define the same land, they formed a virtual estoppel upon the grantees, so far as they were intended to be identical. But if not susceptible of being made identical, then the deed of earliest date must control that of later date.

Railway companies have the power to make and enforce all reasonable regulations in regard to the passengers, and to discriminate between fare paid in the cars, and at the stations, and to remove all persons from their cars, who persist in disregarding such regulations, in any reasonable manner, and proper place, although between stations.

But the place of removing such offenders from the cars, may be defined by statute, and a statutory requirement of existing railways, not to remove any one from the cars, except at a regular station, however much it may embarrass the enforcement of the police of the company, is still binding upon them. And a statute giving railways the power to remove offenders at regular stations, is a virtual prohibition from removing them at other points.

BULL v. BLISS.

Guaranty - Diligence.

The defendant being indebted to plaintiff, transferred to him the note of a third party, with the following guaranty, "I warrant this note good and collectable for two years from date." The defendant left soon after for California, and did not return for three or four years. The maker of the note continued good till near the close of the two years, when he ceased to have any property, by which payment could be enforced. No demand of payment, or notice of nonpayment was made, or given to defendant for a long time after the expiration of the two years, and just before the commencement of the present suit.

Held, that the obligation of the guaranty was, that the maker of the note should remain good, and the note be collectable during the whole time of two years. That it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to take measures to enforce the collection during the two years, or show such utter insolvency, as to render all such efforts clearly of no avail.

But that notice of non-payment, or demand of payment of defendant, were only necessary before bringing suit, as a condition of the guaranty, and not as a matter of diligence.

BARTON v. BURT.

Recognizance-Appeal.

This is a suit upon recognizance for an appeal, the condition of which was substantially, that the appellant should prosecute the appeal to effect, and pay all additional costs, and the accruing rents of the premises in question, until final judgment, in case of failure. Judgment was given against the appellant in the Appellate Court, and exceptions allowed, and the case transferred to the Supreme Court, and execution stayed. This judgment was affirmed in the Supreme Court. The question is whether the conusor is liable for rents while the cause was pending upon exceptions in the Supreme Court.

Held, that the judgment in the Appellate Court is not to be regarded as final, so long as the appellee is not entitled to take

execution.

STREET & BURDITT V. HALL.

Conflict of laws-Negotiable note, when payment.

This is an action for goods sold defendant for the use of one Platt, and which, as between him and the defendant, it was Platt's duty to pay for.

The plaintiffs took Platt's note for the amount of the bill payable at the bank, and gave him a receipt of payment, in such note, describing it. The plaintiffs are merchants in the City of Troy, and the note and receipt were there executed.

Held, that the effect of the receipt must be determined by the law of New York. By that law it does not amount to payment, unless the note was paid at maturity. Nor will it operate as an estoppel upon the plaintiffs, from suing the defendant, as the receipt expresses the mode of payment, and the defendant was bound to know its legal effect, and cannot therefore urge, that it was calculated to impose upon him the belief, that Platt had paid the debt, and thus induced him to relax his efforts to collect it.

Held, also, that such note not being negotiated, and remaining in the power of the party, is no objection to a recovery against defendant, even without surrendering the note.

If the note had been negotiated, it should be surrendered before the party is entitled to execution.

BRAINARD V. CHAMPLAIN TRANSPORTATION COMPANY.

Interest, not recoverable where delay by plaintiffs.

This is an action for wood delivered the defendants, in pursuance of a contract to pay as soon as the same should be measured

and certified by defendants' measurer, which was expected to be done the winter following. The plaintiffs had all their other claims for wood delivered defendants, certified and paid at the usual time. But this claim was overlooked for some three years, and when presented, the plaintiffs claimed interest on the amount from the time when it would have been paid, if properly presented, which the defendants declined to pay, paying into court money to the amount of debt and costs. The case turned upon the question of interest.

Held, that there was no delay or default on the part of defendants, and that they could not be compelled to pay interest. The delay seems to have been wholly owing to the forgetfulness of plaintiffs.

HAYNES v. LASSELL.

Highway, discontinuance of.

Land owners have no such interest in the continuance of a public town highway, as will entitle them to notice and hearing before the selectmen, upon the question of discontinuing such highway. They have only the same kind of interest in the highway, which the public generally have. It may be greater in degree, but of the same quality. In the laying of a road, the land owners have a private interest, as it deprives them of the use of their land. But they have no such interest in the question of its discontinuance.

WATSON V. JACOBS.

Statute of frauds - Debt of another.

This is an action by a tailor, for the price of a coat made for some third party. After the coat was made the plaintiff declined to deliver it until the defendant became responsible for the price, and upon defendant promising to pay plaintiff for the coat, the plaintiff suffered the person originally contracting, "to go out of the country with the coat, released of all liability."

Held, that this imported that the original debtor was released from his liability, and that the defendant thereby became sole debtor, and that his undertaking was not therefore within the statute of frauds.

Addison County. Supreme Court. January Term. 1857.

BOGUE v. BIGELOW.

Deed - Identity of name.

This is ejectment for the original right of Aaron Jordan Bogue, in the township of Kingston, now called Granville. The name as written in the enrolment of the charter, is Aaron I. Boge. There was proof in the case of the change of the orthography of the family name from Boge to Bogue. There was no other name in the charter having any analogy to the present. In the proprietor's records of an early date, soon after the grant, which was in 1781, another proprietor is allowed to pitch a lot, in the name, and for the right of Aaron Jordan Bogue.

Held, that the I and J are so nearly identical, especially in writings of the date of this charter, that the change from one to the other is scarcely sufficient to raise any doubt of identity. And that all doubt is removed in the present case, by the proprietor's records. And also, that when in tracing land titles, the names are identical, that is to be regarded as prima facie evidence of the identity of persons, there being no contrary presumption to encounter it. But in criminal proceedings, the presumption of innocence is such, that where guilt depends upon record proof, some further proof of identity of persons must be given beyond mere identity of names.

HOLDEN v. Durant.

Principal and agent.

Held, that when one takes the note of the principal, executed by the agent, for a matter known to the payee to be without the proper scope of the agent's authority, it will not bind the principal. But if the agent have authority to execute notes on behalf of the principal, and execute a note to one who is ignorant of any want of authority in the particular case, it will ordinarily bind the prin cipal.

SMALL V. HASKINS.

Exceptions.

By the statute of Vermont, passed in 1824, causes in the County Court might pass into the Supreme Court, for revision of any questions of law raised in the trial, and placed upon the record, by allowance of any two judges of the County Court. By the Re

vised Statutes of 1839, all such exceptions in the County Court are required to be allowed, and placed upon record in the clerk's office by the presiding judge at the trial, within thirty days after the rising of the court. The former provision is still pursued in the Revised Statutes.

Held, that the latter provision must control the mode of allowing exceptions, for the purpose of transferring cases to the Supreme Court on motion. We do not decide that two judges, being a majority of the court, although neither presided at the trial, may not enter upon the record questions of law decided at the trial, so as to form the basis of a writ of error. But the statute seems explicit, that all questions raised at the trial, and which are expected to pass to the Supreme Court for revision, on motion, must be certified by the presiding judges.

Rutland County. Supreme Court. February Term, 1857.

RUT. & BUR. RAILROAD CO. v. ADMR. OF WILLIAM SIMSON.

Evidence-Husband and wife.

The statute of Vermont having removed all objections to the competency of witnesses on the ground of interest, or being parties, the wife is a competent witness in a suit where the husband was interested, but has deceased, unless the testimony is in regard to matters of confidence between herself and her husband.

The statute requiring constables to give bonds before entering upon the duties of office, does not render void their official acts before giving bonds. If the town waive the execution of a bond, either temporarily or permanently, the appointment is valid, and their acts are legal, without a compliance with the statute in this particular. And equally when the town suffer them to act in the office without giving bonds.

JONES & DOw v. BRADLEY.

Contract.

In a contract for work and labor, in building a railway, three fourths to be paid in money, and one fourth in railway stock, at par, which was in fact worth but sixty-five per cent., and with the condition, that if the party undertaking the work did not carry it