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the Koran, without being guilty of this sort of rebellion. The following texts are taken almost at random. "War is enjoined you against infidel'se' Koran, c. 2. p. 38. O irue believers! take not the Jews or Christians for your friends.? c. 5. p. 141." « They are infidels who say verily God is Christ the son of Mary. c, 5. p. 133. Oh true believers ! wage war against such of the infidels as are near you, and let them find severity in you, and know that God is with those who fear him.' c.9. p. 265. Ć When ye encounter the unbelievers, strike off their heads, until ye have made a great slaughter among them.' &c. &c.
Such passages are read daily in every mosque in Indostan; and they are read without danger, because every man of sense knew that the age of, fanaticism, like that of chivalry, is over; and that Mussulman soldiers, now-a-days, fight for pay rather than for faith., A. circumstance, pretty well proved indeed, from Mahometans being to be found alike in the service of every state, or prince, of whatever religion, throughout India or Asia.. We doubt, indeed, very much, whether there is a single instance ; on record, of any one sepoy, officer, or other person, having deserted our service, because we were at war with a prince of the same religion which he himself professed. Thus, then, the whole story of preaching the language of rebellion, when examined into, turns out to be only preaching the Mahometan faith; which (like many other exhortations from the pulpit) had little effect on those who heard it.
We have now gone hastily over most of the considerations that bear upon the justice of this most extraordinary proceeding; and few, we believe, will be hardy enough to defend it on this ground, but we know that it has fand advocates on the score of policy. For our own parts, we are very much disposed to doubt if there can ever be any sound policy in injustice; but, in the present case, there is no need to refer to such a general maxim. We hold India by the tenure of opinion only; cur physical strength is as nothing to that of the natives; and our dominion over all these fair countries, is uplield solely by certain opinions and prejudices, which it is the obvious tendency of our present policy to destroy. The mass of the people is kept in order by their attachment io their religion, and to rank and caste, which makes it easy to mae hage them by the instrumentality of their rulers; and these rulers, again, we have hitherto preserved in alliance or subjection by the fidelity with which we have discharged to them the duties of protectors and allies. By our usurpation of the Carnatic, we have done our utmost to subvert both these principles. We have degraded rank, and violated sanctity: and have availed ourselves of our power to despoil our most artient ally of his influence and
honours. The dispossessed family, of course, will hate us with 1 a deadly hatred; and the great body of Rajahs throughout the 101 country, will be apt to join in a deadly feud against that power which has only been exerted of late for their destruction. Al 3 lowing, for a moment, that they will not carry along with thema'.. great proportion of the people, and that the superior équity of our government should at first render us popular with the lower classes, it is evidently quite absurd to suppose, that we should'. ever succeed to that influence which was secured to their native rulers by ancient habits, and superstitions more strong than comă 117 pulsion. A handful of strangers and infidels must speedily be annihilated among a vast nation of independent bigots; and our 12 rule is absolutely at an end, the moment we cease to rule by the 138 help of superstition and prejudice. 12.56 TL20ino!". 1970
It is remarked by Thucydides, as a principle in human nature, 413 that the existing government is seldom liked by the subjects. 18 During the period of the Nabob's goverriment, we were hardly. known to the inhabitants of the country, otherwise than as gena tlemen, living in the large towns, who spent their money freely;i") were regular in their payments, and behaved well to their doméstics, We had no invidious duties to discharge; and the good we did, se made us to be respected. The Nabob's government performed all the invidious duties. They exacted the revenue, levied theilt customs, and inflicted the punishments. They werė natutally ream) garded as the oppressors, whilst we were considered as the be..! nefactors of the country.—But how is it now? We have changed places with the Nabob; and our relations of esteem are also 1. changed in the eyes of the natives. A certain degree of severitys will always attend the collection of the revenue in India; at least, many years must elapse before a system can be found sufficiently regular, to ensure at once a prompt and easy payinènt. Is it. wise then, to take upon ourselves a task which must naturally ren", der us disagreeable to the inhabitants, especially as it is at least very doubtful, whether we can collect more from the Carnatic than the Nabob did; and, considering the expenses of our judicial system, the balance will not, perhaps, be much in our favour..!
Such is the situation into which we have brought ourselves by this rash act of cupidity or ambition. We have been guilty of a great wrong, in order to bring on ourselves a great calamity=aint have committed injustice, without any prospect of advancing our worldly prosperity. Such is the aspect of the present and the past.--Before concluding, we may cast a hasty glance to the future. Is the evil which has been done remediable; and how are we 78 conduct ourselves in the circumstances which have actually oteurred ?-Yery opposite notions are entertained upon this subject';
and we shall state them very briefly, without presuming to offer any opinion of our own.
It is said, on the one hand, that the country should be retained, because our civil government and internal economy, though necessarily defective, contains within itself a principle of melioration, which no Mahometan government ever does; and because it is believed, that the native princes, if restored once more to their power, would gather wisdom from their misfortunes; and, whilst they appeared to forget the wrongs they had suffered, would only wait for an occasion of revolt. There are many things which ought not to be done,-but, being done, must be adhered to... pres;
On the other hand, the advocates for the restitution of the country affirm, that the permanency and real stability of our empire depends entirely on the degradation of the natives; and that every thing that tends to ameliorate their condition, must sap the foundations of our power. Hence it is thought, that the vesting a proprietary right in the inhabitants, the introduction of equal laws, the overthrow of the ancient families, and every thing else which tends to create a revolution in the habits and inanners of the people, will in the end prove fatal to our empire. They regard the security of our government, as a greater object than any little addition to our revenues; and this, they think, would be best produced by governing the natives through the medium of their ancient rulers, and removing ourselves from the invidious duties of being their immediate controulers. They affirm, that the seizure of the Carnatic has disgraced us, in the eyes of all. the country powers; and that no confidence will be placed in our government, until it is restored to its rightful owners. Spoliatus ante omnia restituendus.
ART. XIV. Orders in Council ; or, an Examination of the Justice, L ality, and Policy of the New System of Comercial Regulatio:ts. With an Appendix of State Papers, Statutes and Authorities.
pp. 114. Longman & Co. and J. Ridgway, London, 1808. W e have received this interesting and very able little publica. tion, just as we were preparing to close our labours for the present quarter; and have been so niuch struck with the importance and novelty of the disquisitions which it contains, that we cannot resist the temptation of laying a hasty account of it before our readers.
As a considerable part of the argument is applicable to the question in the precise shape which it will assume before Parliament, and regards, therefore, the particular form of the mea: sures lately adopted by the English government, rather than the general views of belligerent, or commercial policy, from which those measures took their rise, we shall pass over this branch of the subject very rapidly; and, referring our readers to the work itself for satisfaction on it, shall bestow our chief attention upon the latter portion of the discussion, in itself quite general, and applicable to the prevalent notions of trade and war, as a system.
The tract is divided into three parts. The first, discusses the question, whether the late Orders in Council are consistent with the law of nations; and endeavours to show, from various considerations, that they are wholly repugnant to it: That they are measures of pretended retaliation against our enemy, whom no one ever considered as a party in the cause ; but are in reality directed against neutral nations, whom we have no possible right to injure, mereiy because our enemy has done so, unless they have first acquiesced in the wrong, and thus made themselves parties to his quarrel : That no time was given for even asking the neutrals, whether they were disposed to yield or to resist, the French decree of blockade having been explained by the French government in a manner quite consistent with the law of nations, and acted upon accordingly, up almost to the date of our Orders in Council : That even admitting the general plea of retaliation, the act of our government is not in the nature of a retaliating or reciprocal proceeding ;-it is not preventing neutrals from direct 'trade with France, because she would prevent them from direct trade with England, but forcing them to trade with France in a particular way profitable to ourselves, because France would blockade England altogether: That the regulations respecting certificates of origin, are still less like 'retaliation; and that, in truth, whatever may be the enemy's intention, as to his decree, his power of executing it is confined to the part which is strictly justifiable by the law of nations, viz. the shutting of his ports to certain ships, all the rest being empty threat and insult, and forming no excuse whatever for our aggressions on neutrals, whether they resent them or put up with them. : : To every one of these arguments we are ready to subscribe ; and they appear to us quite decisive of the question, touching the law of nations. But we could have wished that the defence of the Order issued by the late Administration, on January 7. 1807, had been less broadly stated. The arguments by which it is supported, are, many of them, just; and viewing it as an application only (for it is in truth scarcely an extension) of the rule of the war 1756, we must admit, that it rests on the same grounds with this rule. The preamble, too, when it mentions retaliation as the plea for issuing it, very possibly means only to state the motive
for using a just right, and not to defend the justice of that right.
Moreover, this Order, even as a retaliation, is not without its fase yourable circumstances; for there were several neutrals at that
time beside America; and the measure may have been taken with mig view to the majority of cases, leaving to America her excep
tions, founded on time not having been given her for acquiescing tain, or resisting the French decree; which exceptions, it may be < said, were competent before our prize courts. After making all 1 these concessions, we shall not be accused of too much rigour
towards the defenders of the Order 7. January, if we add, that s they should state more explicitly, their avowal, and their defence,
too, of the Rule 1756, on which it ultimately, and by their own is showing, rests. It is a good argument against the author of - War in Disguise,' and his adherents; to quote the Rule 1756, - when they attack the Order January 1807, which they cecainly
never will do, unless to accuse it of not going far enough. But what defence of the Order is it to those who deny that Rule?
If the rule is fairly avowed, then we are at issue with the sup- porters of the order upon the rule; ---if it is not avowed, or if
they fail in maintaining it, then we are at issue with them upon the whole of their order. Unhappily, such argumenta ad hominem,
are too commonly introduced in discussing great state questions b in this debating and eloquent country. Is a great measure to be ski defended? Its friends never think what are its merits, but
o who are its opponents; and instead of justifying their conriduct to the world, or to the people whose interests it affects, think, io they, do, enough, if they throw a sop to the barking animals - who are attacking it. You did so yourselves ;',or, You did * worfe; '-or, 'What would you have said had we nor done this ?'
These, alas, are the arguments by which our great statesmen but
tog often vindicate to their country the very questionable policy i which they are pursuing ! To all such topics we make one an* Twer. It may be your adversaries lave done as bad or worse ; * but what is that to the country? We appear for the country, ci and require, not that you ihall estop your opponents, by proving
them to be worse than yourselves, this is no comfort to the people, but that you shall defend your cause on its own merits. ? Che misery of the system we have alluded to is just this ;-that from defending measures on the ground of their being justified by
foriner example, or because the adversary's mouth is itopped by .. his own conduct, the transition is too easy to adopting measures to with a view to such wretched confiderations ; or, at any rate,
without the salutary dread of an opposition, controuling the exe
cutive, upon broad, itatesmanlike principles. Are we quite sure that ' :10 compromise is made upon the public welfare, in the cabinet as