it continues to apply even after he has actually come to be a citizen of the United States.

Thus, by our law no legal validity will be given to an act done in a foreign domicil if the act were invalid there, notwithstanding that the party had meanwhile proceeded to acquire the political status of a citizen of the United States. In general, the fact of naturalization in the United States leaves untouched the private rights or duties of the native domicil. It confers on the party political rights here; it augments his municipal rights here in some respects; but he cannot by reason of it set up, even here, any modification of rights, either of person or property, regarding acts done or interests retained by him in Prussia. But, in respect of acts done or interests acquired in this country, he is governed by its laws, and not by those of. Prussia.

To justify the absoluteness of the doctrine as here laid down in disregard of the dicta of many of the treatises on conflict of laws, domestic and foreign, a few illustrations are subjoined, which will serve at the same time to indicate the exceptions to the rule.

1. It is an established general rule of law in this country that the question of the validity of a marriage here, depends on the law of the place where the matrimonial engagement was contracted.

Hence, if a minor contracts marriage in Prussia in violation of the local law, the marriage does not acquire validity by the transfer of the minor's person to the United States. Such would be the rule in obedience to the doctrine of lex loci contractûs, even if the party were a citizen of the United States sojourning at Berlin: a fortiori if he be a subject of Prussia.

On the other hand, if an emigrant from Prussia, having become domiciled in New York, propose to contract a marriage in the latter place, its validity in this country will depend on the law of New York, without regard to the question of the capacity or incapacity of the party by the laws of Prussia.

In this class of cases, then, it is plain the law of the domicil of origin prevails as to things done there, and that of actual domicil as to things done here. The probable exceptions in regard to the efficacy here of the marriage contracted abroad, and valid there, would relate to questions of incest or polygamy, and the foreign marriage

might acquire exceptional validity by reason of the exter ritoriality of the parties.

2. In many countries of Europe, the age of complete capacity to contract is twenty-five years; and here it is twenty-one years.

Now, it is well settled in this country that a foreign emigrant domiciled here, and of the age of twenty-one years, cannot avoid a promissory note or other contract made here, by pleading that he is not as yet of full age in the domicil of his origin.

On the other hand, if the case were of a contract made in the foreign country, our courts would reject it, or give effect to it, according to the law of the place of contract, which, in the question now under consideration, would be the domicil of origin.

Here, in this class of cases, exceptions might arise in relation to contracts, which the laws of this country stigmatize as against good morals or public policy.

3. The relations of parent and child, of guardian and ward, afford other illustrations of the subject.

If a person be subject in the domicil of his origin to the control of parent or guardian, that subjection will affect all acts done by him there, and the legal quality of those acts will not be changed by his emigrating to this country and here gaining a new domicil; but, on the other hand, if an act be done by such person here, it must be judged by our law.

Thus, persons under twenty-one years of age, that is, minors, even here, may be enlisted into the military service of the United States. Suppose the party thus enlisting be of alien birth and domicil. If he have a parent or guardian domiciled in this country, the enlistment is not valid without the consent of such parent or guardian; but no question is admitted of any such potestas patria or tutrix in the country of the party's pristine or previous domicil in Eu

rope.

4. Questions of inheritance, testament and trust, are soluble by the same doctrine, with certain modifications.

Thus, the descent or devise of lands is regulated by the law of the particular State in which the lands are situated. And so of any other interest in lands, whether of inheritance, devise, or trust.

But, in regard to movables, the right by inheritance bequest or otherwise, depends on the law of the domicil. If the decedent, for instance, be at the time of his decease,

domiciled in Prussia, his testament is to be judged, and to have effect, according to the laws of Prussia; but if h ebe at the time domiciled here, then by the laws of the State in which he has actual domicil. So it is in regard to his succession if he die intestate.

These are consequences dependent on domicil, however, as distinguished from commorancy. Thus, if the party decedent be a mere traveller or temporary sojourner in this country, without animus manendi, and retaining by act and manifest intention, his foreign domicil, his succession or his testament of movable property here, and of his lands abroad, even though it be made in this country, will be governed by the law of that proper domicil. It is otherwise if he reside here with legally declared intention to

become a citizen of the United States.

So as to fiduciary interests. Whatever trust-property a person may be entitled to in the country of his first domicil, and whatever trust-obligations he may have there incurred, will be judged by the laws of that country, if brought in question here; but all such rights or obligations growing up here, depend on the law of the particular State.

I think these examples will suffice to show what the law of this country is in regard to conflicts of the law of legal capacity, more especially in the matter of age, the particular object of the inquiries of the Baron von Gerolt.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully,

HON. WM. L. MARCY, Secretary of State.

C. CUSHING.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.

District of Massachusetts. February, 1857.

UNITED STATES v. THOMAS P. PINGREE, ET AL.

The "additional duty of one hundred per cent." secured by transportation bonds, under Act 1854, c. 30, § 6, is one hundred per cent. on the original duty, and not on the invoice value of the goods.

The transportation bond, under Act 1854, c. 30, § 6, properly includes the original duty, as well as the additional duty, the bond first given for the original duty being cancelled.

MESSRS. PINGREE & Co. imported certain bags of Castana nuts, and placed them in the bonded warehouse in Salem,

giving bonds for the import duties, which were $105. The invoice value of the nuts was $350. Being desirous of removing them to Boston for sale, in bond, they executed, with sureties, the instrument required of them at the Salem custom house, which is called a transportation bond. It was not in the usual form of a bond, with a condition and a penal sum, but was a covenant, under seal, that the goods should be transported to Boston and there re-warehoused within thirty days, and failing that, that the defendants would pay the import duty of $105 and a further sum of $350, as an additional duty," under the act of 1854, c. 30. By a misapprehension on the part of the merchants who bought the nuts of the defendants, and without any intent to avoid re-warehousing, the nuts were not rewarehoused within the time. The government claimed a verdict for $455, which was so rendered, under pro forma instructions from the court. The defendants then moved in arrest of judgment.

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SPRAGUE, J.-Several grounds are taken in support of this motion. The first is, that the instrument in suit is not "a bond," within the meaning of the statute. It is not, to be sure, in the form of a bond with a penal sum and condition, but if its requirements are those of the statute, and no harm is done to the defendants by its form, and I cannot see that they are prejudiced by the form, I think they must be held by the instrument they have executed.

The second and chief ground is, that the bond is in too large an amount. This depends upon the construction to be given to the act of 1854, c. 30. And there is a singular difficulty in construing this statute. The act requires the collector to take a bond for transportation and re-warehousing; and then provides that if the goods are not duly re-warehoused, the collector shall levy and collect "an additional duty of one hundred per cent.," which additional duty shall be secured by said bond. The District Attorney contends that this clause means an additional duty of 100 per cent. on the invoice value of the goods. The bond was framed, the declaration drawn, and the verdict rendered on this theory. The defendants' counsel contends that it means 100 per cent. on the original duty, or, in other words, a second duty of the same amount as the original duty.

Taking this statute alone, we find no antecedent to which to refer this language, except the import duty. The statute makes no allusion to invoice or value, but only to import duty. The per centage must be calculated upon

something. That something must be the original duty, if we confine our view to this act, for the act presents no other subject-matter than the duty.

But on referring to the general tariff act, we find that all duties are ad valorem, that is, such a per centage on the value of the goods. The original duty, then, being 30 per cent. ad valorem, it is argued that the "additional duty of one hundred per cent." must be 100 per cent. ad valorem.

But, in reply, it is said that the act of 1854 is only supplementary to the act of 1846, c. 84, and that it must be construed in subordination to that act. The act of 1846 establishes the warehouse system. It allows of transportation from one warehouse to another, in bond; and provides that when goods are taken out of warehouse for transportation, a transportation bond shall be given, in "double the duties." Under this act, if the goods were not rewarehoused, the utmost the government could recover was "double the duties," and as the bond could be chancered, the court could direct a sum to be paid less than the penalty.

I have made an examination into the regulations of the treasury department, and find the construction of the warehouse acts, and the practice under them, to have been this. When the goods are originally warehoused, a bond is given in double the duties, conditioned to be void if the duties are paid, or if the goods are withdrawn according to law. When goods are withdrawn for transportation, under bond, the condition of the original bond is considered as fulfilled, and it is cancelled. The goods being delivered to the owner, the only security the government has for the original duties is the transportation bond; and this bond, under the act of 1846, was in a penal sum equal to double the duties. If the goods are duly warehoused, the transportation bond is cancelled, and a new warehouse bond given in the same form as the original.

It is said that under the act of 1846, goods were taken out of warehouse as for transportation, on this bond, and never, in fact, re-warehoused, but put into the market, and the government officers collected only the original duty, the bond being treated as, in fact, only a new security for the duty. In this way the importer evaded the payment of cash duties, and obtained a credit until his bond was payable and demanded. This may serve to explain the peremptory requirement in the act of 1854, that the additional duty shall be levied and collected." If the goods are not re-warehoused, the original duty and the additional