On the trial of such indictments, it is not necessary to prove that the appointment was made in this Commonwealth, or that it was at a distinct time or place from the fight; and the appointment need not be proved by distinct evidence, but may be inferred from conduct of parties and other circumstances.

J. Brown, for defendant.

J. H. Clifford, (Attorney General,) for Commonwealth.

Norfolk County. October Term, 1856.

Present: THE SAME JUSTICES.

COMMONWEALth v. Jones.

Intoxicating liquors.

An indictment for being a common seller of intoxicating liquor at a town named in this Commonwealth, need not allege that the liquors sold were in the Commonwealth at the time of the sale. G. A. Somerby, for defendant.

J. H. Clifford, (Attorney General,) for Commonwealth.

TREADWELL V. SALISBURY MANUFACTURING Co.

Equity jurisdiction - Trust - Manufacturing corporation.

Of a bill in equity brought by a trustee holding stock in a manufacturing corporation, to obtain the instructions of the court as to his duties in investing the trust fund in case they should sell all their property as they proposed to do, this court has no jurisdiction; because, until such sale, the trustee does not require the advice of the court. Nor can the court on such a bill restrain the corporation from selling all their property, because such an injunction is not properly incidental to the main purpose of the bill, nor necessary to dispose of the case; and, also, because a manufacturing corporation have a right to sell all their property, whenever, in the opinion of the directors, it is no longer for the interest of the corporation and their creditors to continue the business.

R. Fletcher and J. J. Clarke, for plaintiffs.

R. Choate, for defendants.

VINAL V. INHABITANTS OF DORCHESTER.

Way-Town damages.

A town is not liable for damages done to a traveller on a highway by a locomotive engine, run by a railroad corporation, on a track illegally laid over the highway.

W. Brigham, for plaintiff.

A. Churchill, for defendant.

CRAWSHAW v. CITY OF ROXBURY.

Offer of reward.

Independently of St. 1840, c. 75, the inhabitants of towns and city councils of cities are authorized to offer rewards for the apprehension of criminals, and that statute does not limit the amount of reward which may be so offered.

An offer of reward" for the apprehension and conviction of any person who shall set fire to any dwelling-house, barn, or building, within the city of Roxbury, with intent to destroy the same," is not void for ambiguity; and is binding on the city, though originally signed only by the mayor, and not ratified by the city till after the performance of the service for which the reward is claimed. And the person who gives information on which the criminal is arrested, and which has a tendency to produce ultimate conviction, and without which he could not have been convicted, unless he had confessed it, is entitled to the reward.

E. Worthington, for plaintiff.

W. Gaston, for defendant.

JENKINS v. QUINCY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE Co.

Fire insurance.

A policy of insurance issued by a mutual fire insurance company, was expressly made subject to their by-laws, one of which provided, that "unless the applicant for insurance shall make a true representation of the property on which he requests insurance, and of his title and interest therein, and also of all incumbrances and the amount and nature thereof, the policy shall be void." An applicant for insurance represented, in answer to questions, that the premises were owned by him and not incumbered, when in fact he was only a mortgagee. Held, that the policy was void. J. W. May, for plaintiff.

J. J. Clarke and G. White, for defendants.

CHARLES RIVER R. R. Co. v. COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF NORFOLK COUNTY.

Railroad damages.

The Rev. Sts. c. 39, § 58, having provided that "no application to the commissioners to estimate damages" for land or property taken for a railroad, shall be sustained, unless made within three

years from the time of taking the same," a mere filing of an application with the Clerk of the County Commissioners, without bringing it to the notice of the Commissioners, or any action of theirs thereon until the three years have elapsed, will not save the bar of the statute.

S. F. Plimpton, for petitioners.
E. Worthington, for respondents.

CLARK V. WARD.

Declaration.

Where a declaration is inserted in the writ, a new declaration cannot be filed on the return day without leave of court.

LANGMAID V. PUFFER.

Misnomer.

A writ in which the defendant was called Charles L. was actually served on Chase L. Held, that a judgment rendered against the defendant, after allowing Charles to be amended to Chase, was not therefore liable to be reversed on error.

J. J. Clarke, for plaintiff in error.
J. M. Keith, for defendant in error.

BATES v. KEMPTON.

Donatio causa mortis.

A promissory note of a third person may be the subject of a donatio causa mortis, and the donee may maintain an action thereon in the name of the donor's administrator, without previous notice to him, and without tendering him indemnity for costs. And the refusal of the court to order, at the request of said administrator, that the question of ownership between the administrator and the plaintiff should be settled before trial of the principal issue in the case, is no ground of exception by the defendant.

W. Colburn, for defendant.

P. P. Todd, for plaintiff.

Essex County. October Term, 1856.

Present: THE SAME JUSTICES.

COMMONWEALTH v. GARDner.

Intoxicating liquors.

Under an indictment for being a common seller of intoxicating liquor, on a certain day named, and "on divers days since," the proof must be confined to acts done on the day specified, the further allegation being indefinite and uncertain.

J. W. Perry, for defendant.

J. H. Clifford, (Attorney General,) for Commonwealth.

COMMONWEALTH v. GREGORY.

Officer.

It is no ground for arresting judgment in a criminal prosecution for assault, that the officer who served the warrant on the defendant was the person assaulted and the complainant.

J. H. Robinson, for defendant.

J. H. Clifford, (Attorney General,) for Commonwealth.

PORTER v. SHEHAN.
Shell fish.

The right of all the inhabitants of the Commonwealth to take shell-fish below high water mark, authorizes them to take only living fish, and no more of the shells of dead fish, or of the mud in which they are imbedded, than must necessarily be removed in taking the living fish.

S. B. Ives, Jr., for plaintiff.
S. H. Phillips, for defendant.

MCFARLAND v. CHASE.

Tenant at will.

A conveyance of land by the three members of a partnership to a new firm, consisting of themselves and one other, transfers one undivided fourth of the premises to the new partner, as tenant in common with the old partners, and puts an end to an existing lease at will of the estate.

J. W. Perry, for plaintiffs.

S. H. Phillips, for defendants.

ESSEX COUNty v. Ilsley.

County commissioners.

St. 1835, c. 95, (imposing a penalty on counties, towns, and cities, the county commissioners, selectmen, or mayor and aldermen of which shall neglect to erect boards at the corners of roads, for one month after being notified,) being a penal statute, and the duty mentioned therein being a joint duty, a notice to one of the county commissioners, apart from the others, is not sufficient. S. H. Phillips, for plaintiff in review. N. W. Harmon, for defendant in review.

On the trial of an appeal taken by a nephew and heir at law of the testator, from a decree of the Judge of the Probate allowing a

will, statements of the testator, that his nephew neglected him and attempted to poison him, are not admissible in evidence of the truth of the facts stated.

The refusal of the presiding judge, upon the trial of an issue of the sanity of a testator, to allow an expert, who had heard all the testimony, to be asked, " Suppose all the facts stated by the several witnesses to be true, was the testator laboring under an insane delusion, or was he of unsound mind?" is not a subject of exception.

Upon the trial of an issue of the validity of a will, a juror, after the charge, inquired of the presiding judge, if the instrument now produced as the last will were disallowed, who would take the property of the testator, there being evidence in the case that the testator had made an earlier will. But the judge replied that that was wholly immaterial to the issue to be determined by the jury, and should not affect the juror's mind; and refused to allow the juror to state a view which in his mind made it material. Held, that this ruling and refusal were no ground for a new trial.

A verdict, finding that a testator, at the time of executing an instrument offered for probate as a will, was of unsound mind, and was also under undue influence, is not inconsistent.

O. P. Lord and S. B. Ives, Jr., for appellee.
S. H. Phillips, for appellant.

Entelligence and Miscellany.

THE TRIAL OF HUNTINGTON, AND THE LEGAL AND MEDICAL THEORY OF THE DEFENCE.

THIS case has occupied a large share of public attention, from the extraordinary number of forgeries committed by the defendant, and from the novel character of the defence, as applied to an accusation of this nature. We do not doubt the correctness of the verdict of guilty, but we cannot join in the abuse which a large portion of the press saw fit to heap upon the counsel for the defence, whose theory of the defendant's insanity was supported not only by considerable antecedent probability, but by the testimony of physicians of experience. We give, as a matter of curiosity, some of the testimony of the medical witnesses.

Dr. WILLARD PARKER said:

He, (Huntington), seemed to have a mind which operated very differently from the mass of minds; my conclusion was that he was insane, self-preservation is one of the laws of our nature, and he seemed to have