if he set them with the intent to catch turtles, and actually did and were well calculated to catch and imprison fish and take fish, and the fish were actually taken at the time, it would be a violation of this law." This instruction was erroneous. The respondent's testimony tended to show that he set the nets for another purpose. The statute does not prohibit the setting of nets, but the catching or taking of fish from the lake by means of nets. It would be a narrow view to take of the language employed to say that a fish accidentally impris oned by the use of a net employed for another purpose, and one which was shown to be entirely legitimate, was "caught," within the meaning of the statute. Whether or not the net was set for the purpose of catching fish was a question for the jury under all the facts and circumstances of the case. The conviction is set aside, and a new trial awarded. LONG and MONTGOMERY, JJ., Concurred with MCGRATH, C. J. HOOKER, J. (dissenting). The defendant was convicted of the offense of unlawfully taking fish by the use of fyke nets, in contravention of section 5 of Act No. 111 of the Public Acts of 1889. This section provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person or persons to take or catch, or attempt to take or catch, any fish at any time with seines, pound nets, gill nets, or any species of nets in any of the waters of this State," etc. The defendant does not deny that he set the nets, or that fish were caught and killed thereby, but he says that he did not set these nets from a desire to catch fish, but to catch turtles, and that he made no use of the fish that were caught, but released such as were alive when he took up his net. The trial court held that this did not constitute a defense. It is admitted that the defendant used a net adapted to and commonly used for the purpose of catching fish. There is every reason to suppose that he knew that it would catch fish, for it had done so to his knowledge. To hold him guiltless is to say that a man may do those things which will certainly result in the destruction of fish, if he has another object in view, and will return such fish as he may take, alive or dead, as the case may be, to the water, and not use them, while his neighbor, who desires to keep them, is guilty. In my opinion, a man who sets a net with the knowledge that it will result in the taking and destruction of fish intends to take them, notwithstanding the fact that his primary object may be to accomplish another purpose. He wants the turtles, and to get them he is willing to take or catch the fish. This does not show an absence of intent, for it is just as unlawful to take fish that turtles may be caught as to take fish to sell or to eat. The right to protect fish by law is within the police power of the State, and there is force in the claim that the act is punishable regardless of the intent. Many cases can be found that hold that convictions may be sustained in the absence of a criminal intent,-e. g., the sale of adulterated milk (Com. v. Farren, 9 Allen, 489); selling liquor not known to be intoxicating (Com. v. Boynton, 2 Allen, 160); marriage of minors by one honestly supposing them of proper age (Beckham v. Nacke, 56 Mo. 546); the killing and sale of a calf under a specified age, though the defendant was ignorant of the animal's age (Com. v. Raymond, 97 Mass. 567); transporting a slave on a steamboat (State v. Baltimore & S. Steam Co., 13 Md. 189). These cases, and others cited in People v. Roby, 52 Mich. 580, where the subject is discussed, fully justify the doctrine that neglect may be criminal. Here there is not mere neglect, but a positive expectation of doing the act prohibited, and immunity is expected upon the claim that the defendant designed to catch turtles, and to do so involved the taking of fish, but his indiffer ence as to the fate of the fish relieved him from liability under the law. In my opinion, the man who sets a net adapted to the purpose and known by him to be likely to catch fish, and which actually does take them, cannot be said to be guiltless. I think the conviction should be affirmed. PEOPLE v. LENNOX. 1. CRIMINAL LAW-FALSE PRETENSES-SUFFICIENCY OF INFORMA TION-SCIENTER. Where the representation set forth in an information for obtaining money by false pretenses are of such a nature as to negative any possible hypothesis of respondent's ignorance of their falsity, an averment that respondent knew them to be false is not necessary. An information, therefore, alleging that respondent designedly falsely represented and pretended that he had received from a certain person a subscription for a specified amount, with payment in full thereon, whereas such person had subscribed and paid only a specified smaller amount, is sufficient. 2. SAME-INTENT TO DEFRAUD-DEFENSES. The fact that money obtained by false pretenses is devoted to the object for which it was given, which is a meritorious one, will not constitute a defense to a criminal prosecution, such fact being immaterial upon the question of intent to defraud. Exceptions before judgment from Ingham; Person, J. Submitted July 13, 1895. Decided October 1, 1895. Cornelius Lennox was convicted of obtaining money by false pretenses. It appeared upon the trial that the money so obtained was used for the purpose for 106 MICH.-10 which it was solicited and given, namely, the establishment of a training school for colored children. Conviction affirmed. Arthur D. Prosser, for appellant. L. B. Gardner, Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. GRANT, J. The gist of the crime charged in the information is that the respondent "did designedly falsely represent and pretend to said Robert B. Shank that he, the said Cornelius Lennox, had received from one Walter A. Newton a subscription of $10, with payment in full thereon by said Walter A. Newton," whereas the said Walter A. Newton had not subscribed nor paid him the $10, and had subscribed and paid to him only $1. The allegations in regard to the subscription book or paper, and that said Newton had written his name and amount therein, are merely descriptive of the means used, and of evidence to sustain the charge. The information would be perfectly good if it contained nothing about the subscription book or paper. "The defendant's knowledge of the falsity of the pretenses is material, and hence must be averred, unless the pretenses stated are of such a nature as to exclude the possible hypothesis of the defendant's ignorance of their falsity." People v. Fitzgerald, 92 Mich. 331, and the authorities there cited. That case was reversed because the information did not allege that the respondent knew he was not authorized by the association to collect the money for the benefit of the person named in the subscription paper. It was held that the respondent might have been ignorant of the fact that the paper he presented was a false and fraudulent statement. The present case comes clearly within the excep tion to the general rule stated in the above authority. The allegation of the information in this case negatives any possible hypothesis of ignorance. In People v. Behee, 90 Mich. 356, the information was held bad because |