may be difpofed to review their former contemptuous judgment upon the value of thofe facred principles which bind nations and individuals together; and to reprobate as unjust and unlawful, that conduct which they find to be ungainful.

This third part of the differtation begins with clearing the way towards a correct understanding of the new fyftem, by fome preliminary remarks upon the confufed, and in many particulars contradictory, regulations laid down in the orders of Council. A general statement is then given of their fubftance,-a sketch of the fum of the changes which they are intended to produce upon the commercial intercourfe of the world. This general view is illuftrated by the following statement of the cafe, and the fummary to which it leads of the principal points that touch the question of policy.

To illuftrate the operation of this new fyftem, let us take the example of an American veffel, and obferve what fhe is allowed and forbidden to do. She may fail with an American cargo to England, and from thence to France, without landing her cargo, if it confift not of cotton or manufactured goods. From France the may return with a French or other reftricted cargo, which the muft land before the can carry it back to America. The chief exports of America are raw produce; therefore, almost her whole trade with the restricted countries is limited by the neceffity of touching at an English port twice, and landing the cargo once: if the American cargo confift of cotton, it must be landed in the outward voyage alfo, and can only proceed by license. The American may trade directly to and from the enemy's West India islands; but cannot (on account of the former law) bring their produce to this country; nor, by the Orders, can fhe carry it to the restricted European ports. She cannot pursue her voyage to and from the north of Europe, by touching at Man, Guernsey or Jersey, either going or coming. But, befides touching there, fhe muft touch at a British or Irish port. It is evident then, that unless for convenience of fmuggling, and evading the French decrees, no American will trade to Europe, through Man, Guernsey and Jerfey. The American cannot purfue her voyage to or from the fouth of Europe, by touching at Malta and Gibraltar; but muft go first to a British or Irish port, and afterwards return thither.

This illuftration comprehends the only material features of the new fyftem, viz. its forcing all the neutral commerce to run through the ports of the United kingdom; its giving the English government a command of the supply of cotton, and some smaller articles, as brandies, wines, European fnuff and tobacco; and its ftopping the exportation of all enemy's West India produce, except cotton, cochineal and indigo, either to this country or to any reftricted part of Europe. It is upon these points that the policy of the measure must be tried. '

P. 41, 42.

The substance of the new regulations being obtained in a sufficiently

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ficiently simple and comprehensive form for examining the expediency of the system, and the ground, as it were, cleared for the discussion, the consequences of the intended changes to our commerce, and the commerce of our enemies and allies, are investigated at considerable length, upon the supposition that the whole of our edicts are quietly acquiesced in by neutrals; and then their tendency to irritate those neutrals is separately pointed out. Instead of following the plan of the work, and analyzing its contents minutely, we shall, according to our practice, endeavour to exhibit a view of its substance, after our own way of considering it, and shall intersperse such additional remarks as suggest themselves to us, although they may have been omitted in the work under review. The subject is of infinite importance, not merely to this country at the present moment, but to the whole science of politics, in which, views, of a tendency the most novel, are now industriously propagated, and a great, and, in our opinion, not merely perilous, but fatal, experiment is attempted, by persons under the guidance of the most blind and extravagant passions with which the rulers of an enlightened people were ever stricken.

France having attempted, or rather threatened to blockade this country, and cut off all intercourse between us and our foreign customers, a prudent statesman would naturally have considered, in the first place, the probable consequences of such a resolution on the enemy's part being enforced. He would immediately have perceived, that the most rigorous execution of this measure could only have cut off our direct intercourse with the parts of the Continent where French influence prevails, leaving us all our trade with neutrals; that is, our trade with America, and with those parts of Europe not overrun by French troops; consequently, he would have concluded, that the utmost exertions of the French government, admitting them to prevail over the proverbial ingenuity of neutral traders, and to prevent our goods from getting in their bottoms directly over to the Continent, could have gone not one step further; and that our direct trade with those neutrals, and, consequently, through their countries, with the countries most subject to the enemy's influence, would still have remained to us. Thus, it would have appeared, that even if France had succeeded in preventing Americans (for example) from carrying over our goods direct to the Continent, she never could prevent them from carrying those same goods from hence to their own ports, and from their own ports to France. No certificates of origin, nor any other conceivable regulation, could have preventted a British cargo from finding its way over by such a route.

Nothing

Nothing but the resolution to give up her whole trade at once, or the possession of fleets sufficient to invest our coasts, and cut off our direct trade with America, could have destroyed our roundabout trade with France. She neither has shown this resolution, nor. does she possess those fleets.

As

The prudent statesman (whose existence we are assuming as a bare possibility) would next have inquired, by what means he could diminish most effectually the total amount of the restrictions which the enemy was thus cnabled to impose on our commerce. As the roundabout trade was of all others the surest means of defeating those restrictions, he would, at all events, have left that untouched-encouraged it-relied upon it-satisfied that nothing but the destruction of it could ever carry the threats of France into execution. This would have struck him at any rate, and he would have laid it down as a matter of course. little would it have been a question, whether the direct trade, which the enemy prohibited between us and himself, should be encouraged in spite of him, and prohibited on our side, as a measure of retaliation. Whether we should say to neutrals, You shall not enter here from enemy's ports, because he won't allow you to land from our ports; or, Come here freely, and depart freely; endeavour, by all means, to evade his restrictions; and we shall afford you every facility for this purpose.' This question would not have detained our statesman long; for he would immediately perceive, that, by adopting the former alternative, he was just playing into the enemy's hand-confirming his decree -carrying into execution parts of it which he himself could not have enforced-and guarding against evasions of it, which must have rendered it almost nugatory without our assistance. To have encouraged the trade between the enemy's country and our own, direct by neutrals, would therefore be the next resolution of the reasoning which we are supposing. By leaving the roundabout trade with France untouched, we should have left open a channel of communication with the Continent in spite of her; and, by promoting all evasions of her decrees against the direct trade, we should have done our best to prevent her from blocking up another channel, much more within her power.

What do the statesmen, whose system we are examining, propose to themselves? They resolve at once to shut up the channel of the roundabout trade, which the enemy could least of allhave effected himself; and they try to encourage the direct channel, which is the most under his controul. They do his business for him, where he most wants their aid, and can the least do with-out them. Where he is powerful, and may do something in spite of their teeth, they attempt to counteract his regulations. There

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are

are two gates in our field through which we wish to drive our sheep one of them we can open and shut at pleasure; it leads into the highway, and we have the key in our pockets: the other belongs, half to us, and half to a malicious neighbour, who wishes to prevent us from driving out our sheep at all. What shall we do? The great counsellors of the time, tell us to shut up our own gate by all means-to make it as fast as we can with bolts and bars, so that not a lambkin may get out; and then to go struggle with our neighbour at the other gate, and try to drive our flocks through that passage. It is related, that the Chancellor Oxenstiern said to his son, when he sent him to a congress of statesmen, and the young man was struck with awe at the solemnity of the occasion, Go, my child, and see how little wisdom it takes to govern the world.

But supposing the prudent statesman, above imagined, had a mind to consider the question of retaliating upon the enemy, let us see how he would reason. He would certainly, in the first place, ask himself, whether, by any conceivable mode of retaliation, he could avoid doing, in great part at least, the very thing which the enemy wishes? Whether, commerce being essentially, and in its own nature, a mutual benefit, he could stop the trade of France, without either immediately or ultimately stinting the trade of England? He would then inquire, which party is likely to suffer most in the contest of self-destruction, in the rivalry of privations and losses? And as it is clear that this must be the party which has most trade- whose trade is most extensive in proportion to his whole resources-whose commerce, in a word, is most essential to his general prosperity-so would it likewise be manifest, that any injury we might inflict on the enemy would be trifling, compared with its expense to ourselves; and that we should damage our own interests so much more than we could injure his, that the utmost we could gain by such a bargain would not be worth the price we must pay.

If, however, retaliation must be resorted to, and if we are resolved to hurt the enemy, cost what it will to ourselves, our statesman would take especial care to see that his measures were really those of retaliation; and if he had the sense of a child, he would be cautious how he mistook cooperation, for retaliation. Our new system makes exactly this mistake. We attack the commerce of neutrals and allies; and we favour the trade of the enemy. One of the greatest markets, if not the greatest for American commerce, is France, and the rest of the restricted country. We at once obstruct all direct communication between America and this market. One of the best markets of France and the retricted country is England. We not only facilitate, by every

means

means in our power, the access to this market; but we actually compel all neutrals to drive the traffic of France with her best customers in the shortest and easiest way. American commerce, we say, shall be all confined, round-about and indirect. Hostile commerce-French commerce, shall be easy, direct and open.

In truth it now depends on our enemy, by means of our assistance, whether any, and what commerce, shall be carried on between himself and England. And this we call a blockade of France, which is in truth much liker a blockade of England. In truth, a general and rigorous blockade of France, liable though it be to many of the objections already stated, is at least an intelligible and consistent measure.

It cuts off his foreign trade entirely, although it deprives us of our trade with him; and if commercial diftrefs can ruin him, fuch a proceed-: ing gives us fome chance of effecting his downfall. But the new fyftem is only a blockade of the enemy, if the enemy himself chufes that it fhall be fo. It can never, by poffibility, ruin him, or even materially injure his commerce: for the moment he is pinched, he can relieve himfelf. He can allow neutrals to enter his own ports, from thofe of Great Britain; and thus obtain as large a fhare of foreign commerce as he defires. Thefe neutral carriers, it is true, must land and re-ship in England certain cargoes; and many (but not by any means all) of thefe voyages will be fomewhat more circuitous than formerly. An American bound to Bordeaux, muft touch at Cork, Falmouth, &c. which is fomewhat out of her course; if bound to Dunkirk, Amfterdam, &c. The would probably touch at Cowes from choice, to receive advices refpecting the market from London correfpondents. Admitting that fome confiderable inconvenience arifes from hence, in all cafes on an average; the whole effect is to raise the prices of the neutral goods a little to the enemy, and to lower fomewhat the profits of the al, without any gain whatever to ourselves. Our friends and our enemies lofe each a little, and we gain nothing at all. The obligation to land certain cargoes can do us no more real good. It increafes fomewhat the lofs of the neutral and the enemy, and may enable us to keep a few more cuftomhouse officers. If, indeed, the Orders in Council are followed up by an act of Parliament impofing duties on the goods fo landed, then we clearly fhall propofe to ourfelves, not certainly to diftrefs the enemy's trade, but to profit both by his commerce and that of our friends. Would it not be a much fimpler expedient, and answer the very fame purpose, to propose that America fhould pay us a yearly tribute, and to raife it as fhe beft can, either upon her own citizens, or her French cuf, tomers? If the duty which we mean to lay on is not the merest trifle, we may be well affured that America will not fubmit to it.' p. 44-46. Upon

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It is confidently reported that fome relaxation of the French Decree has already been allowed in Holland, though this does not appeas very likely.'